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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE
UNIT 29351
APO AE 09014

AEAGB-CI-S

10 FEB 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, ATTN:
AEAGX-MH, APO AE 09014

SUBJECT: Mandatory Declassification Review

1. References:

- a. Executive Order 12958
- b. DoD Directive 5200.1-R, January 1997
- c. AR 380-5, 28 February 1988

2. UP of references 1 a through c, a mandatory declassification review of the following documents by ODCSINT and ODCSOPS personnel:

a. USAREUR Annual Historical Report for 1954-1955

b. USAREUR Historical Report for 1956-1957

c. USAREUR Historical Report for January 1953 - June 1954

d. Annual USAREUR Historical Report 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958

3. The joint review determined that the documents are authorized for **declassification**. The documents were declassified. Please ensure that all internal paragraph and page markings are obliterated at the earliest possible moment.

4. ODCSINT point of contact is Mr. B. F. Hiller, 370-7574/7088.

Robert J. Thayer
ROBERT J. THAYER
Chief, Counterintelligence Division

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
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
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GENERAL H. I. HODES
Commander in Chief, USAREUR

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FOREWORD

The writing of an annual historical report covering the significant activities of Headquarters, USAREUR, is a current Department of the Army requirement. The preparation of this report is a responsibility of the Chief, Historical Division, USAREUR.

The present report provides a comprehensive account of the varied activities of Headquarters, USAREUR, in FY 1957. It was prepared by the staff of the Current History Branch, Historical Division, from information in headquarters files supplemented by interviews with key staff personnel. The preliminary draft was reviewed by interested staff agencies of USAREUR headquarters.

This report should be particularly useful for briefing purposes and will serve as a handy reference for Department of the Army and USAREUR staff agencies. Information of a higher security classification may be found in the top secret supplement to this report, which is prepared as a separate document with limited distribution.

Recent monographs and special studies published by this Division are listed on the inside cover. These publications can be obtained upon request from the Chief, Historical Division, USAREUR, APO 164.

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CHAPTER 1

Mission and Organization

1. National and International Command Relationships

There were no fundamental changes in the national or international command relationships of the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), during Fiscal Year (FY) 1957 (Chart 1). USAREUR remained the senior Army command in the European theater, constituting one component of the tri-service U.S. European Command (US EUCOM). For purely Army matters the Commander in Chief, USAREUR (CINCUSAREUR), remained responsible to the Department of the Army, and in areas involving two or more services, to the Commander in Chief, US EUCOM (US CINCEUR). Within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), CINCUSAREUR acted as Commander, Central Army Group (COMCENTAG), and most of his staff doubled as peacetime CENTAG headquarters. Most of USAREUR's combat elements were assigned to CENTAG as part of NATO forces.¹

2. USAREUR

a. Missions. The primary mission of the command--maintaining the security and combat readiness of its assigned forces--remained unchanged.² New missions added during FY 1957 were to assume the responsibility for over-all coordination and provision of assistance and consultative service for the introduction of NIKE equipment to NATO forces; to provide troops for construction support to the United States Air Forces, Europe (USAFE); to furnish depot-level support to Military Assistance Program (MAP) activities in the areas for which US CINCEUR and the Commander in Chief,

¹For further details, see USAREUR Hist Div, Ann Hist Rept, Hq USAREUR (U), 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56, (hereafter cited as USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56), pp. 1-2. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

²For a listing of the principal USAREUR missions, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 2-6. SECRET.

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Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) were responsible; to maintain common supplies to the extent that such support was not provided by the Department of State or the host nation, within the framework of existing interservice agreements; and to provide administrative and logistical support to Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) in Portugal, France, the Benelux countries, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Ethiopia, to the Army Military Attache (AMA) in Yugoslavia, and to the Kagnew Station in Eritrea.

CINCUSAREUR previously had been charged with advising US CINCEUR on matters pertaining to the Department of State country plans for the Benelux nations, Spain, and Portugal that provided for the evacuation of U.S. noncombatants for whom the Department was responsible. During FY 1957 the scope of this mission was increased when country plans for France and the Federal Republic of Germany were added.

Certain missions were deleted. CINCUSAREUR, for instance, ceased to represent US CINCEUR in relations with U.S. embassies and agencies of foreign governments. Also, the conducting of personal background investigations for the Department of State in implementation of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 was ended.³

b. Organization. USAREUR continued to be organized into major commands, subordinate commands, and USAREUR units (Chart 2). There was no change in the number of commands, but seven new USAREUR units were added during FY 1957 as follows: The U.S. Army Central Finance and Accounting Office, Heidelberg; the U.S. Army Expenditure Accounts Office, Heidelberg; the U.S. Army Transportation Finance and Accounting Office, Heidelberg; the U.S. Army Element, Armed Forces Institute, Heidelberg; the U.S. Army Element, Armed Forces Institute Depot, Frankfurt; the U.S. Army Claims Office, France; and the U.S. Army Claims Office, Germany.⁴

3. USAREUR Headquarters

There were several organizational and functional changes within USAREUR headquarters during FY 1957;⁵ responsibilities for troop information and education and for public information were realigned, the Finance and Accounting Division was merged with the Office of the

³USAREUR Mission Register, 7 Feb 57. SECRET.

4(1) USAREUR Cir 10-5, 3 May 57, sub: Commands and Units of the United States Army, Europe. (2) USAREUR GO 137, 4 Jun 57. (3) USAREUR GO 260, 11 Dec 56. All UNCLASSIFIED. (4) For the organization of USAREUR in FY 1956, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 8. SECRET.


⁵For the organization of USAREUR headquarters in FY 1956, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 9. SECRET. Key personnel changes within USAREUR headquarters during FY 1957 are noted in the Chronology.

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Chart 1

INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS




*Navy headquarters and naval elements have been omitted to simplify the chart.
 Source: USAREUR Info Bul. No. 5, 8 Mar 57, sub: NATO-Freedom's Shield, p. 15. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Chart 2

ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
30 June 1957



Source: USAREUR Cir 10-5, 3 May 57, sub: Organization and Functions, Command and Units of the United States Army, Europe. UNCLASSIFIED. Modifications of this circular are described in the textual material.

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Comptroller, the Air Defense Division was established, and some internal command relationships were changed (Chart 3).

a. Realignment of Responsibility for Troop Information and Education and for Public Information. In Washington the Department of the Army shifted staff responsibility for the educational development of military personnel from the Chief of Information to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; the Chief of Information--whose functions included troop and public information--was placed directly under the Chief of Staff. Subordinate and overseas commands were directed to conform to this new organizational structure.⁶

In compliance with this directive USAREUR headquarters abolished the Armed Forces Information and Education Division as of 1 November 1956 and at the same time redesignated the Public Information Division as the Information Division.⁷ The latter was given both troop and public information functions, while the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, assumed responsibility for troop education.⁸

b. Merger of the Finance and Accounting Division with the Office of the Comptroller. On 1 January 1957 the Finance and Accounting Division was discontinued and its functions were assumed by the Finance and Accounting Office, which was placed within the Office of the Comptroller.⁹ This reorganization conformed with Army Regulations requiring the finance and accounting officer at each level of command to be under the direct supervision and control of the Comptroller.¹⁰

c. Establishment of the Air Defense Division. Because of the many technical, operational, and interservice problems connected with the employment of NIKE guided missiles for air defense, the Department of the Army had approved a USAREUR request that a senior officer with current knowledge in the guided missile field be assigned to the command.¹¹

⁶DA Cir 355-6, 26 Oct 56, sub: Troop Information. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷USAREUR GO 203, 12 Oct 56. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁸DF, C/USAREUR Info Div to COFS, 5 Mar 57, sub: Implementation of Department of the Army Circular 355-6. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 TI&E (1957).

⁹(1) USAREUR GO 265, 19 Dec 56. (2) USAREUR TD 77-7890-03, 20 Dec 56. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰Comment 2, USAREUR Compt to COFS, 23 Nov 56, sub: Merger of Finance and Accounting Division with Office of the Comptroller. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 SD (1956).

¹¹USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 186-87. SECRET.

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Upon his arrival in Europe, Maj. Gen. H. Hewett was designated the USAREUR Air Defense Coordinator¹² and was placed in charge of the newly formed Air Defense Coordination Center. This center was responsible for preparing, coordinating, and presenting air defense studies and NIKE deployment plans for the USAREUR area of responsibility.¹³

In March 1957 CINCUSAREUR was assigned primary responsibility for the over-all coordination of the program under which NIKE units were to be provided to NATO countries, to include technical assistance and consultative service.¹⁴ This new responsibility was delegated to the chief of the expanded Air Defense Coordination Center, which was redesignated as the Air Defense Division on 20 April 1957.¹⁵ Other responsibilities of this division were to advise CINCUSAREUR and headquarters staff agencies on air defense matters; to exercise staff supervision over the program concerned with the selection, acquisition, and development of U.S. NIKE sites in Central Europe; and to coordinate USAREUR and CENTAG defense planning and the technical aspects of air defense operations.¹⁶

d. Changes in Some Internal Command Relationships. In early 1957 the relationship of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, with the various technical services was redefined to coincide with the organizational structure introduced by the Department of the Army. There, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics exercised not only staff supervision but also control over the various technical services.¹⁷

This shift, in turn, led to changes in the command relationships of five special staff divisions. The Civil Affairs and Historical Divisions were placed under the direct supervision and control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, while the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, assumed similar responsibilities for the Special Activities and Labor Service Divisions. These special staff divisions had previously reported directly to the Chief of Staff. Only the Headquarters Commandant and the Air Defense, Inspector General, Information, and Judge Advocate Divisions

¹²USAREUR GO 135, 3 Aug 56. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹³USAREUR GO 122, 18 Jul 56. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

¹⁴Ltr, US EUCOM to CINCUSAREUR et. al., 6 Mar 57, sub: Letter of Instructions, NIKE Missiles for NATO Countries (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

¹⁵USAREUR GO 80, 17 Apr 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁶USAREUR Air Def Div Memo 1, 20 Apr 57, sub: Organization and Functions of the Air Defense Division, p. 2. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. For a detailed discussion of the operations of this division, see Chapter 6.

¹⁷DF, USAREUR SGS to Compt, 23 Jan 57, sub: Evaluation of USAREUR Staff Structure. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 TI&E (1957).


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Chart 3

ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

30 June 1957



Source: USAREUR Organization Charts, 15 May and 15 Jul 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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remained under the direct control of the Chief of Staff.¹⁸

4. Seventh Army

There were no significant changes in the missions of Seventh Army during FY 1957. The command was charged with implementing existing emergency plans, if necessary, and securing the border separating the Federal Republic of Germany from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zone of Germany.¹⁹

Directly subordinate to Seventh Army were V and VII Corps--composed of 5 divisions (2 armored, 2 infantry, and 1 airborne)--the 34th AAA Brigade, and various army troops. On 21 August 1956 the Public Information, Troop Information, and Civil Affairs Sections of Seventh Army headquarters were combined into a Public Affairs Section, thus unifying all activities concerned with German-American relations. At the same time the troop education function was transferred from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.²⁰

5. The U.S. Army Communications Zone, Europe (USACOMZEUR)

USACOMZEUR²¹ continued to maintain and operate a line of communications across France capable of supporting USAREUR combat units.²² The responsibility for certain logistical functions within Germany was transferred to USACOMZEUR during FY 1957²³ when the command was charged with providing or arranging for logistical support--less support provided by the area commands--for all USAREUR units, installations, and activities.²⁴

According to new criteria Orleans Installation (ORIN), Advance Section (ADSEC), Base Section (BASEC), and the Seine Area Command were designated as major subordinate commands. Similarly, the following six subordinate commands were established: The U.S. Army Petroleum

¹⁸USAREUR Stf Memo 10-180-2, 1 Apr 57, sub: Staff Responsibilities and Relationships Within Headquarters, USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁹For further details, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 14-15. SECRET.

²⁰Interv, Mr. J. Borrer, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. J. Kelly, Seventh Army Hist Sec, 10 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

²¹Redesignated from U.S. Army, Europe, Communications Zone (USAREUR COMZ), by USAREUR GO 1, 1 Jan 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

²²For details, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 16-17. SECRET.

²³For details of this transfer, see Chapter 8.

²⁴USAREUR ltr, 22 Mar 57, sub: Mission and Authority of the Commanding General, United States Army Communications Zone, Europe (U). CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1957).

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Distribution Command, Europe; the 9th Hospital Center; the 34th General Hospital; the 37th Transportation Highway Transport Command; the 53d Ordnance Group; and the U.S. Army Aerial Support Center. In addition, a number of subordinate units that supported USACOMZEUR headquarters were under the operational control of USACOMZEUR staff divisions.

Within USACOMZEUR headquarters the only significant changes were the redesignation of the Public Information Division as the Information Division and the redesignation of the Finance and Accounting Division as the Finance and Accounting Office, which was incorporated into the Comptroller Division.²⁵

6. Subordinate Commands

a. 32d AAA Brigade. In the early part of 1957 the 32d AAA Brigade's mission--defending certain Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases in the United Kingdom with Skysweeper units--was abolished. At the same time USAREUR headquarter planned to relieve Seventh Army of the responsibility for air defense in the rear area of the combat zone (west of the Rhine River).²⁶ Accordingly, the brigade, less its units, was transferred to Germany to provide this defense, but by the end of the fiscal year it had not been assigned an operational mission and consisted only of a headquarters and headquarters battery.²⁷

b. Berlin Command. The Commanding General of the Berlin Command was responsible for the U.S. Sector of Berlin. He was charged with planning and supervising military action to maintain law and order and to support U.S. policy in Berlin. In the event of an emergency, he was responsible for the security of U.S. troops and other designated personnel.²⁸ There were no significant changes in either the mission or organization of the command during FY 1957.

c. U.S. Army Port of Embarkation, Bremerhaven (USAPEB). During FY 1957 USAPEB²⁹ was charged with the command, administration, and technical supervision of subports at Rotterdam, Holland, and Mannheim, Germany. These subports were established to reduce expenses by moving certain cargo from and to central Germany on the Rhine River by barge.

²⁵ Incl 1, to ltr, USACOMZEUR to USAREUR Hist Div, 17 Jul 57, sub: Request for Information. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

²⁶ See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion.

²⁷ Memo, Lt Col J. F. Freund, C/USAREUR Air Def Div Plans & Opns Br, to C/Hist Div, 31 Aug 57, sub: 32d AAA Brigade. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

²⁸ For further details on missions, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 21. SECRET.

²⁹ Redesignated from Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation by USAREUR GO 1, 1 Jan 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Several organizational changes were also effected. Replacing the Billeting Office, the Accommodations Division was charged with billeting and central clearance operations, as well as processing of passports, ration cards, and NEO control cards. Procurement activities were taken from the logistics (S-4) section and made the responsibility of a separate organizational division under the staff supervision of the logistics officer. In addition, a consolidated maintenance shop was established and placed under the technical supervision of the Ordnance Officer.³⁰

d. Area Commands. The four area commands (Northern, Western, Headquarters, and Southern) continued to provide services and supplies to units and individuals, including dependents, located in their respective areas. There were no significant changes in the organization of the area commands during FY 1957.³¹

e. Special Troops, Hq USAREUR. This organization continued to provide security, transportation, supplies, utilities, and other services for USAREUR headquarters. Whereas previously enlisted personnel on duty with various USAREUR staff divisions had been assigned to Special Troops and attached to their respective staff divisions, in FY 1957 these personnel were assigned to the staff divisions and attached to Special Troops. Special Troops consisted of 20 assigned and 12 attached units.³²

f. 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group. The 66th Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) Group continued to collect information of a counter-subversive and counterespionage nature. It also maintained the USAREUR Central Registry, and performed other collection or investigative duties assigned by the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. The group consisted of a headquarters with four regional offices, plus a number of field offices and resident agencies. During the current reporting period there was no change in the number of regions, but the jurisdiction and boundaries of some field offices and resident agencies were modified.³³

³⁰Incl 1, to 1st Ind, USAPEB to USAREUR Hist Div, 11 Jul 57, to ltr, USAREUR Hist Div to USAPEB, 2 May 57, sub: Request for Information. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

³¹(1) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 20. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED). (2) 1st Ind, HACOM to USAREUR Hist Div, 8 Jul 57, to ltr, USAREUR Hist Div to HACOM, 2 May 57, sub: Request for Information. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Ltr, WACOM to USAREUR Hist Div, 9 Jul 57, sub: Historical Information. UNCLASSIFIED. (4) Ltr, SACOM to USAREUR Hist Div, 8 Jul 57, sub: Requested Information. UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

³²Interv, Mr. Borrer with CWO W. R. McKewen, USAREUR Special Troops, 6 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

³³(1) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 19. SECRET. (2) Ltr, 66th CIC Gp to USAREUR Hist Div, 13 Jul 57, sub: Request for Information (U). CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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g. 513th Military Intelligence Group. The primary mission of collecting intelligence information by overt means remained unchanged in FY 1957. The group was responsible to the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and was charged with the administrative control of all assigned and attached units, providing military intelligence logistical support to these units and to other intelligence units as required.

The operational control of the U.S. Army Interrogation Center was shifted from the group to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the 1st Military Censorship Detachment was reassigned to the 66th CIC Group. New units assigned to the 513th Military Intelligence Group included 2 medical detachments (intelligence), 3 chemical detachments (intelligence), the U.S. Army Quartermaster Technical Intelligence Detachment, and a transportation detachment (technical intelligence). During FY 1957 the 275th Chemical Detachment (technical intelligence) was inactivated.³⁴

h. The U.S. Army Intelligence, Military Police, and Special Weapons School, Europe. This school³⁵ continued to provide instruction to military personnel in intelligence, counterintelligence, special weapons, military police activities, and related subjects. There were no basic changes in either the mission or organization during FY 1957.³⁶

i. USAREUR Class II Commands. Eleven of the 12 class II commands were abolished during the current reporting period.³⁷ The transfer of certain operations of the various technical services to USACOMZEUR obviated the need for technical service class II commands, and all but the Signal Command were abolished. Since the administrative class II commands were relatively minor in importance, they were similarly abolished.³⁸

³⁴(1) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 25. SECRET. (2) 1st Ind, 513th MI Gp to USAREUR Hist Div, 2 Jul 57, to ltr, USAREUR Hist Div to 513th MI Gp, 2 May 57, sub: Request for Information. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

³⁵Redesignated by USAREUR GO's 260, 11 Dec 56; and 1, 1 Jan 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

³⁶(1) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 23. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED). (2) Interv, Mr. Borrer with Maj K. M. Stewart, USAREUR G3 Tng Br, 16 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

³⁷For details concerning the establishment of these commands, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 17-18. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

³⁸Interv, Mr. Borrer with Lt Col R. P. Hatcher, USAREUR G3 Opns Br, 16 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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7. USAREUR Units

a. The U.S. Army Dependents' Education Group, Karlsruhe. This organization³⁹ continued to provide educational facilities for dependent children of Department of Defense personnel in Germany and France,⁴⁰ operating 91 elementary and 15 high schools with a combined enrollment of over 35,000 pupils.⁴¹

b. U.S. Army Element, U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany. This liaison mission,⁴² established in 1947 by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, was the only direct contact between the U.S. Army and the military forces of the U.S.S.R. in East Germany.⁴³ The mission continued to assist U.S. agencies dealing with the Soviet headquarters, to follow up Soviet execution of quadripartite agreements, and to report to USAREUR headquarters any failure on the part of the Soviets to enforce such agreements.⁴⁴

c. Office, U.S. Commander, Berlin (USCOB). This organization⁴⁵ remained responsible for supervising all U.S. military and political activities in Berlin. It had been established originally to coordinate all U.S. agencies in West Berlin so as to present a unified U.S. position at negotiations with the other occupying powers.⁴⁶

d. U.S. Army Central Finance and Accounting Office, Heidelberg. This office was responsible for central funding operations, maintaining fiscal records, paying all military and civilian personnel assigned to USAREUR headquarters, assuring payment of MDAP-OSP contracts, and controlling the funds for German Training Assistance Group operations. The funding operations extended over Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. Finally, the office was responsible for receiving and dispatching class "E" and "Q" allotments and pay checks for retired military personnel

³⁹ Redesignated by USAREUR GO's 260, 11 Dec 56; and 1, 1 Jan 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴⁰ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 23. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

⁴¹ USAREUR Sch Enrollment Rept, 7 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In U.S. Army Depns' Educ Gp, Karlsruhe, files.

⁴² Redesignated by USAREUR GO's 260, 11 Dec 56; and 1, 1 Jan 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴³ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 24. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

⁴⁴ USAREUR TD 77-7893, 1 Jan 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴⁵ Redesignated from Office of the U.S. Commander, Berlin, 7791 Army Unit, by USAREUR GO's 260, 11 Dec 56; and 1, 1 Jan 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴⁶ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 24. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

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living in Germany.⁴⁷

e. U.S. Army Expenditure Accounts Office, Heidelberg. This USAREUR unit performed the accounts office functions for US EUCOM, USAREUR, USACOMZEUR, and Trieste.⁴⁸

f. U.S. Army Transportation Finance and Accounting Office, Heidelberg. This office reported on the status of funds, examined transportation audit and voucher documents, disbursed and accounted for government funds, collected reimbursable transportation costs, and reviewed and analyzed transportation rates and costs in connection with transportation furnished to U.S. forces in Europe.⁴⁹

g. U.S. Army Element, Armed Forces Institute, Heidelberg, and U.S. Army Element, Armed Forces Institute Depot, Frankfurt. These USAREUR units⁵⁰ were established during FY 1957. The institute in Heidelberg operated the United States Armed Forces Institute (USAFI), Europe, including the administration, registration, and testing service. Although the depot at Frankfurt was part of the USAFI operation, it was established as a separate unit because of the physical separation from Heidelberg and the resulting difference in APO numbers.⁵¹

h. U.S. Army Claims Office, France, and U.S. Army Claims Office, Germany. During FY 1957 the U.S. Claims Office Team, 7724th AU, was divided into two segments--the U.S. Army Claims Office, France,⁵² and the U.S. Army Claims Office, Germany. The former processed claims in favor of and against the U.S. Government arising in France, while the latter had similar responsibilities for Germany, Belgium, and Austria.⁵³

⁴⁷(1) USAREUR TD 77-7752-01, 15 May 57. (2) Fonecon, Mr. Borrer with Maj W. L. Packett, CO, U.S. Army Cen Fin & Acct Off, Heidelberg, 18 Sep 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴⁸Fonecon, Mr. Borrer with Capt C. C. Semple, CO, U.S. Army Expenditure Accts Off, Heidelberg, 19 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED. Certain residual financial matters pertaining to Trieste were handled by this office.

⁴⁹(1) USAREUR TD 77-7752-03, 1 Jan 57. (2) Fonecon, Mr. Borrer with Mr. C. S. Brooks, U.S. Army Trans Fin & Acct Off, Heidelberg, 18 Sep 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵⁰Redesignated by USAREUR GO 260, 11 Dec 56. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵¹(1) USAREUR TD 77-7714-01, 1 Nov 56. (2) USAREUR TD 77-7714-02, 1 Nov 56. (3) Fonecon, Mr. Borrer with Mr. G. L. Gates, U.S. Army Element, Armed Forces Institute, Heidelberg, 13 Sep 57. All UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵²Redesignated from U.S. Claims Office, Paris, by USAREUR GO 137, 4 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵³(1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR TD 77-7724, 1 Feb 57. (3) USAREUR TD 77-7734, 15 Feb 57. All UNCLASSIFIED.

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CHAPTER 2

Comptroller Activities

Section I: Financial Management Problems

In recent years the Army's financial management has been studied intensively by the Army itself as well as by individuals and groups from congressional committees, the General Accounting Office, the executive branch, and the nation's business and industry.

As early as 1949 the first Hoover Commission had reported a need for improving financial management in the Department of Defense. This report had partly motivated the passage of Public Law 216 by the 81st Congress--a law that required, among other things, that all supply transactions in the military establishment be accounted for in dollar value as well as by quantity of items (financial inventory accounting); that procurement of supplies be financed under a revolving fund (stock funds); and that budget estimates be prepared to show cost of performance of programs and activities (cost of performance budget). In compliance with this law, and based on further studies conducted during 1950-53, the Army developed its Financial Management Plan.¹ This plan complied with pertinent legislation and provided for the development of a completely integrated budgeting, accounting, and financial reporting system, which included among its elements stock and consumer funding, integrated accounting, financial reporting, and internal auditing.²

¹USAREUR Memo 355-20-30, 19 Feb 57, sub: Troop Information, Officer's Call--The Army Command Management System, pp. 5-6. UNCLASSIFIED.

²AR 37-5, 21 Aug 53, sub: Financial Management Plan. UNCLASSIFIED.

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8. The Army Command Management System

The need for combining these functions into a single management process that could be related to the Army Program System led to the introduction of the Army Command Management System (ACMS) in the United States during 1955-56.³ The basic principle of the new system was that a commander would be assigned a mission (program), given from the same authority the means (funds and manpower) to carry out that mission without unnecessary restrictions, and made responsible to the same superior for the performance of the mission. The integration of programming and budgeting would facilitate planning both workload and resource requirements, while the integration of accounting, performance analysis, and manpower utilization reporting methods would permit the evaluation of actual accomplishments and use of resources in relation to the original program.⁴

a. The Department of the Army Integrated Structure. As a first step the Department of the Army had promulgated a uniform classification system that provided standard terminology, definitions, and work units for all Army activities. This so-called Integrated Structure was to be used for programming, budgeting, accounting, performance analysis, and manpower allocation and control. It made possible the correlation of data concerning these various activities and provided a basis for an integrated reporting system that could serve multiple purposes. The new structure was not to be applied immediately, but would, rather, be phased into use in accordance with the requirements peculiar to each of the various activities it was designed to cover. A code number was assigned to each activity of the Army Primary Programs, the code being based on the budget code so that an immediate relationship between budget and program matters was established, as required under the Army Command Management System.⁵

b. Changes in the Programming System. The USAREUR program procedures remained unchanged except for minor modifications in terminology effected to adjust the subjects and numbers of the USAREUR command programs to their counterparts in the FY 1957 Department of the Army primary programs. In addition, the following changes of program director assignments were made: programs 4E, Military History, and 4G, Civil Affairs, were assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, as program director; programs 10A, Administrative Services, and 10B, Protective Services, were assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1; program 10D, Information and Education, was deleted and the former programs 10E,

³USAREUR Compt Bul, Vol. IX, No. 2, 15 Jun 57, p. 7. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴USAREUR Memo 1-70-2, 2 May 57, sub: Administration, Army Command Management System. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵AR 1-11, 14 Apr 55, sub: Department of the Army Integrated Structure. UNCLASSIFIED.

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F, and G, redesignated as programs 10D, E, and F for FY 1958.⁶

In anticipation of the changes in the programming system that would be caused by the introduction of the ACMS, the new USAREUR Manual 11-15 defined the procedures for the preparation of the FY 1959 program-budget cycle; its provisions, however, did not become applicable during FY 1957, except for planning actions.⁷

c. The Budget Structure. In July 1955 a simplified budget program structure that would meet ACMS requirements had been proposed by the Department of the Army for the Maintenance and Operation (M&O) appropriation.⁸ The modified version of this structure that USAREUR adopted on 1 July 1956 reduced the number of budget programs from 15 to 12. This was, however, merely an interim procedure leading to a full revision of the budget structure in FY 1958, when there would be only eight budget programs. In FY 1958 installation support funds were to be an integral part of the budget programs pertaining to the missions that those funds would support. As shown below, the FY 1957 structure was a transitional step from the FY 1956 budget to the structure planned for FY 1958.⁹

| <u>FY 1956 Programs</u> | <u>FY 1957 Programs</u> |
|---|--|
| 2000 Command and Management | 2000 Command and Management |
| 2100 Evaluation System | 2100 Evaluation System |
| 2200 Training | 2200 Tactical Forces and Training Activities |
| 2300 Supplies and Minor Equipment | 2400 Procurement and Transportation Operations |
| 2400 Procurement Operations | 2500 Supply Distribution and Maintenance |
| 2500 Supply Distribution and Maintenance | 2600 Army Reserve and ROTC |
| 2600 Army Reserve and ROTC | 2700 Joint Projects |
| 2700 Joint Projects | 3000 Army-wide Services (Administration) |
| 2900 Other Operational Activities | 3100 Army-wide Services (Logistics) |
| 3000 Army-wide Services (Administration) | 3200 Army-wide Services (Finance and Audit) |
| 3100 Army-wide Services (Logistics) | 3300 Medical Care |
| 3200 Army-wide Services (Finance and Audit) | 3500 Operation and Maintenance of Facilities |
| 3300 Medical Care | |
| 3800 Installation Support (Administration) | |
| 3900 Installation Support (Logistics) | |

⁶Change 1, 21 May 57, to USAREUR Cir 11-5, 16 Aug 55, sub: USAREUR Command Program System. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷USAREUR Manual 11-15, 28 May 57, sub: USAREUR Program System. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁸Presentation to VCOFSA and others, 28 Jul 55, sub: Relationship of the Primary Program to the Proposed M&O Budget Structure, cited in USAREUR Compt Bul, Vol. IX, No. 1, 15 Mar 57, pp. 51-52. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁹USAREUR Compt Bul, Vol. IX, No. 1, 15 Mar 57, p. 96. UNCLASSIFIED.

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The support funds of the four abolished programs, as well as the support funds that would have been included in programs 2500, 3000, 3100, 3200, and 3300 were prorated among 10 of the remaining programs. Program 3500 contained no funds, having been established for administrative purposes only; costs of all support activities were charged to this program to simplify accounting procedures. At the end of each month the charges so gathered were distributed to the other 10 programs on a percentage basis, and obligations were made against the funds of the programs that had benefited from the support rendered.

The benefits derived from the interim budget structure were three-fold: the number of programs was reduced and greater flexibility in the use of funds was obtained by reducing the number of funding limitations imposed; installation support costs were charged to the programs benefiting from the support, thus providing a more accurate indication of the actual cost of a given mission; and program schedules were more closely related to the resources available, thus contributing to the integration of budget and program matters.

The major drawback to the system was that the use of Program 3500 imposed an additional workload on the command's accounting personnel. The adoption of the completely revised budget structure in FY 1958 was expected to eliminate this problem.¹⁰

d. Preparations for the Implementation of the Class I Command Management System. The most general application of the Army Command Management System in the continental United States was at the installation level under the specific designation of Class I Command Management System. Since no exact counterparts to the stateside installations existed in Europe, USAREUR considered the area commands, or in some cases the subarea command--later redesignated garrisons--as the most suitable operating agencies for ACMS in West Germany. Accordingly, on 19 July 1956 the USAREUR Field Assistance Team (UFAT)¹¹ was assigned the project of

¹⁰(1) AR 35-217, Change 1, 5 Jun 56, sub: Army Fiscal Code, General Appropriations and Miscellaneous Accounts--Fiscal Year 1957. (2) AR 35-316, 15 Jun 56, sub: Funding and Accounting for Operation and Maintenance of Facilities. (3) Ltr, VCOFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Jul 56, no sub. In USAREUR SGS 100 (1956), Item 6. (4) Interv, Mr. B. H. Siemon, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. E. M. Welch, USAREUR Off of Compt Acct Policy Br, 12 Aug 57. All UNCLASSIFIED. (5) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 29. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED). (6) Annex A, 27 Nov 56, sub: Streamlining Our Financial Management System, to USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 29, 28 Nov 56. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

¹¹For details on the formation and early activities of UFAT, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 35-37. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

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determining whether the principles and procedures of the Class I Command Management System were applicable to the area commands. A project group, consisting of representatives from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, the Office of the Comptroller, and the U.S. General Accounting Office, surveyed the existing financial management activities of the Berlin, Western Area, and Southern Area Commands as well as the Kaiserslautern and Stuttgart Subarea headquarters. These surveys revealed, among other things, that:

(1) The technical service functions of the commands surveyed were not performed in a uniform manner.

(2) Programming conducted at the area command level was based on USAREUR guidance, and the subarea commands performed no programming functions. This procedure was unsatisfactory, since decentralization was essential for a properly functioning command management system.

(3) The budget procedures of the area commands did not conform to those prescribed under ACMS. The Budget Execution Plans (BEP) prepared at the area command level were not directly related to the programs.

(4) Approximately 60 percent of the operations surveyed were already covered by some form of cost accounting by which costs were reported on an obligation and expenditure basis. These cost accounting systems could be integrated into ACMS with some modifications.

(5) Approximately 40 percent of the average command's activities were outside the technical service areas and would require costing by the finance and accounting offices under ACMS. To accomplish this, existing journals would have to be modified, and additional ledgers and journals would have to be used.

On the basis of these findings UFAT concluded that the Class I Command Management System could be introduced without changing the existing command structure and recommended that the system be tested in one area command in order to develop and refine the procedures necessary for full implementation at a later date.¹² The Headquarters Area Command (HACOM) was selected as the test area in which UFAT was directed to introduce the Class I Command Management System.

(1) Preliminary Steps. A UFAT project group was formed by representatives of the U.S. General Accounting Office, the Office of the Comptroller, and the Finance and Accounting Office. After a preliminary orientation, a HACOM working group was formed to assist the UFAT group

¹²(1) Interv, Mr. Siemon with Capt G. P. Mooney, USAREUR Off of Compt Acct Policy Br, 16 Jul 57. (2) UFAT Proj Gp Rept, Proj Asg No. 11, 1 Oct 56. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

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in conducting a detailed study of existing procedures. Each organizational element of HACOM was studied to determine the nature of its accounting and reporting system; the number of man-hours expended in program, budget, performance analysis, and cost accounting activities; the procedures used in collecting, recording, and reporting data concerning these four activities; the number and location of European Command Property (ECP) accounts and the internal procedures and monthly workload of these; and the extent of participation in program and budget formulation. On the basis of this information the UFAT group drew up plans for the implementation of the system.

(2) Development of Command Management Inventory Accounting.

One of the major problems facing the project group was to devise a system for the financial control of operating stocks. Since the property accounts were not operated under financial inventory accounting procedures, the dollar value of the inventories in those accounts had to be established and means had to be found for costing the issues of stocks to operating elements. Since the financial inventory accounting system in use in the United States was considered too complicated for application in European property accounts, the UFAT group developed the Command Management Inventory Accounting (CMIA) system for use with station-type property accounts.

The CMIA procedures were as follows: After a beginning inventory dollar value had been established for each property account, the area command or garrison finance and accounting officer recorded that amount as the opening entry in his control ledger. All documents affecting the account, such as receipts, turn-ins, issues, adjustments, etc., were priced; the accountable officer kept increase and decrease journals that reflected monthly opening inventories, all changes thereto, and monthly closing inventories. At the end of the month this information was forwarded to the appropriate finance and accounting office for posting to control accounts. In addition, the cost of supplies issued to each customer was furnished to the finance and accounting office and to the area or garrison commander, thus providing a means of identifying the cost of the supplies used by each consumer as well as a method of securing financial control of property account inventories.

After being tested in one property account during the months of December 1956 and January 1957, the inventory accounting system was applied to all other property accounts in HACOM during the following months.¹³

¹³(1) UFAT Proj Asg, No. 11a, 2 Oct 56. (2) USAREUR Compt Bul, 15 Mar 57, cited above, pp. 63-64, 94-95. (3) Interv, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col J. Bisbing, USAREUR Off of Compt Mgt Svcs Br, 25 Jul 57. All UNCLASSIFIED.

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(3) Publication of the USAREUR ACMS Manuals. Having developed methods for the implementation of the Class I Command Management System, the working group prepared a general manual and a specialized one for finance and accounting offices, thus providing essential orientation and training material.¹⁴ By 1 May 1957 the training phase was completed and the Class I Command Management System was introduced on a test basis.

e. The Depot Command Management System. Among the UFAT projects undertaken during the last quarter of FY 1956 had been the testing of a depot cost accounting system that would fulfill ACMS requirements and could be adjusted to the local situation.¹⁵ The tests made in two depots carried over into the first quarter of FY 1957, and at the end of that 6-month period the Depot Command Management System (DCMS) was adopted for use at all USAREUR depots as another element of ACMS.¹⁶ Meanwhile USAREUR COMZ was assigned the responsibility for introducing the new system in the depots.¹⁷ Accordingly, COMZ headquarters formed a team--similar to the UFAT team--that established the DCMS in five depots while training ADSEC and BASEC teams in the pertinent procedures. Beginning in January 1957 the ADSEC and BASEC teams introduced the DCMS in the depots under their jurisdiction, and by 30 June the system was applied in all but one of the USAREUR depots.

COMZ also developed a chart of accounts that assigned the same account numbers, titles, and descriptions to the accounts used in both the cost accounting and performance analysis systems, thus completely integrating the two. The chart conformed to the Department of the Army Interim Management Structure for FY 1958, which replaced the Department of the Army Integrated Structure that had been developed in 1955. Thus cost and performance data were directly related to the corresponding program and budget items.¹⁸

f. Preparations for Further Extension. Since USAREUR had to apply ACMS fully by 1 January 1958, and a minimum of three months would be required to accumulate sufficient data upon which to base the FY 1959 budget submission, the area commands and USACOMZEUR were directed to

¹⁴ USAREUR Manuals, Class I Command Management System, and Class I Command Management System Manual for Finance and Accounting Offices, both 15 Jan 57. Copies in USAREUR Off of Compt Acct Policy Br. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁵ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 35-37. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

¹⁶ Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COA, 19 Oct 56, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 320.4 (1956).

¹⁷ Wkly Sum of Maj Actions Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Off of COFS, 1 Aug 56. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

¹⁸ (1) USAREUR Compt Bul, 15 Mar 57, cited above, pp. 44, 77-78.
(2) Interv, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col Bisbing, cited above. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

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initiate cost and performance reporting by 1 October 1957. To assist them in carrying out this directive, a UFAT team visited these commands during May, June, and July 1957 and oriented key personnel in the procedures developed during the HACOM and COMZ tests.¹⁹

9. Changes in Funding Procedures

a. Modification of USAREUR Funding Channels. As a general operating agency (GOA), USAREUR headquarters had received an allocation of funds from the Department of the Army during FY 1956. USAREUR had broken down this allocation and allotted funds to COMZ headquarters and the area commands, which, in turn, had suballotted to their subordinate commands. In the case of COMZ headquarters this system was impractical because under pertinent regulations, after a suballotment had been made to ADSEC or BASEC, these headquarters could not further suballot funds to the various depot finance and accounting offices. Thus the basic tenet of ACMS, that a commander be permitted to accomplish his mission without unnecessary restrictions, could not be applied at the depot level.²⁰

This problem was eliminated when USAREUR headquarters was established as a special operating agency (SOA) with the authority to suballocate funds. Simultaneously USAREUR COMZ headquarters was authorized to allot funds as a general operating agency. This greatly simplified procedures by permitting funding channels to follow command channels as required under ACMS. As SOA, USAREUR headquarters received the Department of the Army allocation and then suballocated these funds to itself, in its role of GOA, and to USAREUR COMZ headquarters. The two general operating agencies then allotted funds to the area commands in Germany and to the section headquarters in France, respectively. The area commands and section headquarters, in turn, suballotted to their respective subarea commands and depots, thus making the funds available to the commanders actually using them.²¹

b. Funding of Military Payrolls. During FY 1957 the Office of the Comptroller wanted to improve the methods used for funding the command's

¹⁹(1) USAREUR Memo 1-70-2, 2 May 57, cited above. (2) Sum Sheet, USAREUR Compt, 13 Jun 57, sub: Establishment of Army Command Management System Within USAREUR. In USAREUR SGS 337/1, Jun 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Rev of USAREUR Comd Programs, FY 57, 3d Qtr, p. 6. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

²⁰Speech by Brig Gen R. Hackett, USAREUR Compt, before the Finance Conference, 17 May 56, quoted in USAREUR Compt Bul, Vol. VIII, No. 2, 15 Jun 56, pp. 26-32. UNCLASSIFIED.

²¹(1) Cable DA-428536, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Jun 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 100 (1956), Item 023. (2) Annex A, 27 Nov 56, sub: Streamlining Our Financial Management System, to USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 29, 28 Nov 56. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

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military disbursing offices. The existing procedures were based on 1953 agreements between the Treasury Department and the overseas civilian banking agencies--the American Express Company, and the Chase-Manhattan Bank.²² Under the terms of these agreements the civilian banks acted as the funding channels²³ for the USAREUR disbursing offices. After considering the relative merits of the existing system and of an alternate method by which disbursing offices would be funded through military channels, USAREUR asked the Department of the Army to authorize military funding.²⁴

First, military funding channels would provide greater control over currency circulation. Moreover, since military funding channels would have to be used under emergency conditions, their timely adoption would facilitate wartime readjustments.

Of even greater import, however, was the question of costs to the United States Government. Since the military payment certificates (MPC's) and Deutsche Marks (DM)--representing call money held by the banks for the military disbursing offices--constituted credits that these banks were unable to use for purposes of their own, the 1953 agreements required the U.S. Army to maintain large static accounts with the banks. These were actual dollar accounts that enabled the banks to invest sums equivalent to the credit established by their MPC and Deutsche Marks holdings. In FY 1957 the balances in these accounts averaged \$41 million and DM 43.5 million (over \$10.3 million). This represented more than \$51 million in funds that had to be borrowed by the government and deposited with the banks. At a rate of 3 percent or more, the interest on the government bonds issued to cover this Federal debt cost over \$1.5 million annually, or more than \$4,200 per day.

Under the existing method of funding, military currency passed through the following cycle. On payday the disbursing offices paid out MPC's to meet their payrolls. The MPC's then found their way to the banks, either by being deposited by the individuals concerned or by being spent and then deposited by the exchanges or other facilities that received the cash. This currency was then held by the banks until the end of the month, when it was purchased from the banks by the disbursing offices to meet the following month's payroll. By revising the funding procedures, USAREUR hoped to eliminate the static accounts and to reduce the interest charges on the

²² Agreement Between the American Express Co., Inc., and the United States Treasury Department, 23 Apr 53. UNCLASSIFIED. Copy in USAREUR Off of Compt Currency & Banking Sec files.

²³ For details, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 38. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

²⁴ Ltr, USAREUR Fin-Acct Off to COFF, 23 Nov 56, sub: Funding of Disbursing Officers. AEAFI-F 123 FI. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Copy in USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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Federal debt correspondingly.²⁵

In the ensuing discussions among USAREUR, Department of the Army, and Treasury Department officials, it was determined that the military payment certificates would become, in effect, IOU's of the United States when the static accounts were eliminated. Thus, not only would the Federal debt be reduced by the amount of the static accounts, but further salutary effects would be obtained by having IOU's in circulation that would not be redeemed until after they had been spent. Accordingly it was decided that USAREUR adopt military funding methods and that the use of MPC's be continued, since changing to dollar currency would nullify any benefits gained from military funding.²⁶

Detailed procedures were developed by the Office of the Comptroller, and in May 1957 all disbursing officers were directed to adopt military funding of MPC's effective 1 July 1957. Under the new system the disbursing offices were to purchase MPC's from the banks whenever they became available during each month, thus eliminating the need for static accounts. The Central Disbursing Office would furnish extra funds whenever the amounts available at local banks proved insufficient. It was anticipated, however, that the amounts involved would be relatively small. Although the conversion to military funding was implemented immediately, the liquidation of the static accounts was to be accomplished gradually so as to minimize the impact of their reduction on the banks; completion of this operation was scheduled for December 1957.²⁷

In another move to improve banking procedures, the disbursing officers were instructed to reduce their limited deposit (checking) accounts in the banks to an absolute minimum. It was estimated that this step would reduce government accounts in the banks by some \$4 million in addition to the \$41 million saved by liquidating the dollar static accounts. At the end of FY 1957 plans were being developed for

²⁵(1) Ibid. (2) Working Paper, 3 Jul 57, sub: Items for Comptroller's Conference, Funding. UNCLASSIFIED. Copy in USAREUR Off of Compt Currency & Banking Sec. (3) Intervs, Mr. Siemon with Capt W. B. Andresen, USAREUR Off of Compt Fin Policy Br, 15 Jul and 16 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁶(1) Ltr, Capt Andresen to Col Hale, Off of COFF 18 Feb 57, no sub. (2) Ltr, Mr. W. R. Burgess, Under Secy of Treas, to Mr. W. L. Hays, Chairman, House of Representatives Subcommittee on Printing, 9 Jan 57. (3) Cable DA-21930, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Apr 57. All UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR Off of Compt Fin Policy Br files.

²⁷(1) Cable SC-29789, CINCUSAREUR to sub comds, 24 May 57. Copy in USAREUR Off of Compt Fin Policy Br files. (2) Interv, Mr. Siemon with Capt Andresen, 15 Jul 57, cited above. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

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eliminating the remaining Deutsche Mark static account.²⁸

c. Funding of British Armed Forces Special Vouchers (BAFSV). At the beginning of the fiscal year USAREUR disbursing offices held approximately \$55,000 in British scrip for sale to U.S. personnel traveling to the British area of responsibility on duty or leave status. To reduce these holdings, USAREUR negotiated a new agreement with the British Army of the Rhine, by which the American Express Company (AMEXCO) was designated as the funding agent of the U.S. Forces. Disbursing officers notified their local AMEXCO offices of their anticipated BAFSV needs one month in advance; all local requirements were transmitted to the AMEXCO Bad Godesberg office, which obtained the BAFSV and distributed them through the same channels without keeping reserves on hand at any point. Moreover, U.S. personnel travelling individually or in units to the British area were authorized to obtain British scrip directly.²⁹

10. Consumer Fund Control

a. The Stock-Consumer Fund System. According to PL 216, 81st Congress, military supply procurement activities had to be financed under a revolving fund. In fulfillment of this requirement, the Army established a stock fund for the purchase of consumable supplies and provided consumer funds for the users, or consumers, of these stocks. Each issue of supplies was offset by a payment from the consumer fund into the stock fund; these funds, in turn, served to purchase supplies for replenishing the depot that had made the issue.³⁰ This system had been extended to USAREUR during FY 1956 and, although its operation was not entirely satisfactory, it did produce valuable planning data.³¹

b. The Consumer Credit System. As a result of the experience gained during FY 1956, USAREUR put into effect its locally developed Consumer Credit System on 1 July 1956. Under this system USAREUR placed the consumer funds, forming part of its annual funding program, in the hands of the finance and accounting officers of the technical service supply control offices instead of actually allotting them to the individual consumer. In this manner maximum utilization of consumer funds was

²⁸(1) Ltr, USAREUR Compt to all Army Disbursing Offs, 27 Mar 57, sub: Official Bank Accounts. AEACO-FAF 255/9 (004.2) CO. (2) Working Paper, 3 Jul 57, cited above. Both FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Both in USAREUR Off of Compt Fin Policy Br files.

²⁹(1) Ltr, USAREUR Fin-Acct Off to COFF, 18 Oct 56, sub: Revision of the MPC-BAFSV's Agreement. AEAFI-F 123 FI. (2) Agreement, 9 Mar 57, no sub. (3) USAREUR Fin Bal No. 12, 25 Apr 57. All UNCLASSIFIED. All in file cited above.

³⁰USAREUR Memo 355-20-30, 19 Feb 57, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

³¹USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 27. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

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assured by centralized control, and, at the same time, the consumer was spared the requirements of financial responsibility and detailed cost accounting. The individual consumers were granted consumer credits against which they requisitioned supplies. Upon issuance of the supplies from the depots, the appropriate finance and accounting offices debited the consumer funds to effect payment.³²

Section II: Financial Resources

11. The USAREUR Funding Program

The USAREUR funding program approved by the Department of the Army totalled \$515,109,843, of which \$509,327,087 was obligated by 30 June 1957 as shown below:³³

USAREUR FY 1957 Funding Program

| | <u>Availability</u> | <u>Obligated</u> |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|
| <u>Total</u> | <u>\$515,109,843</u> | <u>\$509,327,087</u> |
| Maintenance and Operations, Army | 503,470,200 | 502,995,342 |
| Military Construction, Army | 876,043 | 754,570 |
| Reserve Personnel, Army | 169,000 | 128,461 |
| Preparations for Sale and Salvage of Military Property | 1,042,000 | 938,130 |
| Military Personnel, Army (Deutsche Mark only) | 4,152,600 | 4,152,600 |
| Claims (Deutsche Mark only) | 5,400,000 | 357,984 |

³²(1) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 18, 27 Jun 56. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED). (2) Annex A, n.d., sub: Consumer Fund/Consumer Credit System in USAREUR, to USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 5, 5 Mar 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

³³(1) Intervs, Mr. Siemon with Capt H. A. Rosenberger, USAREUR Off of Compt Bud Br, 11 Sep and 31 Oct 57. UNCLASSIFIED. Unless otherwise cited all figures of fund availability used in this section were extracted by Captain Rosenberger from funding advice documents issued by the Departments of Defense and the Army. (2) Interv, Mr. Siemon with Mr. L. M. Prohaska, WS Army Expend Accts Off, 31 Oct 57. UNCLASSIFIED. Obligation figures were extracted by Mr. Prohaska from status of funds reports. (3) Comment 2, Off of Compt to Hist Div, 16 Dec 57, sub: Review of Final Draft of USAREUR Annual Historical Report. UNCLASSIFIED. In Hist Div Doc Br.

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The above amounts included the equivalent of \$133.7 million in Deutsche Mark funds that were used within the limitations imposed by the Department of the Army at the program level. The budgetary interchangeability of the two currencies was demonstrated during the last quarter of FY 1957. At the beginning of the fiscal year the equivalent of some \$90 million in Deutsche Marks was included in the maintenance and operations (M&O) funding program. Drawn from Deutsche Marks made available by the Federal Republic of Germany during the second defense support period--6 May 1956 to 5 May 1957--these funds were used almost exclusively for the pay of German personnel. The \$90 million was exhausted by 31 March. To provide funds for April, the Department of the Army made available \$8.6 million of the Deutsche Mark reserve that had been earmarked for the payment of claims. During May and June USAREUR was authorized to draw the equivalent of \$24.9 million of the mutual aid Deutsche Mark funds that the Federal Republic of Germany was to provide for the period 6 May 1957 to 5 May 1958. After the \$8.6 million borrowed from the claims reserve during April had been refunded, the total mutual aid funds used in FY 1957 equaled \$33.5 million. By this substitution of Deutsche Marks for dollars an equal amount of dollar appropriated funds could be withdrawn from the funding program.³⁴

12. Liquidation of Unused Deutsche Mark Balances

In addition to the funds made available for FY 1957 USAREUR had balances of occupation cost funds as well as funds from the first defense support period--6 May 1955 to 5 May 1956--that had to be liquidated during FY 1957. Under the terms of agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany occupation cost funds were to be expended within 18 months after the end of the occupation, i.e., by 5 November 1956. Similarly, first defense support period funds had to be expended by 5 May 1957. Although a concerted effort was made to liquidate the unexpended balances, difficulties were encountered, particularly with respect to occupation cost funds that had been obligated for construction projects. Delays in land acquisition presented the major obstacle in this area.

Negotiations with the Federal Republic were therefore initiated to insure that any occupation cost funds not expended before the deadline would not be lost. The agreement reached in November 1956 provided that occupation cost funds would remain available without regard to the former time limitation. The first defense support period funds, however, still had to be expended by 5 May 1957 since extension of that deadline would have required new German legislation. The deadline was met with the equivalent of \$58.8 million of obligations being liquidated; in addition,

³⁴(1) USAREUR Program Prog Repts, FY 57, 1st Qtr, p. 4B-25. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED). (2) Ltr, USAREUR to TAG, attn: COA, 22 Jan 57, sub: Transmittal of FY 1957 Mid-Year Review. AEACO-B 120 CO. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 100 Mid-Year Review (1957). (3) Cables SC-20627, 25 Mar 57, and SC-21379, 30 Mar 57, USAREUR to sub comds. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 230 IND (1957).

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occupation cost obligations totalling \$93.6 million in Deutsche Marks were liquidated by 30 June 1957.³⁵

13. Negotiations for Support Funds

Although the outcome of the negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany was a matter of vital concern to USAREUR, the role of this headquarters was, as in the previous year, limited to that of advising US CINCEUR's representative at the U.S. Embassy in Bonn. All three armed services took the position that support contributions should be continued at the previous level of DM 650,000,000. The State Department, on the other hand, recommended acceptance of a German offer of approximately 50 percent of that amount.³⁶ After protracted negotiations, extending over a period of several months, the German offer of DM 350 million in mutual aid contributions for the period 6 May 1957 to 5 May 1958 was accepted by the United States. Both parties, however, reserved the right to reopen the negotiations after six months; the United States hoped to obtain more funds from the Germans after the September elections, while West Germany expected that renewed negotiations would lead to an even greater reduction in the support contributions. The impact of this substantial reduction was not immediately felt.³⁷

14. The Berlin Command Budget

As in previous years, the costs of operations of the U.S. forces stationed in Berlin were budgeted separately because of the continued occupation status of that city.³⁸ Funding programs for the U.S. forces in West Berlin were approved on the basis of the German fiscal year (GFY), which runs from 1 April to 31 March. Thus the funds made available for the U.S. fiscal year 1957 came from two German budgets. During FY 1957 some \$11 million of GFY 1957 and \$1 million of GFY 1958 funds were expended for the support of USAREUR elements in Berlin. In addition to these sums

³⁵(1) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Confs, No. 21, 2 Aug 56, SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED); No. 29, 28 Nov 56, CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED). (2) DF, USAREUR Compt to COFS, 22 Oct 56, sub: Expenditure Deadline for Occupation Cost Deutsche Marks. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 100 (1956). (3) Intervs, Mr. Siemon with Mr. F. E. Kunzi, USAREUR Off of Compt Acct Policy Br, 28 Aug and 16 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED. (4) Comment 2, USAREUR Off of Compt to Hist Div, 22 Oct 57, cited above.

³⁶(1) DF, USAREUR Compt to COFS, 1 Feb 57, sub: Continued DM Support. (2) Cable SX-2266, USAREUR to AMEMB Bonn for Hermberg, 14 Mar 57. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1957).

³⁷(1) Cable 594, AMEMB Bonn to Dept [of State], 7 May 57. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1957). (2) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 9, 5 Jun 57. Both CONFIDENTIAL.

³⁸For a detailed discussion of the budget procedure, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 33-34. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

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\$1.9 million of obligations against GFY 1956 funds were liquidated so that total Deutsche Mark expenditures in FY 1957 in Berlin amounted to the equivalent of \$13.9 million.³⁹

15. Nonappropriated Welfare Funds

As in previous years, the Nonappropriated Fund Section of the Office of the Comptroller provided custodianship and accounting service for the four USAREUR-level welfare funds--the Army Welfare Fund, Germany-Italy-France; the USAREUR Command Welfare Fund; the USAREUR Club and Mess Fund; and the European Scouting Fund. Although preparation of the welfare fund budgets was a responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, the Comptroller's office acted as official home of record for these funds.⁴⁰

a. Revised Welfare Fund Procedures. Effective 1 July 1956 the Department of the Army directed new distribution procedures for non-appropriated welfare funds. Whereas formerly USAREUR profits from the Army exchange system and motion picture theater operations had been paid directly into the local welfare funds, under the revised procedures the Army's share of exchange and motion picture profits was paid into the Department of the Army Central Welfare Fund. The funds thus gathered in the Central Welfare Fund were then distributed quarterly to the welfare funds of the major continental and overseas commands. In effect this provided for an even, world-wide distribution of funds, with areas that produced little revenue benefiting from the high profits of other areas. Overseas welfare funds received their quarterly allocations at a guaranteed minimum of \$1.50 per man per month, based on the average military strength reported in the Quarterly Statement of Operations and Net Worth. In addition, it was anticipated that the Army Central Welfare Fund would declare a year-end dividend for FY 1957, which would become available during the first quarter of FY 1958.⁴¹ In Europe these allocations were received by the Army Welfare Fund, Germany-Italy-France, which in turn made monthly budget grants to the USAREUR Command Welfare Fund, the SETAF Central Welfare Fund, the American Forces and SETAF radio networks, the USAREUR and SETAF Dependents' Schools, and the European Scouting Fund. The USAREUR Command Welfare Fund suballocated its grants to the area command welfare funds, the Seventh Army Welfare Fund, the USAREUR Special

³⁹ Interv, Mr. Siemon with Mr. Kunzi, 16 Sep 57, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴⁰ Intervs, Mr. B. H. Siemon with Capt E. A. Pepin, USAREUR Off of Compt Acct Policy Br, 2 Aug and 4 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴¹ (1) Ibid. (2) DA Cir 230-4, 6 Jul 56, sub: Nonappropriated Fund Facilities and Activities, Nonappropriated Military Welfare Funds Program, Fiscal Year 1957, and Change 1, 13 Feb 57, thereto. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Services Fund, the USAREUR Education Fund, and the Hunting and Fishing Fund.⁴² The Army Welfare Fund, Germany-Italy-France, distributed \$13,490,217.37 during FY 1957.⁴³

b. Welfare Construction. As of January 1957 the United States Army Construction Agency, Germany (USACAG) assumed responsibility for welfare construction in Germany. According to the new procedure the Army Welfare Board, Germany-Italy-France issued a certificate of fund availability covering the entire welfare construction program assigned to USACAG, whereupon contracts were let, and, as work progressed, contractors sent their bills to the Nonappropriated Fund Section for payment. Projects amounting to less than \$12,000 were executed as in the past. The area command or USACOMZEUR subordinate command welfare funds were granted the money, and they assumed responsibility for the performance of the corresponding part of the welfare construction program.⁴⁴

Section III: Review and Control Functions

16. Internal Control and Review

The Office of the Comptroller was responsible for the adequacy of USAREUR accounting and related financial operations and for the proper functioning of these internal control activities at the subordinate command level. In the internal reorganization that took place on 1 January 1957 the Internal Control and Review Branch was established to more effectively carry out this responsibility.

a. Technical Inspections and Visits. During the second half of FY 1957 personnel of the Internal Control and Review Branch visited the comptrollers' offices of subordinate commands to render technical assistance and to determine the adequacy of the control exercised over appropriated fund, nonappropriated fund, and property accounts. These visits

⁴² Draft, n.d., sub: Nonappropriated Fund Accounting in the Finance and Accounting Division, USAREUR, atchd to memo, Act C/USAREUR Off of Compt Acct Br to Capt Pepin, C/Nonappropriated Fund Sec, 13 Sep 56, sub: Material for Finance Journal. UNCLASSIFIED. Copy in USAREUR Off of Compt Acct Policy Br files.

⁴³ Financial Rept, Army Welfare Fund, Germany-Italy-France, ECN-724, 30 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED. Copy in USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

⁴⁴ (1) Min, Mtg of Army Welfare Board, Germany-Italy-France, 17 Aug 56. (2) Interv, Mr. Siemon with Mr. E. J. Kreutzer, USAREUR Off of Compt Acct Policy Br files, 2 Aug 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

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were not made for the purpose of checking the individual accounts, but rather to insure proper functioning of the subordinate commands' comptrollers.⁴⁵

b. Price Control Audits. As a result of negotiations that had begun in FY 1956,⁴⁶ the West German Ministry of Economics agreed to extend the German price control auditing services to fixed-price dollar contracts let by USAREUR agencies in West Germany. Effective 15 September 1956 a copy of each such contract that amounted to more than \$5,000 was forwarded to the local German price control offices, which audited the dollar contracts in the same manner as Deutsche Mark contracts. The German reports of audit were evaluated by the Internal Control and Review Branch, which then sent advisory comments to the contracting officer and the finance and accounting officer concerned. No final payments were made until such comments were received. It was estimated that this price control audit system resulted in a saving of some \$10,000 in FY 1957.⁴⁷

17. Management Services

While most of the management service activities were of a routine nature, a number of significant changes took place, largely as a result of shifting emphasis.⁴⁸

a. Performance Analysis. In addition to performing their normal work, the performance analysis personnel took an active part in introducing ACMS procedures. They developed an integrated accounting structure that was compatible with the USAREUR command management system. In the future, however, performance analysis functions were expected to become an integral part of ACMS and thus to lose their identity as a specific program.⁴⁹

⁴⁵(1) AR 10-82, 19 Apr 56, sub: Organization and Functions, Comptrollers in the Army Establishment. (2) Intervs, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col J. D. Williams, 5 Aug 57, and Mr. C. B. Mitchell, 25 Jul 57, USAREUR Off of Compt Internal Ctl & Review Br. All UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴⁶For details, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 42. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

⁴⁷(1) USAREUR Memo 36-5-3, 27 Aug 56, sub: Audit of Fixed-Price-Dollar Contracts by German Price Control Offices. (2) Interv, Mr. Siemon with Mr. H. W. Steinitz, USAREUR Off of Compt Internal Ctl & Review Br. Both UNCLASSIFIED. (3) For details of the DM auditing service, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 49. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

⁴⁸For details concerning previous management services, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 45-55. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

⁴⁹(1) Tab A to Memo, C/Manpower Survey Sec to C/Mgt Svcs Br, 1 Aug 57, sub: Orientation-Management Services Branch. (2) Tab B to Comment 2, Compt to SGS, n.d., to DF, SGS to Compt, 10 Oct 56, sub: Personnel Staffing, Headquarters USAREUR. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR Off of Compt Mgt Svcs Br.

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b. Manpower Utilization. The workload increased from 26 surveys required in FY 1956 to 55 in FY 1957, mainly because the technical service divisions dropped their own survey programs. Moreover, in view of the reduction in the size of the headquarters directed by CINCUSAREUR in August 1956, the manpower survey function assumed even greater importance. Spaces recovered as a result of survey recommendations could be redistributed so that the efficiency of the headquarters was improved within the reduced personnel ceiling. During FY 1957 a total of 1,886 personnel spaces were made available for redistribution as a result of manpower survey activities.⁵⁰

c. Organizational Analysis. During FY 1956 organizational analyses had been accomplished as part of manpower utilization surveys. The two functions were separated in August 1956, but the procedures remained generally the same. The separation of the two activities was so effective that 9 organizational analyses were conducted as against the 4 programmed for FY 1957.⁵¹

d. Electric Accounting Machines. In June 1957 a committee was formed to determine the feasibility of using punched-card type electric accounting machines in Class I installations under the command management system. This study was inspired by the favorable results obtained in previous stateside tests. Although the committee was formed and took preparatory steps, the actual study in HACOM did not take place during FY 1957.⁵²

e. Automatic Data Processing Systems. With the increased importance of computing machines within the Army establishment, the application of such equipment was formalized under the term automatic data processing systems (ADPS). By definition such a system is composed of one or more

⁵⁰(1) Tab A to Memo, C/Manpower Survey Sec to C/Mgt Svcs Br, cited above. (2) Tab C to Comment 2, Compt to SGS, cited above. (3) Memo, Compt to SGS, 27 Aug 56, sub: Coordinated Review of Reorganization Actions. All UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 320.4 (1956). (4) DF, Compt to COFS, n.d., sub: Status Report, Manpower Utilization Surveys. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Off of Compt Mgt Svcs Br files.

⁵¹(1) Tab D to Comment 2, Compt to SGS, cited above. (2) Interv, Mr. Siemon with Lt Col F. M. Hamby, USAREUR Off of Compt Mgt Svcs Br, 22 Jul 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵²(1) DF, C/Mgt Svcs Br to all Off of Compt Br Chiefs, 7 Jun 57, sub: Mechanization Committee. (2) DA ltr, 11 Mar 57, sub: Mechanization of Installation Accounting. AGAM-P (M) 140.2 (27 Feb 57) COMPT-A. (3) Incl 1, 4th Quarter FY 1957 Review and Analysis of the Subactivity Office Machine Application - EAM, to DF, USAREUR Off of Compt Mgt Svcs Br to Hist Div, 25 Jul 57, sub: Historical Report, FY 1957. All UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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machines using electronic--as opposed to electrical or mechanical--computing units to perform arithmetical and logical operations automatically. Coded operating instructions are stored within the machines by means of magnetic, acoustic, or electrostatic devices, thus permitting fully automatic operation.

To effect optimum utilization of automatic data processing systems, an ADPS committee was formed under the chairmanship of the Office of the Comptroller. Within that office the respective responsibility was assigned to the new ADPS Section of the Management Services Branch. Only one ADPS installation was approved during FY 1957, which was to be used with the Seventh Army's Project MASS. An order for the necessary equipment was placed with the manufacturer during the last quarter of FY 1957 but no actual work on the installation was begun.⁵³ A new Department of the Army regulation defining ADPS duties and responsibilities in detail was in the draft stage, and its publication was expected to result in a revision of USAREUR policies during FY 1958.

f. Management Improvement. The two management improvement functions--incentive awards and work simplification--were continued in FY 1957 virtually unchanged. Of the 7,983 suggestions made under the incentive awards program, 2,260 were accepted for estimated first-year savings of \$2.3 million.

In addition, an estimated \$1.9 million in first-year savings was expected from the 1,988 proposals accepted from the 2,039 supervisors who were trained under the work simplification program. Significantly, these 1,988 proposals saved almost as much money as the 2,511 accepted in FY 1956, thus reflecting the improved quality of the proposals received.⁵⁴

18. Program Review and Analysis

Responsibility for program review and analysis functions, to include the publication of the Program Progress Report and the Quarterly Review of USAREUR Command Programs, continued to be vested in the Program Review and Analysis Branch of the Office of the Comptroller.⁵⁵ This branch was also charged with the collection, compilation, and presentation of all personnel and strength statistics not specifically a responsibility of

⁵³(1) Incl 1 to DF, USAREUR Off of Compt Mgt Svcs Br to Hist Div, 25 Jul 57, cited above. (2) USAREUR Memo 70-50-1, 14 Jun 57, sub: Research and Development, Automatic Data Processing Systems (ADPS). Both UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵⁴(1) Interv, Mr. Siemon with Miss E. Arends, USAREUR Off of Compt Mgt Svcs Br, 22 Jul 57. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 50. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED). (3) Comment 2, USAREUR Off of Compt to Hist Div, 22 Oct 57, cited above.

⁵⁵For a detailed discussion, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 42-45. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

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any single program. In addition, responsibility for the forms control activity was transferred from the Adjutant General Division to the Office of the Comptroller, where it was combined with the reports control function in this branch on 1 October 1956. During FY 1957 the number of forms in use throughout the command was reduced from 19,140 to 15,038 and the number of form letters from 3,648 to 3,333.⁵⁶

Two reporting workload surveys were conducted as part of a sustained Army-wide effort to develop more economical and efficient reporting techniques. The first overseas survey made under the program was conducted by a combined Department of the Army and USAREUR team in Southern Area Command during the period 17-28 September 1956. A similar survey was made of the Toul Engineer Depot from 13 to 24 May 1957. In both cases a somewhat chaotic reporting system was revealed. In SACOM the team surveyed 284 reports and in Toul, 165, finding that, of the reports prepared at Toul, 4 had been discontinued and 38 others had not been authorized under reports control regulations. Similarly, 12 of the SACOM reports were unauthorized. The teams also recommended that 52 of the reports prepared at Toul and 54 of those at SACOM be rescinded. The proportion of recommended rescissions was 1 to 20 for reports required by higher headquarters, 6 out of 20 for those imposed by USAREUR headquarters, and 14 out of 20 for reports required by area command or section headquarters.

Since the major purpose of these surveys was to develop information for an Army-wide reform of reporting systems, no definitive action was taken before the end of the fiscal year.⁵⁷

⁵⁶(1) Interv, Mr. Siemon with Maj W. A. Hott, USAREUR Off of Compt Program Review & Analysis Br, 16 Jul 57. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Comment 2, USAREUR Off of Compt to Hist Div, 22 Oct 57, cited above.

⁵⁷(1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR Compt Buls, Vol. VIII, No. 3, 15 Sep 56, p. 36; Vol. VIII, No. 4, 15 Dec 56, pp. 56-57; and Vol. IX, No. 2, 15 Jun 57, pp. 48-49. All UNCLASSIFIED.

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CHAPTER 3

Personnel

19. Manpower Trends

a. General. During FY 1957 the number of persons under the military command or jurisdiction of CINCUSAREUR decreased slightly, dropping from 516,906 to 514,782, as shown in Table 1. Military strength fell by approximately 15,700, the Labor Service by approximately 3,000 and U.S. civilian employees by approximately 600. These decreases were almost offset, however, by increases of 15,000 in the number of dependents and 2,300 in the number of indigenous employees other than Labor Service personnel. Because of the transfer of activities and units incident to the buildup of the line of communications, in France all personnel categories except the Labor Service showed increases.

The rapid rise in the number of sponsored dependents continued. A look backward over the five years ending 30 June 1957 reveals that while command strength remained fairly static at something over 500,000 and military strength declined by 33,500, the number of dependents in the command rose steadily from 56,000 to almost 145,000.¹ This increase reflected chiefly progress in construction that made more government-operated family-type quarters available. In Germany, however, the number of dependents residing "on the local economy," i.e., not occupying government quarters, increased more than six-fold, from 4,000 on 30 June 1954 to almost 24,500--or more than 20 percent of all dependents in Germany--on 30 June 1957. Most of this increase occurred during fiscal years 1956 and 1957, largely because dependents of enlisted personnel

¹EUCOM/USAREUR Ann Hist Repts, CY 1952 thru FY 1956. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

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in grades E-4 and below, who came overseas without expense to the government, received considerable logistical support, together with space-available return transportation at government expense.²

b. Reduction in Headquarters Personnel. At the beginning of FY 1957 the authorized strength of Headquarters, USAREUR, was 713 officers, 48 warrant officers, 962 enlisted personnel, 712 DA civilians, and 536 other civilians, or a total of 2,971.³ Gen. H. I. Hodes felt that by the end of calendar year 1956 a headquarters staff of that strength would not be justifiable, especially since control over many maintenance and supply functions was being transferred to USACOMZEUR headquarters.⁴ Each USAREUR staff division was therefore asked to study its mission carefully and to recommend what its strength should be as of 31 December 1956.⁵ After a review of these recommendations, the headquarters authorization was reduced, as of 1 January 1957, to 604 officers, 46 warrant officers, 796 enlisted personnel, 615 DA civilians, and 377 other civilian, totalling 2,438--a cut of 15.8% in military personnel and 20.5% in civilian personnel. The reduction was to be accomplished by attrition.⁶

In the midst of this process the Secretary of Defense ordered a personnel reduction of one percent a month in all departmental headquarters during FY 1958, together with a corresponding reduction in the headquarters of all major commands, to begin 31 March 1957.⁷ No headquarters vacancy was to be filled during the remainder of FY 1957 or during FY 1958, except by transfer, unless the position could not be abolished or consolidated with another. Moreover, major commands were to list, by 7 May 1957, the number of military and civilian positions that could be eliminated from headquarters staffs during FY 1958.⁸

²(1) USAREUR Cir 614-20, 3 Aug 55 and C 1, 4 Jan 56, sub: Movement of Personnel to USAREUR. (2) USAREUR Cir 614-30, 3 Aug 55, sub: Assignment of Living Accommodations and Residence on the Local Economy. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

³Cable SX-26387, CINCUSAREUR sgd Hodes to DA for DCSPER, 6 May 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 320.2 (1957).

⁴Monthly Amb-Comdr's Conf, 24 Jul 56, CINC's Comments. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

⁵Memo, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to Brig Gen B. Easley, USAREUR AG and all div chiefs, Aug 56, sub: Personnel Staffing, Hq USAREUR. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 320.2 (1956).

⁶DF's, Col G. P. Warner, USAREUR SGS, to div chiefs, 20 Nov 56. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 230.2 (1957).

⁷Cable DA-510440, DA fr DCSPER to CINCUSAREUR and others, 22 Mar 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

⁸Cable DA-522778, DA fr DCSPER to CINCUSAREUR and others, 30 Apr 57. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. In file cited above.

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General Hodes requested that, in allocating the proposed cuts, the Department of the Army give consideration to those already under way. Not only did he expect his headquarters staff to be down to the 1 January 1957 ceiling by 30 June 1957, but he was planning additional cuts, which would reduce military personnel by 14.5 percent, DA civilians by 9.6 percent, and other civilians by 19.7 percent during FY 1958. In the light of the reductions already made, and because the extent of the command's responsibilities to NATO in the field of guided missiles had not yet been determined, additional reductions and their phasing should not be rigidly imposed.⁹

On 30 June 1957 actual headquarters strength was even lower than the 1 January 1957 authorization.¹⁰ Further cuts were held in abeyance until the effects of budgetary legislation for FY 1958 could be fully determined.

Section I: Military Personnel

20. Strength

a. Changes in the Troop Basis. On 1 July 1956 the troop basis, or ceiling strength, set by the Department of the Army as USAREUR's goal for 30 June 1957, was 241,168 (16,738 officers, 2,477 warrant officers, and 221,953 enlisted personnel).¹¹ Downward adjustments, the largest of which grew out of the reorganization of the 11th Airborne Division, lowered this year-end goal to 229,452 (15,998 officers, 2,491 warrant officers, and 210,963 enlisted personnel).¹²

b. Changes in Manning Levels. However, even before the beginning of FY 1957 the Department of the Army had imposed upon USAREUR an enlisted manning level of 92.2 percent of authorized strength, applicable during the first quarter.¹³ This level was lowered during the third quarter

⁹(1) Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen W. B. Palmer, VCOFSA, 26 Apr 57. (2) Cable SX-26387, CINCUSAREUR sgd Hodes to DA for DCSPER, 6 May 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

¹⁰Memo for rec, USAREUR Compt Off, sgd by Lt Col M. D. McDonough, C/Program Rev & Anal Br, 16 Jul 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

¹¹USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 60. SECRET.

¹²USAREUR Program Prog Rept, 31 May 57, pp. CO-10 and 1-06. CONFIDENTIAL.

¹³(1) Cable DA-903410, DA DCSPER to CINCUSAREUR, 23 May 56. In SGS 320.2 (1956), Item 016 A-1. SECRET. (2) CINC's Wkly Stf Conf Notes No. 16, 14 Jun 56, pp. 2-3. SECRET.

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to 85.3 percent.¹⁴ The reduction was to be distributed equitably over all the major commands, but the five combat divisions of the Seventh Army and the 6th Infantry Regiment in Berlin were to be maintained at authorized strength. Thus, the impact of the reductions was greatest upon headquarters and support units.¹⁵

c. Actual Strength. As shown in Table 1, the actual military strength of the command on 30 June 1957 was 232,686. This figure included hospital patients and individuals in the "pipeline out." With these excluded, the "chargeable" actual strength of the command was 231,599, or 14,956 less than at the beginning of the year. It was 2,147 above ceiling strength and 1,380 above authorized strength. The overstrength reflected the shipment of personnel to the command to fulfill the larger program originally planned.¹⁶

d. Ratio of Supporting to Operating Forces. Operating forces, which constituted 96.8 percent of chargeable actual strength at the beginning of the fiscal year, rose steadily to 97.3 percent at the end:¹⁷

| | <u>1 Jul 56</u> | | <u>31 Dec 56</u> | | <u>30 Jun 57</u> | |
|---------------------|-----------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|
| <u>Total Forces</u> | <u>246,554</u> | <u>100.0</u> | <u>226,606</u> | <u>100.0</u> | <u>231,599</u> | <u>100.0</u> |
| <u>Category</u> | | | | | | |
| Supporting | 7,844 | 3.2 | 6,303 | 2.8 | 6,305 | 2.7 |
| Operating | <u>238,710</u> | <u>96.8</u> | <u>220,303</u> | <u>97.2</u> | <u>225,294</u> | <u>97.3</u> |
| Combat | 146,079 | 59.2 | 133,549 | 58.9 | 133,003 | 57.5 |
| Combat Support | 92,631 | 37.6 | 86,754 | 38.3 | 92,291 | 39.8 |

e. Officer and Warrant Officer Strength. Although officer strength decreased from 18,399 to 16,883, as shown in Table 2, there was an overstrength of about 5.4 percent at the end of the year. There was also a slight overstrength in warrant officers. Because of marked overstrength in junior-grade officers, combined with understrength in captains, many lieutenants were in command of companies and batteries, as during the previous year.

¹⁴CINCUSAREUR's Bimthly Amb-Comdr's Conf, 4 Feb 56. CONFIDENTIAL.

¹⁵CINC's Wkly Stf Conf Notes, No. 25, 20 Sep 56, p. 4. SECRET.

¹⁶(1) USAREUR Program Prog Rept, 30 Jun 57, p. CO-10. CONFIDENTIAL.

(2) Rev of USAREUR Comd Programs FY 57, 4th Qtr, p. 1. CONFIDENTIAL.

¹⁷USAREUR Program Prog Repts, FY 56, 4th Qtr; and FY 57, 2d and 4th Qtrs, p. CO-20. CONFIDENTIAL.

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Table 2--USAREUR Officer and Warrant Officer Strength by Grade, FY 1957
(Chargeable Actual Strength)

| | Officers | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | 30 Jun 56 | 31 Dec 56 | 30 Jun 57 | Over or -Under |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>Actual</u> 18,339 | <u>Actual</u> 17,643 | <u>Authorized</u> 15,969 | <u>Authorized</u> 2,370 |
| General Officers | 51 | 53 | 56 | 6 |
| General | 1 | 1 | | |
| Lieutenant General | 2 | 3 | | |
| Major General | 23 | 20 | | |
| Brigadier General | 25 | 29 | | |
| Field Grade Officers | 4,197 | 4,500 | 4,083 | 1,115 |
| Colonel | 431 | 453 | 413 | 419 |
| Lieutenant Colonel | 1,308 | 1,507 | 1,358 | 1,315 |
| Major | 2,458 | 2,540 | 2,312 | 2,318 |
| Company Grade Officers | 14,091 | 13,090 | 11,892 | 2,203 |
| Captain | 5,611 | 6,010 | 5,734 | 877 |
| Lieutenant | 8,480 | 7,080 | 6,158 | 2,322 |
| <u>Warrant Officers</u> | | | | |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>2,288</u> | <u>2,506</u> | <u>2,427</u> | <u>79</u> |

Source: USAREUR Program Prog Repts, FY 56 and 57, p. CO-16. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

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(1) Strength by Major Elements. Table 3 shows the distribution of officers and warrant officers by major elements on 30 June 1957. As usual, slightly more than half were assigned to Seventh Army. Shifts in distribution among other elements were not significant.

(2) Strength by Race. Through March 1957, the last month for which strengths were reported by race,¹⁸ trends in officer and warrant officer strengths were parallel for both races, as shown in Table 4. At the same time, there was a slight increase in the percentage of Negro officers, accompanied by a slight decrease in the percentage of Negro warrant officers.

f. Enlisted Strength. Actual enlisted strength, which exceeded authorized strength at the beginning of the year, dropped to a marked understrength during the first and second quarters. However, over-strength was regained by 30 June 1957, as shown in the following tabulation:¹⁹

| Date | Ceiling | Authorized | Chargeable Actual | Number | Over - Under Percent |
|-----------|---------|------------|----------------------|---------|----------------------------|
| 1 Jul 56 | 220,724 | 221,120 | 225,927 | + 4,807 | + 2.2 |
| 30 Sep 56 | 220,172 | 220,294 | 206,904 | -13,390 | - 6.0 |
| 31 Dec 56 | 222,012 | 220,423 | 206,457 | -13,966 | - 6.3 |
| 31 Mar 57 | 215,902 | 218,261 | 208,856 | - 9,405 | - 4.8 |
| 30 Jun 57 | 211,296 | 211,854 | 212,299 | + 445 | + 2.4 |

Seventh Army regiments, however, were maintained at or above authorized strength. Women's Army Corps (WAC) enlisted strength, which stood at 920 at the beginning of the year, was 962 at the end.

(1) Strength by Major Elements. The following tabulation shows enlisted strengths by major elements at the beginning and end of

¹⁸ Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. A. M. Friedberg, Compt Rev & Anal Br, 16 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁹(1) USAREUR Program Prog Repts, FY's 56 and 57, p. CO-13.
SECRET. (2) USAREUR Program Prog Rept, FY 57, 3d Qtr, p. 1-06.
SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

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Table 3--USAREUR Officer and Warrant Officer Strength
by Major Elements, 30 June 1957

| | Officers | | | Warrant Officers | | |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| | Author- ized | Actual* | Over -Under | Author- ized | Actual* | Over -Under |
| <u>Totals</u> | <u>15,969</u> | <u>16,826**</u> | <u>/ 857</u> | <u>2,396</u> | <u>2,466***</u> | <u>/ 70</u> |
| USAREUR Headquarters and Units | 814 | 811 | - 3 | 89 | 97 | / 8 |
| Seventh Army | 8,340 | 8,937 | / 597 | 1,348 | 1,363 | / 15 |
| USACOMZEUR | 3,070 | 3,004 | - 66 | 452 | 441 | - 11 |
| Subordinate Commands | 2,844 | 3,213 | / 369 | 315 | 382 | / 67 |
| Technical and Administrative Services | 901 | 861 | - 40 | 192 | 183 | - 9 |

*Chargeable actual strength

**7 trainees not included

***1 trainee not included

Source: USAREUR Program Prog Rept, 30 Jun 57, pp. CO-14 and 15.
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Table 4--USAREUR Military Personnel By Race, FY 1957
(Chargeable Actual Strength)

| | <u>Total</u> | <u>White</u> | <u>Negro</u> | <u>Percent Negro</u> |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------------------|
| <u>Total Military Personnel</u> | | | | |
| 1 Jul 56 | 246,554 | 219,100 | 26,454 | 11.2 |
| 31 Dec 56 | 226,606 | 199,131 | 27,475 | 12.1 |
| 31 Mar 57* | 228,662 | 200,962 | 27,700 | 12.2 |
| <u>Officers</u> | | | | |
| 1 Jul 56 | 18,339 | 17,659 | 680 | 3.7 |
| 31 Dec 56 | 17,643 | 16,961 | 682 | 3.9 |
| 31 Mar 57* | 17,356 | 16,685 | 671 | 3.9 |
| <u>Warrant Officers</u> | | | | |
| 1 Jul 56 | 2,288 | 2,160 | 128 | 5.6 |
| 31 Dec 56 | 2,506 | 2,367 | 139 | 5.5 |
| 31 Mar 57* | 2,450 | 2,319 | 131 | 5.3 |
| <u>Enlisted Personnel</u> | | | | |
| 1 Jul 56 | 225,927 | 199,281 | 26,646 | 11.8 |
| 31 Dec 56 | 206,457 | 179,803 | 26,654 | 12.9 |
| 31 Mar 57* | 208,586 | 181,958 | 26,898 | 12.9 |

*Reports after this date did not indicate strength by race.

Source: USAREUR Program Prog Repts, FY 57, pp. CO-10 and 13. SECRET.

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the year:²⁰

| Command | 1 July 1956 | | | 30 June 1957 | | |
|--|-----------------|---------|----------------|-----------------|----------|----------------|
| | Author- ized | Actual | Over -Under | Author- ized | Actual | Over -Under |
| Total | 221,120 | 225,908 | 4,788 | 211,854 | 212,291* | 437 |
| USAREUR Headquarters and Units | 1,517 | 1,603 | 86 | 2,508 | 2,491 | - 17 |
| Seventh Army | 154,295 | 158,821 | 4,526 | 148,637 | 149,856 | 1,219 |
| USACOMZEUR | 23,229 | 22,427 | - 802 | 30,565 | 30,043 | - 522 |
| Subordinate Commands | 19,522 | 20,393 | 871 | 17,094 | 18,008 | 914 |
| Technical and Admin- istrative Services | 22,557 | 22,664 | 107 | 13,050 | 11,893 | -1,157 |

*8 trainees not included

(2) Strength by Race. Down to the end of March 1957, the last month for which strenghts were reported by race, the percentage of Negro enlisted personnel in the command (Table 4) increased from 11.8 to 12.9 and that of total Negro personnel (officer, warrant officer, and enlisted) from 11.2 to 12.2.

(3) Strength by Grade. The following tabulation shows chargeable actual enlisted strength by grade at the beginning and end of FY 1957:²¹

| | | 1 July 1956 | 30 June 1957 | Increase or -Decrease |
|-------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------------------|
| Grade | | Total | | |
| | | 225,927 | 212,299 | - 13,628 |
| M/Sgt | E-7 | 6,944 | 7,876 | 932 |
| M/Sp | E-7 | 117 | 111 | - 6 |
| SFC | E-6 | 15,424 | 17,242 | 1,818 |
| SP-1 | E-6 | 703 | 487 | - 216 |
| Sgt | E-5 | 14,237 | 15,173 | 936 |
| SP-2 | E-5 | 13,108 | 14,175 | 1,067 |
| Cpl | E-4 | 4,024 | 2,034 | - 1,990 |
| SP-3 | E-4 | 49,116 | 49,857 | 741 |
| PFC | E-3 | 79,582 | 73,838 | - 5,744 |
| Pvt | E-2 and E-1 | 42,672 | 31,506 | - 11,166 |

²⁰ USAREUR Program Prog Repts, FY's 56 and 57, 4th Qtr, pp. CO-14 and 15. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

²¹ USAREUR Program Prog Repts, FY's 56 and 57, 4th Qtr, p. CO-16. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

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Much attention was paid to correcting the maldistribution of NCO's within major commands, which tended to be aggravated, in gyroscope units, with each incoming packet of trainees.²² Attention was also paid to correcting the shortages in combat MOS's and overstrengths in administration MOS's in grades E-5 through E-7 which had caused much concern during previous years. (See par. 22b & c).

(4) Strength by Components. The ratio of Regular Army to non-RA enlisted personnel continued to increase through December 1956, when RA's constituted 74.1 percent of all personnel, and then receded:²³

| | <u>Strength</u> | <u>Percent RA</u> | |
|-----------|-----------------|-------------------|------|
| | <u>RA</u> | <u>Non-RA</u> | |
| 30 Jun 56 | 148,408 | 77,500 | 65.7 |
| 31 Dec 56 | 153,068 | 53,368 | 74.1 |
| 30 Jun 57 | 147,092 | 65,199 | 69.3 |

At the end of the year the Technical and Administrative Services had the highest percentage of RA's (79.1) and Seventh Army the lowest (66.4).

21. Reenlistments, Recruiting, and Replacement

a. Reenlistments. While USAREUR reenlistments during FY 1956 had exceeded those of FY 1955, the trend of both RA and non-RA reenlistments had been downward from quarter to quarter. Moreover, since a FY 1956 survey had revealed that 20 percent of the reenlistees had GCT scores below 90, greater caution had to be exercised in determining the mental qualifications of prospective reenlistees.²⁴ As time went on there was ample evidence of positive correlation between low mentality and high court-martial and "incident" rates. There was also an increasing need for high-caliber enlisted personnel to man the new weapons.²⁵

In early August 1956, when it was found that many RA enlistments and reenlistments during the preceding 7 months had violated Army Regulations concerning mental qualifications, USAREUR referred the

²² Rev of USAREUR Comd Programs FY 57, 2d Qtr, p. 2. CONFIDENTIAL.

²³ USAREUR Program Prog Repts, FY's 56 and 57, p. GO-26. CONFIDENTIAL.

²⁴ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 69. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

²⁵ (1) Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to Lt Gen D. P. Booth, DCSPER, 8 Apr 57. SECRET. In SGS 471.5 (1957). (2) DOD Pamphlet, May 57, sub: Qualitative Distribution Trends, pp. 19-21. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

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subordinate commands to the appropriate regulation.²⁶ The minimum requirement was a score of 31 or more on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) or 90 or more on the Aptitude Area General Technical (AAGT) Test. This might be waived for E-4's applying for a second term of service and E-5's applying for a third or subsequent term. However, the waivee had to have had 9 or more years of active service, with excellent conduct and efficiency ratings and no record of a court-martial or company punishment during the two years preceding his application. In USAREUR, waiver authority was restricted to regimental or comparable commanders, and the objective of preventing undesirable personnel from reenlisting was emphasized.

The inauguration in February 1957 of a world-wide intra-Army reenlistment program for retaining personnel of high quality in the Regular Army on a long-term basis enabled USAREUR to intensify its own efforts.²⁷ Under the new program the command was allotted 15 officers and 97 EM spaces for full-time reenlistment specialists. All were given special training. Every enlisted man meeting reenlistment requirements was interviewed by a reenlistment NCO approximately 90 days before the expiration of his term of service (ETS), by his unit commander about 30 days later and, if still undecided, by a reenlistment specialist of a higher headquarters within 15 to 30 days before ETS.

While reenlistments during FY 1957 totaled only 11,152 as against 18,038 during FY 1956, the downward trend was reversed during the last quarter, when RA reenlistments exceeded those of the third by almost 18 percent;²⁸

| | <u>Total</u> | <u>1st Quarter</u> | <u>2d Quarter</u> | <u>3d Quarter</u> | <u>4th Quarter</u> |
|--------------|---------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| <u>Total</u> | <u>11,152</u> | <u>3,177</u> | <u>2,924</u> | <u>2,341</u> | <u>2,710</u> |
| RA | <u>10,540</u> | 2,991 | 2,750 | 2,206 | 2,593 |
| Non-RA | <u>612</u> | 186 | 174 | 135 | 117 |

At the same time, the quality of the intake was improved through strict application of the criteria for reenlistment. About 6,250, or 20 percent, of the approximately 31,000 men who became due for separation from the service during the third and fourth quarters were found to be ineligible.

²⁶(1) USAREUR Memo 601-200-2, 2 Aug 56, sub: Mental Qualifications for Enlistment and Reenlistment in the Regular Army. (2) AR 601-210, 12 Apr 56, sub: Qualifications and Procedures for Processing Applications for Enlistment and Reenlistment in the Regular Army, par. 5.

²⁷(1) AR 601-280, 5 Mar 57, sub: Intra-Army Reenlistment Program. (2) USAREUR Memo 601-200-5, 13 Feb 57, sub: USAREUR Enlistment/Reenlistment Program, and accompanying letter.

²⁸Rev of USAREUR Comd Programs FY 57, 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th Qtrs. CONFIDENTIAL.

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Of the remainder, 1,872, or 7.5 percent, were reenlisted. In addition, 3,179 fully eligible men who would normally have been returned to the United States before the completion of 3-year overseas tours, accepted short-term discharges in Europe and reenlisted for a minimum of 3 years in order to complete full tours.²⁹

b. Alien Enlistment Program. Recruiting of individuals from Iron Curtain countries for enlistments of 5 or more years continued, under Congressional authority granted in 1951 and extended in 1955. By enlisting over 300 persons during the year, total enlistments since 1951 were brought to 1,302. For security and other reasons, exceedingly careful screening was still deemed essential, so that only about 10 percent of the applicants were accepted. Of the approximately 300 enlistees whose terms of service had expired, 140 reenlisted.³⁰

c. Impact of Gyroscope Rotations. In October 1956 the Department of the Army asked USAREUR and the Seventh Army to study their experiences with the gyroscope replacement system and to submit a report, with recommendations, by 15 April 1957.³¹ CINCUSAREUR commented that no major difficulties had been encountered and that the gyroscope program had been beneficial to his command. While modifications would have to be made from time to time, he recommended that the gyroscope concept be retained. At the same time, he endorsed Seventh Army recommendations that divisions be rotated in smaller increments and that the gyroscope plan be extended to include company-size units with certain exceptions.³²

22. Career Management

a. Officer Integration into the Regular Army. Public Law 737, enacted in July 1956, authorized an increase in the number of Regular Army male and WAC commissioned officers from 39,600 to 49,500 with no restriction as to grade.³³ Appointees had to be of such an age as to permit the completion of 20 years of active duty before age 55 and were

²⁹Ibid., 3d Qtr, p. 1; 4th Qtr, p. 2. CONFIDENTIAL.

³⁰(1) Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Capt O. L. McKinney, USAREUR G1 Mil Pers Br, 28 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) The Stars & Stripes (Eur. ed.), 26 Jul 57, p. 5. (3) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 55, pp. 85-86. SECRET.

³¹(1) Ltr, DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Oct 56, sub: Report on Status of Operation Gyroscope. (2) DF, USAREUR G3 to DCSOPS, 1 Apr 57, same sub. SECRET. Both in SGS 322 GYRO (1957).

³²Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 12 Apr 57, and incl ltr, 7th Army (ATGC GY 370.5), 15 Mar 57, sub and file as above. SECRET.

³³(1) PL 737, 84th Cong., Armed Forces Regular Officer Augmentation Act of 1956, 20 Jul 56. (2) DA Cir 601-26, 13 Aug 56, sub: Appointment as Commissioned Officers in the Regular Army. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

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required to have at least two years of college credit or GED test equivalency. It was expected that reserve officers on active duty would constitute the chief source for the increase. Candidates were required to apply during the period 1 October 1956 to 31 January 1957 (later extended).

Early response by USAREUR officers was slow; on 31 December 1956 only 856 applications had been received. By 31 March 1957, however, the number increased to 4,138, and of these 3,198 had been forwarded to the Department of the Army.³⁴ No appointments were made during FY 1957.

b. Compulsory Retirement of Certain Enlisted Personnel. The Department of the Army policy requiring the retirement, with certain exceptions, of enlisted men with more than 30 years of active service, and of those over 55 years old with 20 years or more of service, became effective 31 December 1956.³⁵ Designed primarily to relieve the overstrengths in E-7's and E-6's, which was prevalent following the Korean War, as well as to rid the Army of many "professional privates," this measure also increased the opportunities for promotion of younger men to higher grades.

c. Restoration of MOS Balance. In the three upper enlisted grades, overstrengths in administrative MOS's, coupled with critical shortages in many technical MOS's, continued during a major part of FY 1957. The imbalance was partially corrected when, in November 1956, major and subordinate commanders were instructed to transfer, reclassify, or report as surplus, all excess E-5 through E-7 personnel in overstrength MOS's, and to disapprove requests of such personnel for extension of overseas tours. At the same time, the USAREUR Assignment Team at Fort Dix, New Jersey, was instructed to use great care whenever personnel in overstrength primary MOS's had to be assigned to USAREUR. Such individuals were thenceforth assigned either in their secondary MOS's or in "for duty and training" MOS's.³⁶

23. Personnel Policies and Problems

a. Incident Rate Trends. Crimes and offenses of Americans against Germans, commonly known as "incidents," which had been the subject of much unfavorable publicity and the object of great concern during FY 1956, engaged the attention of all levels of command during FY 1957. To bring the rate down, in July 1956 General Hodes directed the safeguarding of ammunition, strict regulation of leaves and passes, the conduct of athletic programs on the smaller posts, and especially the elimination

³⁴ Rev of USAREUR Comd Programs FY 57, 3d Qtr, p. 3. UNCLASSIFIED.

³⁵ (1) Cable DA-387068, DA fr TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 2 Feb 56. In SGS 210.456 (1956), Item 08. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 73. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

³⁶ CINC's Wkly Stf Conf Notes, No. 27, 13 Nov 56, p. 3. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

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of habitual offenders through administrative procedures.³⁷ Thereupon, elimination of "undesirables" by board action under the authority of appropriate Army Regulations³⁸--which had averaged 300 a month through August 1956--rose to 608 for September and 722 for October, dropped to 680 for November, and averaged about 480 a month during the remainder of the fiscal year.³⁹ Action by separation boards and courts-martial eliminated approximately 1,400 enlisted men during the fourth quarter.⁴⁰

Almost concurrently, the incident rate in Germany, which was 1.66 per thousand military personnel for June 1956⁴¹ and 1.59 for July, dropped to approximately 1.3 for September and 1.1 for December, rose again to 1.3 for March 1957, but dropped to 1.1 for June 1957.⁴²

In USACOMZEUR, offenses of U.S. personnel against local citizens had never constituted as acute a problem as in Germany. Through similar methods of control there, the comparable rate during the last half of FY 1957 averaged less than 0.5 monthly.⁴³

When a G1 study showed that incident rates from 1953-56 increased consistently during the Christmas holiday and summer periods,⁴⁴ precautionary steps, including the issuance of a troop information fact sheet, were taken to guard against the recurrence of such a rise during the summer of 1957.

b. Housing Problems. Troop billeting posed no serious difficulties. In France a shortage of 4,000 billets at the beginning of the year was virtually wiped out through the construction of prefabricated buildings. In Germany, available billets exceeded utilization throughout the year. The BOQ housing program was satisfactory.⁴⁵ Family housing, however, presented a different picture.

³⁷USAREUR Memo 1-20-9, 24 Jul 56, sub: Bimthly-Amb Comdr's Conf Notes, 23 Jul 56, Annex A, Comments by the CINC, sub: Serious Incidents. UNCLASSIFIED.

³⁸(1) AR 635-208, 21 May 56, sub: Personnel Separations: Discharge, Undesirable Habits and Traits of Character. (2) AR 635-209, 17 Mar 55, sub: Personnel Separations: Discharge, Inaptitude or Unsuitability.

³⁹USAREUR G1 Stat Charts on Discipline, Law, and Order. UNCLASSIFIED. In G1 Mil Pers Br.

⁴⁰Rev of USAREUR Comd Programs FY 57, 4th Qtr, p. 2. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁴¹The figure 1.08 in the FY 1956 USAREUR Annual Historical Report, p. 93, represented incidents per 1,000 Americans (military and civilian).

⁴²Rev of USAREUR Comd Programs FY 57, 4th Qtr, p. 24. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁴³COMZ Performance Repts, 31 May 57, p. 53; 30 Jun 57, p. 107. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁴⁴DF, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to COFS, 29 Apr 57, sub: Annual Increase in Incidents. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 (1957).

⁴⁵USAREUR Program Prog Repts, FY 57. CONFIDENTIAL.

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(1) In Germany. As already pointed out, an increasing number of dependent families in Germany was residing on the local economy, frequently under very unsatisfactory living conditions. At the beginning of the year only 38,576 units, including all categories of housing suitable for family use, were available to meet a long-range requirement of approximately 53,000 units. At the end of the year availability was still 12,000 units short of the requirement. As a permanent solution, the possibility of additional construction through the use of surplus commodity funds, as in France, was being investigated,⁴⁶ and such a proposal was submitted to the Federal Republic of Germany on 1 February 1957 for consideration. Meanwhile, only 47.6 percent of incoming dependents of military personnel eligible for family-type government housing excluding gyroscope dependents were traveling concurrently with their sponsors or after a maximum delay of 60 days. The others had to wait from 3 to 16 months, depending upon the local housing situation.⁴⁷

(2) In France. Practically all travel of dependents to France was concurrent, if desired,⁴⁸ and military personnel assigned to USACOMZEUR continued to receive a living allowance. However, government housing for dependents was largely unavailable because the amount of family housing operated directly by the Army was negligible. The cost of living in French communities continued to be high. Even though progress was being made in the construction of surplus commodity and rental guarantee family housing units,⁴⁹ their availability on 30 June 1957 was reported as 2,283 units short of requirements,⁵⁰ and projections through FY 1960 envisioned an over-all shortage of about 1,500 units.⁵¹

c. Curtailment of Logistical Support of Certain Dependents. In an effort to lighten the command's logistical burden and to stem or reverse the continuing increase in the number of dependents residing on the economy, the Department of the Army announced in early May 1957 that PX and commissary privileges would not be granted to dependents who came overseas after 6 June 1957 without express military authorization.

⁴⁶USAREUR Program Prog Repts, FY 57, 1st Qtr, p. 10; 4th Qtr, p. 8. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁴⁷Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col R. A. Kapp, USAREUR G1 Welfare & Rec Br, 28 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Surplus commodity units--financed with funds from the sale of U.S. surplus commodities in countries other than France; ownership remains with the contractor; U.S. has rent-free use of units for 20 years and is responsible for their maintenance and upkeep. Rental guarantee units--financed by French companies, who retain ownership and receive from the U.S. Government a 5- to 7-year rental guarantee.

⁵⁰COMZ Performance Rept, 30 Jun 57, p. 7. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁵¹Rev of USAREUR Comd Programs, FY 57, 4th Qtr, pp. 8, 36. CONFIDENTIAL.

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Moreover, free space-available return transportation for such dependents would be restricted to cases, probably very few, in which return transportation at government expense would serve the government's best interests.⁵² The new prohibitions affected not only dependents of military personnel in grades E-4 and below, with less than 4 years of service, who were not eligible for family-type government housing, but all other dependents who came overseas at their own expense--for example, tourists or those awaiting the availability of family-type government housing. At the end of the fiscal year the effects of this curtailment had not yet become clear.

d. Shortage of School-Trained Special Weapons Personnel. In April 1957 General Hodes sent a personal letter to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to call his attention to an alarming situation: USAREUR artillery and ordnance units were not receiving enough school-trained special weapons personnel to guarantee continued combat-ready posture. As a compensatory measure, personnel with allied skills had been transferred into these units for on-the-job training, and ordnance special weapons battalions had been conducting special classes to qualify artillerymen in special weapons. However, this very activity had interfered with the ordnance battalions' operational mission. In addition, 1 special weapons battalion, in which only half of the assigned technicians had been school-trained, had failed in recent DA technical proficiency inspections; 2 artillery battalions had also failed, and 2 others had achieved only marginal ratings.⁵³ General Hodes took the position that if his requirements were to be met, the number of men programmed through special weapons schools in the United States would have to be increased.⁵⁴

Almost concurrently, a Seventh Army board of officers reported that unless there was an immediate and substantial increase in the number of special weapons and guided missile technicians being sent to the European theater, Seventh Army's atomic capability would be seriously endangered. One solution suggested was that the USAREUR Assignment Team at Fort Dix screen out persons with special weapons training and assign them to appropriate special weapons organizations.⁵⁵

⁵²(1) DOD Dir 1315.7, 7 May 57. (2) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 12 May 57, p. 1. (3) Cable SC-32531, 14 Jun 57, USAREUR to sub comds. UNCLASSIFIED. In G1 Mil Pers Br files.

⁵³Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to Lt Gen D. P. Booth, DCSPER, 8 Apr 57. SECRET. In SGS 471.6 (1957).

⁵⁴Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to TAG, 8 Apr 57, sub: Personnel Shortage in the Special Weapons Field (U). SECRET. In file cited above.

⁵⁵Board Report on the Operation, Training, and Supply of Special Weapons Units, 7th Army, 10 May 57. SECRET. In file cited above.

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At first glance, USAREUR's strength in critical special weapons MOS's appeared favorable in comparison with the Army-wide situation.⁵⁶ A review of the situation revealed that the USAREUR shortages were a reflection of over-all shortages, which the Department of the Army was making every effort to meet and most of which would be eliminated by the end of FY 1958. During the interim period of personnel adjustment that had to follow such a major change in military concept and organizational structure as the introduction of special weapons, the commands would have to accept deficiencies in school output and use such expedencies as they could develop.⁵⁷

Section II: Civilian Personnel

24. Strength and Trends

During FY 1957 the number of civilian employees, excluding Labor Service personnel, increased slightly. The figures, extracted from Table 1, were:

| | <u>30 Jun 56</u> | <u>30 Jun 57</u> | <u>/Increase or -Decrease</u> |
|---|------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <u>Employees Total</u> | <u>119,032</u> | <u>120,733</u> | <u>/ 1,701</u> |
| U.S. Civilian | 6,077 | 5,481 | - 596 |
| Continental Wage Scale (dollar paid) | 151 | 138 | - 13 |
| Local Wage Rate (dollar paid) | 20,433 | 21,385 | / 952 |
| German Resident | 92,371 | 93,729 | / 1,358 |

The decrease in U.S. and Allied/neutral employees was more than offset by an increase in indigenous employees: in France, because of the transfer of functions to USACOMZEUR and the difficulty of obtaining Labor Service workers; in Germany, because of the substitution of civilian contract guards for Labor Service guards.⁵⁸

⁵⁶Ltr, Maj Gen J. F. Collins, Aot DCSPER, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINC-USAREUR, 24 Apr 57. SECRET. In file cited above.

⁵⁷Ltr, Gen Booth to Gen Hodes, 16 May 57, sub: USAREUR's Status in Artillery and Ordnance Personnel (U). SECRET. In file cited above.

⁵⁸USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 84-85. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

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25. Administration and Finance

a. Appointment of Civilian Chief. This was the first full year of the incumbency of a civilian as chief of civilian personnel. He had been appointed in May 1956, in accordance with practice in other overseas theaters and the Defense Department's policy of placing civilians in positions to which assignments of military personnel were not required by law or for other very cogent reasons.⁵⁹

b. The Payroll. Of the 120,733 U.S., Allied/neutral, and indigenous civilians, excluding Labor Service personnel, employed by the command, 21,893 were paid from appropriated funds, 32,128 from nonappropriated funds, and 66,712 from Defense Support Costs (Table 1). Reflecting higher wage schedules, the dollar payroll was \$68,538,538, an increase of almost 8 million dollars over FY 1956, and the Deutsche Mark payroll was DM 480,258,148 (\$114,347,178), an increase equivalent to more than 6 million dollars.⁶⁰

c. New Berlin Wage Scale. German LWR increases that had begun on 1 April 1956 did not apply to LWR personnel in Berlin, who were under a separate tariff. To meet rising costs of living there, and as the result of negotiations between the Allied Kommandatura, the American Embassy, and the Berlin Senat during the latter half of FY 1956, a new wage scale for Berlin was adopted in late June 1956, to become effective 1 July. The new scale increased the pay of salaried employees by 5 percent and of hourly paid workers by percentages that averaged 7½ percent but varied with the job. In addition, salaried employees received lump-sum payments equivalent to 30 percent of their June 1956 salaries, and hourly paid workers a flat DM 160.⁶¹

d. Proposed Extension of Pay Raises to Hotel and Retail Sales Employees. Another group not included in the 1 April 1956 wage increases were hotel, restaurant, mess, and retail trade employees.⁶² Negotiations for the extension of the raises to these categories continued during FY 1957, but no agreement was reached.⁶³

⁵⁹(1) DOD Dir No. 1100.3, 20 Aug 54, sub: Guidance for Manpower Programs. (2) Comment 2, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 19 Jan 56, to ltr, Maj Gen T. L. Sherburne, Asst Asst DCSPERS, to Gen A. C. McAuliffe, CINCUSAREUR, 11 Jan 56. (3) Ltr, Gen Sherburne to Maj Gen J. F. Uncles, USAREUR COFS, 20 Feb 56. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in SGS 230 (1956), Item 1.

⁶⁰Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. C. A. Carleson, USAREUR G3 Org & Eq Br, 20 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶¹(1) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf Notes, No. 18, 27 Jun 56, pp. 2-3. CONFIDENTIAL (info used FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY). (2) Interv, Mr. Lane with Mr. S. Sutherland, USAREUR G1 Civ Pers Br, 17 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶²USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 75-77. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

⁶³Interv, Mr. Lane with Mr. W. O. Jacobson, C/USAREUR G1 Civ Pers Br, 6 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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e. New Continental Wage Scale. In July 1956, Continental Wage Scale (CWS) employees--citizens of Allied and neutral countries other than the United States or the host country--received wage and salary increases ranging from 2 to 31 percent, to begin with the first pay period after 27 July. At the same time the workweek was reduced to 40 hours, and certain employees with dependents in the command were granted quarters allowances.⁶⁴

26. Personnel Policies and Problems

a. Department of the Army Civilian Employees.

(1) Completion of Conversion Program. The final date for conversion of Department of the Army civilian employees overseas from "excepted" to competitive Civil Service status was 1 October 1956.⁶⁵ Of 3,154 requests submitted for conversion, 2,776 (88 percent) were approved for career or career-conditional competitive status. In addition, several hundred employees were reinstated in the competitive status they had held in the United States.⁶⁶

(2) Interchange Program. This was the first full year of the Department of the Army Interchange Program, inaugurated in April 1956 for the dual purpose of filling civilian vacancies in overseas commands through the reassignment of qualified employees from the United States, and enabling employees returning to the United States after successful performance overseas to continue their careers in the Department.

In late June 1956, Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, had asked General Hodes to give his personal attention to this program and to the development of a system of career planning for civilians in USAREUR, in accordance with Department of Defense and Army policies.⁶⁷ General Hodes expressed his desire to implement the plan, and reported in mid-July 1956 that some rotations had already been made.⁶⁸ The Civilian Personnel Branch set up the Recruitment and

⁶⁴USAREUR Memo 600-300-1, 27 Jul 56, sub: Employment Conditions and Pay Scales for CWS Employees. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶⁵DA CPR C4.8, ch. 3, 10 Jan 56, sub: Conversions Upon Extension of Competitive Service Overseas. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶⁶Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. L. Winokur, USAREUR G1 Civ Pers Br, 20 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶⁷(1) Ltr, Lt Gen W. L. Weible, DCSPERS, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINC-USAREUR, 26 Jun 56. (2) Memo, Asst SA to COFSA, 24 Apr 56, sub: Civilian Career Planning. Both in SGS 230 (1956). (3) DOD Dir 1430.2, 24 Mar 56, sub: Assignment of Responsibilities for Civilian Career Programs. All UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶⁸Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Weible, 13 Jul 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

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Interchange Coordination Office to carry out this program.⁶⁹

At the end of FY 1957 no reliable figures concerning USAREUR experience were available. During the fourth quarter only six incoming appointees from the U.S. were interchanges. Moreover, a Department of the Army evaluation of the program for the nine months ending 31 March 1957 showed that strength reductions in stateside commands, among other factors, had impeded the placement of available overseas employees, so that the two-way flow of career personnel had not met expectations. Nevertheless, 78 qualified returnees from overseas had been placed in positions in the United States--51 at salaries equal to or higher than those relinquished overseas--and the exchange concept was gaining acceptance overseas. At the end of the year the Department was making a special study looking toward improving the program.⁷⁰

(3) Increased Employment of Dependents. During FY 1957 the command, as a matter of policy, began to give DA civilian employment to larger numbers of sponsored dependents who met specific job requirements, especially as school teachers and as clerk-typists. More than 300 were employed as teachers and many others in clerical positions. Although this policy did not lower payrolls, it produced savings in recruiting, transportation, and housing costs. Moreover, dependents of military personnel were generally well adjusted and thus contributed to good employee morale.⁷¹

(4) Proposed Legislation for Teachers. School teachers in the command worked under certain unfavorable conditions with respect to pay-spread, leaves, evaluation of previous experience, and other matters, which probably could be alleviated only through Congressional legislation.⁷² In September 1956 two G1 representatives visited several schools, in an effort to orient teachers and to hear their grievances. USAREUR and USAFE subsequently worked out joint legislative proposals, which, it was hoped, would be presented to the next session of Congress. In essence, the proposals involved placing teachers in a special Civil Service category, the creation of which would eliminate existing handicaps and improve their status.⁷³

⁶⁹ DF, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to COFS, 30 Jul 56, sub: Civilian Career Planning. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

⁷⁰ (1) Extract fr Army Prog Rept 5-C, for qtr ending 31 Mar 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G1 Civ Pers Br files. (2) USAREUR Program Prog Rept, FY 57, 4th Qtr, p. 5B-15. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷¹ Intervs, Mr. Lane with Mr. W. O. Jacobson and Mr. L. Winokur, USAREUR G1 Civ Pers Br, 6 Jun and 20 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷² USAREUR Ann Hist Repts, FY 55, pp. 135, 220; FY 56, pp. 117-18. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

⁷³ Intervs, Mr. Lane with Messrs. Jacobson and Winokur, cited above.

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b. German Local Wage Rate Employees.

(1) The 45-Hour Week. In October 1956 USAREUR, acting for the U.S. forces in Europe, proposed to the French, British, and Belgian forces that the workweek of most categories of German LWR employees be reduced to 44 or 45 hours, with no decrease in pay.⁷⁴ Action upon a similar U.S. suggestion during the FY 1956 negotiations leading to the adoption of a new wage scale had been postponed because the other employing forces had felt that discussion of a shorter workweek would only delay a wage agreement. However, a continuing trend toward higher wages and a shorter workweek in German industry indicated that the German trade unions would soon ask for another wage increase. USAREUR felt that the employing forces would have to develop a joint position and, if possible, be prepared to offer a 44- or 45-hour week as a counter-proposal.

The suggestion was made none too soon, for on 12 October 1956 the German unions gave notice of their desire for new wage negotiations. The employing forces easily agreed among themselves to offer first, or instead, a 45-hour workweek without reduction in take-home pay. However, under the procedure established by the West German Government, negotiations between the forces and the unions had to be conducted through and by the Federal Ministry of Finance. This agency, which had tended to proceed very slowly in reducing work hours in German industry, was equally cautious about permitting the armed forces of guest nations to set a precedent to which civilian employees of the new German Armed Forces might point. Not until 14 May 1957 did the ministry advise the employing forces that it was ready to negotiate, on their behalf, for a reduced workweek. Moreover, the negotiations were to concern only categories of workers for whom such a reduction had already been established in German industry.⁷⁵

Actual negotiations began on 27 May 1957, with representatives of the employing forces as observers. It soon became clear that the forces' desire to consider the length of the workweek first and hourly wages later, if need be, conflicted with the wish of some of the unions that both matters be considered together. At one point the German Industrial Metalworkers' Union (Industrie Gewerkschaft Metall) made formal allegations to the American (AFL) and International Machinists' Unions that the NATO Armed Forces in Germany were blocking the negotiations.⁷⁶ But

⁷⁴ Ltrs, CINCUSAREUR to CCEFA, CINC BAOR, CINC 2ATAF, and CG Belgain I Corps, 8 Oct 56, sub: Negotiating Position on Reduced Work Week for Specific Categories of German Employees. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. In SGS 230 IND (1956), Item 04.

⁷⁵ Telecon TT-9607, USAREUR to DA for DCSPER, 18 Jun 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div files.

⁷⁶ Cable DA-924356, DA fr DCSPER to USAREUR, 14 Jun 57, cited in Telecon cited above. CONFIDENTIAL.

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this charge was easily disproved by a detailed review of the discussions up to that point.⁷⁷

In late June 1957 an agreement was reached.⁷⁸ Effective 1 August 1957, a reduction of work hours to 45 a week was granted to about 67 percent of USAREUR's German LWR employees, principally those in categories for which comparable reductions had been made in German industry. A 5-day workweek was also established in most cases. Since weekly take-home pay remained the same, the reduction in working hours necessitated an upward adjustment of over 6 percent in weekly pay rates. Increased rates for overtime would come into being on 1 January 1958.

(2) Proposed Extension to Other LWR Employees. The reduced workweek did not apply to employees in hotels, restaurants, clubs, hospitals, fire and guard companies, commissaries, exchanges, and similar establishments, which obviously had to operate for long hours or continuously. Nor had such a reduction been granted to corresponding workers in German industry. However, as a step toward equalizing working conditions, the employing forces undertook to realign their job structures in these categories with those in German industry. At the end of the year the forces' position was being studied by the German authorities.⁷⁹

(3) Performance Allowance System. In March 1957 USAREUR adopted a system of monetary awards for German LWR manual workers, as distinct from foremen and administrative and clerical personnel, for satisfactory and superior work performance over specified periods. The allowance was 2 percent of basic pay for at least 6 months of continuous satisfactory service, 4 percent for at least 18 months of such service; 4 percent after 12 months of superior performance, and 6 percent after 18 months of superior performance.⁸⁰ Requirements for building construction employees were somewhat more stringent.

(4) Security Separation Policy. Shortly after becoming a sovereign state the Federal Republic of Germany compiled, as a security measure, a list of 14 illegal or undesirable German organizations. In May 1957 US EUCOM directed that personnel officers, in the course of security separation actions, should consider these organizations, or membership therein, as inimical to U.S. security interests also.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Telecon TT-9607, cited above.

⁷⁸ USAREUR Memo 600-310-10, 9 Jul 57, sub: Reduction of Work Hours for LWR Personnel. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷⁹ Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. S. Sutherland, USAREUR G1 Civ Pers Br, 28 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁸⁰ USAREUR Memo 600-300-3, 27 Mar 57, sub: Performance Allowances for LWR Civilian Employees. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁸¹ US EUCOM Memo 380-5-16, 6 May 57, sub: Security Separations of Indigenous Employees. CONFIDENTIAL.

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Personnel officers were likewise to reject members of certain other organizations when screening applications for employment. If later evidence showed that an employee was a member of or in sympathy with any of these organizations, but had not so stated in the personal history submitted, he was to be discharged for untruthfulness.

c. French Local Wage Rate Employees.

(1) Impact of Algerian and Suez Situations. USACOMZEUR continued to employ LWR workers, but recruiting was made more difficult than usual by the Suez episode and the Algerian situation. Conscription of French citizens into the French Armed Forces reduced the available labor pool and made inroads into the LWR working staff. It also made many LWR jobs for men less attractive, since a worker employed to fill a draftee's place could be hired only temporarily.⁸² Moreover, unless beyond draft age, a newly hired worker would himself be liable to military conscription. Thus availability of personnel was uncertain and largely unpredictable.

(2) Supplementary Contributions to Retirement Pay for Cadre Workers. At the suggestion of the French Central Liaison Mission, USAREUR and USAFE agreed in September 1956 to adopt the French plan under which employers made special contributions to the retirement pay of supervisory personnel, known as the cadre. The supplementary contribution agreed upon, effective 1 January 1957, was 6 percent of an employee's wages, to be applied toward retirement pay, and 1.5 percent toward other social security benefits. Although dictated only by French custom, the step was deemed advisable as a means of retaining the services of experienced supervisors, enhancing the reputation of the U.S. forces as enlightened employers, and demonstrating that in its dealings with French LWR workers the United States accepted prevailing French practices in the field of employee-management relationships.⁸³

(3) Proposed Performance Allowance System. At the close of the year a plan of monetary awards for sustained performance, similar to that adopted for certain categories of German LWR workers, was being formulated for France.⁸⁴

⁸²USAREUR Program Prog Rept, FY 57, 2d Qtr, pp. 1-10 (released Feb 57). UNCLASSIFIED.

⁸³(1) Cables EPCPA-95294, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Sep 56; SX-18828, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 10 Sep 56; EPCPA-97215, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Sep 56; 8171, Ch/EES Nuremberg to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Sep 56. (2) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to COFS, 6 Sep 56, sub: Retirement Pay for French Supervisors. All UNCLASSIFIED. All in SGS 230 IND (1956), Item 012.

⁸⁴Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. W. O. Jacobson, C/USAREUR G1 Civ Pers Br, 6 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Section III: Labor Service Personnel

Labor Service units, composed of German and displaced non-German civilians, continued to provide guard and technical service support in Germany and France, under the staff supervision of the Labor Service Division (LSD), Headquarters, USAREUR.

27. Strength and Trends

Numerical strength continued to decline more than anticipated. Losses approximated 14.5 percent (Table 1), following a similar decrease during FY 1956.

a. Losses to German Armed Forces. Following the activation of West German Armed Forces, about 40 percent of the German Labor Service personnel, chiefly older men and including many in the higher grades, had volunteered for the new forces. Although not all volunteers were accepted, 1,147 Labor Service employees were called up between November 1955 and the end of FY 1957. Moreover, it seemed likely that many of the younger men would be drafted.⁸⁵

b. Losses Through Emigration. Because of efforts to allow as many eligible persons as possible to take advantage of the provisions of the U.S. Escapee Program before its expiration on 31 December 1956,⁸⁶ the Labor Service lost approximately 1,200 non-German individuals through emigration to the United States.⁸⁷ Since these included about 950 Poles, the impact of this loss was felt heavily in France, where, by agreement, only Polish Labor Service workers were employed.

c. Losses Through Budgetary Limitations. The Labor Service also continued to feel the pinch of budgetary limitations, chiefly from decreased Deutsche Mark funds for the support of units assigned to Germany. An over-all personnel ceiling of 18,218 was imposed, to be maintained by a controlled reduction-in-force if necessary. Beginning 1 July 1956, funds for the employment of Labor Service guards were drastically curtailed. The process of substituting commercial-contract guards for Labor Service guards in posts of a nonsensitive nature, which had been instituted in FY 1956 in anticipation of this contingency,⁸⁸

⁸⁵ CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 11, 17 Jul 57, Annex B, sub: Labor Services Past and Present. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁸⁶ USAREUR Program Prog Rept, FY 57, 2d Qtr, pp. 1-10 (released Feb 57). UNCLASSIFIED.

⁸⁷ Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col R. J. Billado, Dep C/USAREUR LSD, 6 Jun and 17 Jul 57. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁸⁸ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 84-85. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

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was completed by 31 December 1956. Forced reduction did not become necessary.

28. Composition

On 30 June 1957 the national composition⁸⁹ of the Labor Service force under the jurisdiction of the Army, as compared with that at the end of FY 1956, was as follows:⁹⁰

| | <u>30 Jun 56</u> | <u>30 Jun 57</u> | <u>Decrease</u> |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| <u>Total</u> | <u>20,013</u> | <u>17,185*</u> | <u>2,828</u> |
| Germans | 11,117 | 9,668 | 1,449 |
| Poles | 6,068** | 4,993*** | 1,075 |
| Latvians | 1,168 | 1,124 | 44 |
| Lithuanians | 678 | 651 | 27 |
| Estonians | 304 | 241 | 63 |
| Czechoslovakians | 251 | 158 | 93 |
| Bulgarians | 160 | 160 | 0 |
| Russians | 159 | 102 | 57 |
| Albanians | 108 | 88 | 20 |

*Actual end-of-month strength. The figure 17,234 shown in Table 1 represents persons paid during June.

**2,488 in France.

***1,903 in France.

29. Personnel Policies and Problems

a. Continuation of German Contingents. The Bonn Conventions stipulated that Labor Service units composed of German nationals would be disbanded by 5 May 1957, and not reestablished, unless agreement to continue them was reached before that date through negotiation between the employing governments and the Federal Republic of Germany.⁹¹ Talks between German and other delegations began on 20 July 1956.⁹² They were long drawn out, chiefly because of the Federal Republic's insistence that the units, if continued, would have to be strictly civilian in

⁸⁹ Hungarians not listed separately.

⁹⁰ (1) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 83. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL). (2) USAREUR LSD Tab of LS Strength by Nationalities, 30 Jun 57. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁹¹ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 85. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

⁹² (1) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 20, 19 Jul 56, p. 4. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED). (2) USAREUR Memo 1-20-9, 28 Jul 56, ch 1, sub: Bimonthly Ambassador-Commander's Conference, 23 July 1956, Annex A, comments by C/LSD. UNCLASSIFIED.

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character.⁹³

According to the agreement reached in February 1957,⁹⁴ the forces might continue to employ German citizens, either individually or in groups, after 5 May, for labor service anywhere on West German territory. Units would be known as Civilian Labor Groups (Zivile Arbeitsgruppen) and would be engaged in services of a noncombatant nature only. Personnel would receive no military training, hold no military rank, and wear no military insignia; nor would they participate in military parades or other ceremonies in military formation. They might be required to wear uniforms while at work, but the uniforms were not to resemble those of German or other forces stationed in Germany, and wearing them while off-duty would be discouraged. Wages and salaries, which might include subsistence and billeting, would be regulated by a special tariff.⁹⁵ The German Labor Service units in the employ of the U.S. forces remained under the operational control of Seventh Army.⁹⁶ An amendment provided that German Labor Service amphibious and bridge construction units, which obviously performed certain military functions, would remain intact until the new German Armed Forces were in a position to take over those functions without impairing the efficiency of Seventh Army operations.⁹⁷

Thus, while German Labor Service units were technically disbanded as of 5 May 1957, by agreement they were reactivated immediately and continued to operate in most essential respects. Moreover, the U.S. forces' right to maintain non-German Labor Service units was not affected.⁹⁸

⁹³(1) Cable 257, AMEMB Bonn to DA, 18 Dec 56. SECRET. In SGS 231.4 (1956). (2) Memo for rec, USAREUR ACOFS G3, 21 Jan 56, sub: 9th Meeting of Reps of the CINCs, 19 Jan 56. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 337 (1957). (3) DF, USAREUR LSD to DCOFS, 26 Mar 57, sub: Continuation of Labor Service Units, and Comment 2, SGS to LSD, 30 Mar 56, same sub. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 231.4 (1957).

⁹⁴Cables 242, US CINCEUR Rep Bonn to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Feb 57; CN 319, AMEMB Bonn to Sec State, 11 Feb 57. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in SGS 231.4 (1957), Item 3.

⁹⁵USAREUR Memo 600-400-2, 3 Jun 57, sub: Labor Service Organization in Germany Under Article 45 of the Forces Convention. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁹⁶(1) Cable 472, AMEMB Bonn to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Mar 57. (2) Cable SX-2439, USAREUR to AMEMB Bonn, 25 Mar 57. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in SGS 231.4 (1957), Item 3.

⁹⁷(1) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 28, 21 Nov 56, pp. 2-3. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cables 449, AMEMB Bonn to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Mar 57; SX-2374, USAREUR AMEMB Bonn, 20 Mar 57. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in SGS 231.4 (1957), Item 3. (3) Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col R. J. Billado, Dep C/USAREUR LSD, 18 Jul 57. CONFIDENTIAL. (4) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 11, 16 Jul 57, Annex B, sub: Labor Services Past and Present. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁹⁸USAREUR JA Hist Jnl for, May 57, Item 1, 17 May 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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b. Reorganization. The agreement to continue German contingents, together with the wage agreement for German and non-German units that had been adopted in June 1956,⁹⁹ led to a number of organizational changes. Military titles and terminology were replaced by civilian grades and terminology, but basic structure and functions were not changed.¹⁰⁰

c. Use of Hungarian Refugees. Following the Hungarian uprisings in late 1956, the possibility of hiring Hungarian refugees for Labor Service units came under consideration.¹⁰¹ At the time there were no Hungarian units in the Labor Service, although approximately 100 Hungarians were members of other national units, principally Polish. If the Department of State concurred, USAREUR could seek Kersten funds¹⁰² for the employment of up to 1,000 of the refugees. It seemed that this number would become available. Hiring them would accord with national policy, the Washington agencies controlling Kersten funds would probably be receptive to the idea, and international good will would be enhanced if the plan were put into effect without delay. A basic consideration in support of such a plan was that the new Hungarian units would increase the technical support rendered by the Labor Service organization. The possibility of sending Hungarian units to France was also considered. However, such a step would necessitate negotiation with the French, since by agreement no non-German Labor Service workers except Poles might be sent to that country.

The general idea gained the support of the Federal Republic of Germany, which had agreed to accept 10 percent of the persons who had found refuge in Austria. Employment by the Labor Service would provide billets for those hired and would thus ease West Germany's housing burden to some extent.¹⁰³ US EUCOM endorsed the proposal, provided that no recruiting would be done in Austria, that no pressure would be exerted upon the refugees, and that no psychological exploitation of the new units would be undertaken initially. In addition, US EUCOM recommended that the Department of the Army give immediate consideration to expanding the Labor Service, or establishing another program, to absorb refugees

⁹⁹(1) USAREUR Cir 600-434, 18 Jun 56, Annex A, sub: Tariff Agreement for the Employment of the Civilian Service Units within the Territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 83-84. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

¹⁰⁰(1) Interv, Mr. Lane with Col Billado, 18 Jul 57, cited above. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) USAREUR Cir 600-446, 17 Apr 57, sub: Labor Service Supply--Clothing and Insignia. (3) USAREUR Memo 600-400-2, 3 Jun 57, and Annexes, sub: Labor Service Organization in Germany Under Article 45 of the Forces Convention. Last two UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰¹USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 29, 28 Nov 56. CONFIDENTIAL.

¹⁰²Special funds appropriated by Congress for recruiting aliens.

¹⁰³Cable 257, AMEMB Bonn to DA, 18 Dec 56. SECRET. In SGS 231.4 (1956).

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from Hungary and other Soviet satellites if the westward trek from those countries should increase.¹⁰⁴ Because of the rapidly diminishing Labor Service strength in France, USAREUR COMZ was willing to consider the organization of Hungarian units for service there, but raised the point that French industry was generally opposed to the entry of foreign workers.¹⁰⁵

The Department of the Army's final decision was that the organization of Hungarian refugees into separate units would be politically untimely. No objection was raised, however, to their employment as individuals to fill vacancies in existing units.¹⁰⁶ Few Hungarians were actually secured, possibly because no all-Hungarian units were to be formed.¹⁰⁷ In general, those few were inducted without incident, although in at least one instance there were brawls between Poles and Hungarians when the latter joined a Polish company.¹⁰⁸

d. Continued Difficulties in France. Even though the lowered authorized ceilings were maintained, recruiting of Polish replacements for Labor Service units in France continued to be difficult. Not only were Labor Service personnel ineligible for French social service benefits, but they would become ineligible for the more liberal German benefits if they did not return to West Germany within 6 months of their date of transfer to France. In partial compensation, the United States continued to grant them a limited amount of free medical care, together with sick and annual leave, and added other privileges, such as PX eligibility, payment in MPC's, and the purchase of gasoline from QM outlets.¹⁰⁹

e. Completion of Documentation Process. The U.S.-financed screening center at Kaiserslautern completed documentation of the legal status of certain Polish Labor Service personnel scheduled to return to West

¹⁰⁴(1) Cable SX-2389, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 29 Nov 56. (2) Cable EC-9-6668, US CINCEUR to DA, 6 Dec 56. (3) Cable DA-480212, DA to US CINCEUR, 11 Dec 56. SECRET. All in file cited above.

¹⁰⁵(1) Ltr, Maj Gen E. D. Post, USAREUR DCOFS, to Maj Gen H. W. Johnson, CG USAREUR COMZ, 11 Dec 56. (2) Ltr, Gen Johnson to Gen Post, 20 Dec 56. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file cited above.

¹⁰⁶(1) Cables DA-484495 and -515629, DA to US CINCEUR, 21 and 31 Dec 56. (2) Cable EC-9-7043, US CINCEUR to DA, 28 Dec 56. All CONFIDENTIAL. All in file cited above.

¹⁰⁷Interv, Mr. Lane with Col Billado, 18 Jul 57, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰⁸Kaiserslautern Pfaelzische Volkszeitung, 25 Jun 56, p. 3 and 27 Jun, p. 5, cited in Hq USAREUR Daily Foreign Press Summary for 25-26 and 27-28 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰⁹CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 11, 18 Jul 57, Annex B, sub: Labor Services Past and Present. CONFIDENTIAL.

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Germany from France.¹¹⁰ This process had begun in 1955, when the Federal Republic of Germany became increasingly anxious to make sure that non-German workers returning to Germany were eligible for reentry under German law.¹¹¹

Section IV: Morale, Discipline, and Welfare

30. General State of Morale

Morale continued to be high. Participation in religious activities increased.¹¹² USAREUR personnel took part in 5,700 community relations events in Germany, 300 in France, and 500 in England--and the trend was upward throughout the year. Absences without leave were fewer. Complaints from individuals and commands received by the USAREUR IG Division were normal and declining; of 197 received during the third quarter, 63 were found to be justified; of 151 received during the 4th quarter, 37 were found to be justified. The largest single group (19 percent) received during the fourth quarter concerned administrative matters, pay, and allowances; about 17 percent involved conduct, and 15 percent related to the service and supply functions. Miscellaneous complaints (not more than 5 pertaining to any one subject) concerned efficiency ratings, enlistment "promises," and refusals of or delays in marriage request approvals.¹¹³

a. Factors Contributing to Improved Morale.

(1) Officers' Prestige Program. In October 1956 the Department of the Army urged all commands to discontinue practices, required of officers, that tended to be irritating and to infringe upon the degree of privilege to which persons in positions of trust were entitled. In the main, these infringements were installation requirements that could be corrected locally.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ Interv, Mr. Lane with Col Billado, 18 Jul 57, cited above.

¹¹¹ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 55, p. 114. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

¹¹² Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col C. J. Murphy, USAREUR Dep Ch, 6 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹¹³ Rev of USAREUR Comd Programs FY 57, 4th Qtr, pp. 2-3. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

¹¹⁴ Ltr, Lt Gen E. P. Booth, DCSPER, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, 12 Oct 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 330.11 (1957).

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A headquarters study instituted by General Hodes resulted in several administrative changes. Authority to approve certain work order requests was delegated to deputy division chiefs. Except in matters concerning pay, allowances, and accountability for funds and property, local support installations were authorized to accept officers' certificates more widely in lieu of complete documentation; for example, as evidence of the appropriate clearances when departing from a post.¹¹⁵

(2) NCO Prestige Program. The program to enhance the prestige of noncommissioned officers, begun in FY 1956, continued. In September 1956 General Hodes urged all subordinate commands to put forth greater efforts in this respect and made definite suggestions concerning what might be done.¹¹⁶ Some of the accomplishments reported by the various subordinate commands included elimination of repetitive training; awarding of certificates of achievement; opening of new clubs for NCO's (E-5 to E-7); extension of class VI privileges to certain bachelor NCO's; allowing E-7's and E-6's to use ID cards as passes; and organizing of separate NCO messes.¹¹⁷

(3) Payment of Travel Allowances. Until the third quarter of FY 1957 an individual traveling by privately owned vehicle on a permanent change of station within Germany could not be paid a travel allowance in lieu of transportation. This restriction had been imposed by a Joint Travel Regulation, issued during the occupation period, which prohibited payment of such an allowance when transportation was available at no cost to the government or the individual. At the end of the occupation period, however, the Federal Republic of Germany had stopped providing free transportation as such. Moreover, Defense Support Deutsche Mark funds allotted for paying travel costs were not sufficient for FY 1957. Since free transportation was therefore no longer available, the Department of the Army was asked to authorize the reimbursement of individuals, from dollar funds, for the cost of travel by privately owned vehicle. The request was granted in March 1957, and USAREUR revised its regulations accordingly.¹¹⁸ Because of the widespread ownership of automobiles by both officer and enlisted personnel, this change had considerable impact.

¹¹⁵(1) List of Recommendations Considered Favorably, 7 Jan 57. (2) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Booth, 23 Jan 57. (3) Ltr, Gen Booth to Gen Hodes, 27 Mar 57. All UNCLASSIFIED. All in file cited above.

¹¹⁶Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to sub comds, 19 Sep 56, sub: NCO Prestige. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 330.11 (1957).

¹¹⁷Ltrs, Maj Gen R. W. Cogliazier, CG COMZ, to Gen Hodes, 3 Oct 56; Lt Col I. W. Brooks, CO BPOE, to Gen Hodes, 4 Oct 56; Brig Gen G. T. Duncan, CG 6th Inf Regt, to Gen Hodes, 27 Apr 57; and others. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

¹¹⁸(1) Memo, Brig Gen R. Hackett, USAREUR Compt, to TIG, 11 Oct 56, sub: Payment of Monetary Allowance in Lieu of Transportation in Connection with Change of Station. (2) Cable DA-5066947, DA Compt to CINC-USAREUR, 13 Mar 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR Compt Fin Policy Br files.

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(4) Red Cross and Army Emergency Relief Activities. The American Red Cross, as usual, contributed to good morale by furnishing financial and other assistance in the solution of personal and family problems. Financial aid, in 115,700 cases involving Armed Forces personnel in Europe, amounted to approximately \$757,000, of which \$715,000 was in the form of loans and \$42,000 in outright grants. In addition, 12,500 Red Cross volunteer workers contributed 121,000 man-hours of assistance as Grey Ladies, staff and nurses' aides, canteen helpers, production workers, Motor Corps Service personnel, etc.¹¹⁹

Army Emergency Relief made 7,452 personal loans, totaling \$1,059,000 and 164 outright grants, totaling \$26,400, to USAREUR personnel. Of the money loaned, \$902,000 had been repaid at the end of the year.¹²⁰

b. Factors Adversely Affecting Morale. On the other hand, a number of circumstances and developments were unfavorable to the maintenance of high morale.

(1) Limited Availability of Concurrent Travel. While gyroscope movements to and from Germany increased the amount of concurrent travel, many families eligible for government housing still had to wait from 3 to 16 months before housing became available. (See par. 23b (1) above).

(2) Continued Difficulties in France. As already pointed out, the unavailability of government-operated family-type housing, the shortages in commodity and guaranteed rental housing, together with the generally high cost of living on the local economy, continued to make service in France relatively unattractive.

(3) Charges for Banking Services. A minor, but command-wide irritant was the exaction of certain new banking fees. Following a survey during FY 1956,¹²¹ the U.S. Treasury, with the concurrence of the military departments, had authorized overseas banking facilities to introduce a new schedule of charges to patrons, effective 1 January 1957. While the charge for cashing a check drawn on a bank in the United States was reduced from 3/4 of 1 percent (minimum 40 cents) to 1/4 of 1 percent (minimum 10 cents), new charges were approved: 50 cents monthly against each checking account in which the balance fell below \$200 during the month; 25 cents for each savings account withdrawal in excess of two per month; one dollar, plus expenses, for each check returned because of insufficient funds, and a minimum of 25 cents for accepting a check from

¹¹⁹ Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. F. D. Saitta, ARC Ln Off to USAREUR, 22 Jul 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹²⁰ Info fr USAREUR AER Off, 16 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹²¹ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 38-39. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

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a non-account-holder, for collection.¹²² Taking immediate exception, USAREUR pointed out that military and civilian personnel were already paying a disproportionate share of the cost of military banking. (During FY 1956 the Treasury Department had borne only 27.8 percent). The charges against checking accounts would affect low-income enlisted personnel in particular and would tend to discourage the use of bank accounts at a time when USAREUR was stressing their use for the assignment of pay. Moreover, some of the charges were either excessive or inadequate.¹²³ However, since the new schedule had been recommended by the Treasury Department with Department of the Army concurrence, the matter was not pursued further.¹²⁴

31. Discipline

a. Absence Without Leave. Continuing a downward trend, absences without leave were fewer, averaging about 400 a month as against 450 during FY 1956. The average number of man-days lost per absence remained about the same, at 4.6.¹²⁵

| | <u>Cases of AWOL</u> | <u>Man-Days Lost</u> | <u>Average Man- Days Lost</u> |
|--------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Sep 56 | 378 | 1,823 | 4.9 |
| Dec 56 | 407 | 1,825 | 4.5 |
| Mar 57 | 405 | 1,650 | 4.1 |
| Jun 57 | 400 | 2,071 | 5.0 |

b. Crimes and Offenses.

(1) Offenses Against Persons and Property. During FY 1956, reported civil-type offenses of military personnel against persons and property had averaged 3.28 per thousand troops per month, as against 2.96 for FY 1955, and the trend had been generally upward, reaching 3.67 in June 1956.¹²⁶ The average for FY 1957 was 3.7. However, from 4.02 in July 1956 the rate dropped steadily, month by month, to 3.35 in November, doubtless reflecting the general tightening of discipline

¹²² Ltr, C/DA Fld Svc Div to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Nov 56, sub: Charges Made Against Individuals by Banking Facilities in Overseas Areas. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Compt Fin Policy Br files.

¹²³ 1st Ind, USAREUR Fin Acct Off to COFF, 15 Dec 56, to ltr cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹²⁴ Cable DA-488699, COFF to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Jan 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

¹²⁵ Repts of AWOL Incidents, Man-Days Lost, and Dropped From Rolls Incidents (MRU No. 499). UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Compt Prog Rev & Anal Br.

¹²⁶ USAREUR PM Stat Rept-RCS-PMG-2 (R-3), Military Offenders Involved In Civil-Type Offenses, FY 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR PM Div files.

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following the adverse "incident" publicity in the German press. Although it mounted again, reaching 4.06, a record, in March 1957, in June it had fallen to 3.43.¹²⁷

(2) Traffic Offenses. "Moving" traffic offenses, which were about 75 percent of all traffic offenses of American drivers and which included speeding, drunken driving, failure to heed signals, etc., averaged about 3,200 monthly.¹²⁸ In an effort to eliminate unsafe and reckless drivers from the roads, the driving privileges of 4,954 individuals were suspended or revoked during the year, twice as many as during the previous year.¹²⁹

(3) Military Offenses. Purely military offenses (absence without leave, pass and uniform violations, disrespect to a superior, etc.) averaged about 8.6 per thousand troops per month--a sharp decrease of about 35 percent from FY 1956.¹³⁰

c. Courts-Martial. Although the number and rate of general courts-martial remained fairly constant, total courts increased by almost 20 percent over FY 1956:

| | <u>FY 1956</u> | <u>FY 1957</u> | | | | |
|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| | <u>Totals</u> | <u>Totals</u> | <u>1st Qtr</u> | <u>2d Qtr</u> | <u>3d Qtr</u> | <u>4th Qtr</u> |
| <u>Totals</u> | 25,547 | 31,557 | 8,512 | 6,632 | 9,033 | 7,380 |
| General | 1,016 | 913 | 240 | 215 | 235 | 223 |
| Special | 8,372 | 9,151 | 2,607 | 1,970 | 2,495 | 2,079 |
| Summary | 16,159 | 20,493 | 5,665 | 4,447 | 6,303 | 5,078 |

Expressed in number of trials per thousand troops per month, the over-all rate, which had been 9.75 in June 1956, was 11.42 during the first quarter of FY 1957, 9.27 during the second quarter, 11.12 during the third, and 10.35 during the fourth. The most striking increase was in summary courts. In a month-to-month-analysis, August 1956 showed large increases in all types because of the emphasis on discipline following the adverse "incident" publicity in the German press.¹³¹

¹²⁷ Incl 1 to DF, USAREUR PM to Hist Div, 2 Oct 57, sub: Provost Marshal Statistics. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹²⁸ Rates per month were no longer computed, since they would involve only personnel who drove cars and would be virtually meaningless.

¹²⁹ USAREUR Program Prog Repts, FY 57, 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th Qtrs, pp. 10-B-08 and 10-B-10. CONFIDENTIAL.

¹³⁰ Incl 1 to DF, USAREUR PM to Hist Div, 2 Oct 57, sub: Provost Marshal Statistics. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹³¹ (1) Rees of USAREUR JA Div Mil Jus Br. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Rev of USAREUR Comd Programs, FY 57, 1st Qtr, pp. 3, 27-29; 2d Qtr, pp. 4, 32-34; 3d Qtr, pp. 4, 35-37; 4th Qtr, pp. 4, 27. CONFIDENTIAL.

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d. Imprisonment. At the end of FY 1956 the number of prisoners held in confinement had been 831. At the end of FY 1957 it was 815, of whom 526 were in provisional guardhouses, 77 in the USAREUR stockade, and 212 in the USAREUR Rehabilitation Center. During the second quarter, Rehabilitation Center prisoners dropped sharply from 390 to 71, because of a new USAREUR policy, beginning September 1956, under which many prisoners were returned by board action to the United States for separation from the service.¹³²

32. Safety

At the end of FY 1956 the USAREUR accident rate, including vehicular, industrial, and military training mishaps, was rising and had become a matter of deep concern.¹³³ The objectives of the resulting safety program for FY 1957 were to intensify safety education and training throughout the command, to improve supervision, and to reduce accident rates. The goals were to decrease military personnel injuries by at least 9 percent, DA civilian injuries by at least 2 percent, other civilian injuries by at least 12 percent, Army motor vehicle injuries by at least 7 percent, and Army aircraft injuries by at least 10 percent.¹³⁴

a. Measures Taken. In pursuance of this program, fulltime civilian personnel were assigned to safety program duty in all area commands, at Seventh Army and its corps headquarters, and in USACOMZEUR commands. Safety training, especially for supervisory personnel, was expanded. Special visual aids for instruction in the prevention of accidents on the job and during training were prepared, with English, German, and French texts, and distributed. With the cooperation of German agencies, an intensive and aggressive highway safety campaign was initiated under the slogan, "Back the Attack on Traffic Accidents," to extend through the calendar year 1957. A stage production, "Highway Follies of 1956," sponsored by the USAREUR Provost Marshal Office and Seventh Army was presented in Army theaters in Germany and France beginning 1 July 1956. The Transportation Division published two new training pamphlets covering driving information for the operation of motor vehicles in Germany (EC-55-1) and France (EC-55-2). Also, a procedure for testing motor vehicle operators of newly arrived gyroscope units was instituted. The European Exchange Service (EES), which operated 1,200 vehicles for an aggregate of about 2 million miles a month, equipped all its vehicles with tachographs, which accurately recorded drivers' speeds, stops, and

¹³²USAREUR Program Prog Repts, FY 57, 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th Qtrs, p. 10B-15.
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¹³³USAREUR Memo 1-20-7, 4 Jun 56, sub: Bimonthly Ambassador-Commander's Conference Notes, 28 May 1956, Annex A, Comments by the CINC. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹³⁴USAREUR Program Prog Rept, FY 57, 2d Qtr, p. 4F-02 (released Feb 57). UNCLASSIFIED.

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similar details of operation. EES also used camera cars.¹³⁵

b. General Decline in Accident Rates. As a result, the over-all accident rate was reduced by 21.6 percent, and all contributory rates with the exception of the LWR on-the-job accident rate were lowered.¹³⁶

USAREUR Accident, Injury, and Fatality Rates

| | <u>FY 1956</u> | <u>FY 1957</u> | <u>Percent Increase or Decrease</u> |
|----------------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|
| <u>Injury Rate</u> | | | |
| Military (a) | 9.92 | 9.26 | - 6.7 |
| DA Civilian (b) | 0.85 | 0.41 | - 51.8 |
| Other Civilian (b) | 10.21 | 10.82 | + 6.0 |
| <u>Accident Rate</u> | | | |
| Motor Vehicle (c) | 2.94 | 2.65* or 2.24** | -9.9* or -23.8** |
| Army Aircraft (d) | 52.18 | 28.50 | - 45.4 |
| <u>Fatality Rate</u> | | | |
| Military (a) | 0.289 | 0.234 | - 19.0 |
| DA Civilian (b) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other Civilian (b) | 0.067 | 0.029 | - 56.7 |

*Old system, reporting all accidents.

**New system, reporting only accidents causing \$25 or more damage, an injury, or a fatality.

- (a) per 100,000 man-days' exposure
- (b) per 1,000,000 man-hours' exposure
- (c) per 100,000 miles driven
- (d) per 100,000 hours flown

The EES vehicle accident rate for the last 6 months of the fiscal year was 1.14.

c. Unsolved Problems.

(1) Off-Duty Accident Rate. In spite of indoctrination and stringent pass and leave controls, the off-duty accident rate, involving motorcars chiefly, continued to be high. Injuries incurred while

¹³⁵(1) CINCUSAREUR's Bimthly Amb-Comdr's Conf, 15 Dec 56, Sec VI, sub: Safety Campaign--Highway Traffic Accidents. (2) USAREUR Program Prog Repts, FY 57, Safety Program 4F. (3) Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. M. Morris, SAD EES, 23 Aug 57. All UNCLASSIFIED.

¹³⁶Data fr USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br. UNCLASSIFIED.

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off-duty ranged from 39 to 49 percent, per quarter, of all injuries to military personnel; deaths resulting from injuries while off-duty were from 34 to 82 percent of all deaths of military personnel.¹³⁷

(2) LWR Accident Rate. The on-the-job injury rate among LWR employees, which rose by 6 percent, also continued to be of great concern in both Germany and France. Among measures adopted to reduce it were checks on employees suspected of malingering; enlisting the aid of work councils; denial of pay where accidents were clearly caused by negligence or wrongdoing; increased safety training, and the issue of protective clothing. However, the underlying reason for the striking discrepancy between the LWR and DAC injury rates was thought to be the leniency of indigenous physicians in issuing certificates of disability. Since German accident insurance companies frequently employed their own physicians to make confidential diagnoses and treat sick and injured employees, at the end of the year the command was considering proposals to require LWR employees to obtain certificates from doctors of designated insurance companies or to employ local doctors, responsible to the command, for confidential examinations and diagnoses.¹³⁸

d. Awards. The USAREUR Quarterly Safety Command Awards were not conferred. However, USAREUR, the Southern Area Command, and the 32d AAA Brigade received the Department of the Army Award of Merit for Safety "for superior achievement in the prevention of accidents and maintenance of a safety program."¹³⁹

33. Health

The health of the command was excellent. The average daily non-effective rate was 8.6 per thousand personnel as against 10.4 for FY 1956. The rate of admissions to hospitals for all causes was 323.3 per thousand personnel per year, as compared with 384.5 during FY 1956. Admissions for diseases dropped from 325.3 per thousand to 244.9, and for nonbattle casualties from 60.2 to 52.6. Rates for common respiratory diseases and influenza fell from 102.1 per thousand to 80.4--the lowest level recorded since the U.S. Army arrived in Europe, and the rate for all forms of pneumonia was 5.21 per thousand as against 6.17 in FY 1956. The rate for infectious hepatitis, which accounted for a great deal of lost time, was only 1.25 per thousand personnel as compared with 2.21 during the previous year. It represented a steady decrease from the

¹³⁷ USAREUR Program Prog Repts, FY 57, Safety Program 4F. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹³⁸ (1) Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. J. M. Hoefer, C/USAREUR G1 Safety Br, 22 Jul 57. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Rev of USAREUR Comd Programs, FY 57, 2d Qtr, p. 5. CONFIDENTIAL.

¹³⁹ Interv, Mr. Lane with Mr. Hoefer, 22 Jul 57, cited above.

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record year, FY 1949, when the rate was 13.72 per thousand.¹⁴⁰

a. New VD Circular. Because modern techniques of treatment had reduced the incidence of venereal diseases and had made them a very minor cause of military noneffectiveness, a new USAREUR directive, following revision of Department of the Army policy, rescinded the requirement for reporting VD rates. However, commanders were not relieved of the responsibility of detecting and controlling VD incidence.¹⁴¹

b. Salk Vaccine Program. Response to the voluntary poliomyelitis immunization program showed marked improvement, notwithstanding a continued shortage of vaccine. While the constant turnover among dependent personnel made it impossible to maintain an accurate record of the number of persons receiving all three doses of the vaccine, the following tabulation indicates how great the improvement was:¹⁴²

| | <u>Total Doses</u> | <u>First Dose</u> | <u>Second Dose</u> | <u>Third Dose</u> |
|---------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| FY 1956 | 46,121 | 25,360 | 19,802 | 959 |
| FY 1957 | 132,058 | 59,313 | 47,865 | 24,880 |

c. Water Chlorination Program. Water chlorination continued to be a problem, particularly because a large amount of defective equipment installed by one contractor had to be replaced. Nevertheless, at the end of the year the program had made marked progress. In the Northern, Southern, and Headquarters Area Commands 110 of 212 programmed chlorination stations had been accepted by area engineers.¹⁴³

d. Radiation Hazard Prevention. USAREUR medical and industrial X-ray installations were surveyed for radiation hazards during the year and immediate steps were taken to correct deficiencies. A film badge dosimetric program was initiated to insure that personnel working with sources of ionizing radiation were not overexposed.¹⁴⁴

e. Impact of Medicare Act. The Dependents' Medical Care Act,¹⁴⁵ effective 7 December 1956, permitted the government to pay part of the cost of certain medical care, principally hospitalization, provided by

¹⁴⁰ DF, Col A. J. Rapalski, C/USAREUR Med Div Prev Med Br, to Hist Div, 18 Nov 57, sub: Preventive Medicine Section of USAREUR History FY 1957. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div files.

¹⁴¹ USAREUR Cir 40-330, 12 Apr 57, sub: Venereal Disease Control. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁴² (1) DF, 18 Nov 57, cited above. (2) USAREUR Program Prog Repts, FY 57, Log Svcs Program 10-E, Med & Hosp Svcs. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ DF, 18 Nov 57, cited above.

¹⁴⁵ PL 569, 84th Cong.

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civilian doctors and hospitals to dependents of military personnel on active duty. Since USAREUR's military medical facilities were considered to be generally adequate, the application of the law in Europe was restricted to emergency cases and to dependents living in remote or other areas where military medical facilities did not exist or were incapable of providing adequate care.¹⁴⁶ Up to 30 June 1957 only 52 claims had been filed, involving a governmental responsibility of about \$50 per claim.¹⁴⁷

34. USAREUR Savings Program

The USAREUR savings program, promoting the purchase of U.S. savings bonds by military and DA civilian personnel and the use of the soldiers' deposits system by enlisted personnel, reached record heights. With command emphasis upon thrift as a principle, participation in the program increased from 30.8 percent of personnel during the first quarter to a record 38.2 percent during the fourth. The European Motion Picture Service, The Stars and Stripes, and the American Forces Network took active part in promotion.¹⁴⁸

a. Savings Bond Program. The effectiveness of the savings bonds program was aided by an increase in the interest rate from 3 to $3\frac{1}{4}$ percent on 1 February 1957, by a personal communication from CINCUSAREUR to subordinate commanders during the third quarter, and by a person-to-person canvass, which reached the lowest echelons, during the fourth.¹⁴⁹ Sales during the year totaled \$11,285,995, an increase of 13 percent over FY 1956. Although the extent of participation continued to be far short of the Department of the Army's goal--i.e., purchases by at least 65 percent of military and DA civilian personnel¹⁵⁰--it rose from 14.9 to 18.5 percent of military and from 2.2 to 7.6 percent of civilian personnel during FY 1957. Thirty company-size units received the Minute

¹⁴⁶(1) USAREUR Memo 40-10-1, 3 Dec 56, sub: Medical Care for Dependents. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) CINCUSAREUR's Bimthly Amb-Comdr's Conf, 17 Dec 56: Statement by Maj Gen A. L. Gorby, USAREUR Surgeon. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

¹⁴⁷USAREUR Med Div Program & Resources Br Mthly Rept, Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁴⁸(1) Qtrly Repts, USAREUR Savings Program, FY 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Compt Fin Policy Br. (2) Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Capt W. Kesselman, USAREUR Compt Fin Policy Br, 29 Jul 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁴⁹(1) 1st Ind, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR to CG 7th Army, and others, 11 Apr 57, to DA ltr, 20 Mar 57, sub: Army Savings Bond Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Compt Fin Pol Br files. (2) DA Cir 608-28, 31 Dec 56, sub: 1957 Person-to-Person Canvass--Army Savings Bond Program. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) USAREUR Memo 608-60-9, 5 Apr 57, sub: Army Savings Bonds. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁵⁰DA Cir 500-1, 11 Apr 55, sub: Savings Bond Program.

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Man Award for 65 percent participation, and 8 of these received also the Department of the Army Award for 100 percent participation. Two battalion-size units won the Secretary of the Army Award for 80 percent participation. A USAREUR proposal that DA civilians be permitted to spread payment for a bond over more than one payroll was not approved.¹⁵¹

b. Soldiers' Deposits Program. Soldiers' deposits also increased, totaling \$11,097,002 as compared with \$10,438,623 during FY 1956. Participation reached a new high in June 1957 when 48,860 individuals made deposits.¹⁵²

35. Character Guidance and Religious Activities

a. Character Guidance. A revised character guidance directive stressed the development in the soldier of self-discipline, maturity in personnel conduct, acceptance of his role as an American ambassador of good will, participation in genuinely wholesome after-duty activities, and the faithful practice of his religious obligations, whatever his faith. These were the principal objectives of the USAREUR Character Guidance Program.¹⁵³

Following an expression of general concern on the part of the Department of Defense as well as the receipt of specific complaints from the field, the USAREUR Character Guidance Council,¹⁵⁴ through its Literature Standards Committee, inquired again into the moral tone of certain publications sold at The Stars and Stripes newsstands and into the standards for selecting and reviewing materials accepted for sale.¹⁵⁵ At the end of the year the committee was about to meet with The Stars and Stripes representatives to determine how the standards were applied in actual practice.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵¹(1) Qtrly Repts, USAREUR Savings Program, FY 57, cited above.
(2) Interv, Mr. Lane with Capt Kesselman, 29 Jul 57, cited above. (3) USAREUR Program Prog Rept, FY 57, 4th Qtr, p. 10F-07. All UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁵²Ibid.

¹⁵³USAREUR Cir 28-16, 5 Oct 56, sub: USAREUR Character Guidance. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁵⁴Ltr, OSD to Asst SA, SN, & SAF, 5 Jul 56, sub: Protection of Moral Standards. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br files.

¹⁵⁵(1) DF, USAREUR Character Guidance Council Literary Stds Com, to CINFO, 15 Jan 57. (2) Min, Mtg of USAREUR Character Guidance Council, Jan 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in files cited above.

¹⁵⁶Min, Mtg of USAREUR Character Guidance Council, May 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

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b. Religious Activities. In addition to conducting regular chapel service and pastoral activities, the Chaplain Corps placed emphasis upon the extension of the lay program, religious education for all groups and at all age levels, the retreat program, and the promotion of the Clean Speech Poster Campaign as a special project.

The Protestant Youth of the Chapel, a counterpart of men's and women's groups established in FY 1956, was organized; the women's Catholic Group met for the first time; and an organization for men, women, and children of the Jewish faith got under way. At the first fully organized choir clinic held in Berchtesgaden from 18-22 February 1957, choir leaders, organists, and vocalists concentrated on the study of chapel music, the development of choral groups, and similar topics for local application.

Three new chapels were completed in Germany and five in France. Of the 263 chaplains, representing 24 denominations, 158 were Protestant, 89, Catholic; 9, Jewish; 4, Latter-day Saints; and 3, Christian Scientist. An average of 25 percent of all military and civilian personnel attended one religious service weekly, 7.2 percent attended a religious education activity, and 18.4 percent had some individual contact with a chaplain in the course of his pastoral duties.

In October 1956, ceremonies were held marking the attendance of the 20,000th retreatant at Berchtesgaden since the founding of the Retreat House (Alpine Inn) in June 1954. Opportunities for participation in the retreat program were distributed more equitably through the allocation of spaces to units by the area commands.

Because the demands upon the Alpine Inn continued to exceed its capacity and facilities, denominational retreats with more than 100 participants were held at the General Walker Hotel. All in all, 69 retreats and convocations, with an attendance of 10,917 persons, were held: 43 of these were retreats for Protestant and Catholic personnel; 4 were Jewish Torah convocations; 7 were denominational conferences; 10 were meetings of special groups, such as the Protestant Teen-Agers' Leadership Conference, the Catholic Women's Convention, etc.; and 5 were retreats for chaplains.

c. Clean Speech Poster Contest. As an extension of previous years' efforts, a command-wide Clean Speech Poster Contest, sponsored jointly by the Chaplain Division and the USAREUR Character Guidance Council and endorsed personally by General Hodes, was held during February-May 1957.¹⁵⁷ Military, civilian, and dependent personnel submitted over 5,000 entries, from which the three best were selected at USAREUR headquarters after

¹⁵⁷(1) USAREUR Memo 28-16-2, 13 Feb 56, sub: USAREUR Clean Speech Poster Contest for 1957. (2) Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to all comds, 7 Feb 57, sub: Clean Speech Poster Contest. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Ch Div files.

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preliminary awards and eliminations at lower echelons.¹⁵⁸

36. Welfare and Recreation

a. Special Services. Although no activities were eliminated, the expenditures for the athletics, recreation, and entertainment programs were reduced by more than a million dollars to \$8,458,570. As shown by the following tabulation, 93 percent of the cost was paid from non-appropriated funds.¹⁵⁹

| | <u>FY 1956</u> | | <u>FY 1957</u> | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|--------------|--------------------|--------------|
| <u>Total</u> | <u>\$9,551,785</u> | <u>100.0</u> | <u>\$8,458,570</u> | <u>100.0</u> |
| Nonappropriated Funds | 7,844,241 | 82.1 | 7,870,087 | 93.0 |
| Appropriated Dollar Funds | 903,544 | 9.5 | 318,576 | 3.8 |
| Defense Support Deutsche Marks | 804,000 | 8.4 | 269,907 | 3.2 |

Administrative costs were reduced from 16 percent to slightly more than 10. Approximately 50 percent of the year's expenditure was for service club and library activities and 25 percent for sports and athletics.¹⁶⁰

| <u>Activity</u> | <u>Expenditure</u> | |
|-----------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | <u>Total</u> | <u>\$8,458,570</u> |
| Service Clubs | 2,845,261 | 33.6 |
| Sports | 2,085,165 | 24.7 |
| Libraries | 1,421,752 | 16.8 |
| Administration | 870,501 | 10.3 |
| Crafts Shops | 860,449 | 10.2 |
| Entertainment | 375,442 | 4.4 |

(1) Athletics. Wrestling and cross-country racing were added to the program for men. Thus bowling, tennis, golf, boxing, wrestling, and track and field athletics, including cross-country, were provided throughout the command as individual sports; volleyball, touch football, basketball, soccer, and softball were organized on the company level; soccer, baseball, and basketball teams in battalion-size units, and football and baseball teams at the regimental level. To equalize competition, the number of athletic conferences for the three major

¹⁵⁸(1) Inters, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Cols C. J. Murphy, H. K. Cross, and D. E. Kinsler, USAREUR Ch Div, 6 Jun & 19 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo prepared by USAREUR Ch Div, Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In Hist Div files.

¹⁵⁹Rev of USAREUR Comd Programs, FY 57, 4th Qtr, p. 41. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

¹⁶⁰Ibid., p. 42.

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sports was increased from 10 to 12. USAREUR was host to the CISM (Conseil International du Sport Militaire) boxing meet and sent representatives to that organization's basketball, fencing, boxing, soccer, swimming, and track and field competitions.¹⁶¹

Participation in bowling reached a new high. Fifty new alleys were installed, bringing the total to 886. Games rolled totaled 8,375,000 as against 7,713,500 during FY 1956, with league bowling accounting for more than half of the increase. The number of American Bowling Congress (men's) leagues increased from 586 to 741, enrolling about 56,000 sanctioned bowlers. International Bowling Congress (women's) leagues jumped sharply from 72 to 237, with approximately 12,000 participants. Under the American Junior Bowling Congress, 18 leagues for teenagers--6 more than during FY 1956--were organized and 960 children participated, usually on Saturday mornings.¹⁶²

With the organization of a USAREUR-USAFE interservice sports program for women, participation of women in sports continued to increase. Four softball and volleyball conferences, 5 basketball conferences, and 6 handicap bowling conferences were organized. Tennis, table tennis, badminton, and horseshoe pitching were provided as individual sports and, like the team sports, culminated in championship matches.¹⁶³

(2) Recreation. At the end of the year 125 service clubs, 189 libraries, and 283 crafts facilities (shops, crafts bars, and photo laboratories) were in operation. Estimated monthly average attendance was about 9,600 per service club. Monthly library attendance averaged 475,000, at photo laboratories 114,000, and at crafts shops 94,400.

The principal administrative problem was still the recruiting and retention of qualified personnel. Although career possibilities were stressed, the command did not succeed in obtaining the authorized number of professionally trained librarians, and only 25 percent of the club directors and assistants renewed their contracts, which were for 2 years. Thus the need for on-the-job training of nonprofessional employees remained unchanged. In the crafts program, inability to obtain a sufficient number of indigenous English-speaking instructors resulted in frequent closing of facilities and caused attendance to fall short of anticipation.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. J. R. Dean, USAREUR SAD Spec Svc Athl Sec, 22 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁶² Interv, Mr. Lane with Mr. R. L. Barton, USAREUR SAD Spec Svc Ath Sec, 22 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁶³ Interv, Mr. Lane, with Mr. Dean, 22 Aug 57, cited above.

¹⁶⁴ Intervs, Mr. Lane with Miss L. W. Smith, SAD Sp Svc Rec Sec, Miss F. M. O'Halloran, USAREUR Librarian, and Mr. R. Myers, SAD Sp Svc, 23 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Outstanding service club activities were the second annual Service-Club-of-the-Year Contest, a 6-week square dance clinic, and the All-Army Publicity Scrap Book Contest, in which a USAREUR club placed second. The principal command-wide crafts activities were the 1956 USAREUR photography contest and the first series of photo clinics. USAREUR-level entries in the 6th world-wide interservice contest were exhibited at Army installations, in America Houses, and in a number of city halls in each area command. The clinics, held in May 1957, stressed selection of subjects, what judges look for, and similar topics and were designed to give impetus to the 1957 contest.¹⁶⁵

USAREUR libraries continued to stress their educational aspects, following a survey which indicated that military personnel planning to make a career of the Army were interested primarily in educational materials, while those about to separate wanted career-vocational guidance. Emphasis was upon special books for University of Maryland courses and the intermediate-level program for NCO's. The map collection was expanded. In general, the quality of the libraries' holdings was improved to meet a steadily rising reading level. Book circulation for the year was 3,971,000, higher per capita than in American public libraries as a whole. New installations were opened in Frankfurt and Heidelberg, and facilities in France were expanded somewhat. Reading privileges were extended to German troops training with U.S. forces, and services to other NATO detachments were improved.¹⁶⁶

Educational and recreational tours were placed on a firmer basis with the publication of a USAREUR directive in December 1956.¹⁶⁷ Special Services issued a pamphlet, Take a Tour, for distribution to incoming personnel, and began to supply service clubs with packaged slides, bulletin board materials, program suggestions, and films prepared by national bureaus of tourism. In December 1956 new criteria, including the posting of a surety bond, were adopted for accrediting commercial tour agencies and resulted in the reduction of the number of approved agencies from 35 to 14. While local tours sponsored by service clubs increased from 134,000 in FY 1956 to 139,000 in FY 1957, the number of longer tours conducted by commercial agencies decreased from 47,000 to 43,000.¹⁶⁸

(3) Entertainment. The Special Activities Division continued to encourage and provide equipment and materials for soldier shows and

¹⁶⁵ Intervs, Mr. Lane with Miss Smith and Mr. Myers, 23 Aug 57, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁶⁶ Interv, Mr. Lane with Miss O'Halloran, 23 Aug 57, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁶⁷ USAREUR Cir 28-115, 28 Dec 56, sub: Special Services Leave Activities Program.

¹⁶⁸ Interv, Mr. Lane with Miss K. Curtis, USAREUR SAD Spec Svcs, 23 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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soldier music, opportunities for competition in talent and singing contests, supervision of TO&E bands, and informal aid to other bands.

As shown in the following tabulation, the trend in formal, staged soldier shows, such as revues and dramatic productions, was sharply upward, because of better distribution and utilization of entertainment directors and assistants who devoted the major portion of their efforts to such shows.

| <u>Types of Soldier Shows</u> | <u>FY 1956</u> | | <u>FY 1957</u> | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| | <u>Performances</u> | <u>Attendance</u> | <u>Performances</u> | <u>Attendance</u> |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>10,642</u> | <u>1,039,431</u> | <u>11,207</u> | <u>1,295,734</u> |
| Formal | 1,842 | 466,422 | 3,832 | 901,529 |
| Informal | 8,800 | 573,009 | 7,375 | 394,205 |

The slight decrease in the more numerous informal shows of the service-club variety reflected the shortage in trained service club personnel upon whom the direction of such shows devolved. Although community theater groups gave fewer performances (420) than in FY 1956 (474), they increased in number and in the quality of their productions, and attracted an attendance of about 94,000 during both years. Professional companies presented approximately 600 gratuitous performances before audiences totaling 146,000.

The number of entries in the USAREUR division of the 1957 All-Army Entertainment Contest surpassed 1956 and USAREUR again won first place. Another successful project was the USAREUR Jazz Contest, held in the fall of 1956 and believed to be the first such contest conducted by a major Army command. Two shows made up of finalists in each of these contests toured installations in France and Germany. In a venture of a completely new kind, a dramatic presentation on the "Medical Management of Mass Casualties in Nuclear Warfare" was featured at the NATO Surgeons-General Conference, SHAPE Headquarters, in April 1957.¹⁶⁹

b. The European Motion Picture Service. Although new joint regulations establishing a world-wide integrated Army-Air Force motion picture service¹⁷⁰ were under discussion during most of FY 1957, only the fiscal aspects of the integration were accomplished. The Army's European Motion Picture Service (EMPS) continued to operate independently of the Air Force Motion Picture Service (AFMPS).¹⁷¹ Beginning 1 July 1956, however,

¹⁶⁹ Memo, J. C. Berssenbrugge, SAD Sp Svcs Stf Ent Dir, to USAREUR SAD Tech Info Off, 30 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁷⁰ AR 28-62 (AFR 24-32), 28 Dec 56, sub: Army and Air Force Motion Picture Service. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁷¹ In May 1957 US EUCOM headquarters directed complete integration by 1 October 1957.

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net profits, which totaled \$1,146,000 for FY 1957, were sent to the Board of Directors, Army-Air Force Exchange and Motion Picture Service.

On 30 June 1957, 293 theaters were being operated--16 fewer than on 30 June 1956. Admission was charged in 193 of these, 147 having 35 mm. projectors and 46 having 16 mm. machines. The remaining 100 admission-free movies also had 16 mm. projectors. All were equipped with Cinema-scope. The service employed 28 U.S. and 79 local-hire civilians in addition to military or LWR personnel who operated the theaters.¹⁷²

c. The European Exchange Service. Without having had any major phaseouts, on 30 June 1957 the European Exchange Service (EES) was employing 20,050 persons, 1,302 fewer than on 30 June 1956, although operating 14 more installations. The personnel included 31 officers and enlisted men, 377 U.S. civilians, 13 CWS civilians, and 19,629 local-hire civilians (as against 20,893 at the beginning of the year).¹⁷³ This year an intensified training program for retail, foods, service, and automotive personnel was pursued, based on methods used by large firms in the United States.¹⁷⁴ It was conducted through the EES's 7 administrative centers at the larger exchanges, using motion pictures, film strips and other visual aids, skits, handbooks, and monthly journals, in English, German, and French.¹⁷⁵

Sales aggregated \$182,504,000 as against \$181,600,000 in FY 1956, but through operational economies net profits rose to \$12,238,500, or 6.9 percent of direct sales, as against \$11,618,000, or 6.5 percent, during FY 1956. These profits, like those of the European Motion Picture Service, were forwarded to Washington.¹⁷⁶

Among principal developments were the support rendered by exchanges in the change-over of Army uniforms; the opening at Gruenstadt, Germany, in October 1956, of a central ice cream plant which, at the end of the year, was supplying all EES installations, Army messes, and Army commissaries; and the general redesigning of retail stores to provide for a greater amount of self-service.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷² Interv, Mr. Lane with Mr. S. S. Nelson, C/USAREUR EMPS, 23 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁷³ Interv, Mr. Lane with Mr. D. Ellison, SAD EES Pers Br, 22 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁷⁴ TM 1-10, EES Planned Training Guide, 1 May 56.

¹⁷⁵ Interv, Mr. Lane with Mr. V. W. Nitti, C/SAD EES Tng Br, 22 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁷⁶ (1) DA Cir 60-1 (AF Ltr 147-2), 13 Apr 56, sub: World-Wide Integration of Army and Air Force Exchanges. (2) Interv, Mr. Lane with Mr. A. Rosenberg, SAD EES Compt, 22 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁷⁷ Intervs, Mr. Lane with Col M. M. Radcliffe, Dep/Ch EES, Mr. J. B. Bird, Ch/EES Food & Svcs Br, and Mr. E. A. Bower, Ch/EES Merchandising & Sales Br, 23 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Discussion of integration of the Army and Air Force exchange systems in Europe, which had been under consideration for several years, in FY 1957 yielded an EES-AFEX memorandum of understanding, which was to be evaluated after a year of operation under its provisions. The memorandum was approved by US EUCOM headquarters in June 1957. Designed to bring about simplified and more economical operation, it established certain identities in pricing policies, measures for avoiding competitive buying, a number of geographical areas in which all exchanges would be operated by the service having major strength and support facilities, and a substantial amount of cross-servicing of AFEX by EES (for example, EES to supply AFEX's requirements for ice cream, fruits and vegetables, bakery goods, etc.).¹⁷⁸

d. Armed Forces Recreation Center. The Armed Forces Recreation Center at Garmisch and Berchtesgaden (including Chiemsee) continued without major changes. With year-round recreational facilities and overnight accommodations for approximately 2,475 guests per night, its goal was 75 percent utilization, varying with the seasons. Its several facilities actually accommodated 633,000 overnight guests during the year, for about 79 percent utilization.¹⁷⁹

| | Overnight Guests | Percent Utilization of Facilities | |
|--------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|--------|
| | | Planned | Actual |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>633,000</u> | 75 | 79 |
| 1st Quarter | 204,000 | 89 | 92 |
| 2d Quarter | 102,000 | 60 | 56 |
| 3d Quarter | 139,000 | 75 | 79 |
| 4th Quarter | 188,000 | 79 | 91 |

Although the activities were self-supporting, plant upkeep required the expenditure of about \$700,000 in repairs and utilities funds.

e. Off-Duty Education. The transfer of staff supervision of off-duty troop education to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1,¹⁸⁰ implemented a revised Department of the Army policy that strongly emphasized the educational development of military personnel through standard civilian-type courses of functional importance to the military profession. A major purpose of the change was to make sure that Army educational centers performed command-responsive services and supported the Army's

¹⁷⁸ Interv, Mr. Lane with Mr. M. J. Powell, SAD EES Plans & Mgmt Br, 23 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁷⁹ Interv, Mr. Lane with Maj G. Sherman, USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br, 25 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁸⁰ USAREUR Change Order No. 3, 28 Nov 56. UNCLASSIFIED.

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personnel procurement, training, and assignment objectives.¹⁸¹

At the close of the year, 157 education centers, manned by 538 full- and part-time civilian workers, were operating in Germany and France. The transfer of the 32d AAA Brigade from England had closed out Army educational activities there. Organized classes ranged from the elementary through the college level along lines normally offered by schools in the United States; also included were courses designed specifically to meet immediate Army-related needs. Approximately 46,000 individuals were enrolled during each quarter. Area commanders were responsible for operation and funding.¹⁸²

(1) Intermediate Education. Of the approximately 25,000 NCO's and specialists who were in need of intermediate education, 15,524 participated in the program to meet the Army's goal of an 8th-grade education for all such personnel. Approximately 7,000 earned 8th-grade certificates, as compared with 5,500 during FY 1956.

(2) High School Education. Voluntary participation on the high school level continued to be an important part of the program. Approximately 14,370 individuals enrolled in formal classes and 12,280, including many who did not so enroll, earned high school certificates, or the equivalent thereof, by passing the appropriate General Education Development (GED) tests.

(3) College-Level Courses. The University of Maryland continued to offer courses on the college level. Army personnel accounted for 10,235 course completions, as against 9,496 during the preceding year. Continued interest was also shown in attaining first-year college equivalency by passing the college-level GED test; 1,639 individuals achieved this equivalency.

(4) USAFI Courses. Enrollment in courses, numbering about 250, offered by the United States Armed Forces Institute (USAFI) remained at about 20,000 throughout the year. There were 3,892 individual course completions, compared to 3,036 in FY 1956.

(5) MOS-Related Courses. Many courses to meet specific needs related to training and military duties were organized, particularly in communications, motor mechanics, typewriting, and other technical areas, and in languages. Individual completions during FY 1957 totaled 14,931.

¹⁸¹(1) DA Cir 355-6, 26 Oct 56, sub: Separation of Troop Information and Troop Education. (2) Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj R. W. Gaither, USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br, 23 May 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁸²Statement prepared by Mr. E. Hunter, USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br Educ Consultant, Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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(6) Tests. Testing services and the transmittal of results to USAFI, Madison, Wisconsin, were continued throughout the command. Tests administered during the year numbered 123,424, of which 40,246 represented official course completions.¹⁸³

37. Dependents' Schools

a. Facilities. At the close of the 1956-57 school year USAREUR was operating 165 schools for dependents--91 elementary schools, 15 high schools, and 59 kindergartens. During the year high schools were opened at Mannheim, Germany, and Vitry le Francois, France. Four elementary schools were discontinued: Mannheim #2, Kaiserslautern #2, and the schools at La Roche sur Yon and Souillac sur Mer, France. The number of dormitories for high school students residing in communities not large enough to support high schools of their own was increased to six by the addition of one for the areas surrounding Paris. Ninth grades were added to the schools at Bad Godesberg and Fontainebleau.¹⁸⁴

b. Enrollment. School enrollment reflected the increased number of dependent families in the command and exceeded anticipation.

(1) Grades 1-12. The average monthly enrollment in grades 1-12 was 35,043--an increase of 25 percent over school year 1955-56--with 31,128 in grades 1-8 and 3,915 in high schools. It ranged from 6,064 in the first grade to 1,601 in the ninth and 504 in the twelfth. Actual enrollment at the beginning of the school year in September was 33,618, an increase of more than 17 percent over September 1955. It rose to a peak of 35,576 in February 1957, remained at more than 35,000 through May, and dropped to 34,720 in June. The sharp fluctuations incident to gyroscope movements, which had characterized the previous school year, did not recur.¹⁸⁵

(2) Kindergartens. Kindergarten enrollment averaged 4,195 monthly, an increase of 12.2 percent over the preceding year. Beginning with a low of 3,897 in September 1956, it rose to a high of 4,282 in March 1957 and then declined to 4,199 in June.¹⁸⁶

c. Teachers and Librarians. There was also a considerable increase in the number of teaching personnel. At the close of the school year 1,518 U.S. citizens were in the employ of the school system, as against

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ (1) USAREUR DEG School Enrollment Rept, 7 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED.
(2) Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. S. J. Hergenroeder, Dep Dir DEG, 4 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁸⁵ (1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 117-19.
SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

¹⁸⁶ USAREUR DEG School Enrollment Rept, 7 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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1,431 in June 1956. Of this number, 1,199 were DA civilian teachers (including 54 teaching principals) in grades 1-12, and 73 were kindergarten teachers paid out of nonappropriated funds--a total of 1,266 classroom teachers (compared to 1,173 at the close of the preceding year). There were 28 American librarians, 13 German and French LWR librarians, and 147 German and French language instructors, 144 of whom taught in the elementary schools and were paid out of nonappropriated funds.¹⁸⁷

d. Administrative and Personnel Problems.

(1) Temporary Oversize of Classes. The unexpectedly large excess of enrollment over predictions, pointed out above, caused a teacher shortage and, consequently, a large number of oversized classes in September. The situation was rectified by the end of the second month, chiefly through the employment of over 200 additional dependents, qualified as teachers, under authority already obtained in anticipation of emergency situations.¹⁸⁸ The average student-teacher ratio for the year was 29.8: 1 in grades 1-8 and 20.7: 1 in high schools, against a standard of 30: 1.¹⁸⁹

(2) Teacher-Turnover. The problem of excessive teacher turnover remained unsolved. At the end of the school year 690 teachers had terminated employment. Of this number, 392 were U.S.-recruited personnel who were returning to their homes, 233 were locally obtained dependents appointed temporarily, and 65 were transferring to other agencies.¹⁹⁰

38. Youth Activities

a. The AYA Program. This was the third year of the American Youth Activities (AYA) Program, which was designed to promote wholesome out-of-school activities for boys and girls between the ages of 7 and 18, to reduce juvenile delinquency to a minimum, and to encourage friendly relationship between American and European youth groups.¹⁹¹ Through administrative decentralization and less emphasis upon command-wide projects, communities were encouraged to develop their own programs as determined by local facilities, resourcefulness, and leadership. Activities included arts and crafts, social hours, athletics, camping,

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ USAREUR Civ Pers Ltr 3-56, 16 Aug 56, sub: Temporary Appointment for Teachers, Item X. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁸⁹ (1) Interv, Mr. Lane with Mr. Hergenroeder, 4 Jun 57, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR DEG Enrollment Rept, 7 Jun 57, p. 2. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁹⁰ DF, Dir USAREUR DEG to G1 Civ Pers Br, 27 Jul 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In DEG files.

¹⁹¹ USAREUR Cir 148, 8 Jul 54, sub: American Youth Activities Program. UNCLASSIFIED.

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part-time employment, and scouting. Regional summer camps were continued. Both "major" and "minor" Little League summer baseball were conducted throughout the command. Participation by boys from 8 to 10 years old doubled. Play culminated in a championship series in each area command, but no USAREUR championship series was held at Garmisch as in previous years.

Shortage of suitable facilities continued to hamper activities in many localities. However, in January 1957 the Departments of Defense and the Army approved a revision of the community center construction program that had been deferred in FY 1956 because of rising building costs.¹⁹² While construction of new buildings proposed for France was still suspended indefinitely, 25 new structures and 5 remodeling projects were authorized and initiated within American housing projects in Germany.¹⁹³

Close ties were developed between AYA and the German-American relations program of the Community Relations Section, Public Information Division. Advisory councils composed of senior U.S. military personnel and leading German civic officials were established in over 50 communities. At the end of the year junior councils, to function through dependents' school and AYA Youth Council channels, were being planned.¹⁹⁴

b. Scouting. Scouting, for boys and girls, was sponsored command-wide by the USAREUR Youth Activities Board and the European Advisory Council, under working relationships developed during FY 1956 with the parent scouting organizations in the United States.¹⁹⁵ The scouting budget for FY 1957 was \$109,000. The Boy Scout Camp at Dautphe, built at a cost of \$25,000, was used for the first time during the summer of 1956. The Girl Scout Camp at Hammertshausen, costing \$27,000, was begun in September 1956 and finished in time to be used during the summer of 1957. A limited program of international activities was carried on.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹² CINCUSAREUR's Bimthly Amb-Comdr's Conf, 4 Feb 57. Formal Comments by ACOFS G4. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁹³ Revised Rept on AYA Program for Europe, 29 May 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br Youth Actv files.

¹⁹⁴ Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col H. N. Moses, USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁹⁵ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 124. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

¹⁹⁶ Revised Rept on AYA Program for Europe, 29 May 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Scout Enrollment¹⁹⁷
(as of 31 December 1956)

| <u>Boys</u> | | <u>Girls</u> | |
|---------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| <u>11,857</u> | | <u>10,288</u> | |
| Cubs | 7,406 | Brownies | 6,324 |
| Scouts | 3,706 | Intermediates | 3,876 |
| Explorers | 745 | Seniors | 88 |
| Adult Workers | <u>4,217</u> | Adult Workers | <u>3,923</u> |

39. Contributions to National Charities

In October 1956 the President announced the first of three annual Federal overseas fund-raising campaigns, exclusive of the annual AER/ARS drive, under a new policy that abrogated the command's own plans for a single drive.¹⁹⁸ Thus four campaigns were conducted during FY 1957. They brought in approximately 13 percent less than had the eight drives during FY 1956, and the principal participating agencies received appreciably smaller returns. On the other hand, the proceeds were shared by a larger number of agencies, including several that had not participated during other years.

a. Federally Sponsored Drives. The three federally sponsored drives were the Federal Overseas Fund Campaign, the National Health Agencies Campaign, and the American National Red Cross Drive.

(1) Federal Overseas Fund Campaign. This was a consolidated appeal for CARE, the Crusade for Freedom (Radio Free Europe), the American Social Hygiene Association, the National Recreation Association, the American Branch of the International Social Service, the United Seamen's Service, and the United Service Organizations.¹⁹⁹ It ran from 15 November to 15 December 1956 and raised approximately \$87,500.²⁰⁰

(2) National Health Agencies Campaign. This was also a consolidated appeal. The beneficiaries were the American Cancer Society,

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ (1) Cable DEF-467953, OSD sgd Wilson to US CINCEUR and others, 26 Oct 56. (2) Unpublished USAREUR Cir 900-10, 1956, sub: USAREUR Consolidated Charitable Fund Campaign. Both in SGS 005 (1956), Item 05. (3) USAREUR Memo 900-10-8, 15 Nov 56, sub: Fund-Raising Campaigns. All UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁹⁹ USAREUR Memo 900-10-7, 29 Oct 56, sub: Voluntary Fund-Raising Campaign. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁰⁰ Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col E. S. Graham, JSAREUR AER Off, 11 Jul 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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the American Heart Association, the National Tuberculosis Association,²⁰¹ United Cerebral Palsy, the Arthritis and Rheumatism Foundation, the National Society for Crippled Children and Adults, the Muscular Dystrophy Association, and the National Multiple Sclerosis Society. It began on 1 January 1957 and was scheduled to continue to 15 February, but because of a delay in shipment of campaign materials,²⁰² as well as the fact that the initial response was deemed unrepresentative, solicitations were discontinued temporarily. Since it was also believed that the appeal was being made too soon after the Christmas holidays, the drive was not resumed until 15 April 1957 and was terminated at the end of May. Contributions totaled approximately \$85,000.²⁰³

When the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis notified the command that it could not participate in a joint campaign or accept funds so raised, individuals were permitted to make contributions to that agency without reference to the federally sponsored campaign. USAREUR kept no official record of contributions so made.²⁰⁴

(3) The Red Cross Drive. The third federally sponsored campaign was the American National Red Cross Drive, from 28 February through 30 March 1957.²⁰⁵ Contributions totaled \$257,151, as against \$341,000 realized from the 1956 drive. Of the 1957 amount, \$145,958 was contributed by Seventh Army and USAREUR military personnel and the remainder by Navy, Air Force, and civilian personnel.

When the National Red Cross launched an emergency appeal for the people of Hungary, following the uprising there in late 1956, the Department of the Army authorized the solicitation of voluntary contributions from military and civilian personnel, stipulating that no promotional literature should be used.²⁰⁶ USAREUR personnel contributed \$57,000 to this special cause between 15 and 31 December 1956.

²⁰¹ The National Tuberculosis Association realized an additional \$19,000 from the sale of Christmas seals during November and December 1956.

²⁰² USAREUR Memo 900-10-12, 6 Feb 57, sub: National Health Agencies Fund-Raising Campaign. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁰³ Interv, Mr. Lane with Col Graham, 16 Sep 57, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁰⁴ (1) Ibid. (2) Cable DA-480821, DA sgd TAG to US CINCEUR and others, 12 Dec 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 005 (1956).

²⁰⁵ USAREUR Memo 940-5-3, 14 Feb 57, sub: ARC Fund-Raising Campaign 1957. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁰⁶ Interv, Mr. D. A. Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. F. D. Saitta, ARC Ln Off to USAREUR, 22 Jul 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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b. The Joint AER/ARS Campaign. The annual joint campaign for Army Emergency Relief (AER) and the Army Relief Society (ARS) was conducted as usual, from 31 August to 10 October 1956. Contributions totaled \$223,200,²⁰⁷ approximately 20 percent less than in FY 1956.

²⁰⁷ Interv, Mr. Lane with Col Graham, 16 Sep 57, cited above.

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CHAPTER 4

Intelligence Activities

Section I: Collection of Positive Intelligence Information

40. Fields of Intelligence Collection Interest and Areas of Responsibility

CINCUSAREUR remained primarily responsible for intelligence information collection in the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and that part of the U.S.S.R. which lies west of the Ural Mountains, the Kara-Kalpak A.S.S.R., and the Turkmen S.S.R. CINCUSAREUR also had collection responsibilities in all other areas of strategic interest to his command. Within its area of responsibility, USAREUR directed its efforts toward collecting intelligence information pertaining to early warning of the imminence of hostilities, the capabilities and probable courses of action of the military forces¹ of the Soviet Bloc countries, and other matters of military significance.

41. Positive Intelligence Collection Agencies

USAREUR continued to secure intelligence information from various non-USAREUR agencies as well as through its own intelligence organizations. It also obtained items of interest from organizations and committees responsible for coordinating U.S. and Allied intelligence activities. There were no significant changes in either the missions or the methods employed by these agencies.

¹(1) USAREUR Mission Register, 7 Feb 57. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (2) Unless otherwise cited, the material in this section is based on Interv, Capt R. K. Sawyer, USAREUR Hist Div, with Capt W. D. Getz, G2 Intel Coll Br, 19 Jun 57. SECRET.

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a. USAREUR Agencies. The following agencies collected positive intelligence under the supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

(1) Seventh Army. The attached 532d Military Intelligence Battalion's mission of detecting and reporting any evidence of movement of Soviet Bloc forces that would indicate the imminence of hostilities remained unchanged. In carrying out this mission the battalion continued to screen overt-type sources entering the U.S. area of responsibility in West Germany, excluding German returnees from the U.S.S.R. The battalion also maintained liaison with 481 West German border police and customs stations, and kept visible East German and Czechoslovakian border security installations under surveillance. During FY 1957 the battalion operated 29 installations where border crossers were interviewed and information was recorded, screened 29,919 sources, and submitted 9,846 reports.

(2) The 513th Military Intelligence Group. The 513th Military Intelligence Group continued to serve as the administrative headquarters for certain U.S. Army intelligence units assigned or attached to USAREUR. The group also provided administrative and logistical support for the USAREUR Interrogation Center, formerly known as the USAREUR Intelligence Center, located at Camp King, near Frankfurt. This center was redesignated on 1 February 1957 and placed under the operational control of the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. The 513th Military Intelligence Group was thus relieved of operational intelligence functions and enabled to concentrate on its primary mission of providing administrative and logistical support for operational intelligence agencies.

The technical intelligence detachments assigned or attached to the 513th MI Group remained under the operational control of the USAREUR Interrogation Center for the purpose of obtaining technical information from refugees and similar persons. Altogether 28,747 sources were screened during the reporting period; 1,779 were interrogated at Camp King and the remainder at the Berlin element of the Interrogation Center. Approximately 3,700 reports were prepared.

(3) 522d Military Intelligence Battalion. This battalion remained responsible for the clandestine collection of intelligence information pertaining to the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and the European portion of the U.S.S.R. The battalion collected information on order of battle, military supply, transportation, communications, scientific and technical developments, and economic and political trends through the use of resident agents and roving observers or by means of penetration. The battalion was the sole USAREUR unit engaged in clandestine collection of intelligence information.

(4) The Area Commands. The intelligence officers of the four area commands in West Germany, the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, and the Berlin Command continued to collect weather data, inform the Assistant

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Chief of Staff, G-2, on current trends within their commands, and perform other intelligence missions through overt methods. During the reporting period the area command intelligence officers participated in bimonthly conferences, which the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, conducted as a means of keeping them informed on current intelligence developments.

(5) U.S. Army Element, U.S. Military Liaison Mission to Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (USMLM). Except for the addition of the phrase "U.S. Army Element" to its former designation as the U.S. Military Liaison Mission to Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany,² there was no significant change in the mission, organization, or method of operation of this unit during the fiscal year. In addition to his open liaison mission, the Chief, USMLM, had a primary responsibility under the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for collecting intelligence information on Soviet troops and East German military and paramilitary forces in the German Democratic Republic. As in former years, the organization's main element was at Potsdam and a supporting element was in the U.S. Sector of Berlin.

In accordance with a U.S. - U.S.S.R. military commanders' agreement reached in 1947, the 14 officers and enlisted men of the mission had credentials permitting them to travel with relative freedom throughout the German Democratic Republic, excluding certain permanently restricted areas. Periodically, other areas were closed temporarily to members of the mission, especially when troop or equipment movements were underway. Within these limitations, mission personnel toured the East Zone regularly and methodically in an effort to detect unusual changes or trends, and completed approximately 500 tours of 1-, 2-, and 3-day duration during the year.

Members of the liaison mission were subjected to increasing harassment by Soviet and German Democratic Republic authorities, particularly in the latter part of the reporting period. As in the past, mission vehicles were followed and often stopped, the occupants being detained for an examination of credentials or other reasons, and in the spring of 1957 physical violence was directed against Americans on several occasions. Strong protests regarding these incidents were addressed to the Chief of Staff, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, without result.

(6) U.S. Army Operations and Research Detachment. The former Service Detachment (7746)³ continued its surveillance of communications in the U.S. areas of responsibility in West Germany and West Berlin. Assigned to the 513th Military Intelligence Group, this unit operated under the control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, maintaining 10 base stations located in post offices or telephone exchanges in large cities throughout its areas of responsibility. Its intelligence collection mission was both positive and counterintelligence in nature. The

²USAREUR GO's 260, 11 Dec 56; and 1, 1 Jan 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED. (Other information in par. (5) is SECRET).

³Redesignated by USAREUR GO 260, 11 Dec 56. UNCLASSIFIED. (Other information in par. (6) is SECRET).

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detachment continued to restrict its monitoring to specific individuals or organizations of intelligence interest. During the reporting period the detachment monitored an average of 600 telephone lines, including long-distance wires from the U.S.S.R. and its satellite countries. Telegraph and teletype messages were duplicated on separate machines tied in to the main lines. By the end of FY 1957 the detachment was maintaining surveillance over approximately 2,300 persons or organizations.⁴

b. Non-USAREUR Agencies. Successful conduct of the USAREUR intelligence effort required continuing liaison with other intelligence agencies and organizations and with other military headquarters interested in intelligence activities in Europe. The more important of these contacts were the following:

(1) Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army. The office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, continued to furnish guidance through the Department of the Army Intelligence Plan, Intelligence Collection Guides, Intelligence Collection Memoranda, and Specific Requests for Information. The Department of the Army also supported USAREUR's intelligence operation by allocating contingency funds, by providing finished intelligence prepared at the Department of the Army level and by other governmental agencies, and by analyzing the finished intelligence produced by USAREUR.

(2) J2, US EUCOM. The policy directives of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, US EUCOM, delineated the intelligence missions within the US EUCOM area. USAREUR remained responsible for intelligence collection and primary intelligence analysis for both ground and security forces in the Soviet Zone of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, and for the integration of information concerning the western U.S.S.R. USAREUR also participated in the US EUCOM Indications Committee, the joint agency sponsored by US EUCOM for considering possible indications of the imminence of hostilities.

(3) Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAFE. USAREUR and USAFE headquarters continued to coordinate intelligence activities through the exchange of liaison officers and through the Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Germany. USAREUR field collection agencies assisted USAFE in gathering scientific and technical intelligence as well as air order of battle intelligence to supplement the latter's coverage of air installations in the East Zone of Germany and the satellite countries.

(4) Intelligence Officer, USNAVGER. USAREUR furnished continuing intelligence collection and logistical support to the intelligence office of U.S. Naval Forces, Germany (USNAVGER), including security

⁴Interv, Capt Sawyer with Maj J. C. Lucore, G2 Intel Coll Br, 5 Jun 57. SECRET.

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checks, courier service, and the use of G2 communications facilities. During the reporting period the USNAVGER intelligence office moved from Heidelberg to Frankfurt.

(5) U.S. Embassy, West Germany. Routine contacts with the U.S. Embassy continued through the G2 liaison officer accredited to the Office of the Coordinator and Special Adviser, U.S. Embassy, which had offices in both Frankfurt and Bonn. Other intelligence contacts with the U.S. Embassy were maintained through coordinating agencies.

(6) Department of the Army Detachment (DAD). The Department of the Army Detachment carried out its mission independently, except for certain intelligence activities coordinated with USAREUR through staff conferences and a permanently assigned liaison officer. There was appropriate cooperation at the field installation level, and USAREUR continued to provide both administrative and logistical support in accordance with departmental instructions.

(7) Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). During FY 1957 the former Gehlen Organization became the official German intelligence service. At the same time, its responsibilities and relationships with Allied intelligence agencies were not yet fully and clearly defined. Meanwhile the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, maintained constant liaison with the BND through appropriate channels for the exchange of certain intelligence, and the German agency cooperated on the overt interrogation of refugees and defectors. The groundwork was laid for the establishment of combined U.S. - German interrogation centers in West Germany.

(8) British and French Armed Forces. The free exchange of intelligence between military intelligence organizations of USAREUR and the British Army of the Rhine continued through full-time intelligence liaison officers and frequent intelligence production conferences. Relationships with the French remained comparatively less close, although one designated French Army intelligence liaison officer visited the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, regularly. Other intelligence contacts with the French took place within the NATO structure.

(9) SHAPE. Intelligence relations with SHAPE were maintained through NATO channels. In addition, a copy of the monthly US EUCOM listing of indications of the imminence of hostilities, to which USAREUR contributed, was distributed to SHAPE headquarters.

(10) Army Attaches. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, maintained direct intelligence contact with Army attaches in the European area, especially those in Warsaw, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, and Moscow, who visited Heidelberg frequently. USAREUR also had contact with the attaches in France, the Benelux countries, and the three Scandinavian countries. Through the Army attaches, USAREUR exchanged a certain amount of intelligence information with the competent authorities in these countries.

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(11) Southern European Task Force (SETAF). Intelligence relations with SETAF consisted of a routine, lateral exchange of information. In addition, there was an increasing exchange of liaison visits between the two headquarters, primarily concerning intelligence operational matters.

(12) United States Escapee Program (USEP). The USAREUR intelligence effort continued to benefit indirectly from the United States Escapee Program, whose primary mission was to help escapees from Soviet domination reestablish themselves in the Free World. By contributing to the comfort of these refugees, and thereby raising their morale, USEP assisted the intelligence exploitation effort. At the same time, USEP eliminated a most difficult problem by assuming responsibility for resettling the escapees.

(13) Radio Stations. USAREUR continued to furnish Radio Free Europe, the Voice of America, and Radio Liberation with information on listeners' reactions to broadcasts. USAREUR also assisted the stations in locating refugees who could be used in the propaganda effort and provided facilities in the field for interviewing persons who were considered potential sources of propaganda material. This support was necessarily consistent with security and with the full exploitation of individuals for intelligence purposes.

(14) Army Security Agency in Europe (ASAE). This Department of the Army organization remained responsible for furnishing both communications intelligence and communications security support to USAREUR. ASAE maintained liaison officers with both the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and Seventh Army Headquarters. USAREUR intelligence agencies provided ASAE with raw information derived from such sources as teletype, mail, and telephone intercepts. ASAE in turn furnished USAREUR with intelligence concerning the imminence of hostilities and other selected data on Soviet and Satellite order of battle, military activities, transportation and communications, and political and economic developments affecting the war potential of East Germany and other satellite countries.⁵

c. Interagency Coordination.

(1) Coordinator and Special Adviser to the U.S. Ambassador, Germany. The Coordinator and Special Adviser to the U.S. Ambassador, Germany, continued to coordinate overt intelligence activities on behalf of the Ambassador, who was the senior U.S. representative in the Federal Republic of Germany. In this connection the Coordinator maintained offices in both Frankfurt and Bonn.

⁵Interv, Capt Sawyer with Maj Lucore, 5 Jun 57. SECRET.

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(2) Office of the Coordinator and Special Adviser, Bavaria (OCA). This office performed a similar function at lower levels, coordinating relations between U.S. intelligence and security agencies and Bavarian civilian authorities. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, USAREUR, accredited a permanent liaison officer to OCA, Bavaria.

(3) Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Germany (ICCG). As the principal coordinating body for all overt collection activities in Germany, ICCG consisted of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, USAREUR; the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAFE; the Intelligence Officer, USNAVGER; and the Coordinator and Special Adviser to the U.S. Ambassador, who served as permanent chairman. The Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, US EUCOM, continued to participate as an observer at the regular ICCG meetings. Although the committee itself met only upon call of the chairman, or upon specific request of a member, various subcommittees and working groups convened frequently throughout the year. For example, the Standing Scientific and Technical Subcommittee coordinated all intelligence matters of a technical nature for ICCG, under the chairmanship of a Department of the Army Detachment representative. Another subcommittee met periodically to do preparatory work and to select working groups that studied problems before they were submitted to the main committee.

(4) Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Berlin. There was no change in either the organization or function of the Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Berlin, made up of representatives of the principal intelligence agencies in Berlin and of the U.S. Commander, Berlin. The group continued to provide Berlin agencies with an opportunity for consultation and aided in preventing duplication of effort.

(5) Returnee Exploitation Group (REG). This joint interagency operation was primarily concerned with the exploitation of German scientists who had returned from the U.S.S.R. and settled in the East Zone of Germany. Financial and similar awards were offered through USAREUR intelligence agencies to induce these scientists to defect to the Federal Republic. The operation was highly successful and provided a major source of intelligence information on the extent and scope of Soviet research and development. USAREUR maintained a liaison officer with the group, which it supported operationally.

(6) Defector Reception Center (DRC). Also a joint interagency operation, the Defector Reception Center was concerned essentially with non-German sources of special or national interests. Originally from the U.S.S.R. or its satellites, these individuals were brought in from points in Germany and other European and Middle Eastern countries. Their exploitation was based on the participating agencies' primary areas of interest and on the knowledge of the sources themselves.

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42. Effect of German Sovereignty on the Intelligence Effort

USAREUR intelligence operations were not seriously hindered by German sovereignty. Certain compromises were necessary, particularly with reference to screening and interrogating sources in the refugee stream. At the end of the fiscal year negotiations were underway to bring about German intelligence agency participation in certain aspects of USAREUR's overt effort.

Section II: Production, Maintenance, and
Dissemination of Intelligence

43. Production of Intelligence

The USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Strategic Intelligence Detachments (SID) continued to produce positive intelligence.⁶ The information collected by field agencies was collated, evaluated, interpreted, and published as intelligence studies, reports, or basic documents. The production of intelligence included order of battle handbooks, surveys and lists of known Communist training areas and supply depots, and similar publications, as well as intelligence concerning armament, vehicle, petroleum, and iron and steel production. Other information obtained concerned scientific and technical intelligence in the fields of atomic energy, missiles, electronics, and biological and chemical warfare, and intelligence concerning political and governmental activities related to military planning and security, psychological weaknesses of governments, and resistance movements.

44. Maintenance of Intelligence

Changes in U.S. and Allied military doctrine and policy, together with the changing situation in USAREUR's area of responsibility, made necessary a continuing review of intelligence requirements during the reporting period. Intelligence was maintained on a current basis through the review and revision of intelligence collection memoranda, which established continuing requirements, and by the development of specific requests for information when intelligence was desired on a one-time basis. In addition, frequent staff visits were made to field collection agencies to keep them abreast of the changing situation and to insure that they obtained the required information.

⁶Unless otherwise cited, the material in this section is based on Interv, Capt R. K. Sawyer, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj W. F. Pickell, G2 Intel Production Br, 5 Jun 57. SECRET.

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45. Dissemination of Intelligence

The intelligence dissemination media included the USAREUR Intelligence Summary, Items of Intelligence Interest, the USAREUR Weekly Intelligence Summary Cable, the weekly INTEX Cable, and the top secret annual USAREUR Military Estimate. In addition, many commanders, staff officers, and visiting officials were briefed to appraise them of the intelligence situation and assist them in developing emergency and war plans. The USAREUR Intelligence Summary, formerly issued on a biweekly basis, became a monthly publication beginning in March 1957. The longer period between issues gave intelligence analysts additional time for observing trends and making appraisals. A new G2 publication called the USAREUR Weekly Sitrep, consisting of a map overprinted with the current situation and appropriate comments, was distributed within the command beginning with the first issue on 19 April 1957.

46. Emergency Map Reserves

The USAREUR Map Stockage Plan, for which the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, had primary staff responsibility, was revised during the reporting period. The total quantity of maps in storage, kept at four depots located at Schwetzingen and Kaiserslautern, Germany, and St. Ay and Bordeaux, France, was to remain unchanged, but the amounts stored at the various depots were to be redistributed according to the geographical location of depots, a more realistic estimate of future USAREUR needs, and similar factors. The redistribution program was expected to get underway during FY 1958.⁷

The governments of the United States and Spain concluded an agreement on 22 May 1957, whereby the latter country was to print a 1:50,000-scale map series of Spain for possible use in an emergency. Five thousand copies of each sheet were to be printed initially and stored at a U.S. air base near Madrid.

The 1:100,000-scale cross country movement map series program, initiated by the Intelligence and Mapping Branch of the USAREUR Engineer Division in FY 1956, was extended on 11 August 1956 to include the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) area. It was anticipated that the project would be completed in 1960.

At a LANDCENT geographic conference in May 1956, the Federal Republic of Germany had agreed to produce the first edition of a 1:250,000-scale map of all Germany. This project was still in progress at the close of FY 1957. At the same conference, the Germans had promised to produce 1:25,000 and 1:50,000 map series of both East and West Germany. The 1:25,000-scale series was completed during the fiscal year, but the 1:50,000-scale series was still under production.

⁷Interv, Capt Sawyer with Maj E. L. Sievers, G2 Intel Production Br, 5 Jun 57. SECRET.

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Meanwhile the preparation of trig (bench mark) lists by the Federal Republic of Germany for the U.S. Army continued through the close of FY 1957. The entire problem was simplified when the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, authorized the release to the Germans of the formula used to convert the Gauss-Kruger system to the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid system.⁸

Section III: Counterintelligence Activities

47. Scope

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, continued to supervise the USAREUR counterintelligence program, which was designed to provide security for USAREUR installations and activities.⁹ Offensive counterintelligence measures were directed against agencies and individuals of hostile powers and against subversive activities constituting a threat to the command. Defensive counterintelligence measures were directed at protecting information, personnel, equipment, and installations against sabotage, subversion, and espionage, and at detecting treason, sedition, subversion, or disaffection among USAREUR's military and civilian personnel. Moreover, physical security programs were developed within USAREUR units and installations.

48. Areas of Collection Interest

USAREUR counterintelligence collection efforts were directed toward those areas where a knowledge of the activities and capabilities of hostile espionage and/or subversive elements would assist the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, both in formulating an accurate estimate of security threats to the command and in recommending countermeasures. Primary areas of collection interest were those from which hostile intelligence operations could be mounted against USAREUR, including West Berlin, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, the satellite countries of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and that part of the U.S.S.R. which lies west of the Ural Mountains. Also of interest were Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, whence operations against USAREUR could be mounted and directed through Austria.

⁸(1) Interv, Capt Sawyer with Maj Sievers, 15 Aug 57. (2) See USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 218. Both SECRET.

⁹Unless otherwise cited, the material in this section is based on a paper prepared for the USAREUR Hist Div by Lt Col Barton, G2 CI Br. SECRET.

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49. Areas of Analysis Interest

The collation, evaluation, and interpretation of USAREUR counterintelligence information, and the incorporation of the products into counterintelligence studies, was an essential ingredient of both offensive and defensive phases. Dissemination of the studies to interested U.S. military and governmental agencies facilitated countermeasures against hostile intelligence services and subversive organizations. The capabilities of all major and subordinate USAREUR commands, as well as departmental, national, and other intelligence resources, were employed in the analysis effort.

50. Counterintelligence Agencies

a. USAREUR Agencies. The 66th Counterintelligence Corps Group was responsible for detecting and reporting treason, sedition, subversion, and disaffection within USAREUR, and aiding in the prevention or neutralization of espionage and sabotage within or directed against the command. The group's zone of clandestine operations (countersabotage, counter-subversion, and counterespionage) encompassed the USAREUR areas of collection and analysis interest, including the Federal Republic of Germany and the U.S. Sector of Berlin.

b. Seventh Army Agencies. The 427th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment and tactical CIC detachments attached to corps and divisions provided internal security of information, personnel, and installations, together with training in phases of tactical counterintelligence within the Seventh Army area of responsibility. Covert and clandestine counter-subversion and counterespionage operations pertaining to Seventh Army were performed by the 66th CIC Group.

c. USAREUR Communications Zone Agencies. While restricted by agreements between the United States and France to operations within American military installations in France, the 766th Counterintelligence Detachment furnished information concerning the general attitude of the French Government and civil populace, significant trends, and the effects of French Communist Party activities directed against the U.S. line of communications through France.

d. Liaison with Non-USAREUR Agencies. USAREUR counterintelligence agencies continued to maintain liaison with various other U.S. and Allied intelligence groups. An exchange of information with these non-USAREUR agencies provided the command with counterintelligence that might otherwise not have been obtained. Close contact was maintained with the German Federal Security Agency (BFV) and the newly-formed German Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD). Similar contacts continued to be maintained with the counterintelligence and political sections of the British Embassy, with the British Army on the Rhine, and, to a lesser degree, with French intelligence elements interested in countersubversion and counterespionage matters. In addition, USAREUR agencies exchanged

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counterintelligence information with the Department of the Army Detachment, the U.S. Air Force's OSI/A-2, and the State Department.

The value of achieving a high degree of cooperation with friendly intelligence services was demonstrated by the amount and quality of information obtained from the comparatively new, expanding German agencies. Coverage of several intelligence fields was largely provided through liaison with these agencies.

51. Offensive Counterintelligence Activities

a. Countersabotage. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was responsible for protecting USAREUR installations and facilities against sabotage. Countersabotage measures included a widespread system of security inspections and surveys to assist local commanders in evaluating and remedying security breaches or hazards. There were no known cases of sabotage directed against USAREUR by hostile intelligence services during FY 1957, although a few disgruntled individuals caused incidents indicating vandalism or malicious damage. While there was a general improvement in countersabotage security, the defensive measures were not actually tested by an enemy and their ultimate value remained unknown.

b. Countersubversion. Such political organizations as the French Communist Party and the illegal West German Communist Party were of USAREUR countersubversion interest. Operations were directed toward determining the organizational structure, strength, capabilities, and intentions of subversive organizations and individuals believed to be hostile to the U.S. forces, with emphasis on the ability of such individuals or organizations to affect U.S. activities in the event of war. Countersubversion activities were also directed against the East German Communist Party, as well as organizations operating in West Berlin and West Germany. The highest priority was given to determining the effect of these groups in penetrating USAREUR installations, West German governmental agencies and military forces, and vital German communications facilities and transportation industries. Various radical German nationalistic groups and extreme right wing organizations were also of countersubversion interest.

c. Counterespionage. USAREUR counterespionage efforts were directed toward detecting and neutralizing agents working for hostile intelligence services and determining the organization, capabilities, and intentions of hostile intelligence services whose efforts were directed against U.S. military targets within the command. Internal clandestine operations were aimed at sources and agents operating for Soviet and satellite intelligence services. External clandestine operations were aimed at identifying agents by penetrating hostile intelligence services and agencies on the highest levels possible at their home bases, with a view toward neutralizing operatives, sources, and agents.

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52. Defensive Counterintelligence Activities

a. Measures to Improve Security. USAREUR counterintelligence agencies conducted 1,784 security surveys and inspections in FY 1957 in an effort to assist commanders in implementing appropriate directives and establishing security devices to prevent the disclosure of or unauthorized access to classified information. In addition, an extensive study was made to determine the status of security within the command.¹⁰ As a result of this study, a USAREUR circular and a command letter were published to inform all commanders of the weaknesses that had been uncovered and to point out methods whereby security could be improved.¹¹

b. Security Clearances. Efforts were made to reduce the processing time for both national agency checks and background investigations. The total processing time for national agency checks was reduced from 100 to 31 days and that for background investigations from 180 to 142 days. During FY 1957 10,190 national agency checks and 4,087 background investigations were processed.¹²

c. Investigations of Security Violations. In June 1956 the Department of the Army had authorized USAREUR to delegate to subordinate commanders with general courts-martial jurisdiction the authority to take final action on reports of investigation involving the loss of U.S. classified information. Cases requiring a report to be forwarded to the Department of the Army were excluded. Initially this authority had been delegated only to the Seventh Army and the U.S. Army Communications Zone, Europe, headquarters, but on 3 June 1957 it was extended to include other commands having general courts-martial jurisdiction. The delegation of authority resulted in a considerable reduction in review processes for minor violations, with a consequent saving of time for Headquarters, USAREUR, personnel.¹³

The USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, reviewed 70 reports of investigation concerning security violations to determine whether compliance with security regulations and directives would have prevented the violations. The findings of the investigating officers indicated that responsible and accountable individuals had failed to comply with existing directives. It was therefore recommended that commanders review

¹⁰ See paragraph 54, below.

¹¹ (1) Qtrly Repts to the Intel Program, USAREUR G2 CI Br, FY 1957. SECRET. (2) USAREUR Cir 380-75, 3 Jul 57, sub: Security Education. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) USAREUR ltr, 31 Jan 57, sub: Security of the United States Army, Europe (U). AEAGB-C(OA) 350.05 (AG-AO). SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL). All in USAREUR G2 CI Br files.

¹² Qtrly Repts to the Intel Program, FY 1957, cited above. SECRET.

¹³ (1) Cable SC-34459, USAREUR to DA, 25 Jun 56. (2) Cable DA-431849, DA to USAREUR, 28 Jun 56. (3) Comments on Repts of Inves Review, USAREUR G2 to AG, FY 1957. All CONFIDENTIAL. All in file above.

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security directives and establish a continuing program of instruction for all individuals handling classified material.¹⁴

d. Alien Enlistment Investigations. Under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the 66th CIC Group continued to investigate applicants who sought enlistment in the U.S. Army under the Alien Enlistment Program (AEP). However, Public Law 597, 81st Congress (Lodge Act), which provided for the Alien Enlistment Program, expired on 30 June 1957. The Department of the Army informed USAREUR in June 1957 that congressional action to extend the Lodge Act would not be completed prior to the date of expiration and warned that no enlistments should be accomplished until the act had been extended. Action to extend Public Law 597 for an additional two years was underway at the end of FY 1957.¹⁵

e. Refugee Relief Act of 1953. The 66th CIC Group also continued to conduct investigations in support of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. Early in the fiscal year plans to close out the investigative phase of the program by 31 December 1956 were forwarded to Washington and were approved by the Department of the Army on 10 September. In August, meanwhile, the Department of the Army indicated that 18,000 additional requests for investigations of visa applicants were expected to be submitted to the 66th CIC Group by the end of September. After that date no more requests for investigations except a few special interest cases were to be accepted from the Investigations, Refugee Program, Germany (IRP), which was responsible for administering the Department of State's part of the Relief Act in Germany. The full resources of the 66th CIC Group were utilized to complete and return 79,245 investigations to IRP by 30 November 1956. By the end of the year this number had increased to 79,331. All aspects of the investigative phase of the Refugee Relief Program in Germany had been closed out by 31 March 1957.¹⁶

53. Integration of Files into the Central Records Facility

The integration of counterintelligence files from the USAREUR Central Registry into the Central Records Facility (CRF), Fort Holabird, Maryland, continued to be the responsibility of the 66th CIC Group. At the end of FY 1957, a total of 439,418 dossiers required processing to determine if they met CRF retirement criteria. Of this number, 340,000 were scheduled

¹⁴Comments on Repts of Inves Review, cited above. CONFIDENTIAL.

¹⁵(1) USAREUR Intelligence Program, FY 57. (2) Cable DA-925278, DCSPER to USAREUR, 26 Jun 57. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above.

¹⁶(1) Paper prepared for USAREUR Hist Div by Maj A. Brinson, USAREUR G2 CI Br. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable DA-907966, DA to USAREUR, 7 Aug 56. CONFIDENTIAL. (3) Ltr, 66th CIC Group to USAREUR G2, 18 Jul 56, sub: Close-out of Investigative Phase of Refugee Relief Act of 1953. AEUC-COM 383.7-1. CONFIDENTIAL. (4) Cable DA-909788, DA to USAREUR, 10 Sep 56. CONFIDENTIAL. All in file above.

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for review during FY 1958. The program was expected to be completed in FY 1959.¹⁷

54. Significant Trends in Counterintelligence

The major USAREUR counterintelligence project initiated during FY 1957 was a coordinated program designed to improve the command's security. The program consisted of a series of defensive activities aimed at assisting all commanders at different levels in raising security standards and thereby increasing the protection of USAREUR installations and facilities. Specific provisions included expanding the scope of security surveys and inspections, increasing the use of security education aids, and a new series of briefings for all personnel. The program as a whole resulted in an increased awareness regarding security threats to the command and a corresponding improvement in USAREUR security.

¹⁷(1) AR 381-46, 2 Aug 55, sub: Integration of Counterintelligence (Investigative) Files into Central Records Facility (U). CONFIDENTIAL.
(2) Ltr, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Sep 56, sub: Criteria for the Contents of Dossiers Forwarded to CRF (U). ACSI-S (Pol). CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

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CHAPTER 5

Planning and Preparations

55. USAREUR Planning Program

Throughout FY 1957 current war and emergency plans for which USAREUR and CENTAG headquarters had responsibility were completed and maintained.

a. Coordination of Planning. Because of the interdependence of the various plans and the complexity of the over-all planning program for the defense of Western Europe, careful coordination with the Department of the Army, US EUCOM, other component services in Europe, the NATO commands, and appropriate political agencies was mandatory. In addition, subordinate commands were provided with planning policy and guidance.¹

b. New System of Numbering Plans. In February 1957 a system was introduced whereby plans were identified by three-digit numbers. The first digit identified the general area, number one being Berlin; number two, points outside the SACEUR/CINCEUR area; number three, Central Europe; and number four, unassigned. The second digit identified the applicable level of the plan. Zero was assigned to U.S. uniservice or USAREUR; one, to U.S. joint or a U.S. unilateral level; two, NATO uniservice or CENTAG level; three, tripartite or a combined U.S.- UK- French level; and four, NATO joint or Central Europe. The third digit referred to the numerical sequence of the plan. Thus, the USAREUR Emergency Plan 201 could be readily identified as the first USAREUR, or U.S. uniservice, plan for a region outside the SACEUR/CINCEUR area.²

¹Program 4A, USAREUR Planning Program, FY 57. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

²Change Order No. 2, 28 Feb 57, w/atchd Annex A, "System of Numbering Plans", to Program 4A, USAREUR Planning Program, FY 57. SECRET NOFORN.

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56. CENTAG Emergency and Operational Planning

a. The Central Zone Plans. CENTAG had completed its NATO emergency planning for FY 1956 with one exception, the Central Zone Joint Emergency Defense Plan 1-56 (CZ JEDP 1-56). This NATO plan was to define the mission of the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe, in the Central Zone upon issuance of the general alert order (GAO) and was to be developed jointly by the land, naval, and air components.

After reviewing the mission assigned to him by the Central Europe Joint Emergency Defense Plan 1-56, which served as the basis for the CZ JEDP 1-56, COMCENTAG arrived at the conclusion that he would be incapable of fulfilling his assignment because of the reduction in French forces. He therefore requested a change in mission from LANDCENT. Meanwhile work on the CZ JEDP 1-56 was suspended; upon receipt of the new Central Europe Joint Emergency Defense Plan 1-57 in late 1956, work on the supporting CZ JEDP 1-57 was begun. The CENTAG portion of the plan was completed and forwarded to FOURATAF for comment in May 1957, but a reply was not received by the end of FY 1957.³

The Central Zone Joint Atomic Fire Plan 1-57 (JPAW) was the joint CENTAG and FOURATAF plan for the employment of atomic weapons, based on planning numbers assigned by COMLANDCENT. Although actually an annex of the CZ JEDP 1-57, the amount of effort expended on its preparation and the over-all importance of the contents justified the publication of the plan as a separate document in January 1957.⁴

b. CENTAG Emergency Planning. Also under preparation was the CENTAG Emergency Plan 1-57, a single service NATO operations plan providing for the execution of the mission and tasks of COMCENTAG during the initial phase of a general war.⁵

c. Early Plans for the Deployment of German Land Forces. In July 1956 the feasibility of emergency utilization of German military personnel stationed in the CENTAG area and not yet certified to NATO was taken into consideration. The effectiveness of integrating individual combat

³(1) For further information on the CZ JEDP 1-57, see the top secret supplement to this report. (2) USAREUR Program Prog Rept, FY 56, 4th Qtr, p. 2A-05. SECRET. (3) Change 1, 5 Nov 56, to Program 4A, USAREUR Planning Program, FY 57. SECRET NOFORN. (4) Interv, Capt J. Mewha, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col J. T. Hennessey, CENTAG Plans Br, 10 Oct 57. SECRET.

⁴(1) USAREUR Program Prog Rept, FY 57, 1st Qtr, p. 4A-10. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Change 1, 5 Nov 56, to Program 4A, cited above. SECRET NOFORN. (3) Interv, Capt Mewha with Lt Col R. A. Marshall, CENTAG Plans Br, 10 Oct 57. SECRET.

⁵For further information on this plan, see the top secret supplement to this report.

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replacements or small units into the CENTAG forces would depend upon their location, training progress, and the warning time before an attack. In August and again in September 1956, permission was requested from LANDCENT to develop, in coordination with West German officials, a modus operandi for such emergency use of the German combat potential within the CENTAG area.⁶ There was no immediate action on this request, but in November 1956 LANDCENT forwarded a NATO-approved plan for the ultimate stationing of the West German land forces. COMCENTAG concurred in principle with the proposed plan, assuming that eventually 2 infantry divisions, including the division in the Fulda-Kassel area, 4 armored divisions, and 3 separate brigades would be assigned to his command.⁷

d. The Regroupment of French Forces and the Assumption of Responsibilities by the New German Army. In May 1956 the French had submitted to SACEUR a plan for regrouping their remaining forces in Germany.⁸ Broadly speaking, the plan proposed that the French First Army in southern Germany be reinforced by units of the French II Corps, with the latter to be relieved by equivalent German units. The regroupment, which was to be carried out in three phases under COMCENTAG's supervision, would strengthen French forces in the southern sector and simultaneously assist in the integration of the new German Army.⁹

(1) Task Force Boston. On 26 July 1956 COMLANDCENT authorized CENTAG headquarters to discuss with the West German Ministry of Defense the relief of the French II Corps with equivalent German units; such exploratory discussions were to be limited to the II Corps sector only.¹⁰

⁶(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 31 Jul 56, sub: Utilization of German Personnel (U). NATO SECRET. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COMLANDCENT, 1 Aug 56, same sub. NATO SECRET. (3) Memo, G.P.W. [Col Warner, SGS] to Gens Hodes, Maddox & Post, 18 Sep 56. SECRET. All in USAREUR SGS 322 Ger (1956), Item 2.

⁷(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 17 Nov 56, sub: Ultimate Peacetime Deployment of the German Land Forces (S). (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COMLANDCENT, 19 Nov 56, same sub. Both NATO SECRET. Both in file above.

⁸For background information, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 154-56. SECRET NOFORN.

⁹In August 1956 CENTAG estimated the combat effectiveness of the entire French II Corps as equivalent to only 1 division. See Cable SX-1680, COMCENTAG to CINCENT, 18 Aug 56. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 CAG (1956), Task Force Boston.

¹⁰(1) Cable SX-1331, COMCENTAG to COMLANDCENT, 23 Jul 56. (2) Cable OPTLC-79113, COMLANDCENT to COMCENTAG, 26 Jul 56. (3) DF, USAREUR G3 COFS, 28 Jul 56, sub: German Proposal Regarding Relief of Elements of II French Corps by Equivalent German Units (U). All NATO SECRET. All in file above.

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During the preliminary discussions that took place in August, the French proposed that units of the German 2d Infantry Division relieve the easternmost element of its II Corps force--Task Force Boston--by October 1956 and that the new units be placed under the command of the French corps headquarters. The French also wanted some control of the logistical support to be rendered the German 2d Division. The West German Government, while agreeing to the command arrangement, desired to retain control over the necessary support, since--according to NATO policy--logistics was a national responsibility. On the other hand, Seventh Army held that control of the German units should be vested in the U.S. V Corps.¹¹

The political problems involved in this issue were as far reaching as the military implications. France, an ally of the United States long before the creation of NATO, was striving to maintain its military and national prestige, particularly in Germany. Realizing its weakness, the French Government was endeavoring to improve its military posture although relinquishing control of a large section of central Germany. Therefore, temporarily placing German units under command of the French II Corps would accomplish the two-fold purpose of initiating a regroupment while tactically strengthening the French First Army. The Federal Republic of Germany would benefit from the proposed regroupment because it would expedite the buildup of German military forces and assist them in acquiring essential housing and facilities. On the other hand, by retaining direct command of the German units, the U.S. Seventh Army would be able to influence the development of the new German Army; this apparent advantage could be nullified by adverse repercussions from the French.¹²

Both the French and the Seventh Army deployment plans for the new German units in the former II Corps sector presented tactical advantages and disadvantages. After integration of the German elements, the French would place 5 combat battalions on Line Richmond as compared to the 3 scheduled in the U.S. plan; the French would also have a more even distribution of forces over the 62-mile Rhine River line, while the Seventh Army plan would place more French troops north of the Lahn River than south. Furthermore, under the Seventh Army plan the French 1st Armored Division would have to be deployed east of the Rhine River--which was unacceptable to the French--or else the left flank of the U.S. forces would be exposed. Finally, the U.S. plan provided for direct contact with the German forces and the placing of the sector covering the Hessian corridor approach under a single corps commander.¹³

¹¹(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 7 Sep 56, sub: Relief of TF Boston by German Forces (S). (2) Cable SX-1984, COMCENTAG to CCFFA, 10 Sep 56. Both NATO SECRET. Both in file above.

¹²See note above.

¹³(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 7 Sep 56, cited above. (2) Cable SX-1984, COMCENTAG to CCFFA, 10 Sep 56, cited above. Both NATO SECRET.

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After appraising the two plans and the political issues involved, COMCENTAG, with CINCENT's approval, informed Seventh Army in October 1956 that West German NATO units would assume the former combat mission of Task Force Boston under operational command of the French II Corps. The commander of the German 2d Infantry Division would relieve the French commander of all tactical responsibility for the sector by 10 February 1957. After the completed regroupment the French elements of the task force would be transferred to the French First Army; the logistical support of the German units would be a national responsibility.¹⁴ If an emergency occurred after the relief of the French II Corps and before the assumption of command by the German III Corps, control of the German units in the area would pass to the U.S. V Corps.¹⁵

The relief of the French Task Force Boston was completed in November 1956, at which time Combat Group A-2 of the German 2d Infantry Division moved into the area and was given access to NATO defense plans on a "need-to-know" basis.¹⁶

(2) Movement of the Second Increment. Meanwhile, planning for the relief of the remainder of the French II Corps continued. The second phase, which consisted of the replacement of all French troops except two Colonial regiments by the remainder of the German 2d Infantry Division and elements of the German 5th Armored Division, was completed in February 1957. The departure of the remaining French elements was dependent on the Federal Republic's negotiations with Baden-Wurttemberg authorities to obtain their acceptance of the stationing of the two Colonial regiments and on the timing of the assumption of command by the German III Corps.¹⁷

¹⁴(1) Cable OPTLC-79510, COMLANDCENT to COMCENTAG, 3 Oct 56. (2) Cable SX-2394, CENTAG to COMLANDCENT, 6 Oct 56. (3) Cable PPCE-79578, CINCENT to LANDCENT, 9 Oct 56. (4) Cable SX-2464, COMCENTAG to Seventh Army, 11 Oct 56. All NATO SECRET. All in file above.

¹⁵(1) Cable SX-2759, CENTAG to COMLANDCENT, 29 Oct 56. (2) Cable 5345, Seventh Army to COMCENTAG, 20 Nov 56. (3) Cable SX-3262, CENTAG to AMEMB, Bonn & CCFFA, 27 Nov 56. (4) DF, USAREUR G3 to COMCENTAG, 20 Dec 56, sub: Request for Change in Boundary of II French Corps (U). All NATO SECRET. All in file above.

¹⁶(1) Cable SX-3265, COMCENTAG to COMLANDCENT, 28 Nov 56. (2) Cable OPTLC-80003, COMLANDCENT to COMCENTAG, 29 Nov 56. Both NATO CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above.

¹⁷(1) Memo, USAREUR G3 to Gen H. I. Hodes, n.d., sub: Relief of II French Corps by German Troops (S). (2) Memo, USAREUR G3 to Gen Hodes, n.d., sub: Relief of Remaining Units of II French Corps by German Units (C). Both NATO SECRET. Both in file above. (3) Cable SX-1071, USAREUR to DA, 5 Jan 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 370.5 (1957).

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(3) Plans for Moving the Third Increment. In December 1956 the French II Corps asked to be relieved of its operational responsibilities east of the Rhine River and suggested that the U.S. V Corps assume command of the German forces in the area. However, the French wished to retain operational control on the Rhine River until the redeployment of their forces was completed.¹⁸ Seventh Army, on the other hand, would not agree to the proposed early relief of the French II Corps from its responsibilities east of the Rhine unless German capability to assume responsibility for the sector without adverse effect upon operational plans was demonstrated.¹⁹ In January 1957, when U.S., German, and French officers met to discuss mutual problems and to accelerate the relief of the French II Corps, it was learned that the German III Corps would not be prepared to assume operational command of the area during 1957, primarily because the corps headquarters lacked proper signal communications. To expedite the matter, USAREUR offered to furnish the necessary personnel and equipment. A few months later German officials informed CENTAG that communications between the German 2d Infantry and 5th Armored Divisions would be satisfactory, and the III Corps headquarters would have a limited operational capability by 1 July 1957.²⁰

Meanwhile, plans for the withdrawal of the third slice were prepared, with 30 June 1957 being designated as the tentative completion date because of urgent operational requirements of the French First Army. On 14 February 1957, however, CINCENT directed that no further action be taken on the establishment of the German III Corps headquarters in Koblenz pending a decision on the general command structure for Central Europe. Planning for the relief of the French II Corps had been based on the assumption that both the German 2d Infantry and 5th Armored Divisions would be ultimately assigned to CENTAG for employment in the sector. Since any action to impede the establishment of the III Corps headquarters would halt German efforts to strengthen the forces of that corps, confirmation of the assignment of the two divisions was necessary for

¹⁸(1) Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to Lt Gen B. C. Clarke, CG Seventh Army, and Lt Gen P. E. Jacquot, CCFFA, 21 Dec 56. Both NATO SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 381 CAG (1956), Task Force Boston. (2) Ltr, Gen Jacquot to Gen Hodes, 31 Dec 56. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 CAG (1957).

¹⁹DF, USAREUR G3 to COMCENTAG, 20 Dec 56, sub: Request for Change in Boundary of II French Corps. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 CAG (1956), Task Force Boston.

²⁰(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 15 Feb 57, sub: Relief of II French Corps (U). (2) Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to Lt Gen H. Speidel, Federal Ministry of Defense, 18 Feb 57. Both NATO SECRET. (3) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 19 Mar 57, sub: Status of German Units in the II French Corps Sector (U). SECRET. All in USAREUR SGS 381 CAG (1957).

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continued planning. Nevertheless, CINCENT assigned Combat Group B-2 of the German 2d Infantry Division to NORTHAG, a step that required the division to prepare emergency plans for both the NORTHAG and CENTAG zones.²¹

In May 1957 the activation of the German III Corps headquarters was approved; however, the corps' forces were to consist of only one combat command of the German 2d Infantry Division in addition to the entire German 5th Armored Division. The transfer of operational responsibilities from the French was to take place on 1 August 1957, at which time the German units would become available to Seventh Army in an emergency. The French Northern Rhine Flotilla would remain in support of the German III Corps and would assist in the training of German engineer units in river crossings. All other French units, except for a reduced corps headquarters of approximately 500 men to command the French 1st Armored Division and its supporting elements in the Trier area, would be withdrawn from the Koblenz area by 1 October 1957. The French 1st Armored Division, being part of the strategic reserve, would continue to support the German III Corps.²²

e. CENTAG's Relationship with German Military Authorities. CENTAG's relationship with the West German territorial commanders was governed by an AFCEM document dated 13 September 1954 and entitled "Division of Responsibilities in Wartime between National Territorial Commanders, The Supreme Commander and Subordinate Allied Commanders." This document was in turn based on a North Atlantic Council document (MC/36) that was revised in February 1957 (MC 36/1). Both specified the operational relationships for the land combat zone and for the communications zone.

In the land combat zone, national sovereignty was to be subject to the overriding authority of NATO commanders to conduct operations and to control supporting activities within their areas of responsibility as deemed necessary for the accomplishment of their missions. Subject to this requirement and for as long as possible, national authorities would

²¹ (1) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 25 Feb 57, sub: Relief of II French Corps (U). (2) Cable SX-2040, CENTAG to COMLANDCENT, 2 Mar 57. Both NATO SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 381 CAG (1957). (3) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 1 Apr 57, sub: Relief of II French Corps Units (U). (4) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 22 Apr 57, sub: Assignment of German Forces in II French Corps Sector (U). Both NATO SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS NATO No. 2 (1957).

²² (1) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 13 May 57, sub: Relief of II French Corps (U). NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS NATO No. 2 (1957). (2) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 10 Jun 57, sub: French Headquarters "R" in Koblenz (U). NATO SECRET. In CENTAG OUT Correspondence file 1957, Item 54. (3) Comments by Maj Gen R. C. Cooper, USAREUR ACOFS G3, at Commander's Conference at Fontainebleau, 18 Jun 57. NATO SECRET. In CENTAG Admin file, 337, Comdr's Conf.

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retain authority over and responsibility for their land and people. In West Germany, the Allied commanders were responsible for the over-all defense and security of the armed forces and their communications and for ensuring that the plans of the German territorial commanders were in consonance with Allied plans. Territorial commanders were responsible to their national authorities for local protection of property and persons, for internal security and maintenance of order, and for the protection of national vulnerable points. Where they affected the security and communications of the field forces, territorial plans had to conform with the directives of the Allied commanders and otherwise had to be in consonance with the over-all Allied plan.

In the communications zone, national authorities would retain full sovereignty and would provide, in consultation with the Allied commanders, for the general defense and security, to include the lines of communications. Allied commanders would be responsible only for the local security of their own installations.²³

During peacetime host governments to NATO forces were required to draw up detailed statements of the authority to be delegated to the Allied commanders; however, the Federal Republic of Germany had made no such comprehensive commitments. Throughout the reporting period West German and Allied officials met frequently to work out specific agreements on matters of policy and on delegation of authority.²⁴

Since the German military regions were responsible for the ultimate defense of German territory and would command all national forces not assigned to or earmarked for NATO, their plans had to be in consonance with the over-all CENTAG plans. In addition to the purely negative benefits of precluding interference by unilateral German operations, such coordination with the German territorial forces could produce a significant direct contribution to CENTAG's combat efficiency. This would be particularly true in such fields as barrier and denial operations and the control of the civilian population, in which Allied efforts had not been very successful. Therefore, when Lt. Gen. Adolf Heusinger, Chief of the Military Advisory Council to the Federal Ministry of Defense, informed COMCENTAG in March 1957 that the German military regions were authorized to contact the appropriate NATO headquarters to discuss certain operational plans, the way to realistic planning was opened.²⁵

²³ Stf Study, USAREUR G3, 8 May 57, no sub. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS NATO No. 2 (1957).

²⁴ DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 28 May 57, sub: Relations between NATO Operational Commanders and the West German Federal Ministry of Defense (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 CAG (1957).

²⁵ (1) Stf Study, USAREUR G3, 8 May 57, cited above. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, Lt Gen A. Heusinger, Fed Min of Def, Bonn, to Gen H. I. Hodes, COMCENTAG, 23 Mar 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 381 CAG (1957).

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Initial negotiations were limited because most German officers lacked essential security clearances. COMCENTAG in May 1957 authorized his subordinate army commanders to make direct contact with the German military region headquarters for establishing liaison and coordinating procedures. In order to permit effective planning the German Ministry of Defense was asked at the same time to furnish CENTAG with a statement of the present and future missions of and the authority delegated to the German military regions.²⁶ Policy in various subject areas would of necessity be determined piecemeal over a considerable period, but it was in CENTAG's interest not to wait until all problems were settled before beginning to implement specific agreements. Since immediate decentralization to the lower echelons was desirable, Seventh Army and the French First Army authorized subordinate commands to establish contact with the German military regions as required.²⁷

f. German Participation in Barrier and Denial Planning. In a June 1956 meeting at Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe, topics for immediate discussions with the West German Minister of Defense (MOD) had been defined as follows: NATO materiel requirements in the combat zone; police cooperation; communications; denial of strategic resources in the Federal Republic of Germany; and emergency crossing facilities over the Rhine River.²⁸ At a subsequent meeting in September 1956, which was attended by CENTAG observers, the discussion centered on the denial of strategic resources on West German territory by preparing barriers to public highways and waterways, military and civilian airfields, communications, pipelines, and other supply installations as well as by denying road and rail transport. While desiring to participate in a program designed to hold a potential enemy as far to the east as possible, the West German Government wanted to minimize the destruction and to control any demolitions at the highest level. Quite apart from other considerations, this coincided with SHAPE's stay-at-home policy that required the civil population to remain in place. The German representatives proposed the establishment of a classification system for the various degrees of destruction; targets to be destroyed beyond repair would be listed for "total destruction;" those where only a vital part was to be destroyed, for "partial destruction;"

²⁶(1) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Heusinger, 20 May 57. In USAREUR SGS NATO No. 2 (1957). (2) Ltrs, COMCENTAG to CG's U.S. Seventh Army and French First Army, 24 May 57, sub: Liaison with German Military Districts (Wehrbereichen) (U). NATO CONFIDENTIAL. (3) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 28 May 57, sub: Military Coordination by German and U.S. Personnel (U). NATO SECRET. Both in CENTAG OUT Corr file 1957, Items 43 and 45.

²⁷(1) Ltrs, COMCENTAG to CG's Seventh Army and French First Army, 24 May 57, cited above. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. (2) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 28 May 57, cited above. NATO SECRET.

²⁸For details, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 156-57. SECRET NOFORN.

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and targets that were to be rendered inoperative by the removal or destruction of a single part, for "paralyzing destruction." In the latter case further use of the target would be made possible by replacing the critical part. As a result of this meeting a general policy statement incorporating the German position was issued; army groups and associated level commands were authorized to proceed with detailed planning.²⁹

NATO operating procedures for the land combat zone specified that Allied commanders would have the authority to conduct operations and to control any supporting activities necessary to accomplish their missions within their areas of responsibility. On the other hand, German military regions were not assigned any responsibility for operational demolitions except in support of the Allied tactical commanders operating in their areas.³⁰ In March 1957, therefore, CENTAG engineers established contact with the West German IV Military Region regarding barrier and denial plans (Map 1). The IV Military Region--charged with preparing all barriers in the former French II Corps area with the exception of 18 strategic targets for which the U.S. V Corps retained responsibility--had taken over the French barrier plans and four ammunition depots where packaged explosives were stored for each target; the Germans were then checking target folders to determine the accuracy and adequacy of French plans to impede a potential enemy advance across the former French II Corps territory. Without having received any target information from U.S. sources, the West German military engineers had contacted civilian officials, such as railroad, highway, utility, and communications personnel, and had plotted barrier zones and likely targets wherever the construction of demolition chambers or related activities had been planned or undertaken in the U.S. sector.³¹

In April 1957 the commander of the VI Military Region requested information on barrier and denial plans for his area. Seventh Army welcomed this inquiry because no extensive tactical operations were contemplated in the area south of the Danube and east of the Iller Rivers--a significant portion of the VI Military Region. Moreover, after the reorganization of the 11th Airborne Division many strategic denial targets located in the Munich-Augsburg-Ulm areas were beyond Seventh Army's demolition capability, and it was essential that the VI Military Region

²⁹(1) DF's, USAREUR G3 to G4, Engr, et.al., 30 Aug 56; and 17 Sep 56, sub: Denial to Potential Enemy of Strategic Resources in the GFR (S). (2) DF, CENTAG Plans Sec to USAREUR G3, 12 Sep 56, same sub. All NATO SECRET. All in CENTAG Admin files, CAG OUT Corr 1956, Item 41. (3) Stf Study, USAREUR G3, 8 May 57, cited above. NATO SECRET.

³⁰(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 23 May 57, sub: Integration of German Military Districts (Wehrbereiche) (WBK) into CENTAG Barrier & Denial Operations (U). (2) Ltr, COMCENTAG to Min of Def, Bonn, 27 May 57, same sub. Both NATO SECRET. Both in CENTAG Admin files, CAG OUT Corr 1956, Item 41.

³¹Memo for rec, Lt Col R. M. Carn, USAREUR Engr Div CENTAG Plans Sec, 12 Mar 57. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. In CENTAG Admin files.


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MAP I

MILITARY REGIONS
(Wehrbereichskommandos)

IN THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY



SOURCE: USAREUR ACOFS G3,
GTAG FILES. UNCLASSIFIED.

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take over some of the responsibility.³²

While these isolated efforts at finding local solutions were made, West German coordination in demolition planning was sought at a higher level. At a briefing on Seventh Army's barrier and denial plan COMCENTAG directed his headquarters to use the capabilities of the German military regions. Control and supervision of denial and barrier operations, however, would remain with the tactical commanders. Seventh Army and CENTAG/USAREUR representatives therefore prepared a draft directive defining the ground force commanders' role in controlling German military region barrier and denial activities. After internal and lateral coordination, the draft was forwarded to the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1957 for concurrence or comment.³³ Under the proposed draft the German military regions would be responsible for providing demolition chambers in the designs of such structures of military value as highways and railway bridges; airfields; inland waterway locks, ports, and docks; and ocean ports and docks. The German regional commander would also appoint a security-cleared officer who would be charged with supplying the manpower and resources needed for the barrier and denial projects of the respective Allied commander. At the order for simple alert or after, West German engineer units, assigned to the military regions and committed to barrier and denial preparations, would be placed under the operational command of the appropriate Allied tactical commander; they would revert to national control after completion of their NATO missions.³⁴ Planning would be a responsibility of the Allied tactical commanders concerned in any zone of tactical operations. Therefore, the German military regions would make their capability in such operations available to the barrier and denial planning authorities and would comply with requests of the Allied tactical commanders for assistance. Barrier and denial target information would be exchanged between German military regions and Allied tactical commanders on a "need-to-know" basis.³⁵ By the end of the reporting period CENTAG

³² Ltr, CG Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 15 May 57, sub: Military Coordination by German and U.S. Personnel (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 CAG (1957).

³³ DF, CENTAG Plans Sec, 16 Apr 57, sub: Planning for Denial to the Potential Enemy of Resources in the Territory of the GFR (U), w/atchd memo for rec, Hq CENTAG, 15 Apr 57, same sub. NATO SECRET. In CENTAG Admin files, CENTAG OUT Corr 1957, Item 21.

³⁴ Draft, n.d., sub: Procedure for Control by Army Commanders of Capabilities of German Military Regions (WEK) for Barrier and Denial Operations (U). NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS NATO No. 2 (1957).

³⁵ Comment 2, USAREUR G3 to Hist Div, 4 Nov 57, to DF, USAREUR Hist Div to G3, 18 Oct 57, sub: Review of Draft Chapter of USAREUR Annual Historical Report, FY 57 (U). SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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had not received a reply from the West German Ministry of Defense.

57. USAREUR Emergency-Alert Planning

a. Capabilities Plans. USAREUR's basic unilateral war plan, the USAREUR Capabilities Plan 1-56 (Basic) (USAREUR CP 1-56), was published in July 1956 and approved, with minor reservations, by US EUCOM in November.³⁶ The plan provided for the execution of CINCUSAREUR's missions during both a cold war period and a general war of 30 months' duration. Thus it covered operations before and after the assumption of operational control of U.S. forces by NATO commanders.³⁷

During FY 1956 the alternate and supplementary capabilities plans had been consolidated into one volume that US EUCOM approved in December 1956. The alternate plan provided for the conduct of operations during the first 30 days of war in the event that NATO command channels could not be activated or the Rhine-Ijssel line defenses should collapse--two eventualities that NATO planners for obvious reasons did not choose to contemplate. In the latter case, USAREUR planned a phased withdrawal to the west.³⁸

Work on the USAREUR basic and alternate capabilities plans for 1957 was underway at the close of the reporting period.

b. Alert Planning.

(1) Responsibility for Movement Control. At the close of FY 1956 US EUCOM had been requested to expand its joint capabilities plan to clarify the channels of alert notification and fix responsibility for movement control throughout Central Europe.³⁹ Therefore, on 6 July 1956 US CINCEUR assigned to CINCUSAREUR the responsibility for controlling all surface movements in Central Europe--including France, Germany, and the Benelux countries--that would be required to implement alert and evacuation plans. For this purpose CINCUSAREUR was to plan, coordinate, and control the movements of personnel, troop units, and supplies over surface lines of communication and/or evacuation routes and to establish priorities in conjunction with CINCUSAFE and CINCNELM. The channels of alert

³⁶ For details of this plan, see the top secret supplement to this report.

³⁷ (1) USAREUR Program Prog Rept, FY 56, 4th Qtr, p. 2A-05. SECRET.
(2) Change 1, 5 Nov 56, to Program 4A, cited above. SECRET NOFORN.

³⁸ (1) See note above. (2) Cable DA-914866, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Dec 56. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1956).

³⁹ For details, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 158-60.
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notification were to be clarified and disseminated in an expanded alert annex to the US EUCOM joint capabilities plan.⁴⁰

(2) The New USAREUR/CENTAG Alert Plan. The expanded alert annex to the US EUCOM joint capabilities plan eliminated the requirement for the USAREUR Joint Emergency Alert Plan, U.S. Forces in Germany (JEAP). To further simplify planning a single-volume, combined USAREUR/CENTAG Emergency Alert Plan (USAREUR/CENTAG EP 321) was prepared to support the new US EUCOM document; it superseded both the USAREUR JEAP and the alert annexes to the USAREUR Capabilities Plan 1-56 and the CENTAG Emergency Plan. The new plan contained alert instructions for all USAREUR and CENTAG areas of responsibility; there were no major changes other than in format.⁴¹ The USAREUR/CENTAG EP 321 was submitted for lateral and ambassadorial coordination at the close of the reporting period.⁴²

(3) Exercise BLITZ. Shortly after receiving authority to exercise movement control in alert periods, CINCUSAREUR directed that USAREUR-wide alerts be followed by a 50- to 100-mile road march by all units concerned. After further consideration, however, it developed that such movements would lead to difficulties. The USAREUR Transportation Center would have to be given advance alert notification so as to coordinate the movements of march units and serials, post guides, conduct road reconnaissances, and work out other necessary details. Advance arrangements also would have to be made with West German civil authorities for the use of roads and for the control of local traffic by civil police. Further, the estimated expenditure of 1,500,000 gallons of gasoline required for the movement of the units could not be justified, since Seventh Army alone was approximately six and one-half million gallons short of its basic gasoline requirements for FY 1957. Finally, such a large movement would alarm the public and have political repercussions.⁴³

CINCUSAREUR therefore modified his instructions for the alert called in October 1956 under the code name Exercise BLITZ. Major commanders were required to move units under their command a distance of 10 miles or move from permanent stations or alert assembly areas and to cross the initial point specified in emergency alert plans. Units in major training

⁴⁰ Cable EC-9-3846, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCNELM, & CINCUSAFE, 6 Jul 56. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1956), Item 014.

⁴¹ (1) USAREUR Program Prog Rept, FY 57, 1st Qtr, p. 4A-05. SECRET. (2) Program 4A, USAREUR Planning Program, FY 58. SECRET NOFORN. (3) DF, USAREUR G3 to DA, U.S. Emb Bonn, et al., 4 Jan 57, sub: Emergency Alert Planning (U). CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (4) Memo for rec, Lt Col C. C. Terrell, USAREUR Asst SGS, 7 May 57, no sub. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1957).

⁴² Sum Sheet, USAREUR G3 Plans Br, 12 Jun 57, sub: Emergency Alert Planning (U). NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1957).

⁴³ DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 10 Sep 56, sub: Alerts (U). CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1956).

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areas were exempt from the movement phase.⁴⁴

Exercise BLITZ showed that the time required to alert subordinate units varied from about two to seven hours. To remedy this unsatisfactory condition conference circuits were established so that all major subordinate and lateral commands could be notified within a maximum of ten minutes; a code word would clear the lines and summon duty officers to the telephone.⁴⁵

(4) Operational Readiness Tests. In June 1957 USAREUR established a policy for testing the command's operational readiness to carry out appropriate portions of emergency plans and procedures. USAREUR units, with the exception of the Berlin Command, would participate in a minimum of two practice alerts per quarter; the Berlin Command would participate only if directed by the U.S. Commander, Berlin. In January, April, July, and October, the area commanders would call practice alerts in which all non-Seventh Army units would participate. The months of February, May, August, and November were left open so that local commanders could call practice alerts. USAREUR-wide alerts, in which all units except the Berlin Command would participate, were to be called in March, June, September, and December.

During practice alerts commanders were to stress speed and adequacy of the notification system; assembly and movement of personnel under extended field conditions; adequacy of transportation; familiarity with initial points, routes, and march tables; and knowledge of plans for destroying or disposing of records and equipment not to be evacuated. In exercising NEO plans noncombatant planning was to be implemented to the extent of activating block and area wardens, manning NEO support installations and service areas, and notifying noncombatants as deemed appropriate by the wardens; however, no publicity was to be given to the testing of the NEO exercises.⁴⁶

To further test the operational readiness of the command USAREUR-wide musters, communications checks, and air raid warning drills were to be conducted. All units, regardless of assignment or location, were to participate in the musters; however, the Berlin Command would do so only to the degree specified by the local commander. Daily communication

⁴⁴Comment 2, USAREUR SGS to G3, 13 Sep 56, to DF cited above. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

⁴⁵(1) Cable SC-22611, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, COMNAVGER, Seventh Army, et al., 10 Oct 56. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) DF, USAREUR SGS to G3, 15 Oct 56, sub: Summary of Times of Completion of Major Phases of Exercise Blitz (U). CONFIDENTIAL. (3) Cable SX-2524, USAREUR to Seventh Army, et al., 16 Oct 56. CONFIDENTIAL. All in file above.

⁴⁶USAREUR ltr, 25 Jun 57, sub: Operational Readiness (U). AEAGC-OP 322 AG (AG-AO). CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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checks by telephone would be made by contacting major and subordinate commands as well as Air Force units. In addition, USAREUR and Seventh Army would conduct periodic HANDICAP WHITE telephonic checks that would be disseminated down to company level. To test the air raid warning system USAREUR messages would be sent in the clear at infrequent intervals, and major and subordinate commands would further disseminate these warnings down to battalion-size units. In the past various Air Force commands had originated these warnings and had passed them on to USAREUR headquarters for information, but no further action had been taken. The new plan requiring USAREUR-wide dissemination would indicate the time required to alert various units and provide a realistic test for the individual units' reaction to such warnings.⁴⁷

(5) Coordination with the British. In October 1956 the Commanders Committee, Northern Forces Central Europe, proposed that closer liaison be effected between Northern and Central Zone forces during an alert period.⁴⁸ COMCENTAG had long felt that close cooperation was both desirable and essential in order to assure the uniform development of a wartime posture and full coordination of all alert measures, particularly those that required the cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany.

To maintain the desired liaison, the Senior U.S. Liaison Officer (SUSLO) and the Senior British Liaison Officer (SBLO) were designated as joint representatives at the respective counterpart headquarters. Until the three commanders of the Central Zone forces--NAVCAE, CENTAG, and FOURATAF--occupied their wartime command posts SBLO would of necessity have to be located at CENTAG headquarters, thus limiting his liaison with FOURATAF to that of normal electrical communications. After the establishment of a joint communications operations center he could maintain personal contact with all three service commands.⁴⁹

(6) German Participation in Alert Planning. In April 1957 the procedure for alerting German units assigned to CENTAG headquarters was being studied. According to CINCENT, German forces to be employed in the French II Corps sector, or to be made available to U.S. commanders in an emergency, would execute the alert measures that had been mutually agreed upon by SHAPE and West German representatives in June 1956. At that time the Germans had agreed that their forces assigned to CENTAG would respond

⁴⁷(1) Ibid. (2) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 17 Jun 57, sub: USAREUR Operational Readiness Directive (U). CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1957).

⁴⁸Ltr, Comdrs Comm, Northern Forces Cen Eur, to CENTAG, NAVCAE & FOURATAF, 4 Oct 56, sub: Alert Measures (U). NATO SECRET. In file above.

⁴⁹Ltr, COMCENTAG to Comdrs Comm, Northern Forces Cen Eur, 5 Nov 56, sub: Alert Period Liaison (U). NATO SECRET. In file above.

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positively to all directed key measures sent through the normal NATO chain of command. On the other hand, the German military regions (Wehrbereichskommandos) would respond only to alert directives with domestic or political connotations in accordance with instructions from their national superior headquarters, the Department of Territorial Defense. However, they would maintain liaison with and assist NATO military commanders operating in their regions when so required.

In April 1957 CENTAG and its subordinate headquarters were therefore authorized to participate actively in alert planning with those German forces in the Central Zone that had been assigned or would be made available. On this authority the CENTAG/USAREUR alert plan was modified to reflect the status of German forces during an alert period. Also, the West German Ministry of Defense was included as an information addressee for those alert measures involving German military regions.⁵⁰

(7) The SHAPE Counter Surprise Military Alert System. The SHAPE countersurprise military alert system (the Scarlet Alert) for initiating countermeasures against an enemy air attack stated that the authority to declare such an alert should be vested in SACEUR and his major subordinate commands. On 5 March 1957 US CINCEUR directed CINCUSAREUR to develop in coordination with CINCUSAFE and other appropriate U.S. commanders a recommended U.S. military position with respect to CINCENT's military vigilance and countersurprise military alert systems.⁵¹ The aspects of the problem changed on 28 March, however, when SACEUR designated himself as the sole authority for declaring alerts and for directing implementing actions. His decision was based upon guidance from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.⁵² This action appeared to impinge upon CINCUSAREUR's authority and responsibility for directing and coordinating joint alert measures, including those of countersurprise, as assigned in the US EUCOM Joint Capabilities Plan 1-55. SACEUR's decision was also operationally undesirable and defeated the purpose of the countersurprise concept--to survive with only minimum warning. In turn, CINCUSAREUR suggested that authority for directing and coordinating joint alert measures be formally vested in the regional commanders, preferably at army group and tactical air force level, so as to assure uniform NATO force response at a reasonably decentralized command level. Actions that would trigger alerts could

⁵⁰ DF, USAREUR G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Apr 57, sub: Alert Measures--German Forces Participation (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 CAG (1957).

⁵¹ (1) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 4 Jun 57, sub: Scarlet Alert Negotiations (U). (2) Cable SX-3701, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 3 Jun 57. Both SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1957). (3) Cable EC-9-1202, US CINCEUR to CINCENT, CINCOSOUTH, et al., 7 Mar 57. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS NATO No. 2 (1957).

⁵² Cable EC-9-1709, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 28 Mar 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1957).

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originate at the lowest command levels and might not reach SHAPE in time for declaration and dissemination to the troops.⁵³ When asked for his concurrence CINCUSAFE replied that SACEUR should retain this authority in order to avoid precipitous actions on the part of subordinate forces and to assure that all forces, regardless of their location in the NATO area, would be provided the same degree of warning. Furthermore, since commanders already possessed the authority to take whatever action was necessary to insure the security of their own forces, CINCUSAFE held USAREUR's proposals to be unneeded. At the close of FY 1957 the divergent USAREUR and USAFE positions were forwarded to US CINCEUR for solution.⁵⁴

c. Noncombatant Evacuation Order (NEO) Planning. Providing for the military defense of Europe was simple when compared to the problems connected with noncombatant evacuation planning.⁵⁵ The evacuation would involve moving nearly 180,000 individuals and 30,000 vehicles in some 293 march serials. The columns would have to move on about 10 predetermined routes through Germany and France, taking approximately 56 hours to clear Germany alone. Troop protection would also be necessary, with each column needing at least 1 officer and 5 noncommissioned officers for control. The need for a simplified, workable plan was obvious.⁵⁶

(1) Proposed Relief of Seventh Army from NEO Responsibilities. Since he wanted to relieve combat forces of administrative loads that were not essential to their mission, CINCUSAREUR in July 1956 directed that steps be taken to transfer responsibility for NEO and military service unit (MISEV) planning and execution from Seventh Army to the area command headquarters. If such a transfer took place the area commands would not be assigned to Seventh Army control until after they had carried out their NEO and MISEV responsibilities; Seventh Army would still provide the necessary troop protection for the NEO columns.⁵⁷

The proposed transfer had many disadvantages to which the Seventh Army commander objected. He would be deprived of his authority to

⁵³ Cable SX-3774, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 5 Jun 57. SECRET. In file above.

⁵⁴(1) Cable OPLW-11814, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jun 57. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1957). (2) Interv, Capt Mewha with Lt Col W. L. Romans, USAREUR G3 Plans & Policy Br, 10 Oct 57. Both SECRET.

⁵⁵USAREUR Memo 1-20-9, 24 Jul 56, sub: Bimonthly Ambassador-Commander's Conference Notes (U). FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

⁵⁶(1) Min, USAREUR Theater Army Stf Conf No. 3, 8 Nov 56. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (2) For details of Previous USAREUR NEO planning, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 161-67. SECRET.

⁵⁷(1) Routing Slip, USAREUR Off of COFS to Gens Maddox & Post, 18 Sep 56. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED). (2) DF, USAREUR G3 to SGS, 7 Sep 56, sub: Items of Interest to the Commander in Chief, w/Incl 2. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1956).

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coordinate all activities and movements taking place within his area of command, and planning would be decentralized to five separate commanders who would be required to coordinate with each other and with Seventh Army without the benefit of a centralized higher command. Further, since the march tables for nearly all emergency troop shifts in Germany were keyed to the NEO plans, the commands responsible for NEO would virtually control tactical movements as well. The Seventh Army commander would be placed in the position of being charged with protecting the NEO columns without having the authority to regulate and control their movements in accordance with the tactical situation. Seventh Army also would be deprived of vital logistical and administrative support from the area commands and of the services of army traffic control personnel until after the NEO and MISEV movements were completed. Finally, USAREUR headquarters would become involved in conducting operations that would require additional personnel to operate a traffic headquarters as well as to prepare and maintain detailed movement plans and march tables.⁵⁸

During a test of NEO operations held in September 1956 as part of Exercise WHIP SAW, the Seventh Army commander's position appeared to be substantiated. At one point in the play of the exercise US CINCEUR directed Theater Army to provide periodic summaries of the progress of NEO, giving the times at which the evacuation columns cleared the Rhine, crossed the Luxembourg and French borders, and arrived in the billeting areas in France. Compliance with this requirement revealed that no USAREUR staff agency had responsibility for monitoring the progress of the columns; Seventh Army and COMZ headquarters exercised control only while the columns were moving through their respective areas. Faulty coordination between these two headquarters became manifest when COMZ reported one NEO column to be halfway into France while Seventh Army simultaneously reported that the same column was held up for 30 hours in Germany due to guerrilla activities. To transfer the NEO responsibility to the area commands would only tend to aggravate the problem and lead to added confusion. Instead it was proposed that a temporary Theater Army NEO control center be established at CENTAG Forward.⁵⁹

On 20 December 1956 CINCUSAREUR decided that no further action be taken to relieve the Seventh Army commander from planning and implementing the NEO and MISEV concepts. USAREUR headquarters would assist in NEO planning and preparations by checking on the area commands and by establishing a small operational group from Theater Army within the CENTAG forward command post. This group would maintain physical contact with Seventh Army, ensure coordination with COMZ, and provide an immediately available facility for obtaining Theater Army decisions and command

⁵⁸ Memo, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 23 Oct 56, sub: Relief of Seventh Army of Responsibility for the Planning and Implementation of NEO and MISEV (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1956).

⁵⁹ DF, CENTAG G3 to SGS, G1, et al., 8 Mar 57, sub: Critique, Exercise WHIP SAW (U), w/incl 1, Exercise WHIP SAW Critique (U), 11 Oct 56. NATO SECRET. Copy in USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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assistance on NEO problems that might arise.⁶⁰

(2) Elimination of the Backlog of Control Cards. At the request of the Department of State a passport control card reporting system had been instituted in 1955, for establishing the whereabouts of noncombatants during an emergency. These cards were to be turned in at various check points along the NEO routes, and reports were to be made to the Department of State.⁶¹

During the Suez crisis in late 1956 deficiencies were discovered in the issuance of identification tags and passport control cards. Many dependents--though present in the theater from 6 months to 3 years--had not received their tags and documents, and the system of distribution varied within each area command. On 10 December 1956 the area commanders were made responsible for issuing the control cards and identification tags as well as for monitoring a block warden system to notify dependents and civilians in case of an emergency; unit commanders were charged with the followup. As the result of a coordinated effort the backlog was soon eliminated, and control cards were issued within a week after the basic information was received from the area commands.⁶²

(3) The Need for a New NEO Concept. Tests of the 1955 USAREUR NEO plan revealed so many deficiencies that a major revision was necessary. A reconnaissance of the NEO routes showed that many were hard to find and were located on unsatisfactory secondary and lesser roads. Seventh Army indicated a shortage of personnel to man the NEO march serials. A search for the rest areas in USACOMZEUR territory revealed that many actually were road nets or open fields; consequently, if the existing NEO plans had to be implemented families would have to travel four or more days in automobiles without rest.⁶³

Joint noncombatant plans of the Departments of State and Defense also envisioned four different situations under which NEO might be

⁶⁰(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 17 Dec 56, sub: Transfer of NEO and MISEV Responsibilities from Seventh Army to Area Commands (U). (2) Comment 2, USAREUR SGS to G3, 20 Dec 56, to DF cited above. Both SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1956).

⁶¹Min, USAREUR Theater Army Conf's Nos. 4 and 5, 15 and 29 Nov 56. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

⁶²(1) Min, USAREUR Theater Army Conf's Nos. 4 and 5, cited above. NATO SECRET. (2) DF, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 7 Dec 56. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Cable SC-29942, USAREUR to Seventh Army, Area Comds, et al., 10 Dec 56. UNCLASSIFIED. (4) DF, USAREUR SGS to G1, 11 Dec 56, sub: Dependent Control Cards. UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1956).

⁶³(1) Min, USAREUR Theater Army Conf, 17 Jan 57. NATO SECRET. (2) Min, USAREUR Theater Army Conf's Nos. 4 and 5, cited above. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 337 (1957).

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initiated. The first, ANTONY, could arise during a pre-hostilities period from a national decision to evacuate up to the order for reinforced alert (ORA). Under this situation a worsening of the international situation would presage a possible emergency. The second, BRUTUS, covered the period from ORA to the time the general alert order (GAO) was given; during this period hostilities, including atomic warfare, could begin momentarily. The third, CAESAR, would be the period from GAO to the end of the initial intensive atomic exchange, a period of approximately 30 days or less. The last, DIANA, covered the period following the initial atomic exchange. A new plan was needed to meet these possible contingencies.⁶⁴

(4) The New Plan. On 18 March 1957 CINCUSAREUR was briefed on the NEO problems and on a revised concept designed to eliminate the over-burdening of personnel and the unrealistic transportation and logistical requirements involved in existing plans. The new plan also provided a workable system under the conditions of extreme emergency outlined by the Departments of State and Defense, and included instructions on air evacuation. To facilitate ease of reference and to achieve a more readable document the revised plan was presented in a manual form rather than in the usual five-paragraph order form.

The new concept substituted the principle of free-flowing NEO traffic for the formal march groupings. By eliminating many of the unnecessary items previously earmarked for the noncombatants and emphasizing maximum preparedness and self-sufficiency on the part of the noncombatants themselves, the supply and support load imposed by the old plan was reduced and simplified. The new plan also had the advantages of speed, the elimination of large assembly areas that might invite enemy air attacks, and economy in the use of military personnel and equipment.⁶⁵

The concept of operations was relatively simple. Upon being alerted noncombatants would report to an initial control area where they would be checked by a warden. When ready the noncombatants would be dispatched individually or in small groups over pre-selected and controlled routes, which the noncombatants had previously reconnoitered as far as the first service area. There they would be issued gas to reach the first source of resupply along the route; this would be the only processing noncombatants would receive until they reached small staging areas in western France. Movement control would be exercised by distinctive route markings, by traffic control posts manned by military or civilian police, and by constant surveillance exercised by military police patrols and aircraft. Ordinary security would be provided by these teams and by the

⁶⁴Min, USAREUR Theater Army Stf Conf No. 1, 27 Oct 56. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

⁶⁵(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to G1, G2, et al., 21 Mar 57, sub: NEO Planning (U). (2) DF, USAREUR G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 4 May 57, sub: NEO Planning (U). Both SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1957).

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proximity of deploying combat elements. Service areas would be established at approximately 100-mile intervals along each evacuation route in Germany and France to provide minimum rations, medical services, POL, and essential rest and comfort facilities. Emergency forwarding areas would be established at critical points for rerouting or temporarily delaying noncombatants in the event the selected westward routes were denied or further movement was otherwise impractical at the time.⁶⁶

(a) Preparation of Dependents. Fundamental to the new NEO concept were the requirements that each adult dependent be thoroughly familiar with the evacuation process; that documentation of all individuals and automobiles be accomplished immediately upon arrival in the theater; and that each noncombatant maintain at all times an immediately available kit containing the necessary documentation and the essential items of food, clothing, and equipment required for surviving for a three- to five-day period.⁶⁷ The security classification of certain portions of NEO plans of higher headquarters had to be downgraded so as to adequately instruct the noncombatants and sponsors and to enable coordination at a practical level with civil and military authorities of host nations. The over-all security classification of the US EUCOM Joint Capabilities Plan (JCP) and the Paris Liaison Group (PLG) Master Noncombatant Evacuation Plan precluded providing evacuees with sufficient information to reach safety under extreme conditions.⁶⁸ Although he would not agree to a possible declassification of his JCP or the PLG NEO plan, US CINCEUR in April 1957 authorized the release of such unclassified information as a description of the alert system, transportation and methods of control, location of assembly points, supplies to be furnished by the noncombatant, and other necessary information to assist the individual during an evacuation period. CINCUSAREUR thereupon approved the preparation of a booklet, "Instructions to U.S. Sponsors and Noncombatants," to be distributed to each family within his area of responsibility. This booklet would contain complete information on preparing for and participating in an emergency evacuation, to include a strip map showing the route to the first service area and vehicle identification signs. The booklet was under preparation at the close of the reporting period.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf No. 15, 10 Sep 57, w/atchd incl, Discussion of USAREUR EP 312 (NEO). SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ (1) DF, USAREUR G3 to G1, G2, et al., 21 Mar 57, cited above.
(2) Cable SX-2550, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 1 Apr 57. Both SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1957).

⁶⁹ (1) Cable EC-9-2200, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Apr 57. (2) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 24 Apr 57, sub: Noncombatant Evacuation Order (U). Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above.

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(b) Reaction to the New Concept. In May 1957 USAREUR was invited to present the revised NEO plans to the Paris Liaison Group. The initial reaction of the group was unfavorable, and the movement phase was thought to be unworkable and impossible of control, especially in situation ANTONY. This portion appeared to provide for a mass movement at maximum speed immediately upon the announcement of the decision to evacuate, even though there was no imminent danger. Despite these objections USAREUR intended to make the revised plans effective on 1 July 1957 unless directed otherwise by US CINCEUR.⁷⁰

On 10 June CINCNELM also refused to concur in the applicability of the revised concept to situation ANTONY because of its apparent conflict with the PLG plan, which provided for, wherever possible, movement from the point of origin direct to the Western Hemisphere rather than to an intermediate area. It also conflicted with other plans that provided for priorities of movement and varying rates of speed geared to predicted shipping availability.⁷¹ USAREUR therefore revised its new NEO concept to provide that under situation ANTONY the evacuation would be conducted more deliberately than under situations BRUTUS and CAESAR. Under ANTONY noncombatants would travel in organized groups from the point of origin direct to aerial and sea ports of embarkation and, if necessary, to evacuation areas in order to permit concentration of resources and avoid overloading of support facilities. Air transportation would be used where practicable, but primary reliance would be placed on travel by civilian automobile.

Subordinate commands were to prepare plans for grouping the noncombatants into serially numbered convoys under competent and properly documented convoy commanders before letting them enter France or Switzerland. This was to be accomplished as close to the border crossing points as the situation would permit and, where geographically possible, west of the Rhine River. In approving the modified concept for planning purposes, US CINCEUR directed that existing NEO plans remain in effect until those incorporating the new concept were reviewed.⁷²

(5) NEO Air Evacuation Planning. In January 1957 the possibility of developing contingent plans for an emergency airlift of noncombatants

⁷⁰ DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 29 May 57, sub: PLG Meeting 21-22 May 57 (U), w/atchd memo for rec, Lt Col J. M. Throckmorton, G3 Plans & Policy Br, to ACOFS G3, 24 May 57, sub: PLG Meeting, 21-22 May 57 (U). Both SECRET. In file above.

⁷¹ Cable 101348Z, CINCNELM to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Jun 57. SECRET. In file above.

⁷² (1) Cable SX-4060, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 18 Jun 57. (2) Cable EC-9-3411, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Jun 57. Both SECRET. Both in file above.

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from the forward areas of West Germany through selected airfields to safehavens was under consideration. US EUCOM was asked to expand its planning program to provide for a joint NEO airlift plan for the forward areas. Assuming that an adequate number of transport aircraft would be available under conditions short of a general war, such a plan would establish area priorities, the necessary procedures for moving and loading the passengers at selected airfields, and the movement to specified safehavens.⁷³

Subsequent investigation revealed that even if all 190 USAFE transport aircraft were available 10 days would be needed to evacuate the estimated 66,000 noncombatants in the forward areas as against the 24 hours allocated in existing plans. Many of the suitable airfields in Germany were located some distance west of the more critical forward areas, and it would take at least 24 hours to assemble the necessary aircraft. During this time the evacuees could move overland a considerable distance toward the safehaven ports. Further, the use of aircraft would involve transportation not under the control of USAREUR.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, in March 1957 CINC-USAREUR directed the development of plans for the air evacuation of forward areas in the event that aircraft could be made available; US EUCOM had stated that after ORA aircraft for evacuation purposes would be available only on an incidental basis in areas to be determined. The new NEO plan, published after the close of the reporting period, made CINCUSAFE--in coordination with CINCUSAREUR--responsible for providing an airlift for the evacuation of noncombatants for whom CINCUSAREUR was responsible in France and West Germany.⁷⁵

(6) Negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany. In April 1957 USAREUR informed US CINCEUR of the need for coordinating appropriate portions of NEO plans with West German civilian and military authorities down to the Land (State) and military district level. Authority was requested to begin the discussions with the understanding that over-all NEO planning would not be divulged. US CINCEUR agreed to the necessity for this coordination and on 20 April indicated that upon concurrence of the U.S. Ambassador at Bonn talks with West German officials could be

⁷³Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 7 Jan 57, sub: NEO Airlift (U).
CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

⁷⁴(1) DF, USAREUR G4 to COFS, 21 Jan 57, sub: NEO Supplement 1-57 (Draft) (U). (2) Comment 2, USAREUR DCOFS to G3, 28 Jan 57, to above DF. (3) DF, USAREUR G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 4 May 57, sub: NEO Planning (U). All SECRET. All in file above.

⁷⁵(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 4 May 57, cited above. SECRET. (2) USAREUR Manual for the Emergency Evacuation of Noncombatants (USAREUR EP 312 NEO) (U), 22 Jul 57. SECRET. Copy in USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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initiated.⁷⁶ In June, when USAREUR reminded the U.S. Embassy to establish the proper contacts, such action was considered politically inexpedient because of the German elections to be held in September 1957.⁷⁷

(7) Safehaven Negotiations.

(a) Switzerland. Because noncombatants from the Munich area might be exposed to many dangers should they be required to proceed along evacuation routes across southern Germany, CINCUSAREUR in December 1956 requested the Paris Liaison Group to consider the use of Switzerland as a temporary safehaven.⁷⁸ USAREUR would furnish information on desirable routes as determined by Seventh Army and the Southern Area Command.

In May 1957 the U.S. Embassy in Bern informed USAREUR that the Swiss Government would not agree to provide a safehaven for an indefinite period and would not entertain any proposal to receive 50,000 noncombatants as originally suggested by USAREUR. The best approach would be that of obtaining noncombatant transit rights and temporary safehaven facilities until further movement was feasible. There was little if any question about the Swiss Government recognizing the seriousness of conditions under ORA or GAO, and even if the evacuation was initiated under ANTONY the evacuees could be diverted to Switzerland if the situation became critical. USAREUR reduced the number of noncombatants to 25,000 from the Munich area only and expressed its willingness to meet any reasonable documentation requirements that the Swiss might propose. The necessary medical and administrative personnel would be provided, if necessary in civilian clothing, and supplies would be furnished either by prestocking or by post-NEO delivery as mutually agreed upon. Diplomatic negotiations with Swiss officials were underway at the close of the reporting period.⁷⁹

(b) Iberian Peninsula. During FY 1957 Portugal insisted that it could provide neither shelter nor food for the estimated 70,000

⁷⁶(1) Cable SX-2550, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 1 Apr 57. SECRET.
(2) Cable EC-9-2200, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Apr 57. CONFIDENTIAL.
Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1957).

⁷⁷(1) Cable 672, AMEMB Bonn to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Jun 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1957). (2) Sum Sheet, USAREUR G3, 13 Jun 57, sub: Coordination of NEO Plans with German Officials (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (June 1957).

⁷⁸(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 15 Dec 56, sub: Use of Switzerland as a Safehaven (S). (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Chm, PLG, 18 Dec 56, same sub. Both SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1956).

⁷⁹(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 29 May 57, w/atchd memo for rec, Lt Col J. M. Throckmorton to ACOFS G3, 24 May 57, cited above. (2) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf No. 15, 10 Sep 57, w/atchd incl, cited above. Both SECRET.

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U.S. evacuees destined for that country. The use of the Lisbon metropolitan area would also be denied the United States for staging or outshipping the evacuees; consequently other specific safehaven sites would have to be selected. In January 1957 the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group was asked to resume discussions with the Portuguese Government. Four months later negotiations had reached the point where specific safehaven sites were selected, whereupon USAREUR representatives were instructed to survey the areas and to establish contact with the U.S. Ambassador to Portugal.⁸⁰

According to instructions from higher headquarters, USAREUR was to furnish both personnel and equipment to establish communications in the Spanish safehaven areas, a mission that rightfully belonged to the U.S. Ambassador in Spain. In May 1957 USAREUR proposed to transfer outmoded equipment to the U.S. Embassy, with the understanding that personnel to maintain and operate the equipment would be furnished from Department of State sources. US EUCOM had the matter under consideration at the close of FY 1957.⁸¹

d. Plan for Rapid Phase-Out of Dependents and Certain Other Personnel (RAPOD 1-56). In September 1956 USAREUR distributed its plan for evacuating dependents and other personnel from France, Germany, and the Benelux countries to the United States under conditions short of a full emergency. The plan remained in effect throughout the reporting period.⁸²

e. Emergency Organization and Movement of USAREUR Headquarters. In May 1956 a new Headquarters USAREUR/CENTAG Emergency Evacuation Order 1-56 (Hq USAREUR/CENTAG EEO 1-56), designed to deconcentrate the Campbell-Patton Barracks complex expeditiously, had been published. The major changes in the EEO 1-56 included the evacuation of personnel directly from the housing areas to assembly points; the establishment of a USAREUR Theater Army interim headquarters; the elimination of test assemblies; the creation of a COMZ augmentation group; and a limitation on the number

⁸⁰(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 29 May 57, cited above. (2) Cable SX-1127, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 9 Jan 57. (3) DF, USAREUR G4 to DCQFS, 18 Jan 57, sub: Deletion of Burtonwood as Destination in Triple Play (S). All SECRET. All in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1957). (4) Min, USAREUR Theater Army Conf, 31 Jan 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1957)

⁸¹DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 29 May 57, cited above. SECRET.

⁸²(1) For concept of the plan, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 168-169. SECRET. (2) Program 4A, USAREUR Planning Program, FY 58. SECRET NOFORN. (3) USAREUR ltr, 26 Sep 56, sub: Plan for Rapid Phase-Out of Dependents and Certain Other Personnel (U) (Short Title: RAPOD 1-56) (U). AEAGA 292 GA (AG-AO). SECRET.

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of personnel authorized access to Campbell Barracks.⁸³

In September 1956 the Headquarters Commandant was directed to revise portions of EEO 1-56 by eliminating the USAREUR Theater Army interim headquarters, establishing CENTAG Forward (Group C) as a small forward command post, and designating certain personnel in USAREUR headquarters (Group F) and CENTAG Main (Group G) to be airlifted to wartime or alert command posts.⁸⁴ CENTAG Forward--a group of approximately 12 officers and a proportionate number of enlisted men--was to serve as a "way station" in the forward area where CINCUSAREUR could obtain information, issue orders, and be reached on matters requiring his decision. No advance echelon was provided; the entire group was to move without delay to the wartime location or to the assembly area during practice alerts. Under this concept the interim headquarters was eliminated. Instead, at an actual or practice alert the Deputy Chief of Staff--to be deputy CINCUSAREUR--and representatives from the general staff divisions would be airlifted to the wartime site to make arrangements to receive the main USAREUR headquarters. In the event of bad weather surface movement would be made. Certain personnel from CENTAG Main also would be airlifted to the main wartime command post. This revision of the EEO 1-56 contained supplementary instructions for the other groups and created Group Y to augment Seventh Army. This group would consist of personnel available for reassignment as a result of the reduced tables of distribution for Groups C, F, and G.⁸⁵

f. Theater Army Headquarters. According to existing plans USAREUR headquarters would be divided into CENTAG and Theater Army headquarters in the event of an emergency. After many efforts to arrive at a correct staffing for the Theater Army headquarters, an attempt to evaluate the breakdown of the two headquarters was made during Exercise WHIP SAW in October 1956. After that exercise the question arose as to whether a Theater Army headquarters was needed or whether COMZ headquarters should be augmented. Although he did not decide the issue at the time, CINCUSAREUR was certain that a U.S. headquarters was needed to act as a referee between major U.S. Army commands and as an intermediary between

⁸³(1) For background information, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 167-68. SECRET. (2) USAREUR G4 Stf Jnl, Daily Log, 12 Jul 56. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁸⁴(1) Wkly Sum of Maj Actions Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Off of COFS, 24 Sep 56. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (2) DF, USAREUR G3 to Hq Comdt, 24 Aug 56, sub: Headquarters Arrangement (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1956).

⁸⁵DF, USAREUR COFS to Hq Comdt, 26 Sep 56, sub: Revision of the USAREUR Emergency Evacuation Order (EEO) (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1956).

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those commands and higher headquarters.⁸⁶

In May 1957 CINCUSAREUR resolved the problem by directing that the Theater Army headquarters be composed of a nucleus of 100 officers and 150 enlisted men to be further expanded as the war progressed and the magnitude of its responsibilities increased. An interim Theater Army headquarters of 11 officers and 15 enlisted men was also to be formed and stationed initially with CENTAG Forward to advise the commander in chief on major USAREUR plans and activities during the main headquarters' displacement to a wartime location.⁸⁷

The mission of Theater Army headquarters was redefined as that of a planning, supervisory, and coordinating agency that decentralized combat and administrative operations to the maximum degree possible to major supporting commands and operating detachments. Theater Army was also responsible for the tactical operations of all U.S. Army forces allocated to its control and not assigned to NATO or Allied commands, joint task forces, or unified commands. As such, it would prepare appropriate plans in support of U.S.-joint, NATO, and Allied plans and would provide the necessary plans and policy guidance to further U.S. national objectives. It would also monitor the NEO evacuation plans in accordance with approved plans and directives. Finally, as directed by the U.S. Theater Commander, Theater Army headquarters would furnish or arrange for the administrative and logistical support of all U.S. Army forces, other U.S. component services, and Allied forces.⁸⁸

g. Future Status of Allied Flotillas on the Rhine.

(1) The Proposed Rhine River Control Authority. Existing emergency defense plans provided for evacuating shipping and denying facilities and equipment on the Rhine River to the enemy. American and British naval forces were also to support land and air forces in crossing, transit, and defensive operations on the Rhine should such become necessary. Because of impending disestablishment of the American naval command

⁸⁶(1) Min, USAREUR Theater Army Stf Conf No. 2, 1 Nov 56. (2) DF, CENTAG G3 to SGS, G1, et al., 8 Mar 57, w/incl 1, 11 Oct 56, cited above. Both NATO SECRET. Both in USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

⁸⁷(1) DF, USAREUR DCOFS to G3, 23 May 57, sub: Theater Army Headquarters, w/atchd Tab A, Concept of Operation--Theater Army Headquarters (U). UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1957). (2) DF, USAREUR G3 to SGS, Compt, et al., 31 May 57, sub: Organization of Headquarters USAREUR (Theater Army) (U), w/atchd incl. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

⁸⁸(1) DF, USAREUR DCOFS to G3, 23 May 57, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR (Theater Army) Mission Register, 1 Jun 57. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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in June 1957 and the possibility of the withdrawal of the British Rhine River Squadron, it was proposed to place each flotilla under command of its own national land forces in Germany for all purposes. For regional tasks, such as the evacuation of craft from the Rhine in an emergency, LANDCENT would be the coordinating agency that would issue orders for the flotillas through normal military channels. However, under the forward concept it was preferable to consider the Rhine River as one area rather than as separate sectors. CINCENT therefore proposed the establishment of a Rhine River Control Authority to reconcile all national and Allied civilian and military interests. Probably the most important task of such an authority in time of war would be to coordinate shipping on the river with essential military operations.⁸⁹

USAREUR concurred in general to the proposed naval command structure on the Rhine but stated that the proposed control authority seemed both unnecessary and undesirable.⁹⁰

(2) Inactivation of COMNAVGER. Upon the disestablishment of Commander, Naval Forces in Germany/Naval Forces, Central Army Group (COMNAVGER/COMNAVCG) on 1 June 1957, the Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) assumed direct command of the U.S. naval forces in Germany. He was responsible for granting to appropriate SACEUR subordinate commanders operational control of earmarked forces for short periods or for training exercises with NATO forces. During periods of NATO operational control, the U.S. Rhine River Patrol would be under the tactical control of the appropriate national land commander, and COMLANDCENT, advised as necessary by COMNAVCENT, would be the coordinating authority for NATO regional tasks. COMLANDCENT, through normal military channels, could issue NATO orders earmarked for U.S. naval forces in Germany during the periods when these forces were under NATO operational control.⁹¹

Previously, in March 1957, CINCNELM had agreed that CINCUSAREUR/COMCENTAG might pass operational control of the U.S. Rhine River Patrol to the Commanding General, Seventh Army, for both U.S. and NATO matters. As an interim measure CINCUSAREUR/COMCENTAG instructed the Commander, Rhine River Patrol (CORRPAT), and the Commander, Rhine River Naval Group, U.S. V and VII Corps sectors (COMUSRHIN), to report to Seventh Army for operational control for U.S. peacetime planning and training exercises in addition to their wartime tasks. As a NATO unit, Seventh Army would be

⁸⁹Ltr, Hq AFCE to NAVCENT, Hq BAOR, USAREUR, et al., 20 Feb 57, sub: Future Command of the Allied Flotillas on the Rhine (U). NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS NATO (1957).

⁹⁰Wkly Sum of Maj Actions Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Off of COFS, 12 Mar 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

⁹¹Cable DEF-922926, DA from OASD to USNMR, 14 May 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 NAVY (1957).

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responsible in peacetime for planning and NATO training exercises; in wartime, for assuming operational command.⁹²

(3) The Need for Personnel. The U.S. Rhine River Patrol's lift capability was essential to the execution of USAREUR operational plans, including noncombatant evacuation. If enemy action destroyed any of the fixed or floating bridges over the Rhine, the evacuation of U.S. dependents westward and military operations east of the river could be assured only if the patrol's capability was not impaired. NEO was of such vital national importance that every possible measure had to be taken to ensure its successful execution. On this basis alone the capability of the Rhine River Patrol had to be maintained.

When CINCNELM intimated in June 1957 the withdrawal of U.S. naval personnel from the Rhine, he was informed that no surplus personnel were available for manning the necessary lift craft. If naval personnel for the Rhine River Patrol could not be maintained, USAREUR proposed as an alternative that the funds, spaces, and craft provided to the Navy for the execution of the mission be made available to Seventh Army. Also, time should be allowed for the formation and training of U.S. Army Transportation Corps units as replacements before the naval elements were withdrawn. Substitutions also would have to be made for the naval diesel school, which assisted in the training of Army engineer unit personnel in swinging the floating bridges across the Rhine.

If the Rhine River Patrol was withdrawn and compensating funds and spaces were not made available to USAREUR, the only alternative left would be that of passing the mission in its entirety, including craft, to West German military units. However, this would require the development of suitable operational, planning, and training safeguards for Seventh Army. To be effective in support of combat operations, any unit designated to assume the patrol's current mission would have to be placed under the operational command of Seventh Army for peacetime planning and training and for emergency operations. West German forces would need at least two years to achieve this military capability. By the end of the reporting period there were no further developments affecting the status of the U.S. Rhine River Patrol.⁹³

⁹²(1) Comment 2, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 22 Apr 57, to DF, SGS to G3, 16 Apr 57, sub: Command Relationships and Responsibilities of CORRPAT-CINCNELM Inst 05400.2D (U). (2) Ltr, USAREUR to COMUSRHIN, 23 Apr 57, sub: Command Relationships and Responsibilities of Commander, U.S. Rhine River Naval Group (U). (3) Ltr, CENTAG to COMUSRHIN, 23 Apr 57, same sub. All CONFIDENTIAL. All in file above.

⁹³(1) Cable 201711Z, CINCNELM to US CINCEUR, 20 Jun 57. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-4142, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 21 Jun 57. SECRET. Both in file above.

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58. Major Changes in U.S. Forces

a. Reorganization of the Army. In late 1956 the Department of the Army proposed a reorganization plan for the purpose of adapting infantry, armored, and airborne divisions to both conventional and atomic warfare. Since the introduction of the reorganization measures in the European theater could affect the combat readiness of the Seventh Army and result in a surplus of personnel spaces, US EUCOM proposed that only one division at a time be reorganized. This would prevent any undue reduction of the combat potential. It also appeared desirable for divisions gyroscoping to Europe to be reorganized and trained in the United States prior to departure. Most of the personnel spaces that would become surplus in Europe would be required to form corps or army units in order to maintain combat effectiveness. The remaining personnel could provide the mobile Army task force for the Turkish Straits area that had been suggested by the Department of the Army, strengthen the 10th Special Forces, and increase the number of NIKE battalions.⁹⁴

In this reorganization the 11th Airborne Division and the infantry divisions were expected to lose approximately 5,400 and 3,426 spaces, respectively; the armored divisions would gain only 261 spaces.⁹⁵ USAREUR stressed that all spaces generated by the conversion of its five divisions would be used to form or augment units required by the command. Since much of the equipment necessary to bring the new division organizations to full combat effectiveness would not be immediately available, the major portion of the armor, infantry, and artillery lost by the divisions would have to be turned over to corps troops to maintain USAREUR's combat capability. At the outbreak of hostilities the availability of the maximum number of combat ready units in place would be of paramount importance. No increase in the strength of the 10th Special Forces seemed necessary, and the Department of the Army assumed responsibility for the task forces to Turkey and Greece in December 1956. Furthermore, the number of NIKE battalions programmed for arrival in Europe in FY's 1958 and 1959 would be geared to the Army's capability to furnish the necessary training personnel and equipment.⁹⁶

In November 1956 US EUCOM specified the tentative dates for the reorganization of the Seventh Army divisions, reaffirming at the same time that the maintenance of a uniform level of readiness remained the

⁹⁴Ltr, Gen G. H. Decker, Dep CINCEUR, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, 9 Oct 56. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1956).

⁹⁵Comment 2, USAREUR G3 to Hist Div, 25 Oct 57, sub: Review of Draft Chapter of USAREUR Annual Historical Report. UNCLASSIFIED. In Hist Div Doc Br.

⁹⁶(1) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Decker, 15 Nov 56. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Decker, 13 Dec 56. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1956).

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primary consideration. During FY 1958 the 10th Infantry would rotate with the 3d Infantry Division, and the 2d Armored with the 4th Armored Division. During FY 1959 the 3d Armored would rotate with the 1st Armored Division, and the 8th Infantry with the new-type 4th Infantry Division. The four Europe-bound divisions would be pentomic. In addition, the 11th Airborne Division was scheduled to rotate with the new-type 82d Airborne Division in FY 1958; however, this interchange would depend upon the Cold War situation existing at the time, particularly in the Middle East, since the 11th Airborne Division was committed to provide the bulk of combat elements that would be furnished from Europe.⁹⁷

In late November USAREUR was informed that the reorganization of the divisions would have to be completed on a world-wide basis no later than the end of FY 1958. The tentative Department of the Army schedule called for the reorganization of the 11th Airborne Division in April or May 1957, the 2d Armored Division in August, and the 8th Infantry Division in September and October 1957. From January through March 1958 the 10th Infantry Division and the 3d Armored Division would be reorganized.⁹⁸

In order to avoid emergency planning, property exchanges, and stationing problems that would arise from gyroscoping dissimilar units, Seventh Army preferred to reorganize the 10th Infantry Division during September and October 1957 and the 8th Infantry Division in January and February 1958. The 8th Division would not be reorganized until gyroscope replacement packets had arrived, which would permit reorganization with newly assigned personnel who would remain with the division. This problem was solved by the decision to reorganize both the 3d and the 10th Infantry Divisions before rotation to preclude interchanging unlike units. Furthermore, the overseas packet for the 8th Infantry Division would be trained in the United States by a reorganized division, thus necessitating that the 8th Division be reorganized prior to receipt of the packet.⁹⁹

The reorganization of the 11th Airborne Division under the new pentomic concept was completed by April 1957. Five major battle groups, completely air-transportable, were formed. The total strength was reduced to approximately 11,500 men; overstrength personnel and excess units were reassigned within the theater.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷(1) Ltr, Gen Decker to Gen Hodes, 24 Nov 56. SECRET. (2) DF, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 20 Dec 56, sub: Reorganization of USAREUR Combat Divisions (C). CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above.

⁹⁸(1) Ltr, Gen M.D. Taylor, COFSA, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, 23 Nov 56. (2) Cable DA-914532, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Dec 56. Both SECRET. Both in file above.

⁹⁹(1) Cable 5416, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Dec 56. (2) Cable DA-915161, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Dec 56. Both SECRET. Both in file above.

¹⁰⁰Cable SX-2215, USAREUR to DA for CINFO, 12 Mar 57. CONFIDENTIAL. Copy in USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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b. The Seventh Army Restationing Plan. Because of the over-all weakness of NATO ground forces in Central Europe, in the past Seventh Army combat units had not been positioned in locations affording the greatest military advantage along the most likely axes of a Soviet attack. With the build-up of the West German army and the pentomic reorganization of U.S. divisions underway, an excellent opportunity was afforded to correct the weaknesses in unit deployment and at the same time to effect economies in operating costs. To this end Seventh Army in January 1957 developed a restationing plan formally known as the Mid-Range Concept and informally designated as SEVENTH HEAVEN or 7H.¹⁰¹

Basically the plan provided for the withdrawal of major U.S. combat forces from lower Bavaria to positions north of the Danube River. The vacated facilities would be released to the control of the new West German Army, which would permit the development of a German corps to assume the operational tasks south of the Danube. Units gyroscoping from the United States would be immediately moved to their ultimate stations if possible. With the current replacement of the French II Corps by an equivalent German corps, two West German army corps would be on the flanks of the U.S. forces concentrated in the most vulnerable sector along the Kassel-Frankfurt axis.¹⁰²

The restationing plan was subsequently explained to COMFOURATF and generally approved by CINCENT and SACEUR; in January 1957, CINCUSAREUR presented it to the Department of the Army, the American Ambassador at Bonn, and to the German Federal Minister of Defense. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, agreed to the desirability of withdrawing forces to positions north of the Danube and considered the time propitious for such a change. At the same time he expressed some concern over the complexity of the plan, particularly with respect to the number of divisions scheduled for relocation and the cost involved. Any Army funds required to support such a relocation plan would have to be justified, a major problem in face of current budgetary limitations. Because of the international implications, budgetary aspects, and similar considerations, it might be necessary to settle for something less than the optimum plan to relocate the Seventh Army forces. One solution would be to move the units stationed in Bavaria to positions north of the Danube and to reduce other moves to a minimum. Although this would be less desirable from an operational point of view, a more simple plan of this type would

¹⁰¹(1) Memo, USAREUR G4 for COFS, 29 Jan 57, sub: Status Report on Mid-Range Concept (U). (2) Memo for rec, Col W. F. Powers, C/USAREUR G4 Instl Br, 31 Jan 57, sub: Staff Visit to Hq Seventh Army, 30 Jan 57, (Seventh Heaven) (U). Both SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1957).

¹⁰²(1) For details of the SEVENTH HEAVEN plan, see the top secret supplement to this report. (2) DF, USAREUR G3 to SGS, 1 Feb 57, sub: Seventh Army Restationing Plan (U), w/atcd briefing notes. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1957).

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improve the combat posture and would be more feasible from the standpoints of cost and coordination.¹⁰³

To USAREUR the restationing plan was feasible only if the Federal Republic of Germany would provide the necessary funds--approximately \$180 million--for the essential facilities; U.S. expenditures for the troop movements could be absorbed over a two-year period. The German Ministry of Defense, while concurring in the plan, could not say whether the Federal Republic would finance it or not. In any event the West German Army would desire to station one or two divisions north of the Danube for political and military reasons. At the close of the reporting period the matter was under study, but it seemed unlikely that the Federal Republic would approve the plan until after the West German elections in September 1957.¹⁰⁴

Meanwhile, Seventh Army was to prepare a simpler plan involving a slight withdrawal of the 4th Armored Division westward and southward and of the 8th Infantry Division westward. For the time being the Seventh Army units were to reorganize under the pentomic concept in their present locations.¹⁰⁵

c. Proposed Realignment of the Army Command in Europe. In late June 1957 the Department of the Army suggested that all ground forces existing in or programmed for the US EUCOM area be placed under CINCUSAREUR as the Army component commander. Thus SETAF, the ground forces command in Northern Italy reporting to US EUCOM, would be under USAREUR. Such an arrangement would be in consonance with joint doctrine and would reduce the span of US CINCEUR's control. It would also parallel Navy and Air Force component command organizations within US EUCOM and would result in all uniservice Army problems being referred to the Army component commander. Lastly, it would be in consonance with other unified commands and would reduce the number of US EUCOM commands that reported directly to the Department of the Army on uniservice matters. USAREUR had the proposal under consideration at the close of the reporting period.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³Ltr, Gen Taylor to Gen Hodes, 25 Feb 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1957), B/P, Seventh Heaven.

¹⁰⁴(1)Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Taylor, 5 Mar 57. (2) Ltr, Gen Taylor to Gen Hodes, 14 Mar 57. (3) DF, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 31 May 57, sub: Reorganization (U), w/atchd draft cable. (4) Ltr, Fed Min of Def, sgd Strauss, to CINCUSAREUR, 11 May 57. All SECRET. All in file above.

¹⁰⁵Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 7 Mar 57, sub: Troop Restationing (7H) (U). SECRET. In file above.

¹⁰⁶Cable DA-925140, DA from DCOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jun 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAREUR (1957).

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59. Berlin Planning

a. Evacuation Planning. In July 1956 CINCUSAREUR approved the tripartite Berlin air evacuation plan, TRIPLE PLAY, that was subsequently approved by the British and French. The plan had specified Burtonwood Air Force Base in England as a primary destination for approximately 3,000 U.S. evacuees from Berlin, with the Air Force responsible for logistical support of these evacuees.¹⁰⁷

On 11 January 1957 US CINCEUR directed that, because of its vulnerability, Burtonwood be deleted as a destination airfield in plan TRIPLE PLAY. Bordeaux, France, and Rhein-Main Airbase near Frankfurt in Germany, were designated as off-loading points for the Berlin evacuees. USAREUR was to assume responsibility both for the evacuees' logistical support in a temporary safehaven and for their further movement to an established safehaven.¹⁰⁸ USAREUR objected because of the already overtaxed facilities of the established safehavens in Spain and Portugal and suggested that Burtonwood still be retained as a primary destination for the Berlin evacuees. Furthermore, USAFE should fulfill its logistical support commitment outlined in TRIPLE PLAY. Since vulnerability had not been a prime consideration in the previous selection of destination airfields in western France and England, a reclama of the US EUCOM decision was made. US CINCEUR, however, directed that Burtonwood be deleted as a primary destination from both tripartite and unilateral plans. In May 1957 plan TRIPLE PLAY was revised accordingly, and by the close of the reporting period unilateral plans were under revision.¹⁰⁹

b. Defense Planning.

(1) The Tripartite Defense Directive. On 1 September 1956 each Allied commandant in Berlin was notified of the common wartime mission of defending the city, "containing the maximum enemy forces as long as possible, and doing such damage to means of communications through, and installations of military significance in, West Berlin as is compatible with such defense."¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷(1) For background information, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 170-75, SECRET; and the top secret supplement thereto. (2) Wkly Sum of Maj Actions Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Off of COFS, 25 Jul 56. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

¹⁰⁸Cable EC-9-190, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, 11 Jan 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1957).

¹⁰⁹(1) Cable SX-1127, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 9 Jan 57. (2) DF, USAREUR G4 to DCOFS, 18 Jan 57, sub: Deletion of Burtonwood as Destination in Triple Plan (S). Both SECRET. Both in file above. (3) Interv, Capt Mewha with Lt Col J. H. King, Jr, G3 Plans Br, 12 Aug 57. SECRET.

¹¹⁰Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 1 Sep 56, sub: War Planning for the Allied Garrison, Berlin (C). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS TS files, AG 2825, Item 11.

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If attacked before the outbreak of general East-West hostilities, the Allied commandants were to conduct a coordinated defense of West Berlin against any Soviet aggression in accordance with the common wartime mission. Any use of force by East German units of any description would be met with a view of forcing the Soviets to disclose unmistakably whether or not they would use their own forces to attain success. If West Berlin was attacked at or after the outbreak of war a coordinated defense would be conducted in accordance with wartime missions. Additionally, each commandant was to attack vital targets in the vicinity of Berlin, employing such means as his primary mission would permit. The over-all operational control of the garrison at this time would be exercised by the three Allied commandants in committee, until such time as a competent authority could designate a single commander. Only those troops, supplies, and equipment on hand at the outbreak of hostilities would be available for immediate use, and the decision to reinforce and/or resupply the garrison would be made prior to or at the time of the attack after considering all factors then in existence.

Dependents and certain other noncombatants for whom the tripartite powers were responsible would be evacuated prior to hostilities if possible; if not, they would be safeguarded to the extent compatible with the accomplishment of the primary mission.¹¹¹

(2) Operations Instruction 6. On 17 September 1956 the Berlin commandants published a joint defense plan, Operations Instruction 6, based on the tripartite defense directive for the city. Under enemy pressure there would be a coordinated, phased withdrawal to a final defensive area. During the first phase the Allied garrisons were to be brought to a high degree of combat readiness, the West Berlin police alerted and deployed, and demolitions groups equipped. During the second phase the garrisons would deploy to cover all likely avenues of enemy approach into their respective sectors, with U.S. troops screening those from the east, south, and west; the British, those from the west and east; and the French, those from the east, west, and north. Withdrawal routes from the various sectors to the Allied base at the Olympic Stadium would be secured and the demolition groups dispatched in accordance with the situation. Any enemy penetration was to be met with maximum resistance. During the third phase the defenders would make a coordinated withdrawal to the Stadium while offering maximum resistance to the enemy. At this time the planned demolitions would be executed. The fourth and final phase would consist of the defense of the Stadium area.

As early as possible noncombatants would be moved to certain specified locations, provided they could not be evacuated. The enemy commander would then be informed that these locations were "open areas" and therefore should not be subjected to attack. If this was impossible, the noncombatants would be instructed to take shelter in cellars of substantial buildings.¹¹²

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Operations Instruction 6, Allied Staff, Berlin, n.d. SECRET. Copy in USAREUR G3 Emerg Plans Section.

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(3) Demolitions Planning. In July 1956 a tripartite directive outlining demolitions to be performed in the defense of Berlin, was under consideration, which was to be transmitted through national channels to Berlin commandants concerned. A few weeks later USCOB was informed that if West Berlin was attacked such special means could be employed to attack vital targets in the vicinity of Berlin as the primary mission would permit.¹¹³ The French, however, requested further guidance for an assumed situation where, during war, Berlin would be merely contained or completely bypassed for a certain period of time. Both the British and French also wanted additional instructions to clarify the time when the vital targets would be attacked.

USAREUR was desirous that special forces teams of about 60 to 75 men accomplish these demolitions at the earliest possible time after general hostilities began whether Berlin was attacked or not. The demolitions were planned to complement atomic strikes and to assist the Allied defense effort even if atomic weapons were not immediately used.¹¹⁴ Therefore, on 19 November 1956 USCOB was instructed to use special forces teams for demolition missions within the city, leaving the bulk of U.S. forces available for defense. The proposed demolitions were intended to contribute to the over-all Allied war effort as well as to the defense of Berlin. Generally the tasks outlined followed the proposed tripartite demolitions directive; nevertheless, various aspects of the special forces operations were conceived on a U.S. unilateral basis. USCOB was authorized to discuss U.S. planning with the British and French commandants whenever necessary.¹¹⁵ Meanwhile, in December 1956 the British and French agreed to the issuing of the tripartite directive governing demolitions to be performed in the defense of Berlin.¹¹⁶

(4) The Use of the West Berlin Police. In the continuous planning for the defense of Berlin the three Allied Commandants always had given consideration to the training of the West Berlin police. In December 1953 they had agreed that in the event of a Soviet or East German armed attack the police would be employed on military duties. At that time the West Berlin police force had contained some 12,000 uniformed

¹¹³ Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 1 Sep 56, cited above. SECRET.

¹¹⁴ (1) Ltr, Maj Gen C. L. Dasher, USCOB, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINC-USAREUR, 5 Nov 56, sub: War Planning for the Allied Garrison Berlin (C). (2) Comment 2, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 15 Nov 56, to DF, SGS to G3, 8 Nov 56, sub: Letter dated November 1956 to Gen Hodes from Gen Dasher Re: War Planning for the Allied Garrison Berlin (C). Both SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1956).

¹¹⁵ Wkly Sum of Maj Actions Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Off of COFS, 19 Nov 56. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

¹¹⁶ Cable SX-3568, USAREUR to CINC's Com, British Forces, Ger, and CCFFA, 21 Dec 56. SECRET. In USAREUR.SGS 600.6 (1956). For further discussion, see the top secret supplement to this report.

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men, including a specially trained Force B of 3,000 men for the preservation of order in an emergency.

In 1955 the Berlin commandants had reaffirmed that the full employment of all West Berlin police, not only Force B, under military command would constitute a vital element in the defense of the city. They had planned to form the police into a militia or volunteer corps and to issue them special uniforms or insignia. However, the Allied High Commission's legal advisors had expressed the view that even if the police were converted into a militia forming an integral part of the Allied Forces the precautions envisaged might not be sufficient to ensure that they would not be treated as guerrillas. It had been feared that the Russians, on their own interpretation of the 1949 Geneva Convention and the quadripartite documents concerning the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, might claim justification for reprisals against the individuals concerned. The Allied High Commissioners nevertheless had agreed to refer this problem to their respective governments; the Department of State had been requested to decide whether the employment of the Berlin police could be approved in case of war or a serious emergency. No decision was made on this point.

In December 1956 the question of training and using the Berlin police again arose, and on 11 January 1957 the political advisors to the Berlin commandants approved an intensification of the military training of Force B. The commandants, in turn, approved training for Force B in the use of grenades, mines, and mine field patterns. The mayor of Berlin was informed also that the city would be defended in case of aggression and that plans were prepared for this purpose.¹¹⁷ Meanwhile, in Berlin a committee,¹¹⁸ consisting of the Chief of Staff and representatives of the Allied Staff, Berlin, and members of the Political Affairs and Public Safety staffs, met first in February 1957 to prepare an agreed-upon tripartite agenda and again in August to arrive at a joint position on each agenda item so that Berlin police and military plans could be integrated to the greatest extent feasible. However, the U.S. Commander, Berlin (USCOB), desired an up-to-date police plan and thought the police should be told of plans to place them under military control in an emergency and of the planned withdrawal and concentration at a particular location.¹¹⁹ While agreeing that this was strictly a military matter within the purview of the Allied commandants, CINCUSAREUR felt that British and French concurrence would be necessary before informing the West Berlin police and that the

¹¹⁷ Ltr, Maj Gen C. L. Dasher, USCOB, to Maj Gen H. G. Maddox, USAREUR COFS, 15 Jan 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1957).

¹¹⁸ The committee became known as the "Berlin Committee."

¹¹⁹ (1) 1st Ind, Hq Berlin Comd to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Nov 57, to ltr, USAREUR Hist Div to CG Berlin Comd, 16 Oct 57, sub: Request for Information (U). SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (2) Ltr, Gen Dasher to Gen Hodes, 14 Feb 57, w/atchd Tabs A, B, C & D. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1957).

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Federal Republic of Germany should not be brought into the picture. By the close of the reporting period tripartite agreement had not been reached.¹²⁰

60. Special Weapons Planning and Actions

a. Staff Responsibilities for Special Weapons Activities. Staff Memorandum 10-100-1, issued on 19 July 1956, clarified the staff responsibilities in the field of atomic planning and amplified Department of the Army Field Manual 101-5.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, was responsible for obtaining qualified personnel for special weapons units and for supervising the Adjutant General Division in keeping pertinent records and reports of these personnel. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was required to perform the normal intelligence functions necessary for safeguarding the weapons and was to assist the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, in selecting targets to be attacked.

The primary responsibility for developing plans for using atomic weapons, for supervising atomic training, and for establishing the troop basis of atomic units and supporting troops was vested in the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, with the support of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. G3 also was responsible for preparing the general deployment plan, maintaining planning coordination, and supervising activities pertaining to cover and deception plans. G3 was to advise G4 on the delivery-rate schedule; on the requirements and forecasts of requirements for the expenditure of Army-controlled atomic weapons in support of NATO plans for land forces in the LANDCENT sector and of U.S. contingency plans in the European, Mediterranean, and Turkish areas; on stockpiling special weapons; and on selecting the location of storage sites from an operational point of view.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, was concerned mainly with the logistical aspects of atomic planning, including requisitioning, transportation, storage, and security of the special weapons. G4 was also responsible for planning logistical support to joint operations, for establishing locations of storage sites, and for developing area damage-control plans. Other responsibilities for special weapons activities were vested in the Provost Marshal, Transportation, Signal, and Chemical Divisions.¹²¹

¹²⁰(1) Ltr, Gen Maddox to Gen Dasher, 25 Feb 57. SECRET. In file above. (2) Wkly Sum of Maj Actions Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Off of COFS, 1 Mar 57. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (3) 1st Ind, Hq Berlin Comd to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Nov 57, cited above. SECRET.

¹²¹USAREUR Stf Memo 10-100-1, 19 Jul 56, sub: Staff Responsibilities for Special Weapons (Atomic) Activities (U). SECRET.

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b. Plans for Atomic Delivery Units. According to the Department of the Army FY 1958 Troop Program, USAREUR was to have 3 separate Honest John battalions; in addition, 1 Honest John battery was to be assigned to each reorganized division. Early in 1957 USAREUR was directed to reorganize the projected units from 5 batteries on hand, and by April 1957 the pentomic 11th Airborne Division received 1 Honest John battery. A battery for the 2d Armored Division was programmed for August. The 3 remaining Honest John batteries were to be transformed into battalion-size units, and additional batteries for the 8th Infantry, 10th Infantry, and 3d Armored Divisions were to be organized as equipment became available.

Although Seventh Army objected to this reorganization plan and suggested that the Department of the Army be requested to ship one Honest John battalion that previously had been programmed for FY 1958, the easiest method of reorganizing and of obtaining maximum efficiency during the interim period was to expand existing batteries into battalions. The Department of the Army reorganizational concept was therefore adopted in April 1957, with the expansion of three Honest John batteries into battalions scheduled to be accomplished by 1 July 1957.¹²²

Four nondivisional Honest John battalions--two to support NORTHAG and two for CENTAG--were needed to maintain maximum atomic capability and to provide enough flexibility to meet U.S. and NATO requirements for atomic support across exceptionally wide frontages. In June 1957 USAREUR requested departmental authorization to activate an additional Honest John battalion from within its own resources during the first quarter of FY 1958. Four battalions with three launchers each would thus be available to the command during that fiscal year. In addition, because of the proven reliability of the 280-mm gun USAREUR requested that the Department of the Army troop basis for FY 1959 contain six 280-mm gun battalions, including a war reserve of six complete 280-mm gun assemblies with transporters. Five of these would also serve as a maintenance float.¹²³

On 25 June the Department of the Army approved the activation of the fourth Honest John battalion during FY 1958, provided this action could be taken with the equipment and personnel on hand. At the same time the FY 1959 troop program was changed to include the six 280-mm gun battalions; however, the request for the six complete gun assemblies with transporters for a war reserve was not approved. The Army's worldwide assets of spares, other than those in Europe, consisted of only three gun assemblies and two sets of transporters.¹²⁴

¹²² DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 8 Apr 57, sub: Reorganization of Honest John Units (U), and Comment 2, SGS to G3, 20 Apr 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

¹²³ (1) Cable SX-3973, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 14 Jun 57. SECRET.
(2) Cable DA-539891, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1957).

¹²⁴ Cable DA-925221, DA from ODCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Jun 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

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c. Developments on SACEUR's Atomic Policy.

(1) Control of Expenditure of Atomic Weapons at the CENTAG-FOURATAF Level.¹²⁵ In December 1956, an AIRCENT-LANDCENT-NAVCENT conference on 1957 atomic plans for the Central Region was held at Fontainebleau to review the army groups' and tactical air forces' requests for modifications or adjustments of atomic weapons planning numbers. Coordination was all the more necessary since CENTAG and FOURATAF representatives, for example, could not present an authoritative joint plan because of differences of opinion as to atomic weapons expenditure control procedures. Apparently the air force representatives had no clear understanding of COMFOURATAF's position on control of weapons for the land battle, including the air-delivered weapons earmarked for this purpose. On the other hand, the substance of the plans for the Central Region pertaining to objectives, areas, and weapons was acceptable and was approved by the conferees; at the request of the CENTAG and FOURATAF representatives, six additional air-delivered weapons were made available for the CENTAG-FOURATAF zone. The question of control was to be resolved as soon as possible.¹²⁶

Meanwhile, on 10 December the commanders of CENTAG and FOURATAF met to resolve the problem of control. Pure battlefield targets that represented close-in support, either by air or ground weapons, and counterair targets were not discussed. With regards to interdiction targets from the Iron Curtain eastward, the two commanders reached a compromise but forwarded their views to CINCENT for consideration. Since the targets had been jointly preselected and the situation and intelligence information available would determine the requirement for expenditure of a weapon, they agreed that such questions as the requirement and time of expenditure, type of weapon, and delivery means would be settled by joint consultation. The ground commander at army or army group headquarters would control ground-delivered weapons and the air force commander at the corresponding level would control air-delivered weapons.¹²⁷

In January 1957 SACEUR authorized certain commanders of field armies, tactical air forces, naval task groups, or equivalent and higher headquarters to release atomic strikes. He granted this authorization only for previously approved directed task plans, regional Code GREEN

¹²⁵ For a detailed discussion of SACEUR's policy and the CENTAG position toward it, see the top secret supplement to this report.

¹²⁶ DF, USAREUR G3 to COMCENTAG, 14 Dec 56, sub: Atomic Plans for 1957 (U). SECRET. In file above.

¹²⁷ (1) Cable CG-2535, FOURATAF to COMCENTAG, 13 Dec 56. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR 381 CAG (1956). (2) Interv, Capt Mewha with Lt Col R. A. Marshall, G3 CENTAG Plans Sec, 17 Oct 56. SECRET.

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plans, and for requests to convert a regional Code BLACK plan to Code GREEN.¹²⁸ The controlling commander designated in a SACEUR-approved directed task plan or regional Code GREEN plan could, after R-hour, authorize the expenditure of assigned atomic weapons provided the threat envisaged in the plan developed. The controlling commander designated in a regional Code BLACK plan would possess this authority only after SACEUR had converted it to Code GREEN.¹²⁹ However, the problem of overall control of the expenditure of atomic weapons in the Central Region had not been resolved by the close of the reporting period.¹³⁰

(2) Joint Command and Operations Centers. In August 1956 SACEUR emphasized the need of having joint command and operations centers (JCOC's) at each joint level of command, starting at field army-numbered air force headquarters. The absence of such centers had affected the functioning of operational command channels and had been the chief reason for the slowness of atomic procedures in preceding training exercises. In the past messages had been used between service headquarters to accomplish coordination; the purpose of introducing JCOC's was to reduce the number of communications circuits as well as the volume of inter-headquarters messages required to execute atomic strike plans and thus reduce the time required to request, coordinate, approve, and execute atomic strike missions. On 17 August the establishment of JCOC's was directed at all joint levels of command with the least practicable delay and in time for use in Exercise WHIP SAW to be held in September 1956. Thereafter the centers would be maintained in a state of readiness and training, permitting immediate operation in the event of an emergency.¹³¹

Since Seventh Army and the Twelfth Air Force could not agree on a mutually suitable site for a wartime JCOC, thus making additional negotiations necessary, COMCENTAG recommended that the establishment of a wartime site be disassociated from the immediate problem of establishing one for WHIP SAW. The best available solution for the impending exercise would be to interchange operations and intelligence representatives and provide for direct voice and teletype circuits between Seventh Army and the Twelfth Air Force.¹³² US CINCEUR, however, did not approve this suggestion since it would not meet SACEUR's requirement that the JCOC's

¹²⁸ Code GREEN weapons could be expended without recourse to SACEUR; Code BLACK, only with SACEUR's approval.

¹²⁹ Cable SPPCE-10080, CINCENT to COMCENTAG, 11 Jan 57. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1957).

¹³⁰ Interv, Capt Mewha with Col S. E. Otto, G3 CENTAG Plans Sec, 17 Oct 56. SECRET.

¹³¹ Cable OPTLC-79226, COMLANDCENT to COMNORTHAG, COMCENTAG, 17 Aug 56. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1956), Item 7A.

¹³² Cable SX-1805, COMCENTAG to COMLANDCENT, 29 Aug 56. NATO SECRET. In file above.

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be established in time for the exercise and maintained in a state of readiness thereafter. Because the controversial issue appeared to be the location of the JCOC, US CINCEUR defined the general principles for establishing the location during wartime and during training exercises. During all phases of operations, and particularly during the critical period, field army and tactical air force commands would be located close to each other so that timely joint decisions could be made. When the Air Force was carrying out preplanned atomic strikes in a counterair offensive the JCOC would be located in the area most suitable for the conduct of air operations, as selected by the air force commander. During subsequent periods when significant air support would be available for the ground forces the JCOC would be located in the area most suitable for the conduct of ground operations, as selected by the ground force commander. Since WHIP SAW would be primarily an air exercise US CINCEUR directed that Seventh Army headquarters, including sufficient command and operational personnel to effectively carry out SACEUR's directive, be established at the location determined by the commander of the Twelfth Air Force. The FOURATAF communications center, in turn, would serve as the JCOC for both CENTAG and FOURATAF headquarters.¹³³

During Exercise WHIP SAW, CENTAG personnel participated in the operation of the JCOC located at the FOURATAF command post. In reality the JCOC was a joint processing center for atomic messages that were to be distributed to Army and Air Force agencies. Decisions on such messages still had to be obtained from operations sections of the respective headquarters. While the senior CENTAG representative had the authority to make decisions for his commander, he was at a decided disadvantage since he did not have timely access to COMCENTAG's views and received only periodic reports from the CENTAG operations center. Furthermore, he did not receive all messages concerning atomic activities.

As a result of the exercise, both COMCENTAG and COMFOURATAF agreed that a future JCOC, if required, would have to provide space for the command and operational elements of both services in the same installation. Furthermore, the joint communications center of this installation would have to provide adequate communications for both the Army and Air Force elements with higher, lower, and lateral headquarters for atomic weapons processing as well as for the conduct of other operations.¹³⁴ While agreeing that the principle of close air-ground coordination was sound and that undoubtedly emphasis would be placed on the employment of various weapons during certain periods of a battle, the commanding

¹³³(1) Cable EC-9-4999, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, 10 Sep 56. NATO SECRET. In file above. (2) Cable JSCE-79404, CINCENT to SACEUR, 19 Sep 56. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1956), B/P 8, WHIP SAW.

¹³⁴DF, USAREUR G3 to SGS, 1 Oct 56, sub: Notes for COMCENTAG Comments at Joint Critique of Exercise WHIP SAW on 2 October 1956 (U). NATO SECRET. In file above.

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generals of CENTAG and Seventh Army considered it unsound that Army and Air Force commanders and their staffs be required to remain together at a joint headquarters. Since the land and air battles would be concurrent joint operational problems could best be resolved by the commanders in the field--a position supported by COMFOURATAF. Nevertheless, planning for the JCOC's continued.¹³⁵

At the close of the reporting period CINCENT set forth a policy that closely conformed to that suggested by the ground forces commanders, and reaffirmed that JCOC's be established at the army group-tactical air force level of command. However, the implementation of this policy would be feasible only if the two component headquarters could be adjacent to a JCOC without prejudicing the accomplishment of their respective service missions. If no JCOC was established an interchange of officers would be accomplished so that the respective service views could be maintained. The liaison officers would maintain contact and communications with their parent headquarters.¹³⁶

d. Missiles for NATO Countries. In late 1956 the United States agreed to bolster the defenses of NATO countries with the most up-to-date weapons, to include special weapons delivery systems. These weapons would be made available under the FY 1957 Mutual Security Assistance Program.

In February 1957 the Department of Defense granted US CINCEUR the authority to release to SACEUR and recipient countries the tentative FY 1957 Military Assistance Program allocation of special weapons as follows: to Belgium, the Netherlands, and Greece, equipment for 1 Honest John battalion each; to Denmark, equipment for 1 NIKE and 1 Honest John battalion; to France, 2 Honest John battalions and 1 Matador squadron; to Italy, 1 Honest John and 3 NIKE battalions; to Norway, 1 NIKE and 1 Honest John battalion; and to Turkey, 2 Honest John battalions. West Germany was offered equipment for 6 NIKE battalions and 2 Matador squadrons. Nuclear components would not be released.¹³⁷

The Department of the Army training policy for Honest John cadres from NATO countries specified that each Honest John unit in Europe would

¹³⁵(1) For further details on the continued planning, see the top secret supplement to this report. (2) FOURATAF-CENTAG-NAVCAG Joint Critique of Exercise WHIP SAW, 2 Oct 56, w/atcd remarks by COMCENTAG, COMFOURATAF, and CG Seventh Army. NATO SECRET. In file above. (3) Cable SX-2406, COMCENTAG to COMLANDCENT, 6 Oct 56. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1956), B/P, WHIP SAW, Vol. 2.

¹³⁶Cable PPCE-11632, CINCENT to COMAIRCENT, COMNAVCENT, COMLANDCENT, 2 Jul 57. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 CAG (1957).

¹³⁷(1) Cable DEF-917503, OASD (ISA) to US CINCEUR, 7 Feb 57. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable DA-920881, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Apr 57. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

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conduct three weeks' on-the-job training for no more than one NATO cadre in each six-month period. (Only one cadre per country would be trained by USAREUR units). This training would include one week at the U.S. battery and two weeks at a firing range. A three-man mobile training team would visit each country approximately 60 days after the country received its equipment.¹³⁸ During the reporting period, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups of the proposed recipient countries contacted USAREUR as to the firing schedule of the Honest John and for other information. All negotiations with NATO countries relative to release of special weapons equipment were conducted by higher headquarters.¹³⁹

e. Atomic Support of NORTHAG Operations.¹⁴⁰

(1) The First Provisional Artillery Task Force. Under US EUCOM plans USAREUR was required to furnish atomic support to the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). In coordinating plans for the movement and control of this support force, NORTHAG requested that an operational-type group headquarters be provided from U.S. sources to control the atomic artillery units. The reasons given were that NORTHAG's chain of command did not provide for such a headquarters and that the atomic weapons would have to remain under U.S. control. Although USAREUR did not provide for such a headquarters, it did form in January 1957 the First Provisional Artillery Task Force to furnish NORTHAG the required atomic support.¹⁴¹

(2) Stationing of the Task Force. Shortly after its creation NORTHAG proposed that the task force be permanently stationed in its area. CINCUSAREUR was favorably inclined to this proposal and in March 1957 asked US CINCEUR for his approval in principle so that planning could begin. Intrastaff work was meanwhile initiated to provide for the peacetime administration and logistical support of the task force should its transfer be approved.¹⁴²

¹³⁸ Memo, Maj Gen H. Hewett, Air Def Coordinator, to Members of Stf, ADCC, 4 Jan 57, sub: Guidance on Release of Information Reference NATO Forces (U). SECRET NOFORN. In USAREUR Air Def Div 322 (1957).

¹³⁹ Cable EC-9-287, US CINCEUR to MAAG's Benelux, UK, France, et al., 17 Jan 57. CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957). For information regarding negotiations with proposed recipient countries, see entire file.

¹⁴⁰ For more detailed information, see the top secret supplement to this report.

¹⁴¹ (1) Cable G3 (OPS) 6, COMNORTHAG to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Nov 56. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1956). (2) Cable SX-1484, USAREUR to COMNORTHAG, 29 Jan 57. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

¹⁴² (1) Wkly Sum of Maj Actions Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Off of COFS, 13 Mar 57. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (2) Interv, Capt Mewha with Lt Col R. A. Edwards, USAREUR G3 Ops Br, 10 Oct 57. SECRET.

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In May 1957 US EUCOM approved the objectives sought in the peacetime stationing of the task force in the NORTHAG sector and COMCENTAG agreed that for political reasons the task force should not be moved to NORTHAG until after the German elections in September. By 30 June 1957 studies were underway to determine the feasibility of restationing the task force.¹⁴³

61. Refugee and Civil Control Planning

a. Development of German Plans. On 27 September 1956 representatives of AFCENT, SHAPE, NORTHAG, and CENTAG met at Bonn, where the German Federal Ministry of Interior outlined its concept of planning for the evacuation and displacement of German civilians and the control of refugees in wartime. In many ways the features of the German concept paralleled the ideas on which CENTAG plans were based.¹⁴⁴

The German concept for reducing population concentrations involved two phases. During the first phase residential areas that appeared to be threatened by nuclear weapons and areas within about four miles of airfields would be evacuated. This would involve 29 cities and the displacement of approximately 9.7 million people over distances of about 30 to 35 miles. The second phase called for temporary moves from residential areas that might be exposed to conventional attack. Tentatively this would affect 39 cities and the evacuation of about 1.3 million people over distances of 6 to 7 miles.

Although the West German Government supported a "stay at home" policy, it estimated that approximately 30 percent of the population within a 60-mile belt west of the zonal border would attempt to move. Preliminary plans to control this movement included the establishment of barrier lines and reception areas, and control by police and quasi-police organizations. The preparation of implementing plans for the concept was expected to take from 1 to 3 years. To facilitate its planning the German Ministry of Interior requested information pertaining to U.S. military plans for the control of refugees and the roads and areas that could not be used due to military requirements. On 3 October 1956 LANDCENT authorized direct negotiations with the German Federal Republic on matters of mutual interest pertaining to civil defense planning.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³(1) Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, COMCENTAG, to Gen Sir Dudley Ward, COM-NORTHAG, 25 May 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 370.5 (1957). (2) Interv, Capt Mewha with Lt Col Edwards, 10 Oct 57, cited above.

¹⁴⁴Sum Sheet, USAREUR CAD, 4 Oct 56, sub: Coordination with Germans about Civil Defense Planning (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1956), Folder 5.

¹⁴⁵(1) Ibid. (2) DF, USAREUR CAD to SGS, 1 Nov 56, sub: German Concept and Plan for Civil Control During Wartime (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1956).

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On the basis of the German concept for the wartime control of civilians USAREUR prepared a list of points that had to be coordinated with the Federal Republic of Germany. To be of maximum assistance to the military effort, the West German Government would have to insure that refugee movements would not hinder military traffic, that vital installations would be protected against sabotage, and that unreliable people would be arrested or detained.¹⁴⁶ The USAREUR plan was based on the assumption that the West German Government would continue to be effective; it disregarded any appraisal or opinion that might lead to the development of unilateral plans in the event of the collapse of that government. Therefore, the desires of the U.S. military commander would have to be presented to a German organization, possibly the Military District. Details involving the location of critical points, areas, and routes could be best coordinated by the headquarters responsible for carrying out the plans. Accordingly, decentralization to the lowest practicable level consistent with security was essential. Also, there was little possibility that direct control of West German police units would be delegated to U.S. Army commanders, although such units might be given a direct support-type mission.¹⁴⁷

In January 1957 the West German Minister of Defense was informed that U.S. refugee control plans were based on a "stay at home" concept and had three priority objectives. The first was to prevent a refugee movement from getting underway by the use of such psychological and coercive measures as proclamations and announcements in newspapers and bulletins and over the radio, control of the sale of motor fuel, and the imposition of curfews; the second, if a movement began, to divert or stop the refugees as soon as possible at barrier lines or preselected local dispersal areas; and the third, if the first two steps were unsuccessful, to control the movement and direct the refugees toward long-range holding areas at the rear or flanks of the combat zone to prevent interference with military operations and to facilitate control and support.¹⁴⁸

The West German Ministry of Defense recognized that, until its plans were made, military plans would have to remain in effect and German

¹⁴⁶(1) Memo for rec, USAREUR Asst SGS, 5 Nov 56, sub: German Concept and Plan for Civil Control During Wartime (U). SECRET. (2) DF, USAREUR CAD to DCOFS, 5 Dec 56, sub: Progress Report on Plans for Discussions with Germans about Civil Controls During Wartime. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Both in file above.

¹⁴⁷Memo, C/USAREUR CAD to DCOFS, 14 Jan 57, sub: Coordination with German Federal Republic on Plans to Control Civilian Movement During Wartime (NATO C). NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS NATO No. 3 (1957).

¹⁴⁸Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Fed Min of Def, Bonn, 16 Jan 57, SECRET; w/Incl, Answers to German Questions about Current Military Plans Relating to Civilian Movement in Wartime. NATO SECRET. In file above.

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civil police agencies would have to assist in the control of the civilian population. It was determined that the responsibility for such control would be vested in the German Ministry of Interior and counterpart agencies at the state and local levels. Short-range measures by which West German police could assist U.S. military commanders in the field could not be discussed since these matters had been referred to an AFCEM committee on police cooperation.¹⁴⁹

In May 1957, however, at the request of the West German Ministry of Defense the U.S. Seventh Army and the French First Army were authorized to negotiate directly with the German military districts (Wehrbereichskommando) to obtain the wartime civil controls necessary to execute their missions. The discussions were to be limited to the development of long-range German plans for control of the civil population in the event of war. No problems related to German implementation of plans for the interim period could be discussed because the German representatives were not authorized to do so. The West German Ministry of Defense had proposed the use of barrier lines to control all civilian movement, which, although consistent with U.S. military plans, was not acceptable as an absolute restriction. The existing situation might make it necessary and desirable that movement past the barrier lines take place, in which case barriers would serve to channel and control the movement in a desired direction and over specified routes.¹⁵⁰ At the close of the reporting period discussions between German military district and Seventh Army representatives had been initiated.

b. The Proposed SHAPE Directive. In April 1957 SHAPE forwarded to major subordinate commanders a draft directive giving them guidance for the control of refugees during an emergency. In commenting on the draft, USAREUR/CENTAG planners maintained that national authorities should be responsible for exercising necessary wartime controls over civilians within their territory to prevent interference with military operations. In the absence of any effective action by national authorities, military commanders should ensure the operational freedom of their forces, to include the temporary assumption of control over civilians.

¹⁴⁹(1) Memo for rec, USAREUR CAD, 23 Jan 57, sub: Conference with Representatives of German Federal Republic about Civil Movement in War-time (U). (2) DF, USAREUR CAD to Asst DCOFS, 8 Feb 57, sub: Discussions with the German Government about NEO, MISEV, and Refugee Control (U). Both SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1957).

¹⁵⁰(1) Ltr, COMCENTAG to CG Seventh Army, 31 May 57, sub: Development of German Plans to Control the Civil Population During Wartime (U). NATO CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, COMCENTAG to Fed Min of Def, Bonn, 31 May 57. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR CAD Unit Jnl, 31 May 57, Item 3. Copy in USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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Every effort should be made to prevent the beginning of a refugee movement by persuading or preventing people from moving except for reasons of military expediency or for survival. All refugee movements should be controlled to prevent interference with military operations. If necessary, certain areas would have to be evacuated. In any event, maximum use would have to be made of civilian agencies since military forces could take only such action as necessary for operational success.¹⁵¹

c. Problem Areas Resulting from Radiological Contamination. If atomic weapons were used, certain problems bearing upon the civil population and refugee concentrations would arise. USAREUR would have to warn and evacuate inhabitants from areas about to be affected or already contaminated by radiological fallout. A continuous radiological surveillance of the contaminated areas would have to be maintained, and civilian agencies would have to be assisted in conducting radiological surveys when required or requested. Civilian evacuees and casualties also would have to be supported. Furthermore, certain areas would have to be denied to civilian use. At the end of FY 1957 plans covering these possible problem areas were being prepared.¹⁵²

62. Psychological and Unconventional Warfare

a. Psychological Warfare.

(1) The Proposed Expansion and Psychological Exploitation of Labor Service Troops. In February 1957 the Department of the Army queried US CINCEUR as to the desirability of expanding the labor service organization and using its Russian company for limited psychological exploitation. At the time the Department of Defense Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) was examining whether the continued expenditure of Mutual Security Act funds in support of the labor service organization was justified or whether such funds could not be used more profitably for other refugee programs and activities. With regard to the proposed expansion, OCB was of the opinion that since the additional personnel would support Army operations they should be paid from Army appropriations. Further, after FY 1957 Mutual Security Act funds might not be available to support some 1,000 Soviet-orbit nationals already in the labor service organizations. Information was desired whether to press for the continuation of the organization, to include the proposed expansion, or to

¹⁵¹ Ltr, C/USAREUR CAD to COMLANDCENT, 23 May 57, sub: Draft Directive about Control of Refugees (U), w/incl 2, Suggested Outline of SHAPE Directive Regarding Refugee Control. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, 31 May 57, Item 4.

¹⁵² DF, USAREUR CAD to Chem Div, 9 May 57, sub: Impact of Radiological Contamination on Operational Activities (U). CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, 9 May 57, Item 1.

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withdraw the case from OCB consideration.¹⁵³

As of February 1957, 5,700 Soviet-orbit nationals were employed in the labor service; of these, 2,800 desired to be resettled in the United States. In reply to the Departmental query USAREUR pointed out that any reduction in funds for the labor service organization in FY 1958 would have to be accompanied by a proportionate reduction in personnel. This might affect the excapee program since the organization offered these individuals a chance for gainful employment and demonstrated evidence of the United States' concern for their welfare.¹⁵⁴ Although US CINCEUR agreed with USAREUR's position, the Department of the Army subsequently indicated that Mutual Security Act funds would not be available after FY 1958 and that approximately 1,000 personnel would have to be eliminated. Since the proposed cut would not be effective until FY 1958 no further action was taken during the reporting period.¹⁵⁵

(2) Revisions to the USAREUR Plans. During FY 1957 psychological warfare plans were revised to conform with changes in the US EUCOM capabilities plans. In addition, the CENTAG Emergency Plan 1-57 defined the psychological warfare support that CENTAG would provide to NATO forces, and appropriate annexes were prepared for the major NATO command post exercises LION NOIR and COUNTERPUNCH.¹⁵⁶

b. Unconventional Warfare. During FY 1957 plans for USAREUR unconventional warfare forces were expanded by refining the concepts of the over-all wartime campaign and the means by which specified tasks would be accomplished. Efforts were also made to move the 10th Special Forces from Germany to France or the United Kingdom, which would facilitate their wartime operational mission. The matter was still under discussion at the close of the reporting period.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³(1) Cable EC-9-692, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Feb 57. (2) Cable DA-917639, DA to US CINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, 9 Feb 57. Both SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1957).

¹⁵⁴Cable SX-1822, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 15 Feb 57. SECRET. In file above.

¹⁵⁵(1) Interv, Mr. David Lane, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col R. J. Billado, Dep C/USAREUR Labor Svc Div, 19 Jul 57. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Interv, Capt Mewha with Lt Col D. W. Osgood, USAREUR G3 Plans & Policy Br, 14 Oct 57. SECRET.

¹⁵⁶Draft, Lt Col D. W. Osgood, USAREUR G3 Plans & Policy Br, 16 Oct 56. SECRET. Copy in USAREUR G3 Plans & Policy Br.

¹⁵⁷Ibid.

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63. ORO's Contributions to Planning

During FY 1957 the Operations Research Office (ORO) Field Team of John Hopkins University continued to prepare studies of interest to the USAREUR planning program. Moreover, two analysts provided staff assistance to the USAREUR Air Defense Division.

Certain studies in the field of atomic planning were distributed. The first analysed a new low-yield atomic device that could be employed for demolition purposes within the framework of USAREUR, NATO, and Seventh Army retardation plans. A second, requested by Seventh Army, pertained to the minimum spacing of atomic bursts. The draft study was being used both by Seventh Army and by USAREUR since it was the best data available on the subject. Another ORO study on atomic casualty planning factors yielded a formula for determining loss factors in future training exercises. The formula, briefly, expressed the effectiveness of enemy atomic weapons in terms of individual casualties or equivalent tactical unit losses. Thus, in the submegaton range, U.S. forces could be expected to suffer 700-800 casualties per weapon expended or lose one small unit. The probability was that unit losses would be equally divided between companies and battalions. Other studies under preparation in FY 1957 pertained to atomic target selection and intratheater airlift operations.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁸ (1) Memo, USAREUR Research Advisory Committee for COFS, 4 Jan 57, sub: Annual Report of the USAREUR Research Advisory Committee, w/atchd Annual Report of the USAREUR Research Advisory Committee, Calendar Year 1956. SECRET. (2) Minutes of USAREUR Research Advisory Committee, 30 Mar 57. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 337 (1957). (3) ORO Study S-76, W. E. Cushen, 27 Feb 57, sub: Atomic Casualty Planning Factors (U). SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954, NOFORN. Copy in USAREUR ORO Field Team files.

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CHAPTER 6

Air Defense

Section I: Command Problems

64. Over-all Control of Antiaircraft Weapons

Throughout 1956 the over-all responsibility for the control of U.S. air defense in Europe constituted a major problem. CINCUSAFE wanted his command to be designated as the single U.S. air defense planning agent to work with SACEUR and the Commander, Twelfth Air Force, appointed as the U.S. air defense commander in Central Europe. CINCUSAREUR maintained that USAFE and USAREUR should be jointly responsible for air defense planning within areas of U.S. interest. Moreover, since missile units would be largely wasted under the existing air defense procedures an integrated air defense plan with realistic rules of engagement was needed before the NIKE battalions' arrival in Europe.¹

In an effort to solve the air defense problem, US CINCEUR appointed a joint committee to contact the various headquarters and devise common policies on rules and priorities of engagement, command structures, etc.²

¹(1) For background information, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, Hq USAREUR, 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56, p. 183. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-3875, USAREUR to DA, 30 Jun 56. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1956), B/P, Air Defense (NIKE).

²(1) Cable EC-9-3676, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCNELM, and CINCUSAFE, 26 Jun 56. SECRET. In file cited above. (2) Cable EC-9-3800, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Jul 56. SECRET. (3) Cable DA-905938, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Jul 56. SECRET. Both in same file, Item 025.

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In the study that it prepared, this committee³ recommended, among other things, that operational control of all Seventh Army nondivisional antiaircraft artillery units be assigned to the Commander, Twelfth Air Force, who would be assisted by a joint air defense staff. As a result, US CINCEUR created the interim joint air defense staff to evaluate and implement the recommendations of the study.⁴ In addition, in October 1956 US CINCEUR directed CINCUSAFE to nominate a deputy for Air Defense (Designate) as head of the above-mentioned joint air defense staff, while CINCUSAREUR was to designate the assistant deputy for air defense. Both component commanders were to furnish on call a small number of officers for the initial staff that would serve as a nucleus for later expansion into a permanent staff.⁵

65. The Proposed USAREUR AAA Employment Plan

At approximately the same time that word was received of US EUCOM's intention to place Seventh Army's nondivisional AAA units under the operational control of the Air Force, USAREUR was informed of the new Army reorganization plan that would eliminate its divisional antiaircraft battalions. If implemented literally, these two actions could have deprived the Seventh Army commander of any control over his means, thereby seriously limiting Seventh Army's air defense capability. Any aerial attack in Central Europe undoubtedly would be accompanied by ground action. Since Seventh Army--the only force screening the SHAPE retaliatory bases from such ground attacks--would not be able to defend itself against a potential atomic air attack, the airbases might be overrun in a very short time. Furthermore, Seventh Army had to retain the capability for its own antiaircraft defense in the forward combat zone in order to protect its organic atomic delivery systems and support units. Without AAA defense for the movement of troops between areas and through defiles, the essential tactical mobility of Seventh Army would be severely restricted.⁶

³Details of the Weller study, prepared by a joint committee headed by Brig. Gen. Donald W. Weller, and USAREUR comments thereto are contained in the top secret supplement to this report.

⁴Comment 2, USAREUR Air Def Div to Hist Div, 1 Nov 57, to DF, Hist Div to Air Def Div, 30 Sep 57, sub: Review of Draft Chapters of USAREUR Annual Historical Report (U). SECRET. Copy in USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

⁵(1) Cable EC-9-5608, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, 11 Oct 56. SECRET. (2) DF, USAREUR ADCC to COFS, 26 Nov 56, sub: Reassignment of AAA Units. AEADC 660.21 DC. SECRET. (3) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 28 Nov 56, sub: Reallocation of Seventh Army Antiaircraft Units. AEADC 660.21 DC. SECRET. All in USAREUR SGS 322, USAF (1957).

⁶(1) DF, USAREUR ADCC to COFS, 26 Nov 56, cited above. SECRET.
(2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 28 Nov 56, cited above. SECRET.

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To preserve Seventh Army's antiaircraft defense capability and at the same time make proper provision for a defense of fixed installations, CINCUSAREUR in November 1956 proposed a realignment of the limited air defense means available. Two AAA groups, five 90-mm gun battalions, and two AA operations detachments would be placed under USAREUR headquarters. The 34th AAA Brigade and the other antiaircraft units would remain under Seventh Army. To more clearly delineate areas of responsibility, USAREUR intended to establish a Seventh Army Rear Air Defense Boundary, which was to be located initially on the west bank of the Rhine River and subsequently moved as the situation dictated.

The five 90-mm gun battalions mentioned above, of which four were scheduled for conversion to NIKE surface-to-air missile units during FY 1958, would be allocated to the static defenses west of the Rhine River in the Kaiserslautern and Bitburg-Spangdahlem-Hahn areas. Pending conversion to NIKE, these battalions would provide low and medium altitude air defense of US EUCOM's first two priority areas. Two self-propelled automatic weapons (AW) battalions, five Skysweeper, and two 90-mm gun battalions would be allocated to the mobile defense of the Seventh Army east of the Rhine and for the defense of the Rhine River bridges. Since the two self-propelled battalions were not suitable for defense of area targets, they would be employed to replace the existing divisional AA battalions upon completion of the reorganization process. The five Skysweeper battalions would provide low altitude defense of Seventh Army's atomic delivery means, major headquarters, and other critical installations east of the Rhine and would assist in the defense of the Rhine River bridges. After conversion to NIKE, the two 90-mm gun battalions would be stationed east of the Rhine to defend Seventh Army units and the Rhine bridges against either air or ground attack. All these AAA units would be sufficiently mobile to displace with Seventh Army in forward, lateral or retrograde movements and would protect the army forces wherever they were deployed.

On 28 November 1956 CINCUSAREUR recommended that the US EUCOM air defense study be modified to reflect this reallocation of AAA units before the implementing order was given. US EUCOM, however, decided to withhold specific comment until the USAREUR proposals could be studied thoroughly and referred to the interim joint air defense staff. The interim joint staff not only considered CINCUSAREUR's proposed AAA employment plan but prepared four reports, three of which contained divergent Army-Air Force views concerning the organization of a permanent joint air defense staff, the rules of antiaircraft engagement, and the use of available anti-aircraft artillery forces. Only on the question of the utilization of four additional NIKE battalions did the Army and Air Force elements of the interim joint staff reach agreement.⁷

⁷(1) For copies of these studies, see USAREUR Air Def Div file, 381 (1957). (2) Ltr, Gen G. H. Decker, Dep US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Feb 57, sub: Air Defense Planning. SECRET. In same file. (3) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 28 Nov 56, cited above. SECRET. (4) Ltr, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Dec 56, sub: Reallocation of Seventh Army Antiaircraft Units. ECJC 322. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322, USAF (1956).

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66. The Draft of the US EUCOM Air Defense Directive

In February 1957 US CINCEUR made an effort to resolve the Army-Air Force conflict within the interim joint air defense staff. A US EUCOM air defense directive was drafted whose stated purpose was to establish the most effective employment of air defense weapons or combinations of weapons, while guaranteeing maximum possible freedom of operational action to all elements of U.S. forces involved. Any air defense plan adopted by US EUCOM had to support SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan, which required that all friendly atomic storage sites and the airbases from which atomic retaliatory attacks could be launched be protected against enemy atomic air attacks. Since primary consideration had to be given to defending these areas, the EUCOM directive delegated responsibility for the air defense of Central Europe to the Commander, Twelfth Air Force, who was to be assisted by a joint air defense staff⁸--provided by CINCUSAFE and CINCUSAREUR--which would function at Twelfth Air Force headquarters.⁹

Air defense priorities were established as follows: the Kaiserslautern complex, the Bitburg-Spangdahlem airbases, the Rhine River bridges, and the Hahn Air Force base. Five 75-mm gun battalions, 7 90-mm gun battalions, 7 AW battalions, 4 all-weather interceptor squadrons, and 4 day-fighter squadrons were available to defend these areas. According to the draft plan, USAREUR would be required to place its 7 90-mm and 5 75-mm Skysweeper battalions under the operational control of the Commander, Twelfth Air Force, who would use them for air defense on a full-time, continuous basis. These units would not be assigned any other missions, nor would they be redeployed without prior approval of the air defense or theater commander. They would, however, be employed under Army command. One 75-mm and 4 90-mm gun battalions would be deployed in the Kaiserslautern area; 2 90-mm and 2 75-mm battalions would protect the Bitburg-Spangdahlem airbase areas; 1 90-mm battalion would be deployed at the Hahn airbase; and 2 75-mm battalions would be allocated to defend the Rhine River bridges. When NIKE missiles replaced the 90-mm guns, consideration would be given to reassigning the 75-mm battalions. The remaining 2 non-divisional AW battalions and the 5 divisional AW battalions would be responsible for the local defense of Seventh Army units. If the Department of the Army reorganization of divisions eliminated the organic AW battalions and failed to provide corps and/or army combat support counterparts, the use made of the AA units would be reexamined. However,

⁸Since US EUCOM had not activated the staff by June, USAREUR asked USAFE to concur in the establishment of an air defense liaison group at Twelfth Air Force headquarters to preclude having to secure officers later when the theater joint staff would be activated. No reply was received by 30 June 1957. See DF, USAREUR Air Def Div to COFS, 24 Jun 57, sub: Establishment of Air Defense Liaison Group. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 660.2 (1957).

⁹(1) Ltr, Gen Decker to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Feb 57, cited above. (2) US EUCOM draft dir, n.d., sub: Plans, Operations, and Training, Air Defense, US EUCOM. SECRET. In USAREUR Air Def Div 381 (1957).

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according to the most recent information six AW battalions would be retained in Europe even after the divisional reorganization.

Upon becoming available the six NIKE battalions would be deployed to US EUCOM-approved sites; upon becoming operational, they would assume their full-time air defense role under the operational control of the Commander, Twelfth Air Force. If four additional NIKE battalions were received, the first would be used for the defense of the Hahn airbase area and the next three for the air defense of Army logistical installations and the Air Force main operating bases in the Verdun-Nancy-Metz complex.

USAFE was to make its four all-weather interceptor squadrons available for air defense on a similar full-time basis without assigning them any other missions. The four day-fighter squadrons and an Air Force tactical control group would be available only on a part-time basis to permit their use on other missions that might be of overriding importance at the time.¹⁰

a. USAREUR's Reaction. CINCUSAREUR objected to the US EUCOM draft air defense plan, stating in effect that the plan violated military principles by depriving the Seventh Army commander of all his organic air defense weapons larger than 40-mm, even though he would have to engage an enemy with considerable air superiority and with an ample number of atomic weapons. Further, the draft directive did not recognize that the Seventh Army had such high priority AA defense missions as protecting atomic delivery units and special weapons support forces. Lastly, the draft plan violated Army regulations in depriving the army commander of the full air defense control of his area.¹¹

To deprive the Seventh Army commander of all but six self-propelled AW battalions of extremely limited effectiveness for protecting his forces in the combat zone might have serious implications, especially in view of the Air Force's obvious inability to prevent low altitude attacks against troops in the forward areas. Ideally, Seventh Army ought to have 19 battalions of antiaircraft artillery, both automatic weapons and Skysweepers, to provide the necessary low altitude protection of the field forces, particularly the atomic delivery units. For this reason, not less than 12 battalions--preferably 9 Skysweeper and 3 automatic weapons--would have to be placed under Seventh Army control in the forward areas. (A corresponding request for this number had been approved in a new troop basis.) Seventh Army's 5 Skysweeper battalions would have to be retained for local defense, and 4 additional battalions should be transferred from the United Kingdom in exchange for 4 AW battalions that could then be inactivated. Such a change would provide Seventh Army with

¹⁰ US EUCOM draft Dir, cited above. SECRET.

¹¹ Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 11 Mar 57, sub: Air Defense Planning (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 660.2 (1957).

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the most up-to-date equipment, give the Army forces an all-weather air defense capability, and result in a personnel savings of approximately 900 spaces.¹² US CINCEUR, however, did not favorably consider CINCUSAREUR's request on the grounds that the available AA units were insufficient for the protection of the high priority atomic retaliatory airbases. Moreover, because of their lethal capabilities, any Skysweeper battalions transferred from the United Kingdom would of necessity be placed under the operational control of the commander responsible for air defense. The reliability and suitability of the Skysweeper as a weapon in a forward defense area, where frequent movements would be necessary, left much to be desired. Much of Seventh Army's air defense in the combat zone would have to be provided by passive means.¹³

CINCUSAREUR adhered to the position taken in November 1956¹⁴ and requested the draft air defense directive be revised to provide for an allocation of five 90-mm gun battalions for the defense of priority installations. He also asked that the remaining Seventh Army AA units constitute the ground forces' organic local defense means, to be employed as directed by the Seventh Army commander in accordance with the existing tactical situation. The army commander should also be given the authority to establish AAA weapons fire areas into which friendly aircraft would not fly without prior clearance. In these areas the firing units would be free to engage any aircraft not identified as friendly. This would offset the inability of the Air Force to provide adequate early warning and timely identifications and would prevent, by interception, the delivery of air attacks against troops in the forward areas.¹⁵

b. The Proposed Deployment of Conventional AAA to U.S.-controlled Facilities. Upon being advised that the acquisition of real estate for conventional AAA weapons sites around priority installations should not be undertaken until NIKE sites had been acquired, US EUCOM on 25 March 1957 requested CINCUSAREUR for information on the consequences of redeploying the 75-mm and 90-mm weapons to U.S.-controlled properties in the Kaiserslautern, Bitburg-Spangdahlem, Hahn, and Rhine bridge areas. A study forwarded by Seventh Army in April showed that the proposed deployment would permit only a very poor air defense capability; in no case

¹²(1) DF, USAREUR ADCC to ACOFS G3, 12 Feb 57, sub: Changes in Seventh Army AAA Units. (2) Comment 3, USAREUR ADCC to G3, to DF, G3 to G1, G4, ADCC, 27 Feb 57, sub: USAREUR Troop Program, FY 57-58. Both SECRET. Both in USAREUR Air Def Div 322 (1957). (3) Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to US CINCEUR, 5 Mar 57, sub: Antiaircraft Artillery Requirements of Seventh Army. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1957).

¹³Ltr, Gen G. H. Decker, Dep US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Mar 57, sub: Air Defense Planning (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 660.2 (1957).

¹⁴Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 28 Nov 56, cited above. SECRET.

¹⁵Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 11 Mar 57, sub: Air Defense Planning (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 660.2 (1957).

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would the optimum defense desired be closely approached. Such a redeployment would draw the battalions so near the center of the vulnerable area that the possibility of engaging hostile aircraft beyond a bomb release line would be very remote. Except for the protection that could be afforded the airbases against dive bombing, U.S.-controlled real estate around the vital areas was either too limited or too poorly situated to permit the establishment of an effective, all-around antiaircraft defense. Furthermore, 6 of the 7 assigned 90-mm gun battalions would be converted to NIKE equipment and moved to temporary or permanent sites, from which an active defense of the priority areas would be possible. To deploy these battalions to the site before the receipt of the missile equipment might hamper the conversion program and interfere with site construction.

The real deterrent--the lack of sufficient ground space--would be felt especially at the Bitburg, Spangdahlem, and Hahn airbases where all the available U.S.-controlled areas were within the confines of the air installations. If the air defense units took up some of the airbase space, they might interfere with Air Force operations. In addition, the costs of installing communications and of construction revetments, on-site troop billets, and other necessary facilities would not be commensurate with the degree of air defense protection that would be realized.¹⁶ This matter was to be coordinated with USAFE before any further planning was undertaken; USAREUR took no further action during the remainder of the fiscal year.¹⁷

c. The Final US EUCOM Position. After having studied CINCUSAREUR's comments on the US EUCOM draft air defense directive, Deputy US CINCEUR concluded that no change in the theater air defense concepts outlined in the draft directive was justified. To be effective, air defense had to be properly organized, the necessary operating procedures had to be devised, and available forces had to be so used as to meet the over-all requirements of the theater, rather than those of any one service element. The future use of the unconverted 90-mm gun battalion and the 75-mm battalions could be reconsidered after the 6 NIKE battalions programmed for USAREUR became operational. On the basis of these conclusions the draft air defense directive was submitted to US CINCEUR for approval, after which the permanent joint air defense staff would be established, AAA units would move to on-site positions, and communications would be established. The air defense draft had not been approved by the end of the reporting period.¹⁸

¹⁶(1) Ltr, Lt Gen Bruce C. Clarke, CG Seventh Army, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, 19 Apr 57. SECRET. (2) DF, USAREUR Air Def Div to COFS, 4 May 57, sub: Deployment of 75-mm and 90-mm AA Units on U.S. Controlled Property (U). SECRET. Both in file above.

¹⁷Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 9 May 57, sub cited above. SECRET. In USAREUR Air Def Div 322 (1957).

¹⁸(1) Cable EC-9-1407, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Mar 57. (2) Ltr, Dep US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Apr 57, sub: US EUCOM Draft Air Defense Directive (U). Both SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 660.2 (1957). (3) Interv, Capt J. Mewha, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col W. H. Brucker, XO, USAREUR Air Def Div, 15 Aug 57. SECRET.

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67. The USAREUR AAA Reorganization Plan

Three factors were of importance in the realignment of certain air defense responsibilities within the USAREUR area proposed in May 1957. First, in a memorandum published on 26 November 1956, the Secretary of Defense provided guidance to US CINCEUR by clarifying the roles and missions of the military services in air defense. The memorandum enunciated the principle that in overseas areas, the U.S. theater commander should normally assign responsibility for air defense to an air component commander, with the other component services participating appropriately. Under this arrangement, the field Army commander would continue to be responsible for his own local defense employing organic means. Other Army air defense units would carry out point defense missions under the air component commander, while Air Force units would carry out the area defense missions. Army Regulation 525-50, also published in November 1956, amplified the memorandum by defining the Army commander's role in air defense in the combat area. By limiting the amount of outside control, the Army regulation preserved a measure of autonomy in the employment of Army air defense weapons.

The second major factor was the requirement inherent in the Army's basic missions according to which the Army was to provide antiaircraft defense for all military services and their facilities. In accordance with this requirement, US CINCEUR had established an integrated priority list of Army, Navy, and Air Force installations to be defended. USAREUR, in turn, had prepared a NIKE deployment plan which US EUCOM had approved. In essence, this plan provided for siting 4 NIKE battalions to protect the Kaiserslautern complex and the Bitburg-Spangdahlem airbases, all of which were situated west of the Rhine River; 2 NIKE battalions would be sited east of the Rhine to protect essential bridges between Mainz and Karlsruhe. The last factor that influenced the USAREUR AAA reorganization plan was that US EUCOM had not recognized Seventh Army's mobile forces as an entity competing with fixed installations for high priority air defense considerations. In its new plan USAREUR attempted to provide the necessary defense of the priority fixed installations, to afford a measure of protection to Seventh Army's mobile forces, and to comply with directives from higher headquarters.¹⁹

According to the air defense reorganization concept, USAREUR retained the west bank of the Rhine River as the boundary dividing the combat zone into a "forward area" to be defended by Seventh Army, in which were situated substantially all field forces and vital Seventh Army installations

¹⁹ Comment 2, USAREUR Air Def Div to Hist Div, 1 Nov 57, to DF, Hist Div to Air Def Div, 30 Sep 57, sub: Review of Draft Chapters of USAREUR Annual Historical Report (U). SECRET. Copy in USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (2) Interv, Capt Mewha with Col Brucker, 6 Nov 57. SECRET.

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and a "rear area" to be defended by the 32d AAA Brigade,²⁰ in which USACOMZEUR and USAFE forces and static facilities predominated. Army air defense operations would be conducted in accordance with SHAPE air defense procedures.²¹

Upon the outbreak of hostilities (Phase I), Seventh Army would provide air defense for all U.S. forces and vital installations east of the Rhine, giving initial priority to the protection of the Rhine River bridges and the special weapons delivery units. In the event of an alert the 32d AAA Brigade would transfer the 1st AAA Group with 2 90-mm gun battalions to the Seventh Army and would deploy 3 90-mm AAA battalions for the defense of the Kaiserslautern complex, and 1 75-mm battalion each to the Sembach, Bitburg, and Spangdahlem airbases. Plans for operations after the outbreak of hostilities (Phase II) would be prepared in coordination with Seventh Army. A maximum effort was to be made toward taking such passive air defense measures as cover, concealment, camouflage, dispersal, and deception.²²

The advantages of the proposed realignment of responsibilities would be many. Seventh Army would be freed from Theater Army antiaircraft defense responsibilities; at the same time, it would be given command of Skysweeper battalions and NIKE units in the forward areas, even though these units would be under the Twelfth Air Force's operational control; a command structure would be created for the expansion of Theater Army antiaircraft forces into the communications zone; and the NIKE battalions deployed in the forward areas would provide the ground forces commander with required fire support. The main disadvantage was that the NIKE defense forces would be split between two brigades.²³

Seventh Army nonconcurred on the grounds that divided authority and responsibility would jeopardize operations of the NIKE defenses and would complicate coordination and reorganization in the event of movement of any defense elements across the Rhine. Further, it would also violate the Department of the Army policy on air defense. In rebuttal, the USAREUR Air Defense Division pointed out that the proposed realignment was in

²⁰The organic Skysweeper battalions of the 32d AAA Brigade were inactivated in conformance with a Department of the Army directive for reduction in troop spaces. Only the brigade headquarters and the headquarters battery were scheduled for transfer to the vicinity of Kaiserslautern, Germany. Interv, Capt Mewha with Col Brucker, 15 Aug 57, cited above. SECRET.

²¹(1) Memo, Maj Gen Hobart Hewett, C/Air Def Div to COFS, 15 May 57, sub: Organization of USAREUR AA Units. SECRET. In USAREUR Air Def Div 322 (1957). (2) USAREUR ltr, 25 Jul 57, sub: Assignment of Responsibility for the USAREUR Air Defense Mission (U). AEADD 322.011 AG (AG-AO). SECRET.

²²USAREUR ltr, 25 Jul 57, cited above. SECRET.

²³DF, Gen Hewett to COFS, 15 May 57, cited above. SECRET.

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consonance with the departmental air defense policy to the extent permitted by the US EUCOM draft directive; therefore, its adoption would place the Army in a strong position to rebut the directive. CINCUSAREUR approved the proposed realignment of air defense responsibilities shortly after the close of the reporting period.²⁴

68. Department of the Army Concern over US EUCOM Concepts

At the close of the fiscal year, Department of the Army concern over the US EUCOM air defense concepts was expressed by the Army Chief of Staff in a letter to CINCUSAREUR which questioned two aspects of the US EUCOM draft directive. The first was the contemplated establishment of a quasi-joint air defense control structure in the combat zone that would remove most of the field army commander's organic air defense means from his control. The second objectionable aspect was the lack of Army representation at certain echelons within the proposed structure. As an alternate solution it was suggested that the Seventh Army commander or his representative be designated as an air defense sector chief under the operational control of the joint air defense commander. This approach would have the double advantage of keeping the air space in the Seventh Army area under ground force control and conforming with a proposed SHAPE plan for air defense sectors in Europe.²⁵

69. Participation in Joint Planning

a. The US EUCOM Air Defense Requirements Study. In January 1957 the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed US CINCEUR to submit an air defense plan for his area of responsibility that could contribute to the establishment of a JCS "order of magnitude" estimate of the over-all defense requirements for all overseas areas. Representatives of USAREUR, USAFE, SETAF, NELM, and US EUCOM formed an ad hoc committee which, after having received intelligence estimates and strategic concepts from the U.S. element of SHAPE, formulated guidance for a working group, composed of officers and civilian scientists from USAREUR and USAFE headquarters. The study produced by this working group was used by US EUCOM to evaluate certain conclusions concerning the adequacy of previously stated requirements. The contents of the study are analyzed in the top secret

²⁴(1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR ltr, 25 Jul 57, cited above. SECRET.
(3) 1st Ind, Air Def Div to C/Hist Div, 20 Dec 57, to DF, C/Hist Div to Air Def Div, 6 Dec 57, sub: Review of Final Draft of USAREUR Annual Historical Report (U), w/atchd rept. SECRET.

²⁵(1) Ltr, Gen M. D. Taylor, COFSA, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, 1 Jul 57. SECRET. (2) DF, USAREUR ADD to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Jul 57, sub: Air Defense Planning. SECRET. Both in USAREUR ADD 381 (1957).

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supplement to this report.²⁶

b. U.S. Planning for Areas Outside of Central Europe. Concurrently with the preparation of the US EUCOM requirements study for Central Europe, US CINCEUR directed USAFE to prepare a similar study for Spain, Portugal, and Morocco with the assistance of USAREUR.²⁷ Although CINCUSAREUR's air defense responsibilities did not extend to this area, it was considered to the best interests of the U.S. Army that USAREUR participate in requirements planning for the area. Accordingly, one USAREUR member of the main working group was made available temporarily to USAFE headquarters.²⁸

70. Participation in NATO Planning

In June 1957 SHAPE forwarded to the Department of the Army and to USAREUR its draft plan for the coordination of air defenses of NATO Europe in the 1960 period with a request for comments. In essence, the plan proposed a barrier-type air defense, with surface-to-air guided missiles (SAM) defending the forward areas and manned interceptor aircraft the rear areas. Air defense sectors were to be established, and a system of control was proposed.²⁹

On 24 June the Department of the Army raised a number of specific objections to SHAPE's proposals. The draft plan was designed as a step to provide a logical transition from the current NATO posture to the more fully coordinated systems of the post-1965 period when manned interceptors would have little or no capability of meeting the threat behind the forward areas. Therefore, it was considered that requirements for that period should not be based on interceptor forces available for air defense during 1960-62. In addition, no costly aircraft control systems should be established because of the short life and marginal value of aircraft. Since

²⁶(1) DF, USAREUR ADCC to COFS, 28 Jan 57, sub: Air Defense Requirements for U.S. Overseas Installations (U). SECRET. (2) Cable EC-9-535, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCNELM, et al., 30 Jan 57. SECRET NOFORN. (3) Cable OT-4-F-6261, CINCUSAFE to US CINCEUR, 2 Feb 57. SECRET NOFORN. (4) Cable OPLO-7090, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, CINCNELM, 27 Feb 57. SECRET. (5) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to COFS, 21 Feb 57, sub: Air Defense Requirements for U.S. Overseas Installations (U). SECRET. All in USAREUR SGS 660.2 (1957).

²⁷Cable EC-9-748, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Feb 57. SECRET. In file above.

²⁸(1) Interv, Capt Mewha with Col Brucker, 15 Aug 57, cited above. SECRET. (2) 1st Ind, USAREUR Air Def Div to C/Hist Div, 20 Dec 57, cited above. SECRET.

²⁹For details of this plan and USAREUR's comments, see the top secret supplement to this report.

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restrictions on SAM fire might have to be imposed to protect the interceptors while in flight, the best solution would be to exclude interceptors from the SAM areas of coverage.

The normal fire procedure outlined in the draft plan appeared to give higher headquarters the authority to commit individual surface-to-air missiles against certain targets, a method that would seriously limit the capability of the weapon. In turn, by disseminating information on identification and on the engagement status of all targets by other SAM's to the individual batteries, more targets could be engaged and destroyed. In general, higher echelons should only monitor the actions of the SAM units; making target commitment decisions at higher headquarters would take up valuable time that the missile units could use to increase their firepower.

As to the establishment of air defense sectors in Germany, the departmental view was that the principle of wartime unity of command in the combat zone should guide any peacetime solution adopted. The commanders of field armies in Germany should control all combat forces within their areas of responsibility but an integrated air defense of the entire European theater of operations was needed, hence the proposed air defense sectors. These two requirements dictated the adoption of an organizational concept wherein the field army commander would be designated as the air defense sector commander for his area.³⁰

Section II: National Plans for NIKE Deployment in Europe

71. Department of the Army Planning

In April 1956 the Department of the Army had programmed 10 NIKE battalions for the U.S. Army, Europe, in FY 1958. Plans were made accordingly. Subsequent information revealed that NIKE deployments to Europe would be slower than originally planned, and in April 1957 the Department of the Army budget guidance for FY 1959 indicated 6 NIKE battalions for FY 1958, 4 for FY 1959, and 1 more for FY 1961--a total of 11 battalions to be deployed in USAREUR.³¹

³⁰(1) Cable DA-925193, DA from DCSOPS to US CINCEUR, 24 Jun 57. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-4245, USAREUR to Seventh Army, 32d AAA Brig, 26 Jun 57. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 660.2 (1957).

³¹(1) Cable DA-901475, DA from DCOFS Opns to US CINCEUR, 21 Apr 56. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1956), B/P, Air Defense. (2) Interv, Capt Mewha with Col Brucker, 15 Aug 57, cited above. SECRET. (3) Ltr, DA to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 24 Apr 57, sub: Guidance for Preparation of FY 1959 MCA Budget for Antiaircraft Tactical Facilities (U). SECRET. In USAREUR Air Def Div 120 Funds (1957).

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72. The Seventh Army Deployment Plan

In August 1956 Seventh Army was instructed to prepare a sound, flexible operational plan for the six NIKE battalions to be received in FY 1958, based on the assumption that the tentatively selected sites would be approved. Individual plans were to be prepared for each defended area, integrating both NIKE and conventional antiaircraft artillery units.³²

In September 1956 Seventh Army submitted its deployment plan for the six battalions. In brief, it called for the stationing of one NIKE battalion headquarters in Worms with firing batteries located in Wackernheim, Dexheim, Worms, and Kriegsfeld. A second battalion headquarters would be in Pirmasens with the four firing batteries in the immediate vicinity. A third battalion headquarters would be at Baumholder with firing batteries in Zweibrucken, Baumholder, Kirchberg, and at the Hahn airbase. The entire fourth battalion would be in the vicinity of the Bitburg airbase. The fifth NIKE battalion would have its headquarters in Karlsruhe with firing batteries in Germersheim, Kleingartach, Grossachsenheim, and Pforzheim. The last battalion would have firing batteries in Darmstadt, Vielbrunn, Reisenbach, and Mosbach, with the battalion headquarters to be located in Mannheim.³³

The proposed Seventh Army deployment plan did not provide sufficient cover for the western approach to the Kaiserslautern area. USAREUR, therefore, with the approval of US EUCOM, recommended that one site be moved from Worms to west of Kaiserslautern to strengthen the area. The radar portion of the plan also was to be amplified to include the radar set locations of 1 90-mm gun and the 6 NIKE battalions. The radar sets of 5 75-mm gun battalions and 2 self-propelled AA battalions were to be so sited as to improve the coverage and yet permit movement without seriously affecting the radar net. The plans had been completed by the end of the reporting period.³⁴

³²Ltr, USAREUR to CG Seventh Army, n.d., sub: An Operational Plan and a Statement of Requirements for the Six Battalion NIKE Program. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1956), B/P, Air Defense (NIKE).

³³(1) 1st Ind, Air Def Div to C/Hist Div, 20 Dec 57, cited above. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-2673, USAREUR to Seventh Army, 25 Oct 56. CONFIDENTIAL. (3) Cable 5304, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 2 Nov 56. SECRET. All in file above.

³⁴(1) Cable EC-9-6555, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Dec 56. SECRET. In file above. (2) Ltr, Brig Gen S. M. Mellnik, CG 34th AAA Brig, to CG Seventh Army, 22 May 57, sub: NIKE Hercules Program for FY 1959 (C). SECRET. In USAREUR Air Def Div 600.1 Cons & Instl (1957).

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73. NIKE Site Acquisition

a. The Permanent Site Program. During 1955 and 1956, the 6 90-mm AAA battalions that were to be changed initially to NIKE had been allocated for deployment after conversion in defense of the Kaiserslautern complex, the Bitburg-Spangdahlem airbase area, and the Rhine River bridges between Mainz and Karlsruhe.³⁵ Twenty-four missile battery sites were selected by the 34th AAA Brigade, and 19 of these were tested by radar for suitability. The criteria for selection were achievement of maximum defense of the priority areas with the means available and, where possible, location of the sites near existing U.S. installations in order to use available facilities. Since NIKE personnel had to be ready to launch missiles at any time of the day or night, primary consideration was given to locating each site in close proximity to troop housing.³⁶

During the reporting period the 34th AAA Brigade established its requirements for the construction of essential facilities, determined the required logistical maintenance and supply support, and prepared plans to screen personnel for security and aptness. At the close of the fiscal year, training exercises had been planned for the permanent air defense sites. Moreover, NIKE standing operating procedures, to include alert requirements, minimum manning tables, and training memorandums, directives, and objectives, were under preparation.³⁷

b. Negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany. In January 1956 West German key officials had been briefed on plans for bolstering American air defenses with NIKE units. In accordance with the Forces convention, the over-all construction program was submitted to the Federal Republic during the following month, and by 17 May 1956 real estate requirements of the NIKE program had been submitted.

By simultaneously confronting the German Federal and Land (State) governments with U.S. real estate requirements, it was hoped that Bonn would apply sufficient pressure to expedite action on the local level. The American Ambassador, however, withheld presentation of requirements to the Bonn Government at this time, pointing out that the Land governments should first be given sufficient time to act on the matter before he approached a high-level government agency. In the event of prolonged delay in acquiring the properties, the Ambassador promised to take action.³⁸

³⁵(1) For background information, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 185-87. SECRET. (2) 1st Ind, USAREUR Air Def Div to C/Hist Div, 20 Dec 57, cited above. SECRET.

³⁶(1) Ltr, 22 May 57, cited above. SECRET. (2) DF, Air Def Div to ACOFS G4, 12 Jul 57, sub: Essentiality Review of NIKE Construction. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Air Def Div 600.1 (1957).

³⁷Ltr, 22 May 57, cited above. SECRET.

³⁸(1) Memo, Air Def Div to CINCUSAREUR, 9 May 57, sub: NIKE Real Estate Acquisition. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen H. G. Maddox, USAREUR COFS to Lt Gen B. C. Clarke, CG Seventh Army, 1 Mar 57. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in SGS 471.6 (1957).

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Almost immediately the program ran into determined local opposition, especially in the Rhine Palatinate. Resistance to the acquisition of NIKE sites stemmed largely from apprehension over losing agricultural land, from the belief that the presence of the NIKE installation would increase the danger of air attack, and from widespread opposition to rearmament. The problem was further complicated by U.S. Air Force insistence that TALOS missiles be used at four of the sites. When the U.S. Embassy requested the Federal Republic to assist in overcoming state opposition, Bonn drew attention to the constitutional restrictions that greatly limited the Federal Government's coercive power.³⁹

By April 1957 only 6 of the 24 NIKE sites had been definitely acquired. Of the 24 sites, 16 were to be located in the Palatinate, 2 in Hesse, 5 in Baden-Wuerttemberg, and 1 (tentative) in the Saarland. Baden-Wuerttemberg first approved all 5 sites, but local political pressures limited final approval to only 2. Hesse steadfastly refused to approve any sites, while by May 1957 the Palatinate had actually given final approval to the acquisition of only 5 and partial approval to 3 of the 16 sites. The German representatives declared that, since opposition to the NIKE program was increasing, they would be unable to make any further commitments in the foreseeable future.⁴⁰

Subsequent conferences with the Land governments failed to break the stalemate, whereupon the issue was referred to the Central Accommodations Committee in Bonn. The Federal Republic was reminded of its obligation under the Forces Convention to provide these sites, by whatever means necessary. Aside from the state officials' reluctance to antagonize the local population, the preelection atmosphere was a deterrent to prompt acquisition of NIKE sites. After the technical aspects as well as American public reaction to emplacement of NIKE sites in the vicinity of the larger U.S. cities were explained to the Germans, the Defense Ministry representative promised to initiate a program to inform the German public that the NIKE would be a defender of, rather than a hazard to, West Germany. The public information offices of the U.S. forces were to supply data and educational material to assist the Federal Defense Ministry in this task.⁴¹

³⁹(1) Min, IG Closing Conf, 12 Oct 56, 0930 hours. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL). (2) CAD Hist Jnl, incl to DF, USAREUR CAD to Hist Div, 13 Nov 56, sub: CAD Hist Jnl, Sep-Oct 1956. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in Hist Div Doc Br.

⁴⁰(1) USAREUR CAD Jnl, Apr 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In Hist Div Doc Br. (2) Memo, Air Def Div to CINCUSAREUR, 9 May 57, sub: NIKE Real Estate Acquisition. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

⁴¹(1) Memo for rec, 28 Jun 57, sub: Central Accommodations Committee Meeting. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G4 Instl Br files. (2) Interv, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. W. Pool, G4 Real Estate Off, 14 Aug 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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In personal discussion with Minister Strauss, CINCUSAREUR outlined the U.S. position and requested assistance at cabinet level. However, not much could be achieved because the preelection controversy over atomic support and the international disarmament negotiations in London complicated the problem.⁴²

c. Plans for the Use of Temporary Sites. Because of delays in land acquisition, planning, and construction, it was evident that permanent sites would not be available in time for the arrival of the NIKE battalions. Nevertheless, CINCUSAREUR had stated that the NIKE units would be fully operational within two months after arrival even though temporary sites had to be used. Plans were made accordingly.⁴³

When a Departmental directive stipulated that only minimum funds could be used for the temporary NIKE sites, Seventh Army was instructed to find real estate property under U.S. control or available land where the missile units could be located.⁴⁴ Approximately 10 sites were selected by the 34th AAA Brigade, and site layouts were prepared. An estimated \$600,000 was needed initially to prepare the locations, even though U.S. engineer troop units were to be used for site construction. A further estimate of costs for acquiring land and preparing these sites was to be submitted by the area commands in August 1957.⁴⁵

d. Construction of the First Two NIKE Sites.

(1) The Release of Funds. In November 1956 the Department of Defense decided to withhold funds for NIKE construction pending evidence of coordinated Army-Air Force planning for the use of surface-to-air missiles. To prevent further delay in NIKE construction, US EUCOM suggested concurrent planning for both the NIKE and TALOS missiles. Since TALOS units were not programmed for Europe until FY 1960, and any delay in NIKE construction would leave U.S. forces in Europe exposed to

⁴²(1) USAREUR CAD Jnl, May 57. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED). In Hist Div Doc Br. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen H. G. Maddox, USAREUR COFS, to F. J. Strauss, W. German Min of Def, 22 Mar 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957). (3) Memo, Rhine-Palatinate LRO to Air Def Div thru USAREUR CAD, 11 Apr 57, sub: Press Release on NIKE Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 000.7 (1957). (4) Cable SX-3875, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 10 Jan 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1957).

⁴³Wkly Sum of Maj Actions Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Off of COFS, 6 Sep 56. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

⁴⁴Cable SX-1087, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 7 Jan 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 NIKE (1957).

⁴⁵(1) Interv, Capt J. Mewha, Hist Div, with Lt Col J. B. Clark, Air Def Div, 19 Aug 57. SECRET. (2) Ltr, Brig Gen S. M. Mellnik to CG Seventh Army, 22 May 57, cited above. SECRET.

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unopposed nuclear air attacks, USAREUR wanted the construction funds to be released without further delay. The TALOS units, when made available, could be integrated into an air defense system in priority areas determined by a joint USAREUR-USAFE air defense planning committee.⁴⁶

In January 1957 USAREUR again requested the Department of the Army to release construction funds for two NIKE battalions, indicating that the final plans for the sites were completed and the real estate was available. On 17 January \$9,700,000 was released for the construction of 8 sites for 2 NIKE battalions, whereupon US EUCOM authorized the construction of tactical facilities, to include troop housing and battalion and group headquarters.⁴⁷ The difficulties encountered in procuring additional real estate temporarily induced the Department of Defense to withhold allocation of Military Construction, Army (MCA), funds for the next four battalions. Moreover, at the end of June 1957 a world-wide freeze was placed on all MCA programs so that no new contracts for construction could be let. The USAREUR NIKE program suffered particularly from this decision because the missile units were scheduled for early deployment. At the close of the reporting period, the Department of the Army was attempting to secure an exemption to the freeze so that the special weapons portion of the construction program could be continued.⁴⁸

(2) Award of Contracts. On 18 and 23 April 1957 contracts for the construction of the first two NIKE sites in the Rhineland-Palatinate were awarded. The average cost of each site, not including the prorated share of the battalion ordnance direct support shop, was about \$975,000, to be paid from appropriated dollar funds. The sites were under construction at the close of the reporting period. (See Chart 4.)⁴⁹

⁴⁶(1) Cable EC-9-6384, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, CINCUSAREUR, 23 Nov 56. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-3254, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 27 Nov 56. SECRET. (3) Cable ODC-1868688, CINCUSAFE to US CINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, 30 Nov 56. SECRET. (4) Cable EC-9-6596, US CINCEUR to DA, 4 Dec 56. SECRET. (5) Cable EC-9-6600, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, 4 Dec 56. SECRET. All in USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1956), B/P, NIKE Air Defense.

⁴⁷(1) Cable SX-1211, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 15 Jan 57. SECRET. (2) Cable DA-916423, DA from LOG/M4 to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Jan 57. SECRET. Both in USAREUR Air Def Div 120 Funds (1957). (3) Cable EC-3-563, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Jan 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Air Def Div 600.1 Cons & Instl (1957).

⁴⁸(1) Ltr, Col H. M. Spangler, ODCSOPS, to Brig Gen S. M. Mellnik, CG 34th AAA Brig, 5 Mar 57. SECRET. In USAREUR Air Def Div 353.1 (1957). (2) Rev of USAREUR Comd Program, FY 57, 4th Qtr, p. 7. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁴⁹(1) Interv, Capt J. Mewha, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col J. B. Clark, Air Def Div, 19 Aug 57. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-3070, USAREUR to DA for ENGMQ, 30 Apr 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

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(3) The Proposed NATO Common Infrastructure Program. In April 1957 US EUCOM proposed to convert the current U.S. NIKE construction program in Germany into a NATO common infrastructure program. To USAREUR the proposed infrastructure program was without apparent benefit since it would limit U.S. flexibility in establishing standards and criteria and might further delay the negotiations and construction that were underway. The complications of international competitive bidding would prolong procedures beyond the 45 days between turning over plans and specifications to the Federal Republic of Germany and the start of work by the contractor.⁵⁰

US EUCOM replied that the criteria and standards for common funding of fixed NIKE installations under the NATO infrastructure program would invariably be stated in generalized terms in order to permit a degree of flexibility to meet host or user nation requirements. The entire NATO procedure, if adopted, would be implemented by the West German Ministry of Defense; consequently, it would introduce no new disruptive factors into current real estate matters. No further action was taken by the close of the reporting period.⁵¹

e. Revision of the Conversion Schedule of 90-mm Gun Battalions to NIKE. According to Department of the Army plans the six NIKE battalions to be organized in FY 1958 were to be converted from existing USAREUR 90-mm gun battalions. Originally USAREUR planned to convert the 25th and 67th AAA battalions to NIKE by 1 October 1957, the 63d and 552d battalions by 1 November, and the 45th and 95th AAA battalions by 1 December 1957.⁵² Due to the lack of available troop housing and delays in the construction of temporary NIKE sites, USAREUR in June 1957 was forced to reschedule the priority of conversion in the following order: the 63d, 552d, 67th, 45th, 95th, and 25th AAA battalions.⁵³

74. Tentative Plans for Additional NIKE Battalions

The 4 NIKE Hercules battalions, 1 group headquarters, and 1 ordnance direct support shop due to arrive in FY 1959 were planned for location

⁵⁰(1) Cable DA-921611, DA from LOG/M4 to US CINCEUR, 22 Apr 57. SECRET NOFORN. In USAREUR Air Def Div 600.1 Cons & Instl (1957). (2) Cable SX-3134, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 3 May 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).


⁵¹Cable EC-9-2693, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 14 May 57. SECRET NOFORN. In USAREUR Air Def Div 600.1 Cons & Instl (1957).

⁵²Cable SX-2281, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 15 Mar 57. SECRET. In USAREUR Air Def Div 322 (1957).

⁵³(1) Cable SX-4246, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 26 Jun 57. SECRET. (2) Ltr, CG Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jun 57, sub: NIKE Conversion Program. SECRET. Both in file above.

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NIKE SITES



SOURCE: REV OF USAREUR COMD PROGRAMS, FY 57, 4TH QTR, R44 CONFIDENTIAL

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in France. Early in June 1957 US EUCOM was asked to approach the French authorities in order to obtain rights of entry for site reconnaissance, surveys, and base rights for construction, as well as permission to station these units in France. Negotiations with the French were underway at the close of the reporting period.⁵⁴

Section III: Coordination of NIKE Plans with NATO Countries

75. SHAPE Planning

During 1956 the United States agreed to furnish its NATO allies with guided missiles and other special weapons delivery means. In February 1957 US EUCOM received authority to permit the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) of the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, France, Greece, Turkey, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to begin pertinent discussions. The host countries were to be encouraged to integrate the new weapons into their armed forces, depending to a considerable degree upon their willingness and capability for providing qualified personnel for technical training in operation and maintenance of the NIKE system. The host country would have to approve the sites selected and agree to operate the NIKE installations in accordance with SHAPE air defense plans. Necessary land, installations, and facilities would have to be made available, capable personnel would have to be furnished for training, and security safeguards similar to U.S. standards would have to be established for the equipment. US EUCOM, in conjunction with SHAPE would retain the right to establish broad policies and plans on all matters concerning deployment of the weapons, the general area for the sites, and the integration of the weapons into a coordinated air defense system for the NATO area.⁵⁵

⁵⁴(1) DF, USAREUR Air Def Div to Engr, 13 May 57, sub: Guidance for Preparation of FY 1959 MCA Budget for Tactical Antiaircraft Facilities (U). SECRET. (2) Cable SX-3710, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 3 Jun 57. SECRET. Both in USAREUR Air Def Div 120 Funds (1957).

⁵⁵(1) Cable EC-9-862, US CINCEUR to MAAG's Benelux, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway; JUSMAG, Greece; JAMMAT, Ankara, 16 Feb 57. SECRET. (2) Cable DEF-920417, DA from OASD (ISA) to US CINCEUR, 1 Apr 57. SECRET NOFORN. Both in USAREUR Air Def Div 353.1 (1957). (3) Ltr, US EUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 6 Mar 57, sub: Letter of Instructions, NIKE Missiles for NATO Countries (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

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SHAPE plans for FY 1957 allocated 11 NIKE battalions to Denmark, West Germany, Italy, and Norway, but the equipment would not actually become available until December 1958. Early introduction of the NIKE into the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Greece, and Turkey was also considered, if timely planning could be accomplished and if these countries could accommodate the missiles. To exclude these countries from NIKE discussions might have resulted in unfavorable political and psychological reactions that SHAPE desired to avoid; therefore, weapons for the latter five countries were to be tentatively allocated in the FY 1958 Military Assistance Program.⁵⁶

76. The US EUCOM Directive

In January 1957, when US EUCOM first considered making USAREUR responsible for rendering air defense assistance to NATO recipient countries, the Department of the Army was consulted about furnishing the necessary personnel augmentation. While the Department of the Army agreed to furnish plans for maintaining the equipment and for group or "package" training, any personnel augmentation would have to be dependent upon USAREUR requirements and the availability of qualified technical personnel.⁵⁷ However, before accurately establishing any over-all USAREUR personnel requirements, the Department of the Army would have to establish a supply system, a missile firing range would have to be secured, and equipment and trained packets would have to be ready to depart the United States.⁵⁸ At the same time, the MAAG representatives in Italy, Norway, and Denmark indicated that the authorities in their respective countries would require additional time to decide whether they should accept NIKE equipment.⁵⁹

Meanwhile, on 6 March 1957 US CINCEUR assigned CINCUSAREUR the primary responsibility for over-all coordination, assistance, and consultative service in introducing NIKE equipment to NATO forces. In accomplishing this mission, USAREUR was to use the MAAG's as coordinators

⁵⁶(1) Cable EC-9-1113, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Mar 57. SECRET. (2) Cable EC-9-139, same to same, 9 Jan 57. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 471.6 NIKE (1957).

⁵⁷(1) Cable EC-9-289, US CINCEUR to DA, 17 Jan 57. SECRET. (2) Cable DA-917010, DA to US CINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, 29 Jan 57. SECRET. Both in file above.

⁵⁸Memo for rec, Col W. A. Hampton, USAREUR ADCC, n.d. SECRET. In USAREUR Air Def Div 353.1 (1957).

⁵⁹(1) Cable EC-9-886, US CINCEUR to COFSA, 19 Feb 57. SECRET. (2) Cable EC-9-889, US CINCEUR to CHMAAG, Norway and Denmark, 19 Feb 57. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 471.6 NIKE (1957). (3) Cable EC-9-1145, US CINCEUR to DA for DCSOPS, 5 Mar 57. SECRET NOFORN. In USAREUR Air Def Div 353.1 (1957).

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for the respective recipient countries. Prompt and effective implementation of the surface-to-air missile portion of SHAPE air defense plans was to be assured on all matters affecting the deployment of weapons, the selection of sites, and the integration of the weapons into a coordinated air defense plan for the NATO area. Necessary coordination with SHAPE, through US CINCEUR, was authorized. Logistical support of all NIKE equipment in the NATO area, including the supply of spare parts and depot level maintenance until the recipient countries could assume this responsibility, was to be provided by USAREUR. Finally, USAREUR was to monitor the selection of country cadres for NIKE training, advise on and assist in tactical and support unit training, provide school spaces in its school system, and permit the use of its training facilities.⁶⁰

77. Negotiations with the NATO Countries

a. Acceptance of the Weapons. In order to introduce the NIKE to the various NATO countries, SACEUR's military requirements had to be coordinated with the capabilities of the United States and each respective nation's effort in the fields of personnel, training, production, financing, and site selection and construction. To carry out its responsibilities toward the recipient countries, the U.S. had to take available equipment and scheduled training programs into account. It was also necessary that SHAPE allocate weapons so that work could be started on selecting construction designs, planning defenses, and selecting sites. To assist in the over-all coordination of the various national and NATO military programs, the Department of the Army advanced a schedule of dates by which the 11 NATO NIKE battalions allocated in the FY 1957 and the 14 in the FY 1958 Military Assistance Programs should become operational. Six battalions for Germany should be ready by April 1959, 3 for Italy by May 1959, and 1 each for Norway and Denmark by June 1959. Under the tentative FY 1958 program, 6 more for Germany were to become operational by October 1959, 4 in France by November 1959, 1 each for the Netherlands and Belgium by December 1959, and 1 each for Greece and Turkey by January 1960.⁶¹ However, after consultation with the various MAAG's of the proposed recipient countries, USAREUR found that this priority schedule could not be enforced. In March 1957 the Federal Republic of Germany stated that it preferred to accept only 3 of the 6 NIKE battalions offered in the SHAPE FY 1957 program, with the decision on the other 3 to be delayed until after the September 1957 elections. Because of this, US EUCOM, with SHAPE concurrence, decided to reallocate the three battalions to Belgium, France, and the Netherlands and planned to train cadres from these countries

⁶⁰(1) Ltr, US EUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 6 Mar 57, sub: Letter of Instructions, NIKE Missiles for NATO Countries (U). SECRET. (2) DF, USAREUR ADCC to COFS, ACOFS G3, et al., 11 Mar 57, sub: Changes to Letter of Instructions, NIKE Missiles for NATO Countries. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

⁶¹Cable DA-918867, DA to US CINCEUR, 5 Mar 57. SECRET NOFORN. In USAREUR Air Def Div 353.1 (1957).

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in the United States. This change remained within the previously planned allocation of 25 NIKE battalions for the combined FY 1957 and FY 1958 programs, and in effect placed 9 instead of 6 NIKE battalions for the Federal Republic of Germany in the tentative FY 1958 program. By the end of the reporting period France and the Netherlands had accepted the offer; Belgian officials, however, were still considering the proposal.⁶²

b. Training. Meanwhile, USAREUR air defense experts prepared FY 1958 NIKE training programs for West Germany, Italy, Norway, and Denmark on the basis of the Department of the Army guidance for NATO cadres.⁶³ Under this arrangement, only limited NIKE training would be conducted in Europe, with cadres from the various NATO countries to be given proper training in the United States.⁶⁴ Plans were also being made for training small numbers of key maintenance personnel in the United States and for initially providing each NATO NIKE battalion with two contract technicians to assist personnel of the respective country. Operational readiness of the NATO NIKE units could then be verified by USAREUR training inspection teams, assisted by the contract technicians and local personnel. The USAREUR training inspection teams could also instruct NATO personnel in the procedures of conducting operational readiness inspections.⁶⁵

According to the Department of the Army, 20 packets or cadres from recipient NATO nations could be trained in the United States by April 1958, with the first 3 scheduled to arrive in June 1957. The departmental policy was that NATO students could be sent for NIKE training before final commitments for the equipment were made with the countries involved.⁶⁶

By the end of the reporting period, France and the Netherlands had accepted a proposal for training future NIKE personnel in the United States and had begun preliminary screening of applicants to select

⁶²(1) Cable DA-920731, DA from DCSOPS to US CINCEUR, 5 Apr 57. SECRET NOFORN. (2) Cable EC-9-2344, US CINCEUR to SD for OASD/ISA, 26 Apr 57. SECRET NOFORN. Both in USAREUR Air Def Div 353.1 (1957). (3) Cable EC-9-3002, US CINCEUR to DA for DCSOPS, 29 May 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

⁶³(1) Copies of these training programs are contained in USAREUR Air Def Div 353.1 (1957) files. (2) Memo, Maj Gen Hobart Hewett, Air Def Coordinator to Members of Stf, ADCC, 4 Jan 57, sub: Guidance on Release of Information Reference NATO Forces. SECRET NOFORN. In USAREUR Air Def Div 322 (1957).

⁶⁴For more detailed information on training activities, see Chapter 7, below.

⁶⁵(1) Memo, 4 Jan 57, cited above. (2) Cable SX-2184, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 11 Mar 57. SECRET. In USAREUR Air Def Div 353.1 (1957).

⁶⁶Cable DA-920731, DA from DCSOPS to US CINCEUR, 5 Apr 57. SECRET NOFORN. In file above.

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prospective students. Belgium had not formally accepted a similar U.S. offer but had initiated student selection. One German battalion packet was scheduled to begin training in the United States in December 1957. Offers of training assistance to other NATO nations were being withheld pending completion of air defense studies at US EUCOM and SHAPE headquarters that could result in changes in the planned allocation of weapons.⁶⁷

Section IV: Status USAREUR Air Defense on 30 June 1957

At the close of FY 1957 USAREUR antiaircraft artillery forces consisted of 2 AAA brigades, 4 AAA group headquarters, 5 75-mm gun battalions, 7 90-mm gun battalions, and 6 self-propelled automatic weapons battalions. Shortly after the close of the reporting period, the nondivisional AA forces were divided between Seventh Army and Theater Army as follows:⁶⁸

Field Army Nondivisional AA Forces (Seventh Army)

| | |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| 34th AAA Brigade | 7th AAA Battalion (75-mm) |
| 8th AAA Group | 443d AAA Battalion (75-mm) |
| 69th AAA Group | 62d AAA Battalion (40-mm SP) |
| 63d AAA Battalion (90-mm) | 73d AAA Battalion (40-mm SP) |
| | 552d AAA Battalion (90-mm) |

Theater Army AA Forces (32d AAA Brigade)

| | |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1st AAA Group | 67th AAA Battalion (90-mm) |
| 12th AAA Group | 95th AAA Battalion (90-mm) |
| 25th AAA Battalion (90-mm) | 5th AAA Battalion (75-mm) |
| 40th AAA Battalion (90-mm) | 27th AAA Battalion (75-mm) |
| 45th AAA Battalion (90-mm) | 91st AAA Battalion (75-mm) |

⁶⁷(1) Cable EC-9-2344, US CINCEUR to SD for OASD/ISA, 26 Apr 57. SECRET NOFORN. In file above. (2) Cable EC-9-3002, US CINCEUR to DA for DCSOPS, 29 May 57. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

⁶⁸(1) Memo, Maj Gen Hobart Hewett, C/Air Def Div, to COFS, 15 May 57, sub: Organization of USAREUR AA Units. SECRET. In USAREUR Air Def Div 322 (1957). (2) USAREUR ltr, 25 Jul 57, sub: Assignment of Responsibility for the USAREUR Air Defense Mission (U). AEADD 322.011 AG (AG-AO). SECRET.

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CHAPTER 7

Training

78. Training Policy

The general objective of the training program for FY 1957 was to maintain the operational readiness of the United States Army, Europe, so that it could effectively perform its U.S. military-NATO mission at all times.¹ In addition to the conventional training activities there was increasing emphasis on special weapons training reflecting the new developments in atomic and guided missile technology. The FY 1957 training program document contained 9 separate references to atomic and guided missiles training, compared to 5 such references in the previous program. A significant addition to the FY 1957 program was the requirement to include instruction in the offensive and defensive aspects of atomic warfare in all training.² The reorganization of the first combat division along pentomic lines also profoundly affected the command's training activities. In December 1956 the Department of the Army announced that henceforth all training exercises were to be based on situations in which U.S. and aggressor forces had tactical air and atomic weapons.³ Some training exercises devoted exclusively to atomic play had already been conducted. In May 1957 all matters, including training, concerning atomic weapons and guided missiles and the units equipped with these weapons or responsible for their support were assigned highest priority.⁴

¹Program 6, USAREUR Training Program, FY 57. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

²Ibid., p. 6. CONFIDENTIAL.

³Cable SX-3448, USAREUR to Seventh Army, et al., 7 Dec 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1956), Item 016.

⁴Cable SX-3633, USAREUR to subor comds, 29 May 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

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In March 1957 a major policy change was made affecting USAREUR's conduct of command inspections and formal staff visits. Since 1955 USAREUR headquarters personnel had inspected many units and activities, which, since that time, had been placed under the command and/or operational control of COMZ and Seventh Army headquarters. Since command inspection responsibility had already been delegated to both headquarters, it was logical to further extend their responsibility to cover the transferred units. Budgetary considerations and avoidance of duplicate efforts also supported further delegation of this function. Consequently, in February 1957 the annual staff visit to COMZ and its major subordinate headquarters was abolished and the question of discontinuing all command inspections was taken into consideration. During the following months USAREUR command inspections were suspended and in June 1957 CINCUSAREUR delegated his responsibility for conducting the annual command inspections to his immediate subordinate commanders. Brief reports from the commanders and informal staff visits were required to keep USAREUR informed of conditions in the subordinate commands.⁵

79. Specialized Training

a. Special Weapons. Since knowledge of the tactical use, effects, and exploitation of atomic weapons was vital--particularly at lower echelons--the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, formed an ad hoc committee, composed of USAREUR and Seventh Army officers, to study atomic training requirements and make recommendations. In addition, the Department of the Army was asked to send an instruction team from the Command and General Staff College to present a corps-level map exercise to assist commanders and staffs in showing the effects and influence of tactical atomic weapons on combat operations. This request was eventually fulfilled in April and May 1957.⁶ Meanwhile, training tests and lesson plans of stateside service schools were screened for instructional materials that could be used to improve USAREUR atomic training. Even so, atomic weapons developments were expected to move faster than the process of formulating training doctrine for the employment of such weapons.⁷

The ad hoc committee's preparatory work led to the publication of a command circular on atomic warfare training in December 1956. This circular was the first USAREUR training document defining the objectives

⁵(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to DCOFS, 12 Mar 57, sub: CINCUSAREUR Annual Command Inspection and Staff Visits. AEAGC-TR 333GC. (2) Comment 2, DCOFS to G3, 19 Mar 57, same sub. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR G3 Tng Br 333 (Insp & Stf Visits) file. (3) USAREUR Cir 20-20, 19 Jun 57, sub: Inspections and Staff Visits. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶USAREUR Memo 350-205-49, 13 Mar 57, sub: DA Training Team Model Corps Map Exercise. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷Memo, USAREUR G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Aug 56, sub: Training in Atomic Warfare. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1956).

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of atomic warfare training and prescribing the standards of proficiency each individual was to attain at his level of responsibility.⁸

(1) Reorientation Course. The previously instituted annual reorientation course in the tactical employment of atomic weapons for general and field-grade officers was conducted in November 1956 and January 1957. The topics included new developments and delivery means, weapons effects, the technical aspects of special weapons employment, and offensive operations by divisional and corps-size units. Also studied was the impact of atomic weapons on special operations, damage control, logistical support operations, nuclear logistics support, and USAREUR atomic operations and training.⁹

(2) Unit Training. The training of special weapons units was hampered by the limitations of range facilities in Europe and by other shortcomings. Guided missile units stationed in Europe had to be sent to Fort Bliss, Texas, for service practice (i.e., firing sessions). Since key individuals in these units had to be thoroughly trained in the checkout and firing procedures of atomic warheads, the Continental Army Command (CONARC) suggested that these men--from units at service practice at Fort Bliss--attend a 5-day specialized training course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.¹⁰ However, because these key men were essential to the conduct of practice firing, SETAF recommended that the warhead training be given in advance of service practice.¹¹ This recommendation was adopted, and USAREUR personnel from the 558th and 601st Field Artillery Missile Battalions attended the Fort Sill course in May 1957. Beginning in early 1957 USAREUR was required to rotate firing packets of six Corporal battalions from Europe to the United States for annual service practice. With the arrival of NIKE guided missile units, the problem of providing adequate training facilities for special weapons units was expected to

⁸(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 16 Nov 56, sub: Proposed Circular on Atomic Warfare Training, w/Comment 2, SGS to G3, 26 Nov 56, same sub. WP 353 GC. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above. (2) USAREUR Cir 350-59, 4 Dec 56, sub: Atomic Warfare Training. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁹(1) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 10 Oct 56, sub: Reorientation Course in the Tactical Employment of Atomic Weapons. WP 352 GC. (2) Cable SC-28684, USAREUR to Seventh Army, 30 Nov 56. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file above. (3) DF, USAREUR G3 to G4, 10 Jan 57, sub: General Officer Atomic Reorientation Course. WP 352 GC. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G3 Sp Wpns Br 353.1.

¹⁰(1) DF, Col R. E. Haines, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G3, to SGS, 19 Oct 56, sub: Rotation of Field Artillery Battalions. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 GYRO (1956). (2) Cables DA-921537, DA-921931, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 20, 26 Apr 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1957).

¹¹Cable P-0479, SETAF to DA for DCSOPS, 24 Apr 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1957).

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become more complicated.¹²

b. Mobility Exercise Program. In the fall of 1956 the Department of the Army was considering the establishment of a joint task force, which would be capable of moving to any part of the world and whose ground force elements would consist of strategic Army reserves. Since the project never got beyond the planning stage, an alternative mobility exercise program was announced in January 1957. This program of small exercises involved especially the movement of Army units on a worldwide scale. The program objectives were to enhance the role of the Army in demonstrating its ability to deter or resist aggression; to assist the implementation of U.S. policy in such areas as Western Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East; to show the flexibility and mobility of U.S. Army forces; to further air transportability training of Army units; and to demonstrate the use and efficiency of U.S. forces. These objectives were to be achieved by a program of intertheater and intratheater exercises. At least one task force of the Strategic Army Corps was to be airlifted annually from the United States to an overseas area beginning in FY 1958. At the same time, overseas commanders were to conduct at least one intratheater mobility exercise annually.¹³ USAREUR indicated its ability to support the program and commented that the small-scale exercises should employ forces no larger than a reinforced battle group and no smaller than a reinforced company; the Department of the Army approved this program.¹⁴

In May 1957 the Department of the Army directed implementation of the program for FY's 1958 and 1959.¹⁵ USAREUR would participate in Exercise BROWN JUG in Denmark to satisfy the FY 1958 intratheater exercise requirement. The FY 1959 intratheater exercise would take place in a NATO country in the Mediterranean area, preferably in the LANDSOUTHEAST area of responsibility.¹⁶ Department of the Army intertheater exercise plans involved the participation of a reinforced company of the 101st Airborne Division in the Seventh Army Exercise AIRMED ALPHA to be held

¹²DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 12 Jun 57, sub: Guided Missile Range, Benghazi (S). SECRET. In file above.

¹³(1) Cable DA-916561, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 18 Jan 57. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) DF, USAREUR G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Jun 57, sub: Conference Re Mobility Exercise Program (U). SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1957). (3) Cable DA-922678, 10 May 57, DA from DCSOPS to CONARC, CINCUSAREUR, 10 May 57. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files.

¹⁴(1) Cable SX-2175, USAREUR to DA, 9 Mar 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files. (2) DF, 6 Jun 57, cited above.

¹⁵Cable DA-922678, 10 May 57, cited above. SECRET.

¹⁶Cable SX-3501, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 21 May 57. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files.

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in August 1957. In addition, a reinforced battle group was to be sent to West Germany in February 1958.¹⁷ The intertheater exercises were suspended in June 1957 when the Department of the Army decided to reexamine its mobility exercise program with regard to the composition of the forces to be airlifted to overseas areas.¹⁸

c. 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Training. The specialized training of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) continued essentially unchanged during FY 1957. Stress was placed on giving specialists cross-training in weapons, demolitions, communications, and medical treatment, as well as on practicing infantry and guerrilla tactics. In addition, cross-country movement by day and night was conducted, clandestine operations were practiced, USAREUR school training was extensively used, and area background training was continuously emphasized. The resources of the U.S. Army Intelligence, Military Police, and Special Weapons School, Europe; Radio Free Europe; and the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R. were used extensively to support the area background training of the group.

During the winter months mountain marches and cross-country and mountain ski training were conducted. During the spring and summer months FTX's were prepared and executed. The FTX's were excellent training vehicles for training teams in area assessment to be conducted in actual wartime operational areas. FTX 56-1, played at the beginning of the fiscal year, was a joint exercise in which Navy, Air Force, Special Forces, and other Army units or personnel participated. The exercise stressed the early commitment of Special Forces personnel ("pilot teams") into the operational areas by blind drops and without previously arranged contacts. Then the normal deployment of group personnel was accomplished, which included the organization, training, and logistical support of guerrilla forces; the destruction or disruption of specified targets; the conduct of long-range communications; the establishment and maintenance of security nets; and the creation and operation of clandestine nets. Evasion and escape concepts were also tested. By the end of FY 1957, FTX 57-1 was under preparation, the first cycle of which began in June. The capability of the group's operational teams was satisfactory throughout the reporting period.¹⁹

¹⁷(1) Cable SX-3799, USAREUR from Trans Off to US CINCEUR for JMTB, 5 Jun 57. SECRET. In file above. (2) DF, 6 Jun 57, cited above.

¹⁸DA-925280, DA from ODCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, CONARC, 26 Jun 57. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br files.

¹⁹Ltrs, 10th Sp Forces Gp (Abn) to CO Spt Opns TF, Eur (SOTFE), 13 Aug 56, 10 Jan, 15 Apr & 3 Jul 57, sub: Operational Readiness Report (U). TOP SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL). In USAREUR G3 TS files, AG 2750.

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d. Reserve Training. The changes in reserve training policy and procedures were motivated by the realization that the existing system, which was geared to the requirements of assorted groups of reservists of various grades and branches, was not effective. Instead of training each individual to the level required for his use under emergency conditions, the system provided for general training without concentration in any one field, so that the progressive accomplishment of individual officers was difficult to gauge.

The adoption of the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) School System was considered as the best remedy to inadequate reserve training, and the Department of the Army approved the establishment of the system in Europe effective 1 December 1956. USAR schools were established at Heidelberg, Frankfurt, and Paris with three resident branch departments at each (i.e., 3 of the following branches: Infantry, armored, engineer, and adjutant general). Eleven satellite schools were organized such as those at Munich (military intelligence and infantry), Stuttgart (civil affairs and military government), and Nuremberg (infantry) under Heidelberg; Bonn (military intelligence), Kaiserslautern (armored), Wiesbaden (engineer), and Berlin (military intelligence) under Frankfurt; and Orleans (infantry) and London (adjutant general and artillery) under Paris. Certain reserve training outlets that were to be retained included 15-day annual active duty tours with active Army units or installations and reserve duty without pay in reinforcement training units. The latter involved approximately 175 reservists who were ineligible to attend the new schools or who were unable to do so because of the distances involved.

The primary mission of the USAR schools was to instruct and train reserve officers in a progressive system of branch education according to the programs of instruction and detailed lesson outlines provided by stateside service schools. The favorable response to the new program was reflected in improved attendance rates, which rose from about 65 percent to between 85 and 95 percent.²⁰

e. Competitive Marksmanship Program. The program objectives of competitive marksmanship training continued to be met during FY 1957. Teams of outstanding rifle and pistol marksmen were selected through competitive elimination matches to represent USAREUR in the National Matches at Camp Perry and in the European International LeClerc Competition held in July 1956. Command participation in the Camp Perry match was highlighted by the placing of 12 USAREUR marksmen, 1 rifle team, and 1 pistol team on the All Army National Match team. In addition, 2

²⁰(1) Wkly Sum of Maj Actions Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Off of COFS, 10 Sep 56. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED). In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen E. D. Post, USAREUR DCOFS, to TAG, 11 Sep 56, sub: Establishment of USAR School System in USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 352 (1956). (3) USAREUR Program Prog Rept, FY 57, 2d Qtr, p. 13-10. UNCLASSIFIED.

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USAREUR pistol men and 3 rifle marksmen placed relatively high against a large number of entries in the individual pistol and rifle matches. Representing USAREUR in the LeClerc competition, the 60th Infantry Regiment of the 9th Division scored second place to a French team in competition for the grand prize.²¹

80. School Training

USAREUR and Seventh Army schools were operated to fulfill requirements of the command that could not be met by unit schools or regular training activities. The problem of achieving increased economy and efficiency in the operation of service schools was accentuated during FY 1957. Of particular concern was the failure of commanders to use established school quotas. Often unneeded quotas were not canceled in time for reallocation before course instruction began. In the first quarter, for example, 10 percent of the school spaces programmed and funded were not used, despite the existence of critical shortages of skilled personnel. Thus, the opportunity to train nearly 500 personnel in needed skills was lost in one quarter. Moreover, continued nonutilization threatened to reduce the available funds, which in turn would further contract the school program.²² Consequently, during the second quarter the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, reviewed the school training program in conjunction with Seventh Army and the schools proper. As a result, the control of the school quota system was passed to the schools themselves to prevent overprogramming. Quarterly objectives were established on the basis of the starting dates and the lengths of the courses rather than on determination of a fixed number of men to complete a particular course. Generally, the review of the school program resulted in a major reduction of the objective, which permitted its accomplishment within the FY 1957 school budget. Student enrollment was reduced by 8 percent, EM student man-days by 22 percent, and officer student man-days by 13 percent. These reductions were accomplished by cutting the lengths of the courses at the Ordnance School; lowering enrollments at the Ordnance, Engineer, and Quartermaster Schools; changing the operation of the quota system mentioned above; and correcting the reporting deficiencies in the monthly school training reports. Despite these reductions the total USAREUR service school output for FY 1957 exceeded 21,000 students, which was more than the revised program objective.²³

²¹USAREUR Program Prog Rept, FY 57, 1st & 2d Qtrs, pp. 6-20. UNCLASSIFIED.

²²(1) Wkly Sum of Maj Actions Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Off of COFS, 7 Dec 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (2) USAREUR Memo 350-205-36, 11 Dec 56, sub: Utilization of Quotas, USAREUR Service Schools. UNCLASSIFIED.

²³(1) USAREUR Program Prog Rept, FY 57, 2d Qtr, p. 6-15. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Rev of USAREUR Comd Programs, FY 57, 4th Qtr, p. 4. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

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In September 1956 the course at the NCO Academy in Munich was revitalized by selecting as student candidates only men who would actually perform NCO functions upon graduation and by filling each entering class to capacity. The number of failures was reduced without lowering the standards. Finally, effective 13 October 1956, the course was consolidated and shortened from five to four weeks to increase the output of school-trained personnel.²⁴

81. Training Areas

Proper allocation of training area time and space continued to be a major problem, with new demands being imposed by the growing West German Army. Absence of suitable firing ranges for guided missile units in the USAREUR area necessitated rotation of guided missile firing packets to the United States for annual service practice. This procedure entailed a substantial expense and certain operational disadvantages.

a. Acquisition and Release of Training Areas. One of the most urgent needs was to obtain suitable training areas for the 3d Armored Division. After a year of negotiations the Hesse state government agreed on 21 May 1957 to allow armored vehicles to use the Friedberg training area. The felling of trees and the work on roads and trails by the Germans was scheduled for completion by 1 September 1957. Thus, for the first time since its arrival in May 1956, the division would have a convenient training area for its units.²⁵

The French training area at Daaden (approximately 40 miles northeast of Koblenz) was transferred to the Germans in the spring of 1957, incident to the relief of French units in that area. This transfer was timely because German requirements for training time at U.S.-administered major training areas were partially offset.²⁶

b. U.S.-German Sharing of Facilities. German Army use of U.S. training areas and facilities was on a space-available basis. Training requests for German Army units were made through the subordinate headquarters or local U.S. unit having operational responsibility for the particular training area. However, the Germans often failed to submit their requests in sufficient time to assure their approval,²⁷ so that

²⁴Seventh Army Memo 350-5-46, 20 Sep 56, sub: Education and Training, Seventh Army Noncommissioned Officers Academy. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

²⁵DF, USAREUR G4 to COFS, 28 May 57, sub: Friedberg Training Area. AEAGD-IP 600.12 GD. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1957)

²⁶DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 16 May 57, sub: Release of French Training Area, Daaden, to Germans (U). CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

²⁷Cable SX-2142, USAREUR to US CINCEUR Rep, Bonn, 19 Sep 56. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 353 Ger (1956).

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major and subordinate commanders were directed to resolve at local levels the miscellaneous matters concerning the joint use of installations and shared use of training areas and facilities.²⁸ But the Germans apparently were not satisfied with the USAREUR arrangement for sharing facilities. During the status of forces negotiations they proposed that West German agencies assume the administration and control of all training areas jointly used by two or more of the Allied forces, including all major USAREUR training areas. USAREUR could not and did not countenance the proposal because Article 48 of the Bonn Conventions guaranteed USAREUR control of the major training areas. The implication that the training areas were jointly used facilities was incorrect.²⁹ USAREUR defined jointly used facilities as single buildings or other portions of an installation other than entire buildings returned for exclusive use of the German forces. On the other hand, shared facilities were training areas or installations used temporarily on a space-available basis by the German forces.³⁰ The final argument against the proposal was that, during the buildup period of the German armed forces, USAREUR was the only effective force ready to meet the continuing threat of a Soviet attack against its zone of responsibility. Military necessity dictated the priority of USAREUR's training requirements, which could not be assured if another nation controlled U.S. training areas. Any reduction in the availability of training areas to USAREUR units would reduce combat effectiveness and would endanger NATO Europe's security.³¹

c. NATO Training Area Requirements. The CENTAG land training area requirements as approved under the NATO infrastructure program included training areas for 2½ divisions, 2 tank ranges, and 2 antiaircraft artillery ranges. A re-examination of CENTAG needs revealed requirements for 3 divisional areas, 3 tank ranges, and 1 AAA range. The increase in the first two categories was due to the loss of the French training area at Daaden, the increase in U.S. armored and infantry battalion training requirements, and the increase in German armored battalion training requirements since the original submission of the NATO infrastructure program. The decrease in AAA range needs was based on completion of U.S. and French firing practice at their own national ranges. Artillery firing range requirements could be met within existing facilities.³²

²⁸ USAREUR Cir 210-25, 14 Sep 56, sub: Joint Occupancy or Utilization by U.S. and German Forces. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁹ Cable SX-3706, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 23 Dec 56. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 353 Ger (1956).

³⁰ USAREUR Cir 210-25, 14 Sep 56, cited above.

³¹ Cable SX-3706, 23 Dec 56, cited above. CONFIDENTIAL.

³² DF, USAREUR/CENTAG G3 to DCOFS, 11 Jan 57, sub: Land Forces Training Area Requirements (U). NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS NATO Folder No. 2 (1957).

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The acquisition of additional training areas was considered vital because the increase in German Army training requirements in the CENTAG area promised to tax facilities to the extent of jeopardizing the combat readiness of French and U.S. forces.³³

(1) NATO Control of Training Areas. NATO control of all the major training areas in Germany emerged as a major issue during the year under review. Specifically, SHAPE wanted NATO control of the allocation of training time in the LANDCENT (CENTAG and NORTHAG) area. CENTAG, having coordinated its position with Seventh Army and the French First Army, reiterated its stand in favor of retaining national control of the time allocations. Although aware of the urgency of bringing the expanding German armed forces up to their fullest combat potential, CENTAG was convinced that changing the administration of admittedly inadequate land training areas would contribute little toward that goal and, worse, would reduce the combat readiness of trained forces. Furthermore, CENTAG was already assisting the growth of German forces by providing U.S. national training assistance, sharing all training facilities under its jurisdiction, and consistently advocating the acquisition of additional land training areas. Changing the control authority would not alter the collective capacity of existing NATO areas, nor would a revised distribution of training time alleviate the requirements for adequate training facilities for all NATO forces.³⁴

(2) The NORTHAG Position. NORTHAG endorsed the SHAPE proposal provided that the army groups control the allocation of time at the training areas and that the administration of these areas remain with the user having predominant interest. The reduction of British forces, which cut down on BAOR requirements for training area time, the monetary savings resulting from a transfer of British training areas to the Germans, and British willingness to make concessions to facilitate financial and other negotiations with the Germans--these were factors that made the NORTHAG position understandable, if not reasonable.³⁵

(3) CENTAG/USAREUR Arguments. CENTAG, on the other hand, continued to vigorously oppose the SHAPE proposal. In addition to impairing its combat effectiveness, NATO control of training areas would

³³Ltr, CENTAG DCOFS (Maj Gen E. D. Post) to COMLANDCENT, 16 Jan 57,, sub: Land Forces Training Area Requirements (U). AEAGC-TR 353 GC. NATO SECRET. In file above.

³⁴(1) DF, USAREUR/CENTAG G3 to COFS, 20 Apr 57, sub: Control and Administration of Land Training Areas (U). (2) Ltr, USAREUR/CENTAG COFS to COMLANDCENT, 25 Apr 57, sub: Land Training Areas (U). Both AEAGC-TR 353 GC. Both NATO SECRET. Both in file above.

³⁵DF, USAREUR G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Jun 57, sub: Land Training Areas (U). AEAGC-TR 353 GC. SECRET NOFORN. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1957).

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make USAREUR completely dependent upon NATO allocations of range time if CENTAG headquarters was abolished. This might have all the more serious consequences because the European military concepts of adequate training standards did not necessarily harmonize with Department of the Army established criteria. Another objection was that the SHAPE proposal would strengthen West Germany's hand in securing additional use of existing training areas for its Army or in resisting pressure to provide real estate for NATO infrastructure land training area needs. Furthermore, the Federal Republic's bargaining position would be enhanced in negotiations for status of forces agreements affecting maneuvers and training exercises, continued financial support to the Allied powers stationed in Western Germany, and retention of training areas and facilities. Moreover, the SHAPE proposal contravened the current revised terms of reference, which authorized SACEUR to coordinate and supervise national training areas only if these were made available to him by national authorities. Since USAREUR facilities had not been made available by U.S. national authority, the way for the implementation of the SHAPE proposal was not clear. If, however, the issue ultimately reached the national ministries of defense and the NATO Council, the decision would probably be made in favor of the SHAPE proposal. Nevertheless, US CINCEUR was urged to establish a strong national position opposing NATO control of all land training areas.³⁶

(4) LANDCENT Position. While LANDCENT favored the SHAPE suggestion for NATO control of the allocation of training time, it advocated that action be deferred until all nations involved had an opportunity to express their views and until additional efforts had been made to secure more training areas in West Germany and eastern France. This position presumably was taken because of CENTAG's strong opposition to the measure. Nevertheless, with LANDCENT in favor of NATO control, pressure from the Germans and various NATO headquarters to adopt the measure was expected to continue. Confirmation of this trend was seen in a West German Ministry of Defense request in June 1957 to confer with USAREUR on the proportionate joint use of U.S. training areas. Since the German Army was not yet fully utilizing all training facilities made available by USAREUR, no immediate action beyond improving coordination toward fuller utilization was necessary.³⁷

d. Guided Missile Range Requirements. The projected issuance of missiles to NATO countries and U.S. forces in Europe generated the problem of providing suitable missile training ranges. At a conference of Army commanders in December 1956 the Army Chief of Staff requested CINCUSAREUR to study the establishment of a missile training area in Europe or North Africa. This request was passed on to US CINCEUR who was executive agent for the Department of the Army on the missile range project. US EUCOM,

³⁶Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to US CINCEUR, 11 Jun 57, sub: Land Training Areas (U). AEAGC-TR 353 GC. SECRET NOFORN. In file above.

³⁷DF, CENTAG G3 to COFS, 28 Jun 57, sub: Land Training Areas (U). NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS NATO Folder No. 2 (1957).

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in collaboration with USAREUR, USAFE, US NELM, SHAPE, and USRO, initiated a study to determine over-all missile training area requirements for all types of missiles programmed for NATO and U.S. forces in Europe through 1961.³⁸ A conference attended by representatives of the above-mentioned agencies on 27 February 1957 explored guided missile range requirements from U.S. and NATO points of view.³⁹ The results of the conference were incorporated in a report US EUCOM dispatched to the Department of the Army in April 1957.

Although U.S. Navy and USAFE requirements for guided missile training were and could continue to be met within existing or planned facilities, USAREUR needed additional ranges for NIKE and Corporal missile firings. Sufficient training areas were available for Honest John and Lacrosse units. The NATO countries, on the other hand, appeared to have adequate air-to-air and air-to-surface training facilities. Even for the countries without such facilities, the conclusion of bilateral agreements for the use of training areas would satisfy training requirements without the necessity of establishing a NATO common infrastructure all-purpose training area. The report finally noted that the United States ought to proceed with its projected guided missile range at Benghazi, Libya. Here, too, NATO training requirements could be satisfied through bilateral space-available agreements with the United States.⁴⁰

(1) The Benghazi Range. The Benghazi range project had originated as a joint overseas requirement approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). When the JCS withdrew their approval the Navy and Air Force promptly withdrew their requirements for the project, even though the Air Force still needed an airbase at Benghazi (so-called BERKA II). Since USAREUR had a firm requirement for an all-purpose guided missile range, the suggestion was made that BERKA II be built as a joint Army-Air Force facility and the associated guided missile range as an Army overseas project. With USAFE concurrence and US EUCOM support, the plan was submitted in January 1957 to the Department of the Army for approval.⁴¹

After further consideration the possible conversion of the Benghazi project to NATO use seemed objectionable. The early completion of this project might be jeopardized, since other-than-U.S. use of the range would

³⁸ Cable EC-9-1167, US CINCEUR to DA, 6 Mar 57. SECRET. In file above.

³⁹(1) Cable EC-9-833, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 15 Feb 57. SECRET NOFORN. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957). (2) Memo, USAREUR G3 Tng Br to ACOFS G3, 19 Feb 57, sub: Guided Missile Range Requirements (U). AEAGC-TR 353 GC. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1957).

⁴⁰ Cable EC-9-1906, US CINCEUR sgd Decker to COFSA as Exec Agent, 6 Apr 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1957).

⁴¹ DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 12 Jun 57, sub: Guided Missile Range, Benghazi (S). SECRET. In file above.

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involve new negotiations with the Libyan Government, causing certain and unnecessary delay. Acquisition of the range as a sole U.S. requirement was therefore essential; future NATO use of the range could be arranged on a space-available basis, according to established USAREUR policy.⁴²

Although the approval from Washington was still pending, negotiations with the Libyan Government were concluded by the end of June 1957 with an agreement to build BERKA II and the associated range facilities at Benghazi. Preliminary master planning was also completed. Army guided missile range and support facility requirements were included in the USAFE FY 1958 construction program for BERKA II and were submitted to US EUCOM and the Department of the Air Force for approval. Army construction requirements were to be included in the USAREUR FY 1959 construction program, from which the Department of the Army earmarked about \$4 million for Libya. In FY 1957 Congress appropriated \$18 million for BERKA II and \$12 million for the guided missile range at Benghazi, although these funds were not made available because of higher priority projects. The total estimated cost for the Benghazi project was \$42.9 million, of which \$4.6 million was needed for Army "sole-use" facilities. Scheduled for completion in FY 1960, the project was already late (since it was actually needed in 1957) and a means to expedite it had to be found. By the end of June 1957, however, the Department of the Army had not approved the project.⁴³

(2) U.S. NIKE Construction and the Infrastructure Program. With the programming of NIKE units to NATO allies, USAREUR assumed that the range facilities for this weapon could meet both U.S. and NATO needs through proper range scheduling. Range maintenance and other administrative costs could be shared by NATO users on a range-day basis, an arrangement similar to the one at the British training area at Hohn.⁴⁴

82. Maneuvers and Training Exercises

In conducting maneuvers and exercises every effort was made to achieve the desired training objectives as economically as possible. The scope of exercises and the choice of maneuver areas were determined by the desire to avoid excessive expenditures of funds and supplies and to minimize maneuver damage. The purpose of command post exercises (CPX's) was to perfect the command framework into which complete units could be

⁴² Memo, USAREUR G3 Tng Br to ACOFS G3, 19 Feb 57, sub: Guided Missile Range Requirements (U). AEAGC-TR 353 GC. SECRET. In file above.

⁴³ (1) DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 12 Jun 57, sub: Guided Missile Range, Benghazi (S). AEAGC-TR 353 GC. SECRET. In file above. (2) See Gen Hodes' pencilled notations on DF cited, and on Comment 2, USAREUR G3 to SGS, 4 Feb 57, sub: SX-1390 /US EUCOM Cable, 23 Jan 57/ (U). AEAGC-TR 353 GC. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

⁴⁴ (1) Memo, USAREUR G3 Tng Br to ACOFS G3, 19 Feb 57, sub: Guided Missile Range Requirements (U). AEAGC-TR 353 GC. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1957). (2) For further details, see Chapter 6.

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fitted for subsequent field training exercises (FTX's). Although CPX's could be adjusted to the exercise procedures the director wanted practiced, their scope generally paralleled the concepts of the FTX's that followed. CPX's continued to stress command and staff procedures, communications, and realistic tactics. The concepts of FTX's, on the other hand, were simple and less concerned with spectacular events. During FTX's emphasis was placed on such fundamental details and techniques as the issuing of orders, battalion and lower-unit tactics, troop leadership, liaison, intelligence, security, dispersion, use of all kinds of supporting fire, evacuation, resupply, field maintenance, and the handling of prisoners and replacements.⁴⁵ Finally, CPX's and FTX's provided nearly ideal conditions for testing new tactical principles.

a. CPX SUMMER STOCK. In May 1956 the Department of the Army had directed USAREUR to field test the basic concept of a tactical support center.⁴⁶ The first opportunity to conduct this test arose in the Seventh Army CPX SUMMER STOCK, which was held from 7 to 14 July 1956. The exercise involved all regimental and higher headquarters of Seventh Army, including those of all atomic delivery units. The exercise play included the evacuation of garrisons following an alert, withdrawal to and defensive operations at predetermined positions, and the launching of a counterattack. The tactical support center was established under tentage in two positions at the army CP, where it operated throughout the exercise. Agencies integrated within the center were the fire support coordination center (FSCC) for the army artillery, the anti-aircraft operations center for the 34th AAA Brigade, the flight operations center for the Army Aviation Section, the electronic warfare center for the Army Signal Section, the CBR center, and G2 and G3 Air.

At the army headquarters level of operations the tactical support center proved to be an effective instrument of command. Staff coordination was tightened as a result of the proximity of the various agencies located at the center. Thus, the processing of special weapons strikes was facilitated by the close contact of G2, G3, and FSCC personnel in the same tent. For the same reason, the antiaircraft and flight operations centers achieved better coordination on gunfire areas, corridors of safe flight, and rapid transmissions of information on friendly and enemy flights. Furthermore, more timely and accurate information on radioactive fallout and the formation of contamination barriers became available for pre- and poststrike planning. Electronic warfare was also played for the first time in this exercise, which revealed some deficiencies in equipment and in the methods of obtaining and utilizing static

⁴⁵Seventh Army Tng Cir 105-2, 3 Aug 56, sub: Maneuver Control, Conduct of FTX's and CPX's. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴⁶Ltrs, GOFSA (Gen Maxwell D. Taylor) to CINCUSAREUR (Gen H. I. Hodes), 31 May 56, and Hodes to Taylor, 13 Jun 56. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1956), Item 8.

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and changing information.⁴⁷

b. CPX CLEAN SWEEP. The requirement for conducting full-scale CPX's to maintain the operational readiness of USAREUR/CENTAG headquarters during the year⁴⁸ was satisfied by CPX's CLEAN SWEEP, WHIP SAW, and LION NOIR. In preparation for WHIP SAW, CENTAG and Seventh Army headquarters conducted CLEAN SWEEP in August 1956. The principal purpose of the exercise was to train CENTAG Main and Forward headquarters in internal staff operations, including the training of signal personnel at main and forward command posts (CP's).⁴⁹ The exercise tested the operation of a reduced headquarters with realigned functions. The forward CP provided the army group commander with a stop-off point east of the Rhine as well as an essential alternate communications relay station between CENTAG Main and the two subordinate army headquarters (U.S. Seventh and French First Armies). One of the deficiencies of the exercise was the unrealistic tactical atomic play, wherein the aggressor was struck with more atomic weapons than he delivered. In launching his offensive, the enemy would surely direct a greater portion of his atomic effort against friendly ground forces.⁵⁰ Beginning in December 1956 the Army attempted to correct this deficiency by requiring ground forces to be trained under assumed tactical conditions where the aggressor could inflict severe damage by using both tactical air forces and atomic weapons. Furthermore, the relative strength of U.S. and aggressor forces was not to be rigidly fixed, so that changing situations and the interaction of the fighting forces would be reflected in the exercise. Both sides were to have tactical air and atomic weapons, and generally at least one phase of the exercise was to give the enemy superiority in these weapons in order to emphasize dispersion and concealment and to show how the operational activity declined under such unfavorable conditions.⁵¹ Another deficiency demonstrated by CLEAN SWEEP was that estimates of projected losses were untrustworthy because of the difficulty in gauging the atomic destruction factor.⁵²

⁴⁷(1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to TAG, 24 Sep 56, sub: Tactical Support Center (U). (2) Ltr, CG Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, n.d., same sub. Both SECRET. Both in file above, B/P JCOC.

⁴⁸Stf Study, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 9 Feb 57, sub: NATO Exercises and Manuevers for 1958 and 1959. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1957).

⁴⁹DF, USAREUR/CENTAG SGS, 2 Jul 56, sub: CPX CLEAN SWEEP. AEAGC-TR 354.2 GC. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

⁵⁰DF, USAREUR/CENTAG G3, 21 Sep 56, sub: Critique, Exercise CLEAN SWEEP, w/Incl. AEAGC-TR 354.2 GC. NATO SECRET. In file above.

⁵¹Cable SX-3448, USAREUR to Seventh Army, et al., 7 Dec 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1956), Item 016.

⁵²DF, 21 Sep 56, w/Incl, cited above. NATO SECRET.

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c. CPX WHIP SAW. Held in September 1956, CPX WHIP SAW tested the procedures for atomic strikes at the operational level, exercised SACEUR and regional atomic strike plans, and studied the establishment of joint command and operations centers (JCOC's). The participants also gained experience in evaluating the functioning of the emergency organization of CENTAG and Theater Army headquarters.

In his critique of the exercise General Hodes pointed out that weather and peacetime safety requirements prevented the Air Force from executing strikes that would have normally been carried out under actual combat conditions. Moreover, the strength of the ground forces assumed to be in the CENTAG zone of operation for the purposes of the exercise was twice as large as the forces that were actually available.⁵³

d. CPX LION NOIR. Designed to train all NATO headquarters in the Central European area, including the various U.S. national headquarters, CPX LION NOIR was conducted from 21 to 27 March 1957 in a D-plus-30 (Phase II) setting. This allowed the machinery or reinforcement, replacement, and buildup to be brought into play, whereas the traditional D-day setting confined the exercise play to logistical and administrative arrangements. Participating elements included CENTAG and FOURATAF headquarters and, for the first time, the Portuguese 3d Infantry Division, the German II Corps, and the Luxembourg Regimental Combat Team, all of which were successfully integrated into the play.

(1) CENTAG Critique. The exercise revealed that replacement or augmentation units arrived in SACEUR's geographical area without combat equipment, which resulted in delays for equipping and staging under national authorities before the units could be used by SHAPE or NATO. All staff elements needed frequent participation in atomic planning to insure greater familiarity and experience with their atomic procedures. The atomic weapons allocations were not sufficient to permit staff training at every level from army group to division headquarters. The allocation to field armies in LION NOIR, for instance, was less than half of the requirement. Furthermore, the general reluctance of commanders to use their weapons allocation resulted initially in a dragging tempo of atomic play that gained momentum only toward the end of the CPX. COMCENTAG therefore recommended that LION NOIR-type exercises embodying the Phase II setting be conducted annually and that the atomic weapons allocations made to participants in future exercises be larger.⁵⁴

⁵³(1) FOURATAF-CENTAG-NAVCAG Jt Critique of Exercise WHIP SAW, 2 Oct 56. AG 126-244. NATO SECRET. In Hist Div Doc Br. (2) Incl 1, Critique, to DF, CENTAG G3, 8 Mar 57, sub: Critique, Exercise WHIP SAW (U). AEAGC-TR 354.2 GC. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1956), B/P WHIP SAW, Vol. II.

⁵⁴Ltr, COMCENTAG to CINCENT, n.d. [May 57], sub: Final Report on Exercise LION NOIR (U), w/Incl, n.d., same sub. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS LION NOIR (1957).

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(2) German Critique. Participating for the first time in a full-scale NATO exercise, the German forces used LION NOIR as the basis for a comprehensive review of their plans, procedures, and organization. A report on LION NOIR emanating from the Ministry of Defense in Bonn indicated the need for improving the coordination at army group boundaries. More effective play of tactical action could be achieved by more powerful concentrations of armor at the points of main effort and by better timing of double envelopment operations. Not only did Seventh Army impose excessive reporting requirements, but the reporting time for all commands and national authorities needed standardization. Fighter-bomber objectives were generally too deep in enemy territory, and problems of air force support of ground forces were not yet satisfactorily solved. The report also noted that West Germany's limited territory precluded the construction of essential communications zone facilities such as logistical installations, hospitals, and training and refugee control facilities. Bonn suggested that these support facilities for German NATO components be built in neighboring West European countries. Furthermore, the exercise showed that the supply levels for the German forces were unrealistic and that the destruction or capture of West Germany's production base would necessitate external nonreimbursable logistical support for the German forces. A special analysis of supply consumption rates would be needed to achieve common understanding within NATO. Also, the traffic control responsibilities of Allied commanders and of the German Territorial Organization required clarification. The Germans suggested that they be given control of traffic on and across the Rhine and advocated centralized control of rail tank and flat car traffic in Western Europe to avoid bottlenecks. In addition, the flow of intelligence information to Bonn was inadequate, and medical priorities were not the same for wounded civilian and military personnel.

Future exercises could be improved by simplifying some and amplifying other directives and by increasing the play of the German Territorial Organization. Finally, the Germans criticized the excessive use of atomic weapons in the exercise.⁵⁵ In contrast to the American critique, which reported inadequate atomic weapons allocations, the Germans questioned the necessity for employing atomic weapons to break up the front since there were no atomic targets in their areas at the beginning of the counteroffensive phase of the exercise. A very serious psychological problem was involved in the use of large-caliber atomic weapons on the territory of a NATO ally, particularly in view of the stay-at-home policy agreed upon by U.S. and NATO authorities as a means to control the flow of refugees. The use of such weapons appeared justified only where it was crucial to the continuation of combat activities--a decision that should be made by national authorities. Even under these circumstances, the Germans felt that special weapons should be used only to attain a tactical objective that could not be achieved by other means. Moreover, energetic exploitation of the powerful effects of atomic

⁵⁵DF, USAREUR G3 to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Jun 57, sub: Report from MOD Bonn Re Exercise LION NOIR (U). NATO SECRET. In file above.

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weapons in future exercises would preclude the excessive use of these weapons.⁵⁶

Toward the end of FY 1957 USAREUR headquarters was studying the implications of the German critique of LION NOIR.⁵⁷

e. FTX's SABRE KNOT and WAR HAWK. Two Seventh Army-directed FTX's were conducted in the second quarter of FY 1957. The first one, SABRE KNOT, held from 1 to 10 November 1956, was essentially a V Corps exercise held in Land Hesse with the participation of other Seventh Army elements, a reduced Twelfth Air Force command post, and tactical air support. FTX WAR HAWK was a VII Corps exercise held from 4 to 11 December in southern Germany.⁵⁸ The concept for both exercises was the same. The first major tactical phase consisted of "aggressor" violation of the border in a large-scale attack against NATO forces, promulgating delay and withdrawal operations. In Phase II NATO forces stopped the enemy and retained defensive positions by counterattack. A 5-day period was simulated for an offensive build-up. In Phase III NATO executed a sustained offensive. Special weapons were employed in all phases of the exercise.⁵⁹

In addition to the standard goals of FTX's, the objectives of SABRE KNOT and WAR HAWK were to perfect training techniques by emphasizing individual and small unit actions, to train in the defensive and offensive use of atomic weapons, and to test plans for the evacuation of mass casualties caused by atomic weapons. Besides conducting preplay troop orientation on the scope of the exercise and on avoiding maneuver damage, the Seventh Army commander held a special briefing for local German officials.⁶⁰

Many of the deficiencies uncovered during these FTX's were violations of fundamentals such as poor vehicle camouflage, inadequate dispersion, and failure to carry small arms. Communications deficiencies

⁵⁶DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 29 May 57, sub: Extract from MOD Bonn's Report to CINCENT on Exercise LION NOIR (U), w/Incl, same sub. SECRET. In file above.

⁵⁷DF, 10 Jun 57, cited above.

⁵⁸CENTAG ltr, 15 Nov 56, sub: CENTAG-USAREUR Forecast of Training Exercises, w/Incl 2. OT-56-1259. NATO CONFIDENTIAL.

⁵⁹(1) Seventh Army ltr, 5 Sep 56, sub: Initial Instructions, Field Training Exercise "SABRE KNOT." AG 354.2 AETGC-MJT. (2) Seventh Army ltr, 2 Oct 56, sub: Initial Instructions, Field Training Exercise "War HAWK." AETGC-354.2 AG. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both located in Seventh Army Repts on FTX's SABRE KNOT and WAR HAWK on file in USAREUR G3 Tng Br NATO Tng Sec.

⁶⁰Seventh Army Final Rept, FTX's SABRE KNOT and WAR HAWK, 21 Mar 57. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. In USAREUR G3 Tng Br NATO Tng Sec files.

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indicated the need for refresher training in the use of equipment and in security measures. Movement along the roads was occasionally unsatisfactory because of the failure to post or properly mark or place road guides and because of the drivers' tendency to follow too closely behind the preceding vehicle.⁶¹ On the positive side, however, the control system and "aggressor" techniques developed in the exercises were improvements over the two-sided maneuver and umpire systems used in previous exercises. Moreover, the aim of providing more training to more troops at less cost was realized.⁶²

83. Mutual Security Program (MAP) Army Training

The military assistance training program consisted of such activities as providing school spaces and informal observer spaces as well as furnishing mobile training teams composed of highly trained specialists, and orientation tours, demonstrations, and displays for Area I and Area II countries.⁶³ These training requirements were established by the Department of the Army and US EUCOM; USAREUR's role was to match these requirements against its capabilities and to give as much assistance as its other missions permitted.⁶⁴

a. Training Assistance to the German Army. USAREUR's mission of providing training and logistical assistance to the West German Army continued through FY 1957. With the gradual build-up of its army, the Federal Republic was expected to assume more and ultimately all of the responsibility for logistical support and maintenance. Since the Federal Republic was unable to meet the planned schedule of buildup, MAAG Germany asked USAREUR to extend its assistance at German schools and with newly activated units and to leave the maintenance teams in place. USAREUR reexamined the German assistance program and decided to reorganize the training teams and to request the transfer of training assistance responsibility to MAAG Germany on 1 July 1957. The reorganization, approved by the Department of the Army in December 1956, increased the number of training teams from 31 to 34 while reducing the manpower employed from 593 to 508. This permitted activation of 7 unit-training teams for assignment to 3 infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions,

⁶¹Hq Seventh Army Comdrs' Conf, 20 Dec 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1956).

⁶²Seventh Army Final Rept, FTX's SABRE KNOT and WAR HAWK, cited above.

⁶³Area I countries--Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia--paid for the training received from the United States. Area II countries--Ethiopia, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran--received mutual assistance funds for their trainees.

⁶⁴USAREUR Program Prog Rept, FY 57, 3d Qtr, p. 6-20. CONFIDENTIAL.

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1 mountain brigade, and 1 airborne brigade.⁶⁵

On 15 February 1957 MAAG Germany assumed operational control of 15 German Training Assistance Group (GTAG) teams. The rest of the teams were transferred by the end of the fiscal year. USAREUR continued administrative, logistical, and fiscal support until 30 June 1957, whereupon US EUCOM assumed budget and funding responsibilities.⁶⁶ In June 1957 new instructions defined USAREUR's support responsibilities for the training assistance program under MAAG control. USAREUR was to provide TDY training team personnel to augment the MAAG teams, logistical and administrative support to MAAG teams as needed, and spaces in USAREUR schools and orientation/observer training for German Army personnel.⁶⁷

b. Mobile Training Teams. Upon Department of the Army and/or US EUCOM request, USAREUR furnished a limited number of 1- to 4-man mobile training teams to various MAAG's to instruct in the operation and maintenance of a variety of equipment. While these teams were provided so long as USAREUR's training and operational missions were not affected, military assistance beneficiaries had a tendency toward asking for additional mobile training teams as well as other training assistance from available resources. During FY 1957 the Department of the Army directed USAREUR to provide 28 mobile training teams; these teams were to be furnished in addition to the numerous training teams requested by the various MAAG's.⁶⁸ Furthermore, in line with a departmental plan to augment military assistance training, USAREUR was directed to determine the number of combat-type demonstration teams that could be provided from its resources and capabilities. Such teams were available to the German Army but could not be sent to other MAP countries because of logistical and technical support difficulties.⁶⁹ The demands for mobile training teams reached such proportions that USAREUR had to turn down

⁶⁵(1) Cable EC-9-6548, US CINCEUR from Decker to DA for Taylor, 1 Dec 56. (2) Cable DA-914673, DA from DCSOPS to US CINCEUR, 7 Dec 56. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 353 Ger (1956).

⁶⁶Cables SC-14506, USAREUR to US CINCEUR for MAD, C/MAAG Bonn, 6 Feb 57; EC-3-866, US CINCEUR to MAAG Bonn, CINCUSAREUR, 8 Feb 57; SC-15965, USAREUR to area comds & USAPEB, 16 Feb 57. All UNCLASSIFIED. All in file above.

⁶⁷(1) Ltr, US CINCEUR to C/MAAG Germany, CINCUSAREUR, 26 Jun 57, sub: Letter of Instructions, Assistance to the German Army. (2) Memo, Lt Col E. Cook, USAREUR G3 Tng Br, to Col P. F. Oswald, C/G3 Tng Br, 15 Jul 57, sub: Origin and Close-out of the GTAG. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR G3 Tng Br files.

⁶⁸Stf Study, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 2 Jan 57, sub: Mutual Defense Assistance Program Mobile Training Team Policy (U). GC-TR-353 GC. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1957).

⁶⁹DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 30 Oct 56, sub: Proposed Augmentation of MDA Training (U). CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1956).

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requests for this type of assistance that originated from Italy, Turkey, and other countries.⁷⁰ As an alternative to the combat-type demonstration instruction teams, USAREUR proposed that MAP countries send small indigenous teams to the command for training that would qualify them to instruct their countrymen. USAREUR would continue to consider filling training team requests on a case-by-case basis, provided that its own training mission was not disrupted.⁷¹ A draft Army Regulation submitted for comment promised to firmly establish the policy of providing mobile training team assistance from available resources by stipulating that such aid would be furnished from overseas commands to the maximum extent practicable. USAREUR suggested that mobile training teams be used only in very urgent cases when other types of training would be inadequate. By its very nature, a mobile training team with its limited transport capability could carry only a few training aids and little major equipment. Furthermore, a special base of personnel was needed to meet training team requirements, but current and projected manpower limitations and MOS shortages prevented USAREUR from maintaining such a base. It would be desirable that major overseas commands furnish teams only to an extent consistent with their other missions. In an attempt to solve this problem, more consideration might be given to utilizing appropriate service schools.⁷²

In FY 1957 USAREUR provided a total of 21 mobile training teams.⁷³ At the MAP training conference held at US EUCOM headquarters from 5 to 8 February 1957, USAREUR programmed 57 mobile training teams for FY 1958. However, pending arrival of critical-type MOS personnel of instructor caliber, USAREUR would be unable to furnish additional teams for FY 1958.⁷⁴

⁷⁰(1) Ltr, Maj Gen J. C. Fry, C/MAAG Italy, to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Feb 57. (2) Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen Fry, 15 Feb 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Cable SX-3384, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 15 May 57. CONFIDENTIAL. All in USAREUR SGS 353 (1957).

⁷¹Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 15 Nov 56, sub: U.S. Demonstration-Instructor Teams for MDAP Countries (U). AEAGC-TR 334 GC. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

⁷²(1) Stf Study, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 2 Jan 57, cited above, w/Comment 2, SGS to G3, 4 Jan 57. GC-TR 353 GC. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen E. B. Post, USAREUR DCOFS to TAG, 14 Jan 57, sub: Proposed Army Regulation-Training of Foreign Military Personnel by the United States Army. AEAGC-Tr 353 GC. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above.

⁷³Interv, Mr. R. Sher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj H. E. Sias, USAREUR G3 Tng Br, 8 Oct 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷⁴Cable SX-3384, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 15 May 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

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c. NIKE Training for NATO Nations. The introduction of NIKE surface-to-air missiles to NATO military forces generated high priority problems over and above those experienced with conventional arms. The long lead time required for training foreign specialists as well as the complexities of site construction and of maintenance of equipment pointed to the urgent need for U.S. technical assistance. For effective coordination it was essential to establish a single U.S. control agency staffed with NIKE-qualified personnel. Consequently, in March 1957 USAREUR was assigned primary responsibility for over-all coordination and for providing assistance and consultative services in connection with the introduction of NIKE equipment to NATO forces. Among other duties relating to SHAPE Air Defense Plans and to the establishment of the NIKE program, USAREUR was to monitor training matters by advising the MAAG's on the selection and organization of national cadres for tactical and support units that were to be trained in the United States. Within its capability, the command was also to advise and assist in training tactical and support units, provide spaces in USAREUR schools, and extend the use of training facilities and installations on a space available basis.⁷⁵

Although final agreements with various NATO nations for the allocation of NIKE weapons were not yet concluded by 30 June 1957, arrangements for the training of students for NIKE units had been initiated. Thus, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and West Germany were screening students to be trained in the United States.⁷⁶ West Germany, potentially the recipient of the largest number of NIKE units in Europe, established a 10-week training course at the German AAA school in Rendsburg. In May 1957 the first 11 interpreters and students began to take English language refresher and basic electronics courses in preparation for attending the NIKE training program in the United States.⁷⁷ In June 1957 the Department of the Army approved a German proposal to establish a NIKE liaison group at Fort Bliss and at the Redstone Arsenal to coordinate the training and administration of German interpreters and students. The liaison group would remain in the United States until all the expected German packets completed their training.⁷⁸

⁷⁵Ltr, US EUCOM MAD to CINCUSAREUR, various MAAG's and Missions, 6 Mar 57, sub: Letter of Instructions, NIKE Missiles for NATO Countries (U). ECMAA-470. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

⁷⁶(1) Cable SX-2184, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 11 Mar 57. SECRET. In USAREUR Air Def Div 353.1 (1957). (2) Cable EC-9-3002, US CINCEUR to DA for DCSOPS, 29 May 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957). (3) For further details, see Chapter 5.

⁷⁷(1) Cable MAAG-FRG-797, MAAG Germany to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Mar 57. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable MAAG-FRG-1139, MAAG Germany to DA for DCSOPS, 7 May 57. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

⁷⁸(1) Cable MAAG-FRG-1407, MAAG Germany to DA for DCSOPS, 7 Jun 57. (2) Cable DA-925475, DA from DCSOPS to MAAG Bonn, 28 Jun 57. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above.

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The length of time required to train instructors and the national military units in the use and maintenance of NIKE equipment was a major problem for both the United States and Germany. It was estimated that 104 weeks (or 2 years) would pass from the start of the first course to the establishment of combat-ready NIKE units on site in the Federal Republic. This did not include the 36 weeks the German NIKE specialists would spend in the United States preparing themselves for their duties as training instructors. During the fiscal year the Department of the Army was examining ways to reduce the lead time without impairing training quality.⁷⁹

d. Training in USAREUR Schools. USAREUR also trained selected students of Area I and Area II nations in its various service and specialized schools. During FY 1957, 900 spaces were made available for foreign personnel.

e. Orientation Visits and Observer Training. During FY 1957 senior officers of military assistance countries made 14 visits to USAREUR units or installations, where they were oriented in U.S. training methods and techniques. They also learned at first hand how to make optimum use of their respective country's junior personnel who had been trained in U.S. service schools. During the same period foreign visitors filled 1,000 observer spaces at USAREUR schools, depots, and installations, where they observed specific training and practical demonstrations by U.S. personnel.⁸⁰

84. Operational Readiness of the Command

The ultimate purpose of training activities was to produce combat forces capable of performing their assigned missions. The measure of training effectiveness was determined best through battalion and other unit tests and combat readiness reports. These indicated during FY 1957 that assigned combat units were capable of performing their missions.⁸¹ Certain specific aspects of combat readiness were examined in special reports.

⁷⁹(1) Cable MAAG-FRG-1139, MAAG Germany to DA for DCSOPS, 7 May 57.
(2) Cable DA-923338, DA from DCSOPS to MAAG Bonn, 22 May 57. Both SECRET. Both in file above.

⁸⁰(1) Interv, Mr. Sher with Maj Sias, 8 Oct 57, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Cir 350-190, 29 Apr 57, sub: MSP (MAP) Army Training (U). CONFIDENTIAL.

⁸¹(1) USAREUR Program Prog Repts, FY 57, Program 6, Training. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) USAREUR Memo 350-5-5, 10 Jul 56, sub: Quarterly Training Status Report (RCS CSGPO-127). UNCLASSIFIED.

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a. Department of the Army Training Inspection. In September and October 1956 a Department of the Army inspection team conducted a training inspection of USAREUR units. The team was to determine the state of training and the degree of operational readiness of units, the obstacles to training, the effectiveness of the Army's replacement training and school system, the need for modifying and developing materiel, the adequacy of tables of equipment and of allowances, the adequacy of CONARC training literature and aids, and the sufficiency of training ammunition allowances. The team also wanted to observe the preparation, conduct, and evaluation of a major field exercise.

The inspection team reported that the atomic delivery units suffered from critical understrengths and shortages of specialists. Prompt action by the Department of the Army was essential to maintain the units' combat readiness. Moreover, the training conducted in close-in areas was often below standard because command supervision was insufficient and because platoon-size units were inadequately prepared and erroneously instructed in tactics. Morning lecture classes were frequently conducted at the expense of mandatory training sessions; although classes during the morning hours could not be altogether eliminated, such disruptions of the training schedule should be kept at a minimum.⁸²

b. Skill Shortages and Combat Effectiveness. USAREUR's shortage of school-trained special weapons technicians reflected a world-wide situation that materially decreased combat effectiveness. Despite the urgency of obtaining and retaining career soldiers with the aptitude for absorbing highly technical training in guided missiles, atomics, and communications, the Army was unable to procure enough 3-year enlistees or reenlistees to meet training requirements in the long-term technical courses. Consequently, it was necessary to train 2-year inductees in critical MOS's with more personnel turbulence and a larger training base than would otherwise be necessary.⁸³ The Department of the Army pointed out that USAREUR's position in school-trained special weapons personnel was more favorable than in other Army areas. By the end of FY 1958 the shortage would probably be eased because greater numbers of these specialists would become available.⁸⁴ In the meantime, USAREUR planned to train

⁸²(1) Cable DA-441144, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Jul 56. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable SX-2398, USAREUR (sgd Doan-Maj Gen L. L. from CONARC, chief of DA Insp Team) to DA for DCSOPS, 6 Oct 56. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 333 (1956), Items 34C, 11. (3) Hq Seventh Army Comdrs' Conf, 12 Oct 56. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1956).

⁸³Army Comdrs' Conf (U), 3-5 Dec 56, Wash., D.C., p. 86. SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 (info used UNCLASSIFIED). AG 27-128. In USAREUR SGS 337 Army Comdrs' Conf (1956).

⁸⁴Ltr, Lt Gen D. P. Booth, DCSPER, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, 16 May 57, w/Incl, sub: Fact Sheet-USAREUR's Status in Artillery and Ordnance Special Weapons Personnel (U). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

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personnel in the theater to compensate for the shortages in six critical special weapons MOS's. The plan was to use troop education facilities and instructors to teach courses that were related to critical MOS requirements and that were already available in the troop education program--such as Electricity, Mechanics, Physics, or Fundamentals of Radio. Toward the end of June 1957 this plan was implemented by local commanders who asked the educational advisers to tailor the courses to the needs of the personnel and organize the classes. Mandatory on-duty training was authorized so that the classroom instruction could be applied on the job. This meant, for example, that two hours of classroom instruction were followed by appropriate on-the-job training.⁸⁵

c. Seventh Army Combat Effectiveness.

(1) Training Status. Seventh Army's status of training during FY 1957 was generally excellent. However, the various factors influencing combat effectiveness fluctuated during the course of the year. For instance, the rapid turnover of personnel--amounting to 68 percent annually--intensified training requirements. The lack of local range facilities hampered the training of Corporal units, just as the limited ranges available for 762-mm rocket and 280-mm gun units restricted their training. There was also a general shortage of training areas within reasonable distance from unit stations. Moreover, gyroscope units and replacement packets continued to require intensive training to bring them up to proper levels of readiness.⁸⁶ Another factor that affected combat readiness adversely was training absenteeism. Although some effective measures against absenteeism were taken at local levels, the traditional and inflexible adherence to a 12-month training cycle obstructed a more definitive solution.⁸⁷

(2) Special Weapons Capability. With the effectiveness of special weapons units under emergency conditions becoming increasingly important, their capability of supporting Seventh Army was examined in April and May 1957. Among the areas explored were the technical training status of forward assembly teams and the adequacy of training literature,

⁸⁵(1) DF, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 29 May 57, sub: Education Related to Critical MOS's. AEAGA-P 265/60. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1957). (2) USAREUR Memo 621-5-2, 18 Jun 57, sub: MOS-Related Education Courses for Military Personnel. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁸⁶Ltrs, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Jan 57, 25 Jun 57, sub: Review of Combat Readiness (RCS SCGPO-127) (U), w/Incl 1, Combat Readiness Report, Seventh U.S. Army. SECRET. In USAREUR G3 Opns Br 319.1 (DA Tng Status & Combat Readiness Repts).

⁸⁷(1) Comment 2, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 21 Jan 57, sub: Ltr dtd 14 Jan 57 to Gen Hodes from Gen Clarke re: Training Effectiveness. (2) Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to Lt Gen B. C. Clarke, CG Seventh Army, 24 Jan 57. Both FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Both in USAREUR SGS 353 (1957).

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directives, inspection reports, and check sheets. The influence of security requirements on the mission of atomic delivery units was also studied. In addition to the headquarters at various echelons of command, an ordnance group headquarters, 3 ordnance special weapons support (OSWS) battalions, 6 Corporal battalions, 5 Honest John rocket batteries, 6 280-mm gun battalions, 8 8-inch howitzer battalions, and 15 engineer battalions were surveyed.⁸⁸

According to the report, Seventh Army would be capable of waging a highly effective atomic war. Command and staff emphasis on planning and operations for the conduct of such a war were excellent. However, there was a shortage of trained personnel in the target analyst and operational field. Commanders and staffs were ignorant of other aspects of atomic weapons. The high security classification generally attached to special weapons employment, materiel, training, and operations had hampered educational progress in this field. The word "atomic" itself had become so synonymous with complexity that the development and training of atomic units had been retarded.

Current and future needs of qualified personnel would continue as the most important obstacle to the continued training, operation, and supply of Seventh Army's special weapons support and delivery units. Since training standards varied so widely, there was no uniform standard against which training proficiency could be measured. For example, most assembly personnel were trained by different ordnance battalions and using units so that different standards emerged, which in turn varied from Department of the Army and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project criteria.

The expected losses of trained supervisory personnel in ordnance units threatened the mission capability of the support and delivery system companies. Ordnance technical support was excellent, but here too replacements were needed to avoid impairing the technical proficiency of the ordnance special weapons units.

Security requirements placed upon special weapons units drained their manpower, which resulted in loss of training time, which in turn affected the combat efficiency of these units. This situation in combat would siphon off critical personnel at crucial times unless tactical troops were furnished to provide the needed security. The training time of skilled special weapons technicians would be wasted in performing guard functions where other adequate security measures could be employed. Since special weapons units had only the minimum personnel needed to perform their missions, they would have to be relieved as much as possible of nonmission activities peculiar to posts, camps, or stations.

⁸⁸ Seventh Army Bd Rept of the Opns, Tng, and Sup of Sp Wpns Units, 10 May 57, Vol. I, Tab A. SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954. Cy 167 of 200 in USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1957).

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Although Department of the Army and higher headquarters training publications were adequate, there was a problem in timely distribution that caused modifications of these documents to appear before the publication itself. Distribution could be effected through the ordnance special weapons units rather than through Adjutant General publications channels.

The special weapons units also suffered from a severe shortage of training weapons, which would have to be corrected.

Several of these deficiencies could be eliminated by Seventh Army without recourse to higher headquarters. For example, Seventh Army was to direct a course on the missions, capabilities, and requirements of special weapons units, which was to be attended by appropriate commanders and staffs. Another suggestion was that Seventh Army establish a centralized special weapons school for the dual purpose of providing additional training personnel and assuring uniformity in the conduct of the special weapons program.

The problems that were to be solved at departmental level included relieving the shortage of special weapons and guided missiles technicians by assigning greater numbers of career men to user units, transferring the distribution of training and technical publications from the Adjutant General to the Chief of Ordnance, insuring the issuance of the publications concurrently with the equipment, and providing additional training weapons.⁸⁹

⁸⁹Ibid.

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CHAPTER 8

Logistical Support

Section I: Planning

85. Security Preparations

A major aspect of USAREUR security preparations during FY 1957 was the development of logistical planning designed to support the combat units in the event of an emergency and in wartime. While security planning proper was the responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, the preparation of the corollary and complementary logistical support plans was the responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4.

a. USAREUR Logistical Capabilities Plan. The USAREUR Logistical Capabilities Plan provided guidance for developing logistical support in accordance with the operational concepts for current wartime planning. The plan covered those one-time emergency-type instructions and actions that were considered necessary to make the transition from peace to a general wartime situation. The premise was that control of wartime operations would pass to NATO commanders no later than at the general alert, or sooner, if arranged by mutual agreement of the commanders concerned. Since logistical support was to remain a national responsibility, it would continue to be administered through nationally controlled as well as infrastructure installations.¹ An alternate capabilities plan to cover extraordinary contingencies subsequent to the outbreak of hostilities was also prepared.²

¹USAREUR Capabilities Plan 1-56 (BASIC), 16 Apr 57, (U), Vol. II, Logistics, pp. IV-V, 1-2. TOP SECRET (info used SECRET NOFORN).

²For further information on both USAREUR CP 1-56 (BASIC) and USAREUR CP 1-56 (ALTERNATE), see top secret supplement, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 57.

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b. Theater Army Wartime Logistical Standing Operating Procedures. The Theater Army Standing Operating Procedures contained the recurrent portions of the capabilities plans, thus permitting a reduction in the size of the parent plans. The SOP was to be used by Theater Army headquarters and its subordinate commands during field exercises and in wartime. The logistical functions of Theater Army headquarters consisted of planning for the support of all U.S. Army forces initially in the Central European area, formulating policies in accordance with those transmitted by the theater commander and the Department of the Army, and supervising the logistical operations of subordinate commanders.³

The SOP's were developed in draft form during March 1957 and were tested by Theater Army headquarters during Exercise LION NOIR.⁴

c. USAREUR Logistical Estimate (ULE 1-56). The USAREUR Logistical Estimate was formulated at the beginning of FY 1957 in order to correlate logistical capabilities with current tactical and strategical concepts. In so doing, the logistical capabilities of the command were evaluated and the actions necessary to permit proper implementation of the operational concepts of the command were initiated.⁵

d. Special and Emergency Logistical Plans. In addition to logistical planning in immediate support of tactical operations in the event of an emergency and during actual warfare, some other special and emergency plans in the field of logistics were prepared during FY 1957.

(1) Evacuation of Technical Services Supplies and Equipment. In September 1956 doubts arose whether the movement plan, which had been developed as an integral part of the FY 1956 evacuation plan,⁶ would work in an emergency. For instance, the quantities of supplies to be evacuated were considered excessive, no priorities had been established for the evacuation of these supplies, and in some cases their destination had not been properly designated.⁷ Although revision of the evacuation

³USAREUR (Theater Army) Field SOP, 7 Mar 57, Ch. III, Part IV, Logistics. SECRET NOFORN.

⁴(1) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to Stf Divs, 7 Mar 57, sub: USAREUR (Theater Army) Field SOP. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Plans Br files. (2) Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col L. F. Foushee, Sp Asst, USAREUR G4 Plans Br, 27 Jun 57. SECRET.

⁵(1) USAREUR Logistical Estimates, 23 Jul 56 (U). TOP SECRET (info used classified SECRET by the USAREUR G4 Plans Br). (2) See TS Supp, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 57.

⁶USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 215-16. SECRET.

⁷Memo, C/USAREUR G4 Sup Br to C/G4 Plans Br, 10 Sep 56, sub: ETSSE Movement Plan (U). SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Plans Br files, ETSSE (1956).

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plan began during the second quarter of FY 1957, this process had not been completed by 30 June 1957.⁸

(2) Noncombatant Evacuation Order (NEO). Experience gained during alert exercises and staff visits indicated that the logistical portions of the USAREUR NEO plans were also unrealistic. Some of the deficiencies uncovered were the disproportion between transportation requirements and vehicle availability; inadequate stock levels and insufficient maintenance and rotation of supplies; unsatisfactory operation of processing points; and the inexpedient organization of vehicle serials for movement along Army reserved routes.⁹

86. Requirements Planning

According to existing operational concepts, atomic attacks would be exchanged during the initial stages of actual warfare. The consequent atomic destruction suffered by USAREUR installations had to be related to the command's logistical capability to support wartime operational concepts. Logistical requirements planning was to serve this purpose.¹⁰

a. Concept C and the COMZ Outline Plan. At a logistical conference held at USAREUR headquarters on 5-6 September 1956 it was agreed that COMZ headquarters would prepare an outline plan for major installations and their missions, giving special emphasis to supply and service operations.¹¹ The outline plan was to be, in fact, the detailed implementation of Concept C in consonance with changing conditions and pursuant to current Department of the Army thinking.¹²

The COMZ draft outline plan submitted in November 1956 provided for the establishment of a general depot system for all classes of supply--including class V--by the end of FY 1959. At the outset, COMZ stocks were to be dispersed in such a manner that each combat-essential line item would be stored in at least three separate locations in ADSEC and two

⁸ Interv, Mr. Moenk with Maj R. L. McCoy, USAREUR G4 Plans Br, 2 Jul 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁹ DF, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to ACOFS G3, 17 Jan 57, sub: NEO Planning. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G4 Plans Br files, NEO #1 (1956). For further details on NEO planning, see Chapter 5, above.

¹⁰ Interv, Mr. Moenk with various stf offs, USAREUR G4 Plans Br, 27-28 Jun 57. SECRET.

¹¹ Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG COMZ, 11 Oct 56, sub: Guidance for Outline Plan of Installations and Their Missions. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Plans Br files, COMZ Plans (1956).

¹² Memo for rec, Lt Col A. J. Malinkowski, USAREUR G4 Plans Br, 7 Feb 57, sub: Concept C vs. the COMZ Outline Plan. SECRET. In file above, COMZ Plans (1957).

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locations in BASEC. One of the ADSEC general depots was to be located in the Western Area Command sector of Germany. Wartime maintenance would be limited to fourth echelon operations and some rebuild of major components; the system of accounting for theater stocks would be compatible with MASS procedures; and, to the maximum extent practicable, future construction programs would provide for underground storage facilities. Class V supplies, however, were to be stored in earth-covered igloos above ground.¹³

One drawback to the COMZ plan was that it made no provision for assigning personnel of all technical services to perform issue missions. This was not in accordance with the Department of the Army concept that all general depots would be "active storage sites."¹⁴ Obviously, the benefits of protection by dispersal would be nullified, if the distribution capability in an emergency was in doubt. An important prerequisite therefore was that the distribution capability in an emergency be compatible with the dispersion of stocks at each location. Subject to these reservations, the Department of the Army approved the outline plan.¹⁵

Consequently, COMZ was to immediately staff its general depot with a cadre of qualified personnel from each of the technical services concerned. In peacetime this cadre would maintain and rotate stocks in dormant storage, whereas in the event of an emergency it could be organized into a distribution element. This system was to be continually expanded until the distribution capability in an emergency was compatible with the dispersion of stocks at each location. The target date of 30 June 1958 was retained for completion of this action.¹⁶

b. Dispersal Planning. The passive defense plans for fixed installations provided for the dispersal of depot stocks in an emergency to minimize the effect of atomic air attacks.¹⁷ In an effort to develop

¹³(1) Ltr, CG COMZ to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Nov 56, sub: Outline Plan for Major COMZ Installations and Their Missions (U), w/Incl 1, Hq COMZ, Outline Plan for Major Installations and Their Missions. SECRET. (2) Memo for rec, USAREUR G4 Plans Br, n.d., same sub. Both in file above, COMZ Plans, 1956-57.

¹⁴(1) Memo for rec, Mr. C. Dickey, USAREUR G4 Sup Br, 3 Apr 57, sub: Type and Orgn of COMZ Depots (U). SECRET. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to DA, 3 Apr 57, same sub. AEAGD-RD 400 GD. SECRET. Both in file above, COMZ Plans (1957).

¹⁵DA Ltr, to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Apr 57, sub: Type and Orgn of USAREUR COMZ Depots (U). AGAD-CC 323.3 (26 Apr 57) DCSLOG. SECRET. In file above.

¹⁶Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG COMZ, 16 May 57, sub: Outline Plan for Major COMZ Installations and Their Missions (U). SECRET. In file above.

¹⁷USAREUR Cir 525-40, 11 Feb 56, sub: Passive Air Defense Plans for Fixed Installations. UNCLASSIFIED.

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such dispersal plans, COMZ had been directed to determine dispersal sites for emergency use, acquire such sites wherever possible, and develop a plan for moving stocks to such sites when an emergency occurred. The movement of stocks to dispersal sites was to be accomplished primarily by diverting incoming supplies from the United States, with limited quantities of stocks being transferred from existing storage sites.¹⁸

By July 1956 COMZ had prepared dispersal plans for all its depots, and the USAREUR technical services had taken similar action for the depots then under their jurisdiction. The latter depots were subsequently transferred to COMZ control under the USAREUR plans for realignment of functions between the two commands.¹⁹

Section II: Management

87. Logistical Management

a. Effect of the Realignment of Functions Between USAREUR and COMZ. The planning for the realignment of logistical functions between USAREUR and COMZ had begun during FY 1956.²⁰ The first transfer of logistical installations and facilities from USAREUR to COMZ was effected on 1 July 1956 (For a list of the installations and facilities transferred during FY 1957, see Table 5). Additional facilities were to be transferred on 1 July 1957, and the program was to be completed by the transfer of the Army Aircraft Transportation Depot on 31 December 1957.²¹

The above transfers involved some 24,500 personnel, including approximately 8,000 military, 700 Department of the Army civilians, 14,100 German local-wage-rate civilians, 200 French local-wage-rate civilians, and 1,500

¹⁸ USAREUR ltr, 21 May 56, sub: Development of D-day Dispersal Plans. AEAGD-RD 323.3 GD. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Plans Br files, Concept C MISC (1952-57).

¹⁹ (1) 1st Ind, Hq COMZ to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Jul 56, to ltr cited above. AEZLG-PL 323.3 AG. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo for rec, Col R. W. Arthur, Dep ACOFS G4 for Sup Mgt, 7 May 57, sub: Dispersal of USACOMZEUR Depot Stocks. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file above.

²⁰ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 219-22. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

²¹ Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj W. F. Veaudry, G4 Mgt Br, 11 Jul 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Table 5--Logistical Installations and Activities
Transferred to U.S. Army COMZ, Europe, FY 1957

Transferred 1 July 1956^(a)

7742 Rhine Engineer Depot
7773 Pirmasens Signal Depot
53d Chemical Laboratory
7770 Quartermaster Mortuary
Service Detachment
37th Transportation Motor
Transport Command
7962 Chemical Supply Control
Agency
7962 Signal Supply Control Agency
7962 Transportation Supply

7837 Ordnance Vehicle Park
(Germersheim Armament and Vehicle
Park)
7843 Ordnance Maintenance Depot
(Mainz)
7844 Ordnance Tire Rebuild Depot
(Oberramstadt)
7846 Ordnance Maintenance Depot
(Boeblingen)
7848 Ordnance Maintenance Depot
(Schwaebisch-Gmuend)
7962 Ordnance Supply Control Agency

Transferred 1 October 1956^(a)

7962 Engineer Supply Control
Agency
7741 AU Engineer Procurement
Center
7962 Medical Supply Control
Agency
7790 AU Medical Procurement
Detachment
Rhine Medical Depot
12th Ordnance Battalion (SWD)

Quartermaster
993d Quartermaster Detachment
(Petroleum Products Laboratory)
7962 Quartermaster Supply Control
Agency
7856 Quartermaster Supply Control
Office
7861 Munich Quartermaster Service
Detachment
7862 Quartermaster Depot, Giessen
7863 Quartermaster Depot,
Nahbollenbach
7859 Quartermaster Field and
Accounting Office
7871 Quartermaster Petroleum
Distribution Point

Transferred 1 January 1957^(a)

Transportation

7705 AU (USAREUR Transpor-
tation Center) Frankfurt

Ordnance

Ordnance Class V Stock Control
Section
37th Ordnance Park Company
53d Ordnance Group (Mannheim)
367th Ordnance Platoon
601st Ordnance Battalion
Armament Rebuild (Germersheim
Armament and Vehicle Park)
175th & 856th Ordnance Explosive
Disposal (Detachment)
7836 Ordnance Supply Depot
(Mannheim Ordnance Supply
Depot)

Transferred 1 March 1957^(a)

Ordnance Missile Depot (Fischbach)

Transferred 1 April 1957^(a)

2d, 5th, 97th and 98th General
Hospitals
9th Medical Hospital Center
Headquarters
10th Medical General Laboratory
22d, 31st, 34th, 37th and 66th
Ambulance Trains
57th Medical Battalion, Headquarters
and Headquarters Detachment
505th Medical Company (Holding)
581st and 583d Medical Companies
(Ambulance Service)

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Table 5--Logistical Installations and Activities
Transferred to U.S. Army COMZ, Europe,
FY 1957--Continued

886th Medical Company
(Collection, Separate)
4th Medical Laboratory (Army)
6th Convalescent Center
(Laboratory)
63d Medical Detachment
(Helicopter Ambulance)
566th Medical Detachment
(Headquarters Professional
Services)
16th Field Hospital

Transferred 1 July 1957^(b)

U.S. Army Veterinary Detachment,
Europe
U.S. Army Quartermaster Market
Center, Europe
U.S. Army Ordnance Finance and
Accounting Office (Sandhofen)
U.S. Army Ordnance Procurement
Center (Sandhofen)
U.S. Army Signal Procurement
Center (Frankfurt)

Farge Quartermaster POL Depot
(Bremerhaven)^(c)

Approved for Transfer, 31 December 1957^(d)

7703 U.S. Army Transportation Depot,
Sandhofen (Aircraft)

Sources:

- (a) USAREUR Comm for Log Reorg, Log Reorg Status Rept, 9 Apr 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Mgt Br files, 320.01 (1957), Vol. III.
- (b) USAREUR Tp Asgmt Memo 10, 21 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED.
- (c) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CO USAPEB, 5 Jun 57, sub: Review of Logistical Activities in USAREUR (U). UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.
- (d) Cable SC-27221, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 10 May 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

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labor service personnel.²² A COMZ request for additional headquarters personnel spaces was deferred until after the responsibilities for the transferred logistical functions had been fully assumed and the headquarters of COMZ, BASEC, and ADSEC had been reorganized.²³

Actually, only two simple structural changes seemed necessary before COMZ could assume full operational control and exercise command jurisdiction over the major logistical elements of USAREUR. The various supply control agencies would have to be integrated into COMZ, and the command jurisdiction of COMZ headquarters would have to be extended to the logistical installations and activities in Germany.²⁴ Coincident with the transfer of the logistical functions, the chiefs of the USAREUR technical services would have to be relieved of their command and operating responsibility.²⁵ For this reason it was decided that the U.S. Army Chemical Command, Europe, be discontinued effective 1 February 1957,²⁶ and that the other technical service commands--excepting the U.S. Army Signal Command, Europe--be abolished as of 1 July 1957.²⁷

b. Planning for a Peacetime Logistical Command Structure to Support a Wartime Mission. At the beginning of FY 1957 the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, monitored a study for the consolidation and reorganization of logistical support functions of the command. In August 1956 responsibility for this planning was transferred to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3.²⁸ Two important objectives in preparing plans for a reorganization of the peacetime logistical command structure were to improve the wartime posture of Seventh Army and to limit the area commands to the performance of purely peacetime functions. For this purpose Seventh Army

²² Memo, C/USAREUR G4 Mgt Br to ACOFS G4, 23 Jun 56, sub: Estimate of Personnel Strengths Involved in Transfer of Assignment of Functions to COMZ. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Mgt Br files, 320.01 (1956), Vol. II.

²³ Memo for rec, Act USAREUR ACOFS G4, 2 Jul 56, sub: COMZ Hq. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Mgt Br files, 320.01 (1956), Vol. II.

²⁴ Ltr, Maj Gen R. W. Colglazier, CG COMZ, to Gen H. I. Rhodes, CINC-USAREUR, 20 Aug 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

²⁵ (1) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to Tech Svcs, 28 Aug 56, sub: Personnel Staffing, Hq USAREUR AEAGD-M 200 GD. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.
(2) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to Gen Stf Divs & Tech Svcs, 6 May 57, sub: Reorganization of USAREUR Command Structure - Technical Services Commands. UNCLASSIFIED. In same file (1957), Vol. III.

²⁶ USAREUR GO 1, 1 Jan 57 as amended by USAREUR GO 8, 14 Jan 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁷ USAREUR GO 162, 24 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁸ Wkly Sum of Maj Actions Taken by CINCUSAREUR and Gen Offs in Off of COFS, 11 Aug 56. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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would have to take over all exclusively military supply and wartime missions. There would, however, be no reason for such a reorganization unless considerable personnel savings were generated.²⁹

In March 1957 the responsibility for logistical planning reverted to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4. During the following months various possibilities for the reorganization of the logistical support structure were being explored. The solutions under consideration included the consolidation of the four area commands into one single command, the elimination of the four area commands and the creation of the position of a USAREUR director of posts to supervise and coordinate the operations of the eight subarea commands, and the assignment to Seventh Army of the missions currently executed by the area commands.³⁰

Toward the end of FY 1957 it became obvious that the proposed reorganization plans would not result in an appreciable personnel savings or in more efficient operations. The studies were therefore discontinued, and all staff divisions were requested to continuously refine the methods of providing maximum support to Seventh Army. Only thus could they insure that Seventh Army became as self-sufficient as possible for wartime operations under the restrictions imposed by a peacetime organization.³¹

88. Financial Management

a. Stock Funds and Consumer Funds. Stock funds and consumer funds had been in use at the depot level during FY 1956. Serious shortages of consumer funds during the last half of FY 1956 resulted in a temporary decrease in the issuance of stock fund supplies during the fourth quarter.³²

²⁹ Memo, USAREUR SGS to ACOFS G1, G3 and G4, 18 Mar 57, sub: Reorganization of the Area Commands. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 331 (1957).

³⁰ (1) Comment 2, USAREUR ACOFS G4, 27 Mar 57, to Comment 1, 19 Mar 57, USAREUR SGS to ACOFS G4, sub: Service and Support Requirements, Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo for rec, Maj J. W. Lay, Asst USAREUR SGS, 20 Apr 57, sub: Logistic Structure to Support 7th Army and USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1957). (3) DF, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G4 to all Stf Divs, 1 Apr 57, sub: Service and Support Requirements, Germany (Paper #3). UNCLASSIFIED. (4) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to all Stf Divs, 22 Apr 57, sub: Progress Report, Service and Support Requirements (Paper #5). UNCLASSIFIED. (5) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to all Stf Divs, 7 May 57, sub: Service and Support Requirements. UNCLASSIFIED. Last three in USAREUR G4 Mgt Br files, Svcs and Support Rqmts (1957), Vols. I, II.

³¹ DF, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to all Stf Divs, 6 Jun 57, sub: Service and Support Requirements. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

³² USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 262-64. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

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The requirements for FY 1957, established on the basis of FY 1956 experience data plus or minus anticipated changes, were included in the Basic and the Supplemental Budget Execution Plans (BEP). The Department of the Army approved the Basic BEP but withheld approval from the supplemental plan. The consumer fund requirements for FY 1957 were as follows:³³

| <u>Budget Program</u> | <u>Total Estimated Requirement</u> | <u>Amount in BASEC BEP*</u> | <u>Amount in Supplemental BEP**</u> |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| | (in millions of dollars) | | |
| <u>Grand Total</u> | <u>231.0</u> | <u>166.5</u> | <u>64.5</u> |
| Absorption of MASS Buildup | <u>4.5</u> | - | 4.5 |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>226.5</u> | <u>166.5</u> | <u>60.0</u> |
| 2300 | <u>93.1</u> | 61.3 | 31.8 |
| 2500 | <u>125.0</u> | 98.5 | 26.5 |
| 3100 | <u>.6</u> | .6 | - |
| 3300 | <u>7.0</u> | 5.3 | 1.7 |
| 3900 | <u>.8</u> | .8 | - |

* Based on DA dollar guidance

** Not approved by DA

Aside from receiving the consumer funds approved by the Department of the Army, customers of the Army stock funds could generate additional credits by turn-in of excess serviceable property. This procedure had the twofold advantage of encouraging the turn-in of excess property and of greatly increasing the amount of consumer credits available during the fiscal year.³⁴

b. Consumer Credit System. To avoid the premature exhaustion of consumer funds during FY 1957, a system of rationing available funds and controlling supply consumption throughout the command was devised. This system, known as the USAREUR Consumer Credit System, was all the more necessary because the fund requirements had been cut by approximately 30 percent; it became effective 1 July 1956. After having received their allotments of consumer credits, the various subordinate commands determined the appropriate consumer credit requirements for each requisitioner (European Property Account) under their jurisdiction who was authorized

³³ Memo, C/USAREUR G4 Mgt Br to Asst DCOFS, 9 Aug 56, sub: Increases in Consumer Fund Requirements for FY 1958. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Mgt Br files, Consumer Credits (GEN) FY 57.

³⁴ Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj W. C. Conner, USAREUR G4 Mgt Br, 11 Jul 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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to draw supplies from USAREUR depots. The adequacy of supply was therefore dependent upon what individual commanders chose to buy within the consumer credits allocated to them under the system. The commands and European Property Accounts were directed to maintain informal "blotter" accounts of demands and shipments in dollar terms in order to keep within the fund limitations established. Moreover, under this system, customers were not required to obligate for dues-outs since funds were held in the COMZ technical service supply control agencies, finance and accounting offices and obligated by them when supplies became available.³⁵ (For information on the availability and obligation of consumer credits during FY 1957, see Table 6.)

Favorable comments regarding the Consumer Credit System were received both from the European Branch, General Accounting Office, and from the Inspector General, Department of the Army. The latter agency recommended the system for wider use by the Department of the Army.³⁶

Section III: Procurement

During FY 1957 USAREUR procurement, including Deutsche Mark procurement, amounted to approximately \$276,428,000 or 80.6 percent of the FY 1956 total of \$342,917,029. While dollar procurement increased by 61.9 percent over the FY 1956 volume, Deutsche Mark procurement dropped to 27.1 percent of the previous year's total.³⁷

³⁵(1) USAREUR Memo 700-15-1, 17 Dec 56, sub: Financial Control of Supply Consumption in USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo for rec, USAREUR G4 Mgt Br Fin Mgt Sec, 15 Jun 56, sub: USAREUR Consumer Credit System. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Ltr, Eur Br GAO, to Asst U.S. Compt Gen, 6 Jul 56 sub: Consumer Credit System in USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. (4) Memo, C/USAREUR G4 Mgt Br to ACOFS G4, 4 Jan 57, sub: Consumer Credit System vs. Consumer Funding. UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR G4 Mgt Br files, Consumer Credits (GEN) FY 57.

³⁶(1) Ltr, Eur Br GAO to Asst U.S. Compt Gen, 6 Jul 56, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo, C/USAREUR G4 Mgt Br Fin Mgt Sec, to C/G4 Mgt Br and Dep ACOFS G4, 21 Jun 57, sub: Results of Committee Meeting to Study Revising Present Credit Procedures. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

³⁷(1) Dollar Proc Data for Jun 57, 17 Jul 57. (2) DM Proc Data for Jun 57, 17 Jul 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR G4 Proc Br Dollar and DM Proc Repts, FY 57.

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Table 6--Availability and Obligation of Consumer Credits in USAREUR, FY 1957

| | Annual Allocation | Consumer Credits Obligated | Percent Obligated |
|---|----------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| <u>Total USAREUR</u> | <u>\$195,438,266</u> | <u>\$208,492,400</u> | <u>106.6</u> |
| <u>Part I - Availability and Obligation by Budget Program</u> | | | |
| Maintenance, Operation and Administration Funds | | | |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>\$195,438,266</u> | <u>\$208,492,400</u> | <u>106.6</u> |
| Program 2400 - Operation of Ports | 365,500 | 349,822 | 95.7 |
| Program 2500 - Depot Maintenance & Operation | 29,979,726 | 27,986,780 | 93.3 |
| Program 3100 - QM Mortuary Supplies | 32,302 | 30,691 | 95.0 |
| Program 3500 - Field Maintenance & TOE Supplies | 165,060,738 | 180,125,107 | 109.1 |
| <u>Part II - Availability and Obligation by Technical Service</u> | | | |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>\$195,438,266</u> | <u>\$208,492,400</u> | <u>106.6</u> |
| Chemical | 946,170 | 918,701 | 97.0 |
| Engineer | 13,732,673 | 13,605,814 | 99.0 |
| Ordnance | 121,967,963 | 136,081,884 | 111.5 |
| Quartermaster | 48,107,482 | 47,367,334 | 98.4 |
| Signal | 9,874,741 | 9,825,951 | 99.5 |
| Transportation | 809,237 | 772,716 | 95.4 |

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Table 6---Availability and Obligation of Consumer Credits in USAREUR, FY 1957--Continued

| | Annual Allocation | Consumer Credits Obligated | Percent Obligated |
|--|----------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| Part III - Availability and Obligation by USAREUR Commands | | | |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>\$195,438,266</u> | <u>\$208,492,400</u> | <u>106.6</u> |
| Berlin | 1,165,330 | 1,163,674 | 99.8 |
| USAFEB | 575,224 | 556,974 | 96.8 |
| USACOMZEUR | 47,268,027 | 44,510,177 | 94.1 |
| HACOM | 6,058,711 | 6,055,824 | 99.9 |
| NACOM | 11,919,566 | 11,830,620 | 99.2 |
| SACOM | 15,263,483 | 15,093,970 | 98.8 |
| WACOM | 10,037,742 | 9,896,565 | 98.5 |
| Seventh Army | 101,376,555 | 117,750,674 | 116.1 |
| Engineer | 897,854 | 815,730 | 90.8 |
| Ordnance | 304,358 | 297,044 | 97.5 |
| Quartermaster | 18,554 | 9,831 | 52.9 |
| Signal | 545,460 | 508,642 | 93.2 |
| Transportation | 7,402 | 2,675 | 36.1 |

Source: USAREUR G4 Mgt Br Fin Mgt Sec. UNCLASSIFIED.

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89. Dollar Procurement

Offshore procurement (OSP) effected by USAREUR consisted of procurement under the Mutual Security Act (MSA), including the Mutual Assistance Program, the Consumable and Construction (C&C) Segment, and the Foreign Military Facilities Assistance Program (FMFAP), procurement of items for the Department of Defense, and dollar procurement in support of the U.S. forces in Europe.

In the previous fiscal year, military end items provided under grant aids had been included in the so-called Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP). Support items, consisting of construction and consumable items, that certain countries were unable to provide for themselves had been part of the Direct Forces Support (DFS) Program administered by the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) of the State Department. The foreign aid legislation for FY 1957 defined MDAP--redesignated as the Mutual Assistance Program (MAP)--as an all-inclusive program, comprehending the procurement of military end items, the C&C Segment (formerly the DFS program), and FMFAP.³⁸

Table 7 lists the FY 1957 dollar obligations for offshore procurement, showing the cumulative totals by month and by obligating agency. The total amount obligated rose from \$136,227,000 in FY 1956 to \$220,551,000.

The distribution of appropriated dollar funds obligated for MDAP and Defense Department procurement was as follows:

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Obligations (Approximate)</u> | <u>Percent of Total</u> |
|----------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Germany | \$ 115,100,000 | 52 |
| France | 31,100,000 | 14 |
| United Kingdom | 28,300,000 | 13 |
| Netherlands | 9,700,000 | 4 |
| Denmark | 9,300,000 | 4 |
| Italy | 3,700,000 | 2 |

The orders for the remaining 11 percent, or approximately \$23,400,000, were distributed among 13 other countries.³⁹

a. The Mutual Assistance Program (End Items). Under interim authority from the Department of the Army, USAREUR obligated the sum of \$7,080,517 for tanks and test ammunition during the first three

³⁸ Cable EC-9-740, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 11 Feb 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 400.336 (1957).

³⁹ DF, USAREUR G4 Proc Br to G4 Mgt Br, 18 Jul 57, sub: Information for QRLA, Incl 1. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Proc Br files.

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Table 7--Cumulative Offshore Procurement Dollar Obligations, FY 1957

(in thousands of dollars)

| Month | Cumulative Totals | Total Tech Svcs a/ | Technical Services | | | | | Area | | Others b/ |
|--------------|----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|-----|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|-----------|
| | | | Engr | Med | Ord | QM | Sig | Trans | Comds | |
| July 1956 | 7,063 | 2,404 | 0 | 19 | 507 | 1,260 | 618 | 0 | 1,035 | 3,564 |
| August | 13,521 | 6,757 | 3 | 53 | 777 | 3,206 | 2,713 | 5 | 2,384 | 4,275 |
| September | 39,184 | 28,426 | 7,807 | 95 | 8,415 | 9,305 | 2,798 | 6 | 5,186 | 5,397 |
| October | 61,864 | 44,709 | 8,688 | 137 | 8,505 | 23,703 | 3,670 | 6 | 10,134 | 6,805 |
| November | 74,342 | 52,422 | 10,405 | 158 | 9,018 | 26,626 | 6,209 | 6 | 13,950 | 7,731 |
| December | 95,703 | 68,713 | 20,330 | 172 | 11,057 | 29,805 | 7,343 | 6 | 16,891 | 9,805 |
| January 1957 | 109,271 | 74,441 | 21,067 | 220 | 11,947 | 32,462 | 8,739 | 6 | 22,571 | 11,865 |
| February | 120,285 | 79,190 | 21,951 | 245 | 12,169 | 35,305 | 9,514 | 6 | 26,131 | 14,554 |
| March | 135,168 | 88,528 | 22,438 | 273 | 12,616 | 41,433 | 11,762 | 6 | 29,945 | 16,265 |
| April | 155,721 | 103,926 | 30,434 | 325 | 16,392 | 43,882 | 12,887 | 6 | 33,956 | 17,360 |
| May | 169,109 | 111,217 | 30,743 | 362 | 16,858 | 47,403 | 15,845 | 6 | 37,504 | 19,813 |
| June | 220,551 | 154,447 | 38,017 | 595 | 43,959 | 50,970 | 20,900 | 6 | 42,037 | 23,444 |

a/ No procurement obligations for Chem Div

b/ Includes Info Div, DSD, Det "R," and G2

Source: Dollar Proc Repts. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Proc Br.

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quarters of FY 1957. From 1 April - 26 June 1957 USAREUR procurement agencies negotiated 8 contracts for an additional \$3,327,300. More than two-thirds of the MAP procurement was concluded during the last five days of the fiscal year, when 18 contracts for \$20,940,700 were placed. Of the total MAP procurement of \$31,348,517, ordnance items accounted for approximately \$28,400,000 and signal items for the balance. Procurement contracts were placed in six European countries, the major items purchased being ammunition, artillery pieces, radio and signal equipment, and Centurion tanks and allied equipment. These items were to be delivered to Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Ethiopia, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, Korea, Taiwan (Formosa), Thailand, and Viet-Nam.⁴⁰

Together with other procurement activities, USACOMZEUR also assumed responsibility for MAP procurement, subject to USAREUR supervision. As the head of a procuring agency, CINCUSAREUR retained such procurement responsibilities as he was required to assume by law and pertinent regulations.⁴¹

b. Consumables and Construction Segment. The purpose of the Consumables and Construction Segment was to aid the participating countries in supporting the current operations of their armed forces. During FY 1957 this program involved Thailand, Pakistan, Libya, and Turkey. The Pakistan program, totaling \$4,243,117, included a balance of \$1,130,170 carried over from the previous fiscal year.⁴² During the last four days of FY 1957 contracts totaling \$7,984,111 were signed for items destined for Turkey, Pakistan, and Thailand. The contracts for Turkey and Thailand were placed in Belgium and Sweden, respectively. The program for Libya was deferred on 28 June 1957 when USAREUR was notified that the requisite bilateral agreement had not been completed with that country.⁴³

⁴⁰(1) Cable SX-4249, USAREUR to DA for DCOFS LOG/D2, 26 Jun 57.
(2) Cable SX-4351, same to same, 1 Jul 57. (3) Memo, USAREUR G4 Mgt Br to G4 Proc Br, 10 Jul 57, sub: Revision of Briefs, ACOFS G4 Briefing Notebook, w/Incl 5, FY 57 MAP/OSP Program Status, 11 Jul 57. All CONFIDENTIAL. All in file above, FY 57 MAP Folder.

⁴¹Cable SC-23451, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 15 Apr 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1957).

⁴²(1) Memo, USAREUR G4 Mgt Br to G4 Proc Br, 10 Jul 57, sub: Revision of Briefs, ACOFS G4 Briefing Notebook, w/Incl 6, C&C Program, 12 Jul 57.
(2) Ltr, DCOFSA LOG to CINCUSAREUR, 31 Jan 57, sub: Transmittal of Refined FY 57 MAP, C&C Segment (Army) for Thailand (U). (3) Ltr, same to same, 8 Feb 57, sub: Transmittal for Pakistan (U). (4) Ltr, same to same, 12 Apr 57, sub: Transmittal for Libya (U). (5) Ltr, same to same, 29 Apr 57, sub: FY MAP, C&C Segment, Amendment, (Turkey) (U). All CONFIDENTIAL. All in USAREUR G4 Proc Br files, FY 57 C&C Segment Folder.

⁴³(1) Cable SX-4351, USAREUR to DA for DCOFS LOG/D2, 1 Jul 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above, FY 57 MAP Folder. (2) Cable DA-925472, DA from DCOFS LOG/D2 to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Jun 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In same file, FY 57 C&C Segment Folder.

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c. The Foreign Military Facilities Assistance Program. The Foreign Military Facilities Assistance Program had been instituted in FY 1954 as a part of MDAP-OSP for the purpose of increasing European production capacity for explosives and propellants. During FY 1957 USAREUR submitted preliminary reports on 31 tentative projects, and the Department of the Army approved projects for the United Kingdom, Ethiopia, Iraq, and France. All contracts for FMFAP were signed during the month of June 1957. On 3 June a contract was placed involving \$293,860 for the United Kingdom. On 28 June two more contracts were concluded for Ethiopia and Iraq involving \$110,109 and \$75,000, respectively. The last contract, involving \$1,388,450 for France, was completed on the next day. Total FMFAP obligations amounted to \$1,867,419.⁴⁴

90. Deutsche Mark Procurement

Total obligations for the Deutsche Mark procurement program for FY 1957--including the Air Force--amounted to DM 234,700,000 against DM 868,000,000 in FY 1956 and DM 2,322,000,000 in FY 1955. In FY 1957 DM 83,800,000 was obligated for supplies, DM 77,600,000 for construction, DM 46,600,000 for services, and DM 26,700,000 for real estate. Of the total amount, 62 percent was obligated by the area commands, 19 percent by the Air Force, 13 percent by the Engineer Division, and the remaining 6 percent by other procurement agencies in the command.⁴⁵

a. Expenditure of Occupation Cost Funds. Under the terms of the Bonn Conventions funds obligated from the occupation costs budget were to remain available for expenditure for 18 months after the end of the occupation period. According to this agreement, funds obligated before 6 May 1955 would have to be expended before 6 November 1956.⁴⁶ As of 22 October 1956 some DM 121,000,000 of construction funds and DM 11,500,000 of other funds remained unexpended. Moreover, the Air Force, at that time, still had an unexpended balance of DM 102,000,000.⁴⁷ The German Federal Ministry of Finance subsequently granted an indefinite extension for the liquidation of unexpended balances.

⁴⁴(1) Memo, USAREUR G4 Mgt Br to G4 Proc Br, 10 Jul 57, sub: Revision of Briefs, ACOFS G4 Briefing Notebook, w/Incl 5, FAP, 12 Jul 57. (2) Cable SX-4249, USAREUR to DA for DCOFS LOG/D2, 26 Jun 57. (3) Cable SX-4351, same to same, 1 Jul 57. All CONFIDENTIAL. All in file above, FY 57 MAP Folder.

⁴⁵DF, USAREUR G4 Proc Br to G4 Mgt Br, 18 Jul 57, sub: Information for QRLA, w/Incl 1. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

⁴⁶USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 231. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

⁴⁷DF, USAREUR Compt to COFS, 22 Oct 56, sub: Expenditure Deadline for Occupation Costs DM's. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 100 (1956), Vol. II.

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b. The USAREUR Board of Requisition Demand Appeals. In the past the handling of contract claims appeals resulting from procurement in Germany with occupation costs funds had caused friction with the Germans.⁴⁸ Political pressure exerted upon the West German Government led to a demand that German financial agencies be allowed to adjudicate all such claims. Negotiations were initiated early in 1956, leading to a tentative agreement just before the beginning of FY 1957. The agreement provided that subsequent to an agreed-upon date for transfer, the German Federal Republic would adjudicate all appeals from requisition order-demands for the U.S. forces, which had been issued prior to 5 May 1955. Certain types of appeals, however, such as those concerning real estate, those previously adjudicated, contracts containing waivers, and appeals untimely filed,⁴⁹ were excepted by the Federal Republic of Germany.⁵⁰

On 15 July 1956 USAREUR and Finance Ministry representatives met to conclude a final agreement concerning the turn-over date and the amount of funds to be made available to the Federal Ministry of Finance for adjudication of such claims. They agreed that settlement of claims appeals would be transferred to German control on 1 August 1956 and that the U.S. forces would make available a total of DM 6,000,000 for settlement of all claims. The latter provision was conditioned by an agreement to review requirements within three to four months--but not later than 1 November 1956--in order to determine whether USAREUR would have to furnish additional funds.⁵¹

The USAREUR Board of Requisition Demand Appeals continued to hear the cases scheduled for hearing up to 31 July 1956. Moreover, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, and the Judge Advocate Division agreed to screen all appeals prior to turning them over to the German Federal Republic.⁵²

⁴⁸USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 232. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

⁴⁹An announcement of a cut-off date for filing claims appeals had been published in the German Federal Gazette on 17 February 1956.

⁵⁰(1) Ltr, AMEMB Bonn to Ger Fed Min of Fin, 18 May 56. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, Ger Fed Min of Fin to AMEMB Bonn, 28 Jun 56. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR G4 Proc Br files. (3) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to COFS, 20 Nov 56, sub: Appellants Dissatisfaction with Decisions Rendered by BRDA. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 150 (1956), Vol. II.

⁵¹(1) Memo, USAREUR Compt to DCOFS, 16 Jul 56, sub: Settlement of Procurement Appeals. (2) Ltr, Fed Min of Fin to USAREUR Compt, 15 Jul 56. (3) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR Compt to Fed Min of Fin, 21 Jul 56. All UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR G4 Proc Br files.

⁵²Memo, Dep C/USAREUR G4 Proc Br to ACOFS G4, 27 Jul 56, sub: Turn-over of Occupation DM Appeals to the Federal Republic of Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

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(1) Discontinuance of the Board. After 1 August 1956 the board was engaged in transferring the cases on hand to the German Government. In January 1957 those subordinate commands having procurement responsibilities in Germany were directed to submit appeals on contract claims not later than 1 March 1957 so that proper screening action could be taken prior to transfer to the German Government. On 30 June 1957, the Board of Requisition Demand Appeals was discontinued and its residual activities transferred to the Procurement Branch of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4.⁵³

(2) Status of Procurement Claims and Appeals. From the date of its establishment, in 1 October 1954 to 30 June 1957, the Board of Requisition Demand Appeals received 588 appeals. Of this number, 55 were returned to the area commands for settlement; 22 were dropped or withdrawn; 280 were transferred to the German Government; 27 were denied without a hearing; 201 were actually heard by the board; and 3 cases were pending in the Judge Advocate Division on 30 June 1957. Of the 201 appeals heard by the board, awards were made in 108 cases for a total of DM 3,654,354, while 91 cases were denied, and 2 resulted in recovery of funds to the U.S. Government. The full amount claimed was awarded in only 28 of the 108 cases in which awards were made. The appeals submitted to the board amounted to a total of DM 75,354,990, while the cases actually heard involved DM 19,751,231.⁵⁴

c. The USAREUR Procurement Adjustment Board. In September 1956 a new board was created to hear appeals involving procurement orders in Germany using Deutsche Mark defense support funds. The new USAREUR Procurement Board was placed under the Judge Advocate Division; it had no jurisdiction over claims concerning the acquisition of real estate contracts issued to the German Federal Construction Agency.⁵⁵

91. Procurement in West Berlin

Even though the Deutsche Mark funds available for procurement had been sharply curtailed, procurement officers were asked to make continued efforts to place as many orders as possible in West Berlin during FY 1957.⁵⁶

⁵³(1) USAREUR ltr, 14 Jan 57, sub: Liquidation of Outstanding Occupational DM Procurement Accounts. AEAGD 150 (AG-AO). UNCLASSIFIED.

(2) DF, USAREUR G4 Proc Br to AG, 19 Jun 57, sub: Disestablishment of the BRDA. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above. (3) USAREUR GO 146, 11 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵⁴USAREUR G4 Proc Br, A History of Claims and Appeals Arising from the Issuance of Requisition Order-Demands by U.S. Forces in Germany, 1945-57, 11 Jul 57, pp. 13-14. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Proc Br files.

⁵⁵USAREUR GO 172, 12 Sep 56. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵⁶Cable SC-34701, USAREUR to all area comds, 27 Jun 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Proc Br files, 400.12 Berlin (1956), Vol. I.

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As late as March 1957 the responsible officers complained that procurement in West Berlin was hampered by the attitude of manufacturers and suppliers in that city. The suppliers remained complacent with regard to bid solicitation, failed to adhere to delivery schedules, were generally reluctant to deduct all taxes, and their price quotations compared unfavorably with those of West German suppliers.⁵⁷

During FY 1957 bid solicitations in the amount of \$30,122,845 were circulated to West Berlin suppliers. Of this amount, \$21,823,275 was for dollar procurement. Actual contracts placed amounted to \$11,920,654 or 39.2 percent of the bid solicitations, which was slightly more than the \$11,200,000 placed in West Berlin during FY 1956.⁵⁸

92. Debarment and Suspension of European Contractors

The policy concerning debarment and suspension of contractors and prospective contractors in Europe was reevaluated in 1956.⁵⁹ This reevaluation of policy permitted debarment upon showing of commission of fraud (rather than conviction of fraud) and was made applicable to nonappropriated fund activities and property disposal activities. A revised basic list of suspended and debarred contractors and prospective contractors was published in April 1957. This list was disseminated to all procurement officers who were bound to observe the imposed restrictions in the solicitation, award, and administration of U.S. contracts. As previously, they were warned that the information contained in the list could be released solely to authorized personnel.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Memo for rec, USAREUR G4 Proc Br, 3 Apr 57, sub: Berlin Procurement Meeting, 14-15 March 1957. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Proc Br files.

⁵⁸ USAREUR G4 Proc Br, Solicitation and Awards, West Berlin, 1 Jul 56-30 Jun 57. RCS-ECJD 9. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

⁵⁹ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 234. SECRET (info used FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY).

⁶⁰ (1) USAREUR Proc Cir 9, 17 May 57, sub: Clearances and Suspensions and Debarments of Contractors and Prospective Contractors.
(2) USAREUR Memo 715-5-9, 12 Apr 57, sub: USAREUR Consolidated List. Both FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

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Section IV: Supply Functions

93. Implementation of Depot Planning

a. Multiservice Storage Depots. The USACOMZEUR "Outline Plan for Major Communications Zone Installations and Their Missions," dated 24 November 1956, provided that each combat-essential line item would be stored in a minimum of 2 locations in BASEC and 3 locations in ADSEC, with 1 of the latter to be in the WACOM of Germany. On 7 January 1957 all personnel at the Bussac installation were placed under the Commanding Officer, Camp Bussac, for administrative purposes, and the U.S. Army Garrison, Bussac, was directed to commence operating a general depot on 1 March 1957. The Verdun Signal Depot was to be established as the first ADSEC general depot effective 1 July 1957. A similar multiservice installation was to be established at the Kaiserslautern Engineer Depot, effective 1 November 1957.⁶¹

b. Underground General Depots. During FY 1956 plans had been prepared to establish two underground general depots at Massweiler near Pirmasens in Germany and in the Vitry le Francois-St. Dizier area in France.⁶²

The Department of the Army objected to four major points in the USAREUR depot plans. The USAREUR general depot concept supported a field army rather than a corps, the recommended list of critical items to be stored was too long, the storing of ammunition in above-ground igloos was unsatisfactory, and the planned POL storage system was unacceptable.⁶³ USAREUR agreed to establish the two general depots so that they would support one corps each--the WACOM depot for V Corps and the ADSEC depot for VII Corps--and to reduce the number of items to be stored, even though the original list had been developed on an austerity basis. On the other hand, the inclusion of class V stockage in underground facilities would hinge on the availability of funds for this

⁶¹Ltr, COMZ to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Apr 57, sub: Dispersal of Depot Stocks Report (RCS AEAGD-183), AEZLG-SP 250/17 (U). CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED). In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files, 319.1 (1956-57).

⁶²USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 237-39. SECRET.

⁶³Ltr, Lt Gen C. B. Magruder, DCOFSA LOG, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, 13 Aug 56. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1956), Item 1.

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purpose. No decision on changing POL storage plans could be made until the ADSEC site had actually been selected and the cost of connecting the facility to the USAREUR pipeline system could be determined.⁶⁴ In September 1956, however, the Department of the Army dropped its objection to storing ammunition above ground in igloos. The change of policy was motivated by the amount of protection afforded by this type of storage in conjunction with its economy of construction.⁶⁵

(1) ADSEC Underground General Depot. The Department of the Army objected to locating the ADSEC depot in the St. Dizier area because it would be too far to the rear of the Rhine defense line. A location approximately 15 to 20 miles from Nancy seemed preferable. There was a possibility that construction funds might be withdrawn from the FY 1958 program unless this objection was met.⁶⁶ However, this suggested change in location ran counter to the French Government's decision not to authorize this type of depot in the Departments of Meurthe et Moselle, Moselle, Bas Rhin, and Vosges.⁶⁷ The French prohibition notwithstanding, USAREUR insisted that the depot be established in eastern France after attempts to reprogram the construction to Germany had failed.⁶⁸ By 30 June 1957 the French had failed to provide an adequate site in the area desired.⁶⁹

(2) WACOM Underground General Depot. The project had been included in the FY 1958 construction program for Germany, submitted on 1 May 1956.⁷⁰ Early in 1957 USAREUR was notified that the FY 1958 MCA

⁶⁴(1) DF, Comment 2, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Aug 54, to Comment 1, USAREUR SGS to ACOFS G4, 17 Aug 56, sub: Letter, dated 13 August 1956 from Gen Magruder to Gen Hodes re: Field General Depot Study. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Magruder, 22 Aug 56. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above.

⁶⁵Ltr, Gen Magruder to Gen Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, 7 Sep 56. SECRET. In file above.

⁶⁶(1) Ltr, Brig Gen F. Albrecht, ODCOFSA LOG, to Maj Gen A. J. McNamara, USAREUR ACOFS G4, 27 Nov 56. SECRET. (2) Memo for rec, Mr. C. H. Dickey, USAREUR G4 Sup Br, 23 Jan 57, sub: Small General Depot in USAREUR ADSEC (U). SECRET. Both in USAREUR G4 Sup Br files 323.3 (1956-57), Vol. II.

⁶⁷Cable AEZCG-C-278, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Jan 57. SECRET. In file above.

⁶⁸Ltr, Maj Gen A. J. McNamara, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to Brig Gen F. M. Albrecht, ODCOFSA LOG, 5 Apr 57. SECRET. In file above.

⁶⁹Memo, Act C/USAREUR G4 Instls Br to ACOFS G4, 19 Jul 57, sub: Cut-and-Cover Storage Area. SECRET. In file above.

⁷⁰DF, Comment 2, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Jun 56, to Comment 1, 14 Jun 56, sub: Logistical Problems Developed by Secretaries Robertson and Pike on their Visits to Europe. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1956), Item 1.

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New Authorization Program as approved by the Department of Defense contained no projects for Germany. The underground depot for WACOM could, however, be resubmitted for the FY 1959 program.⁷¹

In the meantime, the decision to locate the ADSEC depot in eastern France placed both the ADSEC and WACOM depots in the VII Corps area. The Department of the Army, therefore, directed that the WACOM depot be relocated in the northern Saarland--WACOM area so as to put it in the V Corps area. This decision was relayed to WACOM on 2 April 1957.⁷² As of 30 June 1957 no alternate location had been selected.

c. Guided Missile Storage. The deployment of special weapons and guided missile units in compliance with the pentomic reorganization plan for the ground combat forces created new storage problems. By 1960 the Department of the Army planned to station five types of such units in Europe--artillery battalions equipped with Honest John and Little John rockets, units equipped with Corporal and Redstone guided missiles, and antiaircraft units employing Nike guided missiles.⁷³ Depot plans provided for the above-ground storage of all class V special weapons in specially constructed igloos. The Department of the Army approved this concept in September 1956, mainly because the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project had adopted the practice of storing most of their atomic devices in specially designed and protected above-ground igloos. The front walls and doors of the proposed igloos were to be reinforced to provide an adequate degree of protection from an atomic blast.⁷⁴ Since the basic loads for the tactical units required no construction, only the reserve stockage requirements were of depot planning interest. The igloo

⁷¹(1) Cable DA-490788, DA from DCOFS LOG/M1 to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Jan 57. (2) Cable DA-918174, same to same, 19 Feb 57. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR G4 Sup Br files 323.3 (1956-57), Vol. II.

⁷²(1) Ltr, Brig Gen F. M. Albrecht, ODCOFS LOG, to Maj Gen A. J. McNamara, USAREUR ACOFS G4, 21 Feb 57. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Memo, C/USAREUR G4 Sup Br to C/Instls Br, 2 Apr 57, sub: Location of Underground Depots. SECRET. Both in file above.

⁷³USAREUR ltr, to CG COMZ, 18 Oct 56, sub: Guidelines for Construction Programming, LOFC France (U). AEAGD-IP 600.1 GD. SECRET. In file above.

⁷⁴(1) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Aug 56, sub: Letter, dated 13 August 1956, from Gen Magruder to Gen Hodes, re: Field Depot Study. (2) Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to Lt Gen C. B. Magruder, DCOFS LOG, 22 Aug 56. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1956), Vol. I, Item 1. (3) Ltr, Gen Magruder to Gen Hodes, 7 Sep 56. SECRET. In same file, Vol. III.

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requirements for 1 July 1956 and 1 July 1960, respectively, were as follows:

| <u>1 July 1956</u> | | | | <u>1 July 1960</u> | | | |
|---------------------|---------------|------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|---------------|------------------|----------------------|
| <u>Weapons Type</u> | <u>Number</u> | <u>Per Igloo</u> | <u>Igloos Needed</u> | <u>Weapons Type</u> | <u>Number</u> | <u>Per Igloo</u> | <u>Igloos Needed</u> |
| <u>Total</u> | | | <u>61</u> | <u>Total</u> | | | <u>296</u> |
| Corporal | 114 | 6 | 19 | Corporal | 182 | 6 | 31 |
| Honest John | 765 | 18 | 42 | Honest John | 1,312 | 18 | 73 |
| Redstone | 0 | 1 | 0 | Redstone | 102 | 1 | 102 |
| Little John | 0 | 50* | 0 | Little John | 1,148 | 50* | 25 |
| Nike | 0 | 26 | 0 | Nike | 840 | 26 | 33 |
| | | | | (Testing & Maintenance) | | | 32 |

*Estimated--no measurements available.

Of the 296 igloos required, the 148 located in Germany were completed by 30 June 1957. Sixty-three of these igloos were located at prestock points at North Point, Loersch, Bruchsal, Muenster, Bad Mergentheim, and Boeblingen. In addition, 85 igloos were available at the Ordnance Special Weapons Depot at Fischbach. The remaining 148 igloos required for the storage of the 1 July 1960 reserve requirements were to be located in France. The reduction of conventional ammunition stocks at the Trois Fontaines Ordnance Depot was expected to generate sufficient space to construct 37 igloos. If this plan was not feasible, consideration would be given to other locations in the same vicinity. The remaining ADSEC requirements consisted of 22 igloos to be constructed at or near the ADSEC underground general depot, but separate from the first 37 igloos. In addition, 44 igloos were to be constructed for the storage of conventional ammunition at the ADSEC underground general depot. Guided missile and special weapons storage in BASEC would require 89 igloos that were to be built at Captieux, where a reduction in the storage of conventional ammunition was to take place. However, in the interest of dispersion, COMZ explored the possibility of building some of these igloos at other BASEC installations within reasonable distance of Captieux.⁷⁵

94. Supply Distribution Planning

a. The Army Primary Program. The Army primary program for supply distribution established the basic, world-wide objectives and policies for receipt, storage, issue, care, and preservation of supplies. During

⁷⁵USAREUR ltr, to CG COMZ, 18 Oct 56, sub: Guidelines for Construction Programming, LOFC France (U), AEAGD-IP 600.1 GD, w/Incl 2, 16 Oct 56, sub: Guided Missile Requirements and Distribution. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files 323.3 (1956-57), Vol. II.

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FY 1957 general depots were to be used whenever such use would result in over-all savings to the government. The number of depots operated in overseas commands was to be at the discretion of the commander concerned, but depots were to be limited to the number required to perform an approved mission. In order to insure the proper dispersal of materiel for defense against chemical, biological, and radiological warfare, the establishment of subinstallations was authorized as required. In general, classes I, II, III, and IV stocks within overseas commands were to be maintained at a 30-day operating level and a 30-day safety level for operative stocks, computed at peacetime rates. Class IV stockage for recurring demand items was prescribed in pertinent regulations. Even so, the stockage of certain class IV items, which could not be justified under demand criteria, was authorized. These categories included standby stocks that were required to insure the uninterrupted capabilities of the command; utilities and service support items the absence of which would cause extreme hardship for troops, dependents, and U.S. civilian employees; and stocks to support approved project bills of materials.⁷⁶

b. USAREUR Supply Distribution Program. Based upon the Army primary program, the USAREUR supply distribution program for FY 1957 provided for the establishment of general depots in the command and for the reduction of inventories in depots and stations to the minimum consistent with the supply mission. USAREUR depots were to provide static storage space for approximately 1,500,000 short tons of supplies exclusive of bulk POL, and for the issue of approximately 1,000,000 short tons. Materiel received in the theater supply organization was generated through offshore procurement, command rebuild activities, shipment from the United States, excess usable property, and diverted shipments. No storage space would be required for items shipped directly from the manufacturer or retailer to the consumer or for Project MASS (Modern Army Supply System). Moreover, units would be issued their full authorized allowances subject to established priorities and their ability to properly store, maintain, and use the materiel in both their current and foreseeable missions. Full consideration was to be given to reductions in unit allowances based on the development of equipment modification lists or other modifying authorization documents.⁷⁷

c. Post D-day Logistical Support. Shortly before the end of FY 1956--the instructions did not arrive until after 1 July 1957--the Department of the Army revised the reserve stockage levels by adding a section heretofore not included.⁷⁸ USAREUR was authorized to store Sections II and III items of the selected nonpriority list computed on a 90-day level at combat rates for D-day strengths, subject to existing

⁷⁶DA Supply Distribution and Maintenance Program, Change Orders 1, 17 Feb 56; 4, 16 Jan 57. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁷⁷Program 9, USAREUR Supply Distribution and Maintenance Program, Change Order 1, 25 May 56. SECRET.

⁷⁸For background information, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 240-42. SECRET.

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or currently programmed storage capability. This action greatly increased the number of items that could be stored in Special Theater Reserve No. 1, thus eliminating one of USAREUR's main objections to the new storage program.⁷⁹ In September 1956 the Department of the Army modified its policy of storing supplies for current strengths computed at peacetime levels by allowing a safety level for items not included in the combat reserve. USAREUR was authorized to use combat reserve items to permit continued operations in the event of minor interruption of the normal replenishment schedule or unpredicted fluctuations in supply demands.⁸⁰

In November 1956 the corresponding revisions were made in the authorized stockage levels for storage in Special Theater Reserve No. 1. Classes II and IV items to include repair parts were reduced to a 75-day level for D-day strengths plus an additional 15 days for the D-plus-30 strengths. In addition, Sections II and III items of the selected nonpriority list were to be computed on a 75-day level at combat rates for D-day strengths. The storage of classes II and IV items contained in the combat reserve was reduced to a 30-day safety level, whereas items in these two classes that were not included in the combat reserve remained at the 60-day level.⁸¹ Thus the safety level for classes II and IV items contained in the Special Theater Reserve No. 1 was reduced from 60 to 30 days at the same time that the combat level, itself, was reduced from 90 to 75 days.⁸² During FY 1957 supply agencies operated on the reduced 30-day level for these items of supply while maintaining the integrity of the 75-day level in the combat reserve. This policy was adhered to even though USAREUR was authorized to use the 75-day combat reserve level for operating purposes when required.⁸³

d. Revision of Department of the Army Special Reserves. The Department of the Army instructions issued in May 1956 with regard to the revision of Special Theater Reserves No. 1 and No. 3 were designed to bring Special Reserve No. 3 import tonnages into line with USAREUR's post D-day port handling capabilities. The revision of the two reserve stockpiles reduced the first 3 shipments of Special Reserve No. 3 to combat-essential hard goods, increased the theater stockage of the same

⁷⁹DA ltr, 28 Jun 56, sub: Post D-day Logistical Support of USAREUR (U). AGAM-P (M) 400 (19 Jun 56) DCSLOG. SECRET.

⁸⁰Cable DA-909571, DA from DCOFS LOG/C3 to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Sep 56. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files 6.17a (1956-57), Vol. II, Item 28 atchd.

⁸¹DA ltr, 5 Nov 56, sub: Post D-day Logistical Support of USAREUR (U). AGAM-P (M) 400 (25 Oct 56) DCSLOG. SECRET.

⁸²Memo for rec, Maj H. A. Buckley, USAREUR G4 Sup Br, 29 Nov 56, sub cited above. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files 6.17a (1956-57), Vol. I, Item 28 atchd.

⁸³Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. W. Davis, USAREUR G4 Sup Br, 23 Jul 57. SECRET.

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items (in Special Theater Reserve No. 1), and reduced nonessential items proportionately in order to create the necessary storage space in the command. After receiving these instructions, supply control agencies prepared and submitted requisitions to the Department of the Army for Special Theater Reserve No. 3 items, revised Special Theater Reserve No. 1 to eliminate nonpriority items and to adjust levels, and screened all authorized class IV projects. This action was completed by 30 June 1957.⁸⁴

95. Supply

a. Command Stocks on Hand. At the end of FY 1957 USAREUR had 1,894,702 short tons of stock on hand, which was approximately 300,000 short tons more than a year before (Table 8). All command stocks were stored in USACOMZEUR depots, whether their physical location was in Germany or France.⁸⁵

b. Special Theater Reserve No. 1. Army Special Theater Reserve No. 1 was a reserve of materiel for the post D-day logistical support of U.S. Army forces in Europe, plus a limited quantity of supplies earmarked for the reinforcements scheduled to arrive by D plus 30.⁸⁶

At the beginning of FY 1957 the Special Theater Reserve No. 1, consisting of 31 numbered sections plus a 60-day combat reserve, was being screened and revised. In October the Department of the Army authorized the addition of Section 32 which contained equipment for the handling of bulk POL.⁸⁷ (For the composition and status of the Special Theater Reserve No. 1 on 30 June 1957, see Table 9).

c. Critical Equipment in Short Supply. At the beginning of FY 1957, shortages of critical items of combat-essential equipment existed only in the ordnance class V materiel for the defensive barrier line listed in Section 9 of the Special Theater Reserve No. 1.⁸⁸ By 30 June 1957 the

⁸⁴(1) Ibid. (2) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to COFS, 15 Oct 56, sub: Visit of GAO Team for the Purpose of Reviewing the Theater Reserve Program, w/Incl 1, Briefing for the GAO Team. SECRET. In file above.

⁸⁵(1) USACOMZEUR Depot Opr and Program Performance Rept, 30 Jun 57. RCS-CSGLD-807. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files. (2) USAREUR Qtrly Rev of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 57, pp. 30-39. CONFIDENTIAL. (3) USACOMZEUR Performance Rept, 31 Jul 57, pp. 66-69. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁸⁶For further details, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 242-47. SECRET.

⁸⁷DA ltr, 15 Oct 56, sub: Sec 32, Project ARMY-EUCOM-GEN-102-50-OP (U). AGAM-P (M) (3 Oct 56) DCSLOG. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁸⁸USAREUR Qtrly Rev of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 56, p. 6. SECRET.

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Table 8--Command Stocks on Hand, 30 June 1957

| | <u>Totals</u> | <u>a/</u> | <u>Percent</u> | <u>Ammunition</u> | <u>End</u> | <u>Repair</u> | <u>Subsistence</u> | <u>Others</u> |
|----------------|------------------|-----------------|----------------|-------------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------|
| | | <u>Of Total</u> | | | <u>Items</u> | <u>Parts</u> | | |
| <u>Totals</u> | <u>1,894,702</u> | <u>100.0</u> | | <u>375,022</u> | <u>544,008</u> | <u>276,167</u> | <u>109,430</u> | <u>590,075</u> |
| Chemical | 5,676 | .3 | | 1,222 | 4,082 | 372 | | |
| Engineer | 292,142 | 15.4 | | | 263,723 | 28,419 | | |
| Medical | 13,786 | .7 | | | 13,786 | | | |
| Ordnance | 767,988 | 40.5 | | 373,800 | 145,354 | 241,519 | | 7,315 |
| Quartermaster | 747,897 | 39.5 | | | 77,595 | 2,636 | 109,430 | 558,236 |
| Signal | 36,118 | 1.9 | | | 36,118 | | | |
| Transportation | 31,095 | 1.7 | | | 3,350 | 3,221 | | 24,524 |

b/

a/ All tonnage figures in short tons
b/ Rail equipment and water craft

Source: USACOMZEUR Depot Opr and Program Performance Rept, 30 Jun 57.
RCS-CSGLD-807. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files.

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Table 9--Special Theater Reserve No. 1, 30 June 1957

| | <u>Target</u> (short tons) | <u>On Hand</u> | <u>Percent</u> |
|---|-------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| <u>Total</u> | <u>913,061</u> | <u>781,162</u> | <u>85.5</u> |
| <u>Subtotal</u> | <u>416,398</u> | <u>337,334</u> | <u>81.0</u> |
| <u>Section</u> | | | |
| 5 - Medical combat replacement and expansion units | 1,235 | 1,225 | 99.1 |
| 7 - Engineer bridging equipment for training and emergency use | 59,993 | 54,277 | 90.4 |
| 9 - Barrier line | 129,406 | 115,920 | 89.5 |
| 10 - Vans for machine records unit <u>a/</u> | 8 | 8 | 100.0 |
| 13 - Noncombatant evacuation order | 17,268 | 16,347 | 92.9 |
| 15 - 60-day maintenance and replacement reserve for Air Force | 3,678 | 3,242 | 88.1 |
| 16 - POL 6-inch military flexible pipeline material | 82,525 | 81,947 | 99.3 |
| 17 - Port rehabilitation | 9,484 | 9,386 | 98.9 |
| 18 - Items to augment water supply capability | 299 | 270 | 90.3 |
| 19 - Fire fighting equipment | 759 | 730 | 96.1 |
| 20 - Camouflage material | 1,303 | 989 | 75.5 |
| 21 - Construction supplies and equipment | 7,857 | 6,978 | 88.8 |
| 22 - Censorship supplies | 171 | 171 | 100.0 |
| 24 - Equipment for groups F&G (major headquarters) | 548 | 458 | 83.5 |
| 25 - Chemical, biological, radiological equipment | 1,598 | 1,598 | 100.0 |
| 26 - Generator Reserve for USACOMZEUR | 606 | 478 | 78.8 |
| 27 - Fuel contaminants | 37 | 37 | 100.0 |
| 28 - Railway cars | 36,357 | 1,908 | 5.2 |
| 29 - Floating equipment reserve | 28,083 | 11,868 | 42.2 |
| 30 - TOE equipment for airlift units | 19,746 | 14,896 | 75.4 |
| 31 - Engineer items for beach stabilization and airfield construction | 15,310 | 14,495 | 94.6 |
| 32 - POL bulk handling equipment | 127 | 106 | 83.5 |
| <u>60-day Combat Reserve <u>b/</u></u> | <u>Subtotal</u> | <u>496,663</u> | <u>443,828</u> |
| | | | <u>89.3</u> |

a/ Material does not show up in USACOMZEUR status reports since vans have been physically transferred to USAREUR MRU for storage and maintenance.

b/ QM classes I and III supplies include requirements for Air Force.

Source: USAREUR Qtrly Rev of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 57, pp. 47-48.

SECRET. Info on Section 10 from USAREUR G4 Sup Br. SECRET.

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shortages in Section 9 had not been eliminated and new ones of critical engineer bridging equipment had appeared in Section 7. The engineer equipment in short supply included M2 assault boats, infantry support rafts, 5-ton bridge trucks, and 2½-ton bolster body trucks. This equipment was due in from supply depots in the United States during FY 1958. Ordnance class V shortages in Section 9 consisted of M1 demolition kits, M49 trip flares, T37 antipersonnel mines, 40-pound cratering charges, powder-activated fastener devices, and pull-type firing devices. Except for the trip flares and demolition kits, which were scheduled to arrive in Europe during the second quarter of FY 1958, it was not known when these items would become available.⁸⁹

d. Special Theater Reserve No. 3. Special Theater Reserve No. 3 was composed of materiel stored in the United States or earmarked from D-day production capacity. In the event of an emergency this reserve would be shipped in eight increments in order to extend theater supply support to USAREUR until such time as normal resupply procedures could be established. The initial increments consisted of the same combat-essential items as the Special Theater Reserve No. 1. Later shipments were to contain those items for which the command had submitted requisitions.⁹⁰ For the status of Special Theater Reserve No. 3 on 30 June 1957, both by types and classes of supply and by shipment number, see Table 10.

e. Major Equipment Exchange Programs. During FY 1957 USAREUR completed Project SWAPPO with the Air Force. This project, which had been initiated at the beginning of FY 1955, provided M-series vehicles for the replacement of all World War II vehicles in possession of the Air Force in the European, Mediterranean, and United Kingdom areas. Excluded from the program were special purpose vehicles and those peculiar to the Air Force. Some 13,000 vehicles were rebuilt under USAREUR supervision in commercial facilities in West Berlin, Italy, and the United Kingdom, and the funds and personnel spaces needed for this purpose were provided by the Department of the Army. The rebuilt vehicles were delivered to MDAP recipients, and excess spare parts were disposed of by filling Army requirements, or by making shipments to MDAP recipients, or by using property disposal channels. Contracts were revised as necessary to reflect the vehicle turn-in rates from Air Force units and installations. The last contract placed with an Italian firm, was terminated on 14 December 1956, and USAREUR accepted the last vehicle under this contract on 31 December 1956. Altogether 13,109 vehicles were rebuilt, with West Berlin firms working on 5,151 vehicles, British

⁸⁹USAREUR Qtrly Rev of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 57, pp. 44-45. SECRET.

⁹⁰Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to COFS, 15 Oct 56, sub: Visit of the GAO Team for the Purpose of Reviewing the Theater Reserve Program, w/Incl 1, Briefing for GAO Team. SECRET. In G4 Sup Br files 6.17a.(1956-57), Vol. II, Item 28 atchd.

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Table 10--Special Theater Reserve No. 3, Percentage of Availability by Shipment Number, 30 June 1957

| | <u>1</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>3</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>5</u> | <u>6</u> | <u>7</u> | <u>8</u> |
|--|-----------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------|------------------------|--------------|
| Chemical Classes II, IV | 97 | ZZ713-97 ZZ715-100 | 97 | ZZ718-97 ZZ720-100 | ZZ721-93 ZZ723-100 | 93 | 90 | 93 |
| Engineer Classes II, IV | 100 | 40 | 97 | 70 | 60 | 55 | 50 | 50 |
| Ordnance Classes II, IV | AAM300-73 | AAM301 76 | AAM302-77 AAM303-76 | AAM304 60 | AAM305-65 AAM306-66 | AAM307 62 | AAM308-60 AAM309-56 | AAM310 56 |
| Ordnance Class V | 95 | 92 | 90 | 79 | 79 | 73 | 56 | 42 |
| Quartermaster Classes II, IV | | | | | | | | |
| General Supplies | 100 | 93 | 93 | 89 | 86 | c/ | | |
| Equipment | 100 | 92 | 100 | 92 | 90 | | | |
| Quartermaster Class III | | | | | | | | |
| Handling and laboratory and special Products | a/ | a/ | a/ | 98 | 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 |
| Product | 40 | 23 | 20 | b/ | | | | |

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Table 10--Special Theater Reserve No. 3, Percentage of Availability
by Shipment Number, 30 June 1957--Continued

| Number | <u>1</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>3</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>5</u> | <u>6</u> | <u>7</u> | <u>8</u> |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Signal Major Items | 86 | 87 | 85 | 88 | 87 | 86 | 84 | 82 |
| Signal Maintenance Items | 96 | 95 | 94 | 88 | 87 | 86 | 84 | 82 |
| Medical | 100 | 100 | 100 | d/ | | | | |
| Transportation ^{e/} | Availability Undetermined | | | | | | | |

- a/ Requirement is for one (1) item, which is not available.
- b/ Prestockage not required.
- c/ Firm availability for shipments No. 6, 7, and 8 has not been determined.
- d/ Because of Single Manager System, no firm statements of availability for shipments No. 4 through No. 8 could be made.
- e/ Transportation items located in Air Force depots are now in process of being transferred to DA depots and application of subject assets against Special Reserve No. 3 requirements cannot be accomplished until this action has been completed.

Source: Ltr, DA DCSLOG to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Aug 57, sub: Post D-day Logistical Support of USAREUR. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files.

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Funding was the major problem area in the Seventh Army test of MASS, with USAREUR funds being either allocated to depots in the United States or expended at depots within the command. No trouble was experienced with funding the requisitions handled by USAREUR depots. With respect to requisitioning on supply depots in the United States, however, serious problems soon arose because of a shortage of funds.⁹⁶ In January 1957 the Department of the Army therefore suggested that USAREUR withdraw an additional \$10,000,000 from its annual funding program to meet requirements in the United States created by Seventh Army Project MASS requisitions. While this transfer of funds raised total USAREUR funds available for allocation to depots in the United States to \$32,882,000,⁹⁷ the unobligated balance of Project MASS funds in the United States on 25 January 1957 was reduced to \$721,659.

| | <u>Annual Funding Program</u> | <u>Obligations</u> | <u>Remaining</u> |
|---------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| <u>Totals</u> | <u>\$ 32,882,000</u> | <u>\$ 32,160,341</u> | <u>\$ 721,659</u> |
| Ordnance | 28,882,000 | 28,882,000 ⁹⁸ | 0 |
| Signal | 2,100,000 | 2,016,233 | 83,767 |
| Engineer | 1,400,000 | 875,522 | 524,478 |
| Quartermaster | 400,000 | 293,666 | 106,334 |
| Chemical | 100,000 | 92,920 | 7,080 |

As a consequence, the Chief of Ordnance, Department of the Army, was directed to immediately cease filling any Seventh Army requisitions except those for which funds had already been obligated. The resumption of supply action would depend upon the provision of additional funds by USAREUR.⁹⁹ Seventh Army, in turn, was forced to suspend its requisitions for ordnance or signal items except for emergency requirements during the period from 16 through 24 February 1957.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj R. H. Johnson, USAREUR G4 Sup Br, 9 Oct 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁹⁷ (1) USAREUR G4 Stf Jnl, Daily Log, 7 Jan 57, p. 1, Item 2. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Telecon DA-TT-9262, 11 Jan 57, USAREUR and DCOFS LOG. UNCLASSIFIED. In G4 Mgt Br files (FY 57), Proj MASS Telecon & Ltr file.

⁹⁸ As of 31 January 1957.

⁹⁹ Sig Corps Svc Msg, 12 Feb 57, Maj Gen F. J. Brown, ODCOFS LOG, to Maj Gen A. J. McNamara, USAREUR ACOFS G4. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

¹⁰⁰ Ltr, Lt Gen B. C. Clarke, CG Seventh Army, to Lt Gen C. B. Magruder, DCOFS LOG, 6 Feb 57, w/Incl 1, Cable, Seventh Army to all maj comdrs. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files 401.B (FY 57).

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shops on 3,063 and Italian firms on 4,895. The delivery to MDAP recipients was completed by 30 June 1957.⁹¹

f. Project MASS. During FY 1957 tests of the new Modern Army Supply System (MASS) were carried out in the Seventh Army area, and at the beginning of the last quarter MASS was extended to USACOMZEUR.

(1) The Seventh Army Test. Seventh Army tests of MASS began on 1 July 1956.⁹² In a survey of the functioning of the system in November 1956, the Department of the Army Maintenance Board listed some of the deficiencies that prevented Seventh Army from accruing the full benefits of MASS. To begin with, Seventh Army stocks were inadequate for the test. Also, a definite lack of understanding prevailed at all echelons, and too many local ground rules were being injected into the system. Finally, a lack of confidence in MASS's effectiveness led to overrequisitioning and the creation of unauthorized stock reserves at certain lower levels.⁹³

In February 1957 a Seventh Army board of general officers was appointed to survey the functioning of Project MASS in Seventh Army.⁹⁴ Upon receiving this board's report, the Department of the Army selected four deficiencies as items of major interest. These included the charges that the funds provided were not sufficient to permit an unhampered and valid test of MASS, that Seventh Army had insufficient stocks at the outset, that the time allowed for resupply was not adequate, and that old equipment was creating an abnormal demand for both parts and funds. The Department of the Army considered the report as invaluable in pointing up crucial problem areas before MASS was extended to other overseas commands. Since the deficiencies listed in the report could be corrected, the Seventh Army test had proven the feasibility of Project MASS.⁹⁵

⁹¹(1) USAREUR G4 Stf Jnl, Daily Log, 7 Dec 56. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col B. H. Schimmel, Dep C/USAREUR Ord Proc Cen Ind Div, 8 Oct 57. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁹²Ltr, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to Asst DCOFS LOG, 21 Jun 56, sub: Status of Project MASS. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files (1956), Proj MASS folder, Vol. I.

⁹³Memo, Pres., DA Maint Bd, to CG Seventh Army, 12 Nov 56, sub: Project MASS and Organizational Maintenance in Seventh Army. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files 401.A (FY 57), Vol. II.

⁹⁴Ltr, Lt Gen B. C. Clarke, CG Seventh Army, to Maj Gen B. Hamlett, CG 10th Div, 7 Feb 57, sub: Survey of Functioning of Operation MASS in Seventh U.S. Army. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

⁹⁵Ltr, DCOFS LOG, to CG Seventh Army, thru CINCUSAREUR, 9 Apr 57, sub: Seventh Army Board Report on the Test of Project MASS, dtd 11 Feb-1 Mar 1957, Vols. I & II. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

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Further complications arose during the mid-year review of the USAREUR funding program by the Department of the Army. At this time USAREUR requested approval of a \$10 million reprogramming action and \$12 million in new funds, both of which were to be used to finance Project MASS operations. The Department not only denied the \$12 million request, but deleted a further \$6.7 million from Project 2200 funds. Despite this cut in operating funds, on 25 February 1957 USAREUR approved the transfer of \$6 million in credits to Project MASS so that Seventh Army could resume its requisitioning.¹⁰¹ Since approximately half of the \$12 million request by USAREUR had been intended to finance a new stockage list, the Department of the Army decided to finance this project indirectly through the following credit policy: Seventh Army was to return to USAREUR for 100 percent credit all stockage list quantities on hand that were in excess of revised FY 1957 Table of Organization requirements; USAREUR was to grant 100 percent value on returns of serviceable items that had been procured with FY 1957 funds outside the Seventh Army Revised Stock List; and Seventh Army was to expedite the turn-in of all unserviceable major assemblies. This transaction generated \$7.3 million in credits for Seventh Army's Project MASS and in addition the Comptroller of the Army was directed to restore the \$6.7 million previously deleted from the USAREUR funding program. With this \$14 million the Project MASS test would be continued until other sources of funding could be explored.¹⁰²

Further relief came during April 1957, when the Department of the Army permitted a deviation from AR 37-65 whereby sales return credits could be granted for excesses generated during the test phases of Project MASS. This policy coupled with other reprogramming actions enabled USAREUR to allocate an additional \$22 million in consumer credits by mid-May, thus permitting Seventh Army to requisition up to authorized stock levels before the end of FY 1957.¹⁰³

(2) USAREUR MASS. In September 1956 USAREUR was notified that Project MASS would be extended to USACOMZEU no later than 1 April 1957.¹⁰⁴ Final agreement on the establishment of USAREUR MASS was reached in March

¹⁰¹(1) Ltr, Maj Gen A. J. McNamara, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to Gen Clarke, 12 Mar 57. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen F. J. Brown, ODCOFS LOG, to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, 19 Mar 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR G4 Mgt Br files (FY 57), Proj MASS Telecon & Ltr file.

¹⁰²(1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR Memo 700-5-6, 5 Apr 57, w/Incl 1, DA Memo for rec, 13 Mar 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰³(1) Cable SC-23289, USAREUR to Seventh Army, 12 Apr 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above. (2) Ltr, Gen Clarke to Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, 2 Jul 57, w/Incl 1. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files, 401.B (FY 57).

¹⁰⁴Cable DA-458692, DA from DCOFS LOG/C3 to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Sep 56, UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

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1957. This agreement provided that the system would apply to all organizational and field maintenance repair parts with the exception of medical items and transportation surface items. Repair parts for base rebuild of engineer items would also be included. USACOMZEUR was to establish a separate stock control point that was in no way connected with the previously established Seventh Army stock control point.¹⁰⁵ Project MASS was extended to USACOMZEUR, the area commands, Berlin, and Bremerhaven on 1 April 1957 despite shortages of electrical accounting machines and other electronic equipment.¹⁰⁶ No serious difficulties were experienced prior to the end of FY 1957.

(3) Integration of USAREUR and Seventh Army MASS. According to the plans for the future consolidation of the two MASS operations in Europe, Seventh Army would route its requisitions through the USAREUR MASS stock control point rather than transmit them directly to the United States.¹⁰⁷ USAREUR, however, preferred to delay the integration of the two systems until the USAREUR stock control point was operating so well that it could handle the additional workload. The Department of the Army approved 1 October 1957 as the target date for full integration. By the end of May 1957, however, a possibility existed that one or more of the technical services, or certain categories of MASS items could be integrated prior to the October deadline.¹⁰⁸

(4) Extension of Project MASS to USAFE. With the establishment of USAREUR MASS, the extension to USAFE common-user items was under discussion. Since this extension would enable USAREUR to operate a single supply system for all repair parts, USAFE concurred and requested that the implementing plans be prepared.¹⁰⁹ While the USACOMZEUR plan for the extension received the concurrence of USAFE on 30 April 1957, further staffing action by that headquarters prevented implementation

¹⁰⁵USAREUR Memo 700-5-6, 5 Apr 57, w/Incl 1, 13 Mar 57, both cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰⁶USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf No. 6, 9 Apr 57, p. 3. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰⁷DF, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to Sig Off, 25 Mar 57, sub: Integration of Project MASS, Seventh Army Area and USAREUR MASS. AEAGD-RR-400-GD. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files 401.H, MASS Integration (FY 57).

¹⁰⁸(1) Ltr, Maj Gen F. A. Brown, ODCOFS LOG, to Maj Gen A. T. McNamara, USAREUR ACOFS G4, 18 Apr 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files, 401.B (FY 57). (2) Cable SC-30386, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 31 May 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files 401.H, MASS Integration (FY 57).

¹⁰⁹Memo for rec, Maj John Erb, USAREUR G4 Sup Br, 22 Mar 57, sub: Extension of USAREUR MASS to USAFE for Common Item Support. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files 401.A (FY 57), Vol. II.

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of the plan before 30 June 1957.¹¹⁰

96. The FED-REP-GER Program

The FED-REP-GER Program was a Department of the Army project for the storage of materiel destined for the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1952 it had been decided to stockpile the bulk of this materiel in the United States for future direct shipment to the Federal Republic of Germany. All supplies and items of equipment that USAREUR allocated to this program from excess stocks or offshore procurement were carried in separate property accounts. During FY 1957 USAREUR delivered supplies and equipment specified on the basic lists of requirements developed by the Office of the Secretary of the Army. The shipment schedules were furnished by MAAG, Bonn. By 30 June 1957 USAREUR had made available 61.6 percent of the programmed items and had shipped 31.4 percent of the programmed materiel to the Federal Republic of Germany. (Table 11.)¹¹¹

97. Maintenance Operations

a. Depot Maintenance. The FY 1957 USAREUR program called for rebuilding equipment valued at \$222,452,000 at a total cost of \$47,948,000, for a return of \$4.64 for each dollar expended. Actually, material valued at \$191,674,000, or 86 percent of the objective, was rebuilt at a cost of \$30,545,000 representing a return of \$6.28 for each dollar expended.¹¹²

b. Field Maintenance. USAREUR's objective in field maintenance activities was to eliminate backlogs of equipment in excess of 45 days, and to maintain a backlog consistent with efficient shop operations and with the requirements of the users of the equipment. According to the Department of the Army an acceptable standard was a backlog of not over 10 working days.¹¹³

¹¹⁰(1) 2nd Ind, USAFE to CG USACOMZEUR thru CINCUSAREUR, 30 Apr 57, sub cited above. AEZLG-SP/280/56, Hq USACOMZEUR (15 Mar 56). (2) 5th Ind, Hq 12th AF to CG USACOMZEUR, 26 Jun 57, same sub. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file above.

¹¹¹USAREUR Qtrly Rev of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 57, pp. 56-58. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

¹¹²(1) Ibid., pp. 59-67. (2) Program 9, USAREUR Supply Distribution and Maintenance Program, FY 57, Change Order No. 1, 25 May 56. Both SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

¹¹³(1) USAREUR Qtrly Rev of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 57, pp. 68-71. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL). (2) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to Hist Div, 29 Nov 57, sub: Review of Draft Chapter of USAREUR Annual Historical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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Table 11--MAP Materiel Shipped from and Stored in USAREUR Depots for FED-REP-GER, FY 1957

| | Units. | | | Tonnage | |
|----------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|
| | Total Programmed for Storage | Shipped | Stored <u>a/</u> | Programmed for Storage | Shipped |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>117,457,496</u> | <u>46,114,272</u> | <u>35,877,960</u> | <u>210,795.3</u> | <u>66,211.7</u> |
| <u>Categories of Items</u> | | | | | |
| <u>Ordnance - Total</u> | <u>117,456,568</u> | <u>46,114,272</u> | <u>35,877,032</u> | <u>210,484.6</u> | <u>66,202.7</u> |
| Classes II, IV | 7,460 | 7,080 | 380 | 63,862.8 | 43,073.5 |
| Class V | 117,449,108 | 46,107,199 | 35,876,652 | 146,621.8 | 23,129.2 |
| <u>Signal - Total</u> | <u>928</u> | <u>0</u> | <u>928</u> | <u>310.7</u> | <u>9.0</u> |
| | | | | | <u>301.7</u> |

a/ By DA authority.

Source: USAREUR Qtrly Rev of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 57, pp. 56-58. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

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USAREUR expenditures for field maintenance totaled \$122,554,935 or approximately 101 percent of the FY 1957 program estimates for such operations. The Engineer, Ordnance and Transportation Divisions were within their cost estimates, while the Quartermaster was slightly above, and the Chemical and Signal Divisions some 20 percent above their program estimates. As of 30 June 1957 approximately 12.8 percent of the jobs remaining on hand in field maintenance shops exceeded a 45-day backlog. (Table 12.) There were 164 field maintenance shops--78 fixed installations and 86 TOE units--or 8 more than in FY 1956. These shops employed 14,616 personnel or 1,816 more than during the previous year. Sixty-seven percent of the personnel were military and the remainder mainly LWR personnel.¹¹⁴

c. Instorage Maintenance of Ammunition. During FY 1957 ammunition depots continued to place emphasis on developing modern facilities and equipment in order to increase their instorage maintenance capability to 60,000 tons per year by FY 1958. Meanwhile, maintenance requirements increased particularly at the Trois Fontaines and Captieux Ordnance Depots, where the heavy condensation of moisture affected the separate loading shells that were stored in certain types of prefabricated huts. Since these depots did not have sufficient igloo or bunker storage space, no satisfactory solution could be found. On 1 May 1957 responsibility for operational control of the Ammunition Maintenance Program was transferred to the USACOMZEUR Ordnance Division. The USAREUR Ordnance Division, however, retained the policy and planning responsibilities for instorage maintenance of ammunition.¹¹⁵

The FY 1957 instorage maintenance program concerned ammunition stocks valued at \$40,000,000. As of 30 June 1957 ammunition stocks worth \$30,000,000 or about 75 percent of the programmed amount had been rendered serviceable.¹¹⁶

98. Disposal of Excess Property

CINCUSAREUR was assigned the missions of formulating and implementing coordinated policies and of exercising technical supervision over the disposition of foreign excess personal property generated by the three component services in France, Germany, and the Benelux countries.¹¹⁷ (Chart 5.) As of 1 July 1956 over \$226 million worth or 21 percent of USAREUR command stocks was excess to the command's needs. In addition, the value of foreign excess personal property, including scrap and salvage,

¹¹⁴USAREUR Qtrly Rev of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 57, pp. 68-72. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

¹¹⁵Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col S. R. Hicks & Mr. A. F. Lehr, USAREUR Ord Div Ammo Br, 9 Oct 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹¹⁶Info from USAREUR Ord Div Ammo Br. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹¹⁷US EUCOM Policy Dir 65-5, 17 Aug 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Table 12--USAREUR Field Maintenance Job Results, FY 1957

| Technical Services | Jobs Completed | | On Hand at End of Period | |
|--------------------|-----------------|--|--------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | Annual Forecast | Cumulative FY 1957 Percent Accomplished | Over 45 Days | Total Days Required to Process |
| USAREUR Total | 4,418,730 | 4,480,723 101 | 18,067 | 140,141 7 |
| Chemical | 124,898 | 123,966 100 | 0 | 153 - |
| Engineer | 15,015 | 16,658 110 | 233 | 846 14 |
| Ordnance | 1,546,077 | 1,573,567 102 | 13,158 | 72,639 11 |
| Quartermaster | 2,569,138 | 2,616,146 102 | 3,601 | 61,956 6 |
| Signal | 142,890 | 136,100 95 | 859 | 4,014 8 |
| Transportation | 20,712 | 14,286 70 | 216 | 533 11 |

Source: USAREUR Qtrly Rev of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 57, pp. 70-71. SECRET (info used
CONFIDENTIAL).

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UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE



LEGEND:

Command Channels
All Navy excess property is
property disposal office

----- Tech Supervision
Army and/or Air Force

Source: (1) USAREUR G4 Sup Br. (2) EUCOM Policy Dir 65-5. UNCLASSIFIED.

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was estimated at \$45 million. This foreign excess was occupying 90,000 square feet of covered storage and 836,000 square feet of open storage space, at a time when storage space was at a premium.¹¹⁸ While a solution was being sought to the excess property problem, U.S. General Accounting Office (USGAO) investigations indicated that USAREUR units requisitioned stock items that were identical with items that had been declared excess and were awaiting disposal action.¹¹⁹

a. Organizational and Procedural Changes. On 1 October 1956 the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, assumed responsibility for the entire property disposal program, from the development of policy to actual sales or other means of disposition. Under his direct control operated the USAREUR Property Disposal Detachment--the former Property Disposal Division of the Frankfurt Quartermaster Market Center--which was assigned to NACOM for administrative purposes.¹²⁰

During FY 1957 many refinements were introduced into the property disposal procedures. These included integrity and liability checks for potential bidders and the establishment of a list of international bidders. In the field of management improvement USAREUR initiated a monthly news letter for disposal activities, scheduled command conferences on property disposal, instituted a property disposal management course, and prepared a procedures manual for property disposal activities. Perhaps the greatest improvement, however, was the substitution of spot-bid, retail, and auction sales methods for the former sealed-bid sales procedures.¹²¹

b. Accomplishments. The excess property disposal program was executed in two phases--the declaration and identification of supplies and equipment no longer required, and the utilization and disposition of property so declared as excess. The initial FY 1957 objectives were \$200 million for declaration of excess property, and \$175 million for utilization and disposition. On 1 January 1957 these objectives were revised to \$300 million for declaration, and \$275 million for utilization and disposition. By 30 June 1957 excess declarations totaled \$363,197,000 and the utilization and disposition achievement was \$278,133,440. The utilization and disposition of excess property included redistribution

¹¹⁸Min, USAREUR Log Conf, 5-6 Sep 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files.

¹¹⁹Ltr, USGAO, Eur Br, to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Aug 56, sub: Discrepancies in USAREUR Excess Property Disposal Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1956), Vol. I, Item 3.

¹²⁰(1) Cable SC-20090, USAREUR to USAREUR COMZ, 19 Sep 56. In USAREUR G4 Cen files (Sep 56). (2) Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj Carl O. Sullinger, USAREUR G4 Sup Br, 1 Oct 56. Both UNCLASSIFIED.

¹²¹Briefing, Maj Sullinger for The House Com on Govt Opr, 12 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Sup Br files.

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within the Department of the Army, return to depot stocks, transfer to other government agencies, donations to authorized recipients, sales to the general public, and as a last resort, actual abandonment or destruction.¹²² (Chart 6.)

99. Supply Control

The revision of the Special Theater Reserves and other similar actions reduced the number of line items in the USAREUR supply system from 584,000 to approximately 450,000 as of 30 June 1957. This trend was expected to continue well into FY 1958. The number of line items requisitioned from stateside supply agencies was some 15 percent below the program estimate, and dues-out were also held well below the estimated levels. Declaration of excess property, however, did not meet the estimated program levels because the USAREUR MASS operations during the last quarter of FY 1957 placed such a large additional workload on the supply control agencies of the command.¹²³

Section V: Transportation

100. Transportation Planning

a. Evacuation of Rail Equipment from Germany. Responsibility for planning the evacuation of West German rail equipment in the event of a war had been transferred from USAREUR to SHAPE during FY 1956.¹²⁴ During the period under review representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the various NATO headquarters--including CENTAG--discussed this matter on several occasions, but by 30 June 1957 no new agreement had been developed to replace the former unilateral USAREUR plan.¹²⁵

b. Port and Beach Planning. In an effort to further reduce the workload at the U.S. Army Port of Embarkation, Bremerhaven (USAPEB), a feasibility study was prepared concerning the use of Antwerp for military cargo movements and of Cherbourg for the movement of U.S.-sponsored

¹²²USAREUR Qtrly Rev of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 57, p. 53. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

¹²³USAREUR Qtrly Rev of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 57, pp. 50-52. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

¹²⁴USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 266-67. SECRET.

¹²⁵Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col L. A. Robbins, C/USAREUR Trans Div Plans Br, 18 Oct 57. SECRET.


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Chart 6

USAREUR UTILIZATION AND DISPOSITION
OF EXCESS AND FOREIGN EXCESS
PERSONAL PROPERTY,
1 July 1956 - 30 June 1957

Total: \$278,133,440 (100.0)



* Of total amount sold 75 percent was usable and 25 percent was salvage. In addition USAREUR sold 65,429 short tons of scrap having no acquisition value.

** Also includes MAP and VEHEG.

*** Approximately 85 percent was ammunition destroyed.

Source: USAREUR G4 Sup Br. UNCLASSIFIED.

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military personnel.¹²⁶ In March 1957 the Department of the Army authorized USAREUR to discuss the use of the two ports with the respective Belgian and French authorities, provided such discussions were coordinated with US EUCOM and the U.S. Embassies in Brussels and Paris. No firm commitments were to be made until USAREUR had made a final decision that had departmental approval.¹²⁷ US EUCOM directed that USAREUR submit resumes of the studies for comment prior to forwarding them to the Department of the Army.¹²⁸ As of 30 June 1957 the discussions with Belgian and French officials were still under way.

c. Plan for the Movement of Special Weapons. During FY 1957 a new top secret plan for the receipt and movement of special weapons in USAREUR was published. The new plan, which assigned transportation and security responsibilities during the movement of special weapons, was to be implemented on CINCUSAREUR's order, whereupon the former plan would be rescinded.¹²⁹

101. The USAREUR Floating Equipment Reserve

The USAREUR Floating Equipment Reserve, established by the Department of the Army in January 1954, had been incorporated into the Special Theater Reserve No. 1 during FY 1956.¹³⁰ The equipment was contained in Sections 29, floating equipment, and 30, TOE prestocks, of the special reserve. In late May 1957 a new disposition for the storage of equipment in both wet and dry storage areas in 6 separate locations was made in the following locations: the Canal Maritime and the Basins de La Telindiere at Nantes; La Repentie at La Rochelle; Basin No. 3 at Rochefort; Tonnyay Charente; and the Bassens areas of Bordeaux. Approximately 100 of the required 242 vessels were to be stored in wet storage areas.¹³¹

¹²⁶(1) Telecon DA-TT-9211, USAREUR and DCSOPS, 10 Dec 56. CONFIDENTIAL.
(2) Cable SX-2048, USAREUR to DCSOPS, 2 Mar 57. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 800 (1957).

¹²⁷Cable DA-919663, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Mar 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

¹²⁸(1) Cable EC-9-2089, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Apr 57. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable EC-9-1944, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Apr 57. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above.

¹²⁹Interv, Mr. Moenk with Capt W. E. Slavins, USAREUR G4 Svcs Br, 18 Oct 57. SECRET. For more detail, see TS Supp, USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 57.

¹³⁰USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 243-47, 266-71. SECRET.

¹³¹Ltr, BASEC, USACOMZEU, to CINCUSAREUR, 23 May 57, sub: Proposed Marine Craft Disposition. SECRET. In Trans Div Mat Br files, E-17 (Sites of Eqp) (1957).

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During the previously mentioned revision of the special theater reserves, Transportation Corps representatives on the Department of the Army Logistics Team recommended that the number of items in the floating equipment reserve be increased by including a new factor--normal combat attrition rates--in the computation of items to be stored. By 30 June 1957 USACOMZEUR was revising its storage requirements accordingly.¹³²

As of 30 June 1957, 206 of the required 242 craft were in the command (Table 13), with the balance scheduled to be shipped during the first quarter of FY 1958.¹³³

102. Port Operations

a. USAREUR Operations. Port operations were conducted by the U.S. Army Port of Embarkation, Bremerhaven (USAPEB), in Germany and the 11th Transportation Terminal Command B of USACOMZEUR Base Section in France. The French port complex consisted of U.S. port facilities at Bordeaux, Blaye, La Pallice, La Rochelle, Rochefort, St. Nazaire, and the USACOMZEUR new offshore discharge exercise (NODEX) sites.

(1) Tonnages Handled. The actual tonnages handled during FY 1957--3,760,700 measurement tons--exceeded the programmed figures by 450,700 tons or approximately 13 percent (Table 14). USAPEB handled 65 percent of the tonnage, and the French port complex the remaining 35 percent, against a respective ratio of 69.4 and 30.6 percent during FY 1956.¹³⁴

(2) Personnel Movements Handled. During FY 1957, 259,600 personnel of all categories were moved by surface transportation through USAPEB. This figure, however, included a small number of personnel moved by commercial transportation through the ports of Le Havre, Genoa, and Leghorn. The decrease of approximately 47,200 from the previous fiscal year's total resulted from further intensification of air movements. The French LOFC port complex accommodated only 1,500 personnel, although Concept C provided for the movement of all personnel transferred to or from France through these ports.¹³⁵

¹³²(1) Ltr, Hq Trans & Maint Comd, to USAREUR Trans Off, 19 Feb 57. SECRET. In file above, E-8 (1957). (2) Interv, Mr. Moenk, with Maj T. F. Begley, USAREUR Trans Div Mat Br, 17 Oct 57. SECRET.

¹³³(1) Cable DA-919891, DA from DCOFS LOG/C2 to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Mar 57. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-2627, USAREUR from Trans Off to DA for DCOFS LOG/C2, 5 Apr 57. SECRET. (3) Cable DA-920872, DA from DCOFS LOG/C2 to CHOSA ARTERM, Bklyn, 9 Apr 57. SECRET. All in file above.

¹³⁴USAREUR Qtrly Rev of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 56, pp. 114-15; 30 Jun 57, pp. 77-78. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

¹³⁵Ibid., 30 Jun 56, p. 115; 30 Jun 57, p. 78. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

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Table 13--Special Theater Reserve No. 1, Status of Transportation Corps Items, 30 June 1957

| Equipment - Description | Required | | On Hand | | | Additional Required |
|---|----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------|--------|----------|------------------------|
| | Section 29 Floating Eqp | Section 30 TOE Prestocks | Total | Depots | W/troops | Total |
| 1. Vessel, supply, diesel, steel, 176 ft, design 381 | 1 | | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 2. Tug, harbor, diesel, 200 HP, steel, 45 ft, design 320 | 7 | | 7 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| 3. Tug, harbor, diesel, 600 HP, steel, 65 ft, design 3004 | 15 | 1 | 16 | 4 | 4 | 12 |
| 4. Tug, harbor, diesel, 1220 HP, steel, 100 ft, design 3006 | 2 | | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| 5. Barge, deck cargo, N/P, steel, 585 ton, 120 ft, design 231-A | 44 | | 44 | 31 | 8 | 5 |
| 6. Barge, deck or liquid cargo, N/P, steel, 578 ton or 4,160 bbl, 120 ft, design 231-B | 4 | | 4 | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| 7. Barge, reefer, N/P, steel, 14,200 cu ft, 120 ft, design 7010 | 4 | | 4 | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| 8. Repair shop, floating, marine eqp, N/P, steel, 210 ft, design 7011 | 3 | | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 |

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Table 13--Special Theater Reserve No. 1, Status of Transportation Corps Items, 30 June 1957--
Continued

| Equipment - Description | Required | | On Hand | | Additional Required |
|---|----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------|----------|------------------------|
| | Section 29 Floating Eqp | Section 30 TOE Prestocks | Depots | W/troops | |
| 9. Crane, barge, revolving, D/E, 60-ton, design 413-D | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| 10. Crane, barge, revolving, D/E, 100-ton, design 264-B | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| 11. Boat, P&C, diesel, steel, 65 ft, design 2001 | | 6 | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| 12. Boat, picket, diesel, wood, 36 ft, design 243-B | | 6 | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| 13. Landing craft, diesel, mechanized steel, Navy design, Mark VI LCM (6) | | 129 | 99 | 29 | 128 |
| 14. Landing craft, diesel, mechanized, steel, 70 ft, Navy design, Mark VIII, LCM (8) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 ^{a/} |
| 15. Landing craft, diesel, mechanized, steel, 115 ft, Navy design, LCU 1466 class | | 12 | 3 | 4 | 7 |

^{a/} 10 of these craft were listed as a requirement by BASEC, USACOMZEUR, in May 1957 but DA approval had not been secured.

Source: Status Rept, Trans Corps Items, SR 1, 30 Jun 57. SECRET. In USAREUR Trans Div Mat Br files.

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Table 14--Port Operations, Tonnages Handled, FY 1957
(thousands of measurement tons)

| Quarter | Total USAFEUR | | | USAFEB | | | French Port Complex | | |
|---------------|---------------|---------|-------|---------|---------|-------|---------------------|---------|---------------------|
| | General | | Bulk | General | | Bulk | General | | Bulk |
| | Total | Cargo | POL | Total | Cargo | POL | Total | Cargo | POL |
| Total FY 1957 | 3,760.7 | 2,969.1 | 791.6 | 2,445.4 | 1,921.1 | 524.3 | 1,315.3 | 1,048.0 | 267.3 |
| 1st | 956.8 | 804.8 | 146.0 | 638.4 | 539.4 | 99.0 | 312.4 | 265.4 | 47.0 |
| 2d | 800.4 | 686.0 | 114.4 | 532.5 | 456.2 | 76.3 | 267.9 | 229.8 | 38.1 |
| 3d | 873.9 | 652.5 | 221.4 | 635.2 | 415.5 | 219.7 | 238.7 | 237.0 | 42.0 |
| 4th | 1,135.6 | 825.8 | 309.8 | 639.3 | 510.0 | 129.3 | 496.3 | 315.8 | 180.5 ^{a/} |

^{a/} Includes 37,400 measurement tons received through Amsterdam.

Source: USAFEUR Qtrly Rev of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 57, pp. 77-78. SECRET (info used
CONFIDENTIAL).

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(3) Use of Rotterdam as a Port of Entry. USAREUR instituted the use of Rotterdam as a subport of Bremerhaven on 16 July 1956 on a temporary basis. The port was operated on a trial basis until such time as a permanent subport was established and the necessary intergovernmental agreements concluded.¹³⁶ During July 1956 the USAREUR technical services were directed to indicate Rotterdam as the port of entry for all supplies intended for use in Germany with the following exceptions: household goods and hold baggage, private automobiles, bulk POL, explosives and other small arms, refrigerated supplies, Army-Air Force Exchange cargo, unboxed aircraft, classified and security cargo, mail and parcel post, Project MASS cargo, MDAP cargo for Germany, and any single lift of over 50 long-ton capacity.¹³⁷

With the diversion of all war-risk tonnage to LOFC ports in France, it was estimated that the total tonnage received through the port of Rotterdam would approximate 10,000 long tons per month rather than the 20,000 long tons previously scheduled by the Department of the Army.¹³⁸ This reduction in tonnage led to a restudy of the use of Rotterdam. For this purpose the transportation charges were based on shipment to the Kaiserslautern depot complex in Germany, the destination of most supplies. Comparative figures showed that the total cost of unloading and shipping one long ton of cargo from USAPEB to Kaiserslautern by rail was \$19.43; from Rotterdam to Kaiserslautern by rail, \$12.44; and from Rotterdam to Kaiserslautern by barge and rail via Mannheim subport, \$9.66. Thus, the costs of transshipping 10,000 long tons of cargo per month through Rotterdam were \$96,600, while the corresponding handling charges through USAPEB were \$194,300. The use of Rotterdam would entail the savings of \$97,700 per month or an annual savings of \$1,172,400.¹³⁹

The end of 1956 approached, however, without the Defense and State Departments having definitely approved the use of the port. While Rotterdam port installations were in actual operation, the U.S. military personnel stationed there had no legal protection.¹⁴⁰ On 23 January 1957

¹³⁶ DF, USAREUR Trans Div to COFS through ACOFS G4, 18 Jul 56, sub: Shipment of U.S. Military Supplies through the Port of Rotterdam. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Trans Div Tfc Br files.

¹³⁷ DF, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to Tech Svcs, 10 Jul 56, sub: Routing of U.S. Military Cargo. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Trans Div Tfc Br files.

¹³⁸ DF, USAREUR Trans Div Trans Svcs Br to USAREUR Trans Off, 19 Sep 56, sub: Transportation Division Highlights Report. RCS-TD-COMPT-16. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

¹³⁹ Memo, Mr. P. J. Rogan to USAREUR Trans Div Trans Svcs Br, 19 Oct 56, sub: BPOE-Rotterdam-Mannheim Port Handling and Line Haul Costs. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

¹⁴⁰ Cable 785 (USAREUR SMC-IN 6182), AMEMB, The Hague, to State Dept, 20 Nov 56. SECRET. In file above.

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the approval from Washington was finally received, and the formal agreement for establishing Rotterdam as a U.S. Military Port of Embarkation was concluded on 6 March 1957. The agreement included the Rotterdam subport as a separate organization under the military facilities agreement that had previously been concluded for the stationing of U.S. Air Force units in the Netherlands. The U.S. Army Port and Inland Transportation Office at Rotterdam was officially established on the same day.¹⁴¹ The tonnages shipped through Rotterdam were included in the USAPEB totals.

(4) Sea-Van-Tote Program. The Sea-Van-Tote method of transporting household goods was formally instituted at the beginning of FY 1957. All contracts for the movement of household goods were executed with the 12 American van agencies authorized for this purpose. Pick-ups and deliveries within Germany were made by the German affiliates of the American van lines. Since the charges for transportation of household goods from Bremerhaven to the U.S. area of responsibility in southern Germany were excessive, a facility for handling the CONEX containers used by the van lines was established at the Mannheim subport. After 1 March 1957 all CONEX containers with household goods destined for areas in Germany other than Bremerhaven were shipped to Mannheim, where the appropriate commercial carriers assumed responsibility for final delivery. All household goods shipped out of Germany were delivered to Mannheim, packed in CONEX containers, and dispatched via Bremerhaven to the United States. As of 30 June 1957 more than 50 percent of all household goods shipped into or out of Germany were moved by the Sea-Van-Tote method.¹⁴²

(5) Shipment of Hold Baggage by Railway Express Agency. In late June 1957 the Department of the Army instituted the shipment of priority baggage (PRIBAG)--unaccompanied hold baggage--for Army personnel between points in the United States, West Germany, England, and France. The main purpose was to expedite the shipment of hold baggage for air passengers. Only commercial carriers were to be employed, with the Railway Express Agency acting as the carrier unit. All hold baggage generated in Germany or France would be shipped by this method, except that normally accompanying passengers on commercial or MSTs vessels. Also excluded was the hold baggage of persons from nonappropriated funds or activities that required a local fund citation and payment.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹(1) Cable 1248 (USAREUR SMC-IN 6406), State Dept to AMEMB, The Hague, 23 Jan 57. SECRET. (2) Cable 1327 (USAREUR SMC-IN 1923), AMEMB, The Hague, to State Dept, 6 Mar 57. SECRET. (3) DF, C/USAREUR Trans Div Trans Svcs Br Rail and Water Trans Sec, to C/Trans Div Trans Svcs Br and USAREUR Trans Off, 13 Feb 57, sub: Report of Official Travel--U.S. Embassy. CONFIDENTIAL. All in file above.

¹⁴²(1) USAREUR Cir 55-232, 29 Apr 57, sub: Shipment of Household Goods by the Sea-Van-Tote Method. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk with Maj G. T. Hunt, USAREUR Trans Div Tfc Br, 17 Oct 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁴³(1) DA ltr, 25 Jun 57, sub: Shipment of PRIBAG by REA, TCPAD-PER P3 (RCS #9) General. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Memo 55-220-1, 24 Jul 57, sub: Baggage Shipments by REA. UNCLASSIFIED.

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(6) Roll On, Roll Off System (RORO). In January 1957 the Department of the Army tested a new method of shipping commercial cargo and vehicles to USAREUR by use of the Roll On, Roll Off System. MSTs chartered a converted navy landing ship dock--rechristened as the SS Caribbean Queen--for a total of three trips between the United States and Europe. Wheeled and tracked vehicles loaded at depots in the United States with Army-sponsored cargo were to drive directly onto the vessel at the port of origin, cross the Atlantic, and then drive off at St. Nazaire for onward movement to the consignee. The capacity of the SS Caribbean Queen was 93 loaded semitrailers or equivalent military vehicles plus approximately 100 passenger car-size vehicles.¹⁴⁴

On its first voyage the vessel docked in St. Nazaire on 2 February 1957 with a cargo consisting of loaded commercial military semitrailers, DUKW's military sedans, and jeeps. Retrograde cargo was immediately loaded on the vessel consisting of CONEX containers, private vehicles, and some commercial and military semitrailers. Additional retrograde cargo was loaded at Bremerhaven. Observers at the first unloading test indicated that the principal military advantages in using RORO vessels were simplification of documentation, economy of both time and money in loading and discharging, fewer cargo delays due to inclement weather, a shortened supply cycle, and better use of harbor berths and facilities.¹⁴⁵

A second test was carried out when the vessel returned to St. Nazaire on 11 March 1957. Failure to obtain immediate retrograde cargo, however, caused delay so that the vessel did not reach Bremerhaven until 24 March, where it encountered further delays.¹⁴⁶ On 26 April 1957 MSTs canceled the contract and eliminated the third test voyage. As of the end of the fiscal year no further tests of this system was contemplated.¹⁴⁷

b. NODEX Operations. During FY 1957 5 of the 6 scheduled new off-shore discharge exercises (NODEX) were conducted along the west coast of France, while NODEX 10 was canceled because the French were reluctant to permit beach landings during the height of the resort and tourist season.

¹⁴⁴(1) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 2, 23 Jan 57, p.3. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, CG COMZ to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Dec 56, sub: Test of RORO. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Trans Div Tfc Br files.

¹⁴⁵(1) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 4, 20 Feb 57, pp. 3-4. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED). (2) Cable DA-486756, COFT to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Jan 57. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Memo, Capt W. E. Slavins, USAREUR G4 Svcs Br to ACOFS G4, 14 Feb 57, sub: Visit to St. Nazaire--1st Operation RORO. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file above.

¹⁴⁶Interv, Mr. Moenk with Capt W. E. Slavins, 18 Oct 57, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁴⁷Cable 262249Z, COMSTS to TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., Miami, Fla, 26 Apr 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Trans Div Tfc Br files.

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Only 2 out of the 5 exercises were held at the semipermanent NODEX location at Le Verdon at the mouth of the Gironde Estuary.

(1) NODEX 11. This exercise was conducted at St. Jean de Luz, a new location near Bayonne, during the period 2-19 October 1956. It differed from the five previous exercises in that it was initiated by a 30-day surprise order from BASEC, USACOMZEUR, and was conducted strictly as a lighterage-over-the-beach exercise without piers or tramways. In accordance with the requirements of the Army Training Tests, which were administered during the exercise, DUKW's of the 460th Amphibious Truck Company were the only type lighterage committed during the first 24 hours. A second phase of the exercise during which only LCU and LCM lighterage of the 81st Boat Company were used, continued for the following 24 hours.¹⁴⁸

(2) NODEX 12. This exercise, conducted at Le Verdon from 1-18 December 1956, had two main objectives. First, it was to provide a trained mobile port unit that could be rapidly expanded through attachment of additional units or by the formation of cadres. Second, it was to test lighterage units, rough-terrain forklifts, a provisional railhead company, and the headquarters and headquarters detachment of a transportation battalion. Lighterage in the form of DUKW's, LCM's and LCU's operated as directed by the 15th Transportation Terminal Battalion.¹⁴⁹

(3) NODEX 13. During this exercise, which took place from 1-20 February 1957, three vessels were discharged, two across the beach at Le Verdon and the third in the Gironde Estuary opposite Pauillac, by using an improvised pier made of cargo barges and ramps for DUKW's. For the first time helicopters were used for moving cargo in this type of exercise, with one platoon of the 110th Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) delivering in 21 days approximately 42 tons of cargo directly to depots. In addition, the 334th Transportation Company (Amphibious Truck) from Ft. Story, Virginia, joined the 15th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for the exercise. Approximately 37 percent of the tonnage discharged from the vessels was lightered ashore by this company.¹⁵⁰

(4) NODEX 14. This exercise was conducted from 1-16 April 1957 at Suscino and La Turballe in the Quiberon Bay area slightly northwest of the port of St. Nazaire. Three vessels, two loaded with general cargo and one with ammunition, participated in the exercise. Cargo was discharged into lighterage--consisting of LCM 6's, LCU's, and flat cargo

¹⁴⁸Hq 11th Trans Term Comd B, NODEX 11 Rept, 2-19 Oct 56. CONFMOD. In file above.

¹⁴⁹15th Trans Bn (Term), 11 Trans Term Comd B, NODEX 12 Rept, 1-18 Dec 56. CONFMOD. In file above.

¹⁵⁰(1) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 5, 5 Mar 57, p. 2. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) 15th Trans Bn (Term), 11th Trans Term Comd B, NODEX 13 Rept, 1-20 Feb 57. CONFMOD. In file above.

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barges towed by French commercial tugs--at an anchorage point approximately two miles offshore. After completion of the first vessel at Susecino on 6 April, operations were shifted to La Turballe, 48 miles to the south where the second ship was unloaded. After the second day of operations, 16 April, the third vessel was diverted to St. Nazaire because a French railway strike was scheduled to begin the next day.¹⁵¹

(5) NODEX 15. This exercise was of interest in testing the inherent advantage of a minor tidal port, with emphasis placed upon minimum handling of cargo and maximum profitable use of immediately adjacent rail facilities. The operation took place at St. Gilles Croix de Vie during the period 31 May-8 June 1957. In contrast to past exercises, only two vessels were discharged and cargo moved ashore over a small quay instead of a sand beach. As a result the exercise was completed in only nine days. The exercise tested the suitability of the St. Gilles Croix de Vie operational area, the ability of the NODEX organization to operate at a reduced strength, the use of barges at minor ports and protected inlet sites, and the suitability of DUKW's for moving cargo directly to a railhead. A ceiling of 1,135 personnel was established for the exercise, but actual strengths never approached this figure.¹⁵²

c. Diversions to LOFC Ports. In approving the use of Rotterdam in May 1956, the Department of the Army had directed that all war-risk items for USAREUR as well as nonwar-risk items intended for use in France be shipped through the French LOFC ports. However, any freight shipments exceeding the capacity of the French LOFC ports could be received either through USAPEB or any other port.¹⁵³ This decision was motivated by the dual consideration that the French LOFC had been developed to place combat support in a strategically favorable line of communications and that movement of war risk supplies through France was necessary to allow for the required rotation of combat reserves.¹⁵⁴ USAREUR pointed out that all war risk tonnages, exclusive of bulk POL and Project MASS items, could be received through the French LOFC ports at an additional cost of

¹⁵¹(1) 15th Trans Bn (Term), 11 Trans Term Comd B, NODEX 14 Rept, 1-16 Apr 56. CONFMOD. (2) Memo, C/USAREUR Trans Div Tfc Br to Dep Trans Off, 12 Jun 57, sub: NODEX 14. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above.

¹⁵²(1) 15th Trans Bn (Term), 11th Trans Term Comd B, NODEX 15 Rept, 31 May-8 Jun 57. CONFMOD. (2) Ltr, CG BASEC to CG USACOMZEUR, 5 Jul 57, sub: NODEX 15 Report (RCS-CSGLD-163) (U). CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above.

¹⁵³(1) Cable DA-902392, DA from DCOFS LOG/F4 to CINCUSAREUR, 5 May 56. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable DA-903077, DA from DCOFS LOG/F4 to CINCUSAREUR, 17 May 56. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1956), Item 02 atchd.

¹⁵⁴Cable DA-913624, DA from DCOFS LOG, 16 Nov 56. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1956), Item 02 atchd.

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approximately \$3,800,000. The Department of the Army agreed to furnish the additional funds required and increased the USAREUR FY 1957 funding program by \$3,800,000 for the additional port handling and transportation charges plus \$1,000,000 to cover increased depot operating costs.¹⁵⁵ In September 1956 USAREUR instructed the Overseas Supply Agency at New York to divert to French ports all engineer, ordnance, and signal supplies--with the exception of MDAP and Project MASS items--requisitioned before 1 October 1956. Subsequent to that date, the USAREUR supply control agencies specified French ports of delivery on technical service requisitions for the types of items contained in the Special Theater Reserves No. 1 and No. 3.¹⁵⁶

103. Air Transportation

a. Personnel Movements. During FY 1957 the use of air transportation was emphasized for personnel movements to and from the United States. Air shipments were handled by the Frankfurt Air Passenger Center operated by USAREUR and the Paris Air Traffic Center operated by USAFE.¹⁵⁷ Against a program estimate of 180,100, some 239,500 passengers were actually moved by MATS and commercial aircraft.¹⁵⁸

b. Army Helicopter Units. From 11 to 18 June 1956 Company A, 9th Ordnance Battalion, had conducted tests to determine the feasibility of delivering atomic warheads to using units by H-34 helicopters. On the basis of these tests USAREUR directed Seventh Army to develop plans for employing this method of delivery. However, separate transportation facilities were to be used for moving the nuclear components of missile warheads.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁵(1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to DCOFS LOG, DA, 23 Jun 56, sub: Capability of the French LOFC. SECRET. In USAREUR G4 Plans Br files. (2) Ltr, DCOFS LOG to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Jul 56, sub: Logistical Reorganization in USAREUR. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1956), B/P. (3) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 25, 20 Sep 56, p. 3. SECRET.

¹⁵⁶Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to DCOFS LOG, 25 Sep 56, sub: Development of the LOFC. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1956).

¹⁵⁷Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk with Maj G. T. Hunt, 17 Oct 57, cited above. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁵⁸USAREUR Qtrly Rev of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 57, p. 78. SECRET (info used CONFIDENTIAL).

¹⁵⁹(1) Ltr, CG Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Jul 56, sub: Transportability of Missile Warhead by Helicopter (S). (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 30 Aug 56, same sub. Both SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954. Both in USAREUR SGS 471.6 (1956).

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In March 1957 Seventh Army and USACOMZEUR were directed to arrange for the in-place transfer of the 26th Transportation Company (Light Helicopter), plus the necessary support; not later than 15 April 1957. By this transfer USACOMZEUR was to be given helicopter airlift capability for rapid resupply of warheads in an emergency.¹⁶⁰ Technical difficulties, however, delayed the actual transfer so that by 30 June 1957 the entire plan was being reevaluated.¹⁶¹

104. Rail Transportation

a. Changes in Freight and Passenger Rates. During FY 1957 numerous changes in tariff arrangements concerned the U.S. forces in Europe.

(1) West Germany. The only significant change was an agreement with the Deutsche Speisewagen Gesellschaft (German Dining Car Corp.) concerning Touropa sleeping cars. The agreement provided for payment of the reserve rate of DM 68 per day, rather than the inservice rate of DM 209 per day, for transfer time to and from repair shops as well as time in the repair shops.

(2) Belgium. During FY 1957 both the commercial and military passenger tariff rates were increased by the Belgian railways. Negotiations for a preferential freight tariff of approximately 20 percent less than the commercial rates were nearing successful completion at the end of FY 1957.

(3) The Netherlands. Early in FY 1957 the commercial passenger tariffs were increased and the military rates were renegotiated to make a corresponding increase. By 30 June 1957 new negotiations were underway to secure a revision of the military tariffs and, if possible, a reduction for nonduty travel.

(4) Italy. Effective 1 August 1956 a decree of the Italian Ministry of Transport increased the passenger rates applicable to the U.S. forces by 20 percent for first class services and 10 percent for second class. On 1 December 1956 the Ministry of Transportation increased the freight rates by approximately 10 percent. During the month of March 1957 the Commercial Services Section of the Italian Railways attempted to increase the rates for heating cars by about 17½ percent to be effective 1 April 1957. Since no ministerial decree was involved, USAREUR refused to comply.

¹⁶⁰ Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army and CG USACOMZEUR, 12 Mar 57, sub: Helicopter Airlift Capability for Special Weapons (S). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1957).

¹⁶¹ (1) Cable SC-23170, USAREUR to Seventh Army and USACOMZEUR, 11 Apr 57. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1957). (2) Interv, Mr. Moenk with Lt Col J. V. LaBounty, USAREUR Trans Div Plans Br, 16 Oct 57. SECRET.

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(5) France. Considerable progress was made in negotiations with the French Railways for a downward revision of the carload freight rates. A new flat rate tariff system was placed in effect on 1 April 1957, and negotiations concerning adjustment for the period July 1955 - 31 March 1957 were nearing completion by 30 June 1957.¹⁶²

(6) Switzerland. On 21 October 1956 the Swiss Railways put into effect a new tariff agreement for shipments of specified goods over designated routes through Switzerland. The agreement covered only non-military civilian-type goods--including gasoline--and extended the previous 10 percent reduction in freight rates for commercial goods and 16 percent for POL products. The 16 percent reduction on POL rates was based on a formula providing for the shipment of 5,000 metric tons of POL products during the first 6 months of each calendar year.¹⁶³

b. Transit Agreements. During FY 1957 only one significant agreement for transit rights was reached. The Swiss Federal Technical Service for War Supplies (Eidgenoessische Kriegstechnische Abteilung) granted the U.S. forces permission to ship certain military materiel through Switzerland--both south-north and north-south. For this purpose, an appropriate application had to be submitted to the Swiss Federal Technical Service for War Supplies for approval before a shipment was made. The agreement covered the shipment of military vehicles--with or without arms; artillery and other armament, both assembled and unassembled; airplane parts; radio transmitters and receivers; parts of telephone apparatus; and ammunition. This agreement, long desired by USAREUR, was the result of personal action by Dr. H. Geschwind, President of the Swiss Federal Railways.¹⁶⁴

c. Rail Spur Agreement in France. Negotiations pertaining to a rail spur agreement were extended through FY 1957 because USAREUR refused to accept the standard French Railway contract governing privately owned rail spur operations. The liability provisions of such a contract were particularly objectionable. As of 30 June 1957 only a few points of a rail spur operating agreement still remained to be settled, and the negotiators were confident of developing a convention that corresponded

¹⁶² USAREUR Trans Div, Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 56-30 Jun 57, Tfc Svcs Sec. UNCLASSIFIED. MS in USAREUR Trans Div Tfc Br files.

¹⁶³ (1) USAREUR Memo 55-270-1, 14 Nov 56, sub: Swiss Rail Freight Rates for Transit Shipments. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, Pres, Swiss Railways, to USAREUR Trans Div, 22 Sep 56, sub: Traffic, Italy-Germany, or vice versa, via Switzerland. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Ltr, USAREUR Trans Div to USAREUR Trans Fin & Acct Off, 15 Nov 56, sub: Swiss Rail Rates. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR Trans Div Tfc Br files.

¹⁶⁴ Ltr, Pres, Swiss Federal Railways, to USAREUR Trans Div, 17 Jun 57, sub: Traffic, Italy-Germany, or vice versa, via Switzerland. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) 1st Ind, USARMA, Berne, Switz., to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Jul 57, sub: Shipment of Military Materiel through Switzerland. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file above.

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also to U.S. legal standards.¹⁶⁵

105. Highway Transportation

a. LTL Express Service. Prior to FY 1957 a daily less-than-truckload (LTL) scheduled line haul express service had been established for the movement of badly needed priority stock items. Operational control was a responsibility of USACOMZEUR, and because of the very nature of the service no target tonnages were observed during FY 1957. Schedules between terminals in France and between points in the base sections in France and area commands in Germany were strictly adhered to, even if no full trailer load of priority shipments was available for each day.¹⁶⁶

b. Military Express and Passenger Service in France. When the Heidelberg-Verdun portion of the Military Express and Passenger Service was phased out because of its low utilization rate, COMZ was authorized to continue operating its section if the service could be justified.¹⁶⁷ The utilization target for FY 1957 was the percentage of duty passenger usage at which a savings in travel funds was realized as opposed to the operating costs of the service. This utilization target was achieved--or exceeded--during only four months. Continuation of the service, however, was justified as a convenience to travelers, as a morale factor for space-available nonduty travelers, and as an express service for baggage and for other small high-priority shipments.¹⁶⁸

c. General Transport Administrative Vehicle Program. In Germany the General Transport Administrative Vehicle (GTAV) Program¹⁶⁹ was implemented on 1 July 1956. The program was not extended to France at the time because, with the exception of a few Renault sedans and busses, only military vehicles were in use in that country. During FY 1956 USAREUR had procured approximately 8,800 commercial vehicles at a Deutsche Mark expenditure equivalent to \$20 million to replace military truck capacity, representing a capital investment of \$55,000,000.

¹⁶⁵(1) Memo, C/USAREUR G4 Svcs Br to ACOFS G4, 27 Sep 57, sub: SNCF Rail Spur Tract Agreement. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Svcs Br files.
(2) Interv, Mr. Moenk with Lt Col M. J. Peters, C/USAREUR G4 Svcs Br, 18 Oct 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁶⁶USACOMZEUR Performance Rept, 30 Jun 57, p. 54. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

¹⁶⁷USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 282. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

¹⁶⁸USACOMZEUR Performance Rept, 30 Jun 57, p. 54. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

¹⁶⁹USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 283-84. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

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In Germany the program included 12,400 motor vehicles--the equivalent of over 205 truck companies of 60 trucks each. Approximately 8,800 of these vehicles, being directly assigned to transportation motor pools, were given full maintenance support, while the other 3,600 were assigned to units satellited on transportation motor pools for field maintenance. Of approximately 85 motor pools in operation during FY 1957, 52 were directly under area command control while the remainder repaired various types of commercial vehicles for which the Transportation Division had maintenance responsibility.

As of 30 June 1957 the GTAV expenditure for vehicle maintenance was \$7,573,000 as compared to approximately \$8,800,000 for an identical workload during the previous year. Because of the savings achieved, the GTAV program was one of the ten management improvement programs highlighted by the Office of the Comptroller in its report covering the third quarter of FY 1957.

At the end of FY 1957 steps were taken to transfer to USACOMZEUR about 1,000 Deutsche Mark-procured commercial cargo vehicles that were expected to exceed requirements by September 1957. These excess vehicles were to replace military-type vehicles, and the transfer was expected to generate savings of approximately \$400,000 in USACOMZEUR operating costs. Moreover, since 1,000 of the locally procured sedans would have to be replaced during FY 1958, the Department of the Army was requested on 4 June 1957 to authorize the local procurement of 1,000 sedans.¹⁷⁰

Section VI: Installations Support

106. Construction in Germany

a. USAREUR Construction Agency, Germany. Deutsche Mark support for construction had officially ended on 5 May 1956, and on the same day US CINCEUR had delegated to CINCUSAREUR the full responsibility for executing dollar-appropriated Army construction in the Federal Republic of Germany.¹⁷¹ To assume this responsibility, USAREUR established on

¹⁷⁰(1) Briefing, USAREUR Trans Div to Maj Gen R. B. Lincoln, Jr., COFT, 9 Oct 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Trans Div MT Br files. (2) Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. R. F. Owren, USAREUR Trans Div MT Br, 16 Oct 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁷¹Ltr, Dep US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 5 May 56, sub: Delegation of Authority, Construction in Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1956), Vol. I, Item 8 atchd.

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1 July 1956 the U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany (USACAG), as a class II installation operating under the jurisdiction of the Engineer Division.¹⁷² Personnel engaged in construction activities by the area commands were reduced from 1,037 at the beginning of FY 1957 to 76 by 1 January 1957, at which time USACAG's personnel strength was 207.¹⁷³

b. Deutsche Mark Construction Program. While no Deutsche Mark construction program proper was developed for FY 1957, funds originating from reprogramming and deobligation actions on previous programs were made available for requirements generated during the year. Among the projects thus financed were the construction of troop barracks and of a missile shop at the Ordnance Special Weapons depot at Fischbach, security fencing and improvement of a cave storage area at Dahn, and a heating plant for the Pattonville dependent housing area in Stuttgart.¹⁷⁴

(1) Status. By 30 June 1957 the total amount of Deutsche Mark occupation cost and defense support funds obligated for construction was \$1,070,632,806. At that time 99.4 percent of the contracts had been consummated and 98.3 percent of the construction was completed.¹⁷⁵ (Chart 7). The relatively small FY 1956 program, which amounted to \$1,680,000, was approximately 13.8 percent completed.¹⁷⁶

(2) Dependents Housing. Under the FY 1954 dependents housing program 810 units were completed during FY 1957 to bring completions to 22,006. The 90 housing units that remained under this program were under construction on 30 June 1957, and completion was expected within the next six months.¹⁷⁷ The FY 1955 program consisted of 1,252 family apartments and 1,451 single and duplex homes for senior officers. During FY 1957 958 family apartments were completed, bringing the total number

¹⁷²(1) Comment 2, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to Engr Off, 11 May 55, to DF, USAREUR SGS to ACOFS G4, 10 May 56, sub: Correspondence Control Sheet. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Memo, USAREUR Engr Off to COFS, 23 May 56, sub: U.S. Military Dollar Construction in Western Germany. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above. (3) USAREUR GO 105, 27 Jun 56. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁷³(1) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to COFS, 12 Jan 57, sub: Reduction of Construction Personnel in Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Comment 2, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to COFS, 17 Jan 57, to DF, USAREUR SGS to ACOFS G4, 15 Jan 57, sub: Memo, dtd 12 Jan 57 to COFS from ACOFS G4, sub cited above. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1957).

¹⁷⁴USAREUR Comd Program 13 (Cons), 3d Qtrly Rev and Anal, 15 May 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G4 Instl Br.

¹⁷⁵USAREUR Engr Div, GFY 49 through FY 56 DM Cons Program Rept, 30 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Engr Div R&U Cons Br.

¹⁷⁶(1) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 284-85. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED). (2) USAREUR Engr Div, FY 56 DM Cons Rept, 30 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.


¹⁷⁷USAREUR Engr Div, FY 54 Housing Cons Prog Rept, 30 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

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CHART 7

STATUS OF MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, ARMY, (MCA)
 DEUTSCHE MARK PROGRAM IN GERMANY, GFY 1949 TO FY 1956
 (EXCLUDING BERLIN)



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of completions to 1,156. Of the remaining 96 apartment units, 90 were under construction and the other 6 were scheduled for construction during the second quarter of FY 1958. The construction of senior officers' quarters made good progress, with 1,367 completed during FY 1957. Since 7 homes had been built previously and 76 units were under construction on 30 June 1957, only 1 dwelling unit remained to be started in July 1957.¹⁷⁸

(3) Bachelor Officers' Quarters. The FY 1954 housing construction program had provided for 4,770 units as substitutes for requisitioned hotels and residential properties. During FY 1955 the program had been reduced by 17 units, and further revisions in October 1956 reduced the total to 4,683. During FY 1957 some 1,027 units were built, bringing the total completions to 4,615. The remaining 68 units were under construction and scheduled for completion during the first quarter of FY 1958.¹⁷⁹

c. FY 1957 MCA Construction Program for Germany. The FY 1957 MCA construction program for Germany had originally consisted of 28 projects amounting to \$11,576,000.¹⁸⁰ During November 1956 the Department of the Army reviewed the MCA construction program for Germany and reduced it to 9 projects in the amount of \$2,202,000 as follows:¹⁸¹

| <u>Project</u> | <u>Location</u> | <u>Cost</u> |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| | <u>Total</u> | <u>\$2,202,000</u> |
| Ammunition Renovation Building | Fischbach | 206,000 |
| Power Supply | Rhine Ordnance Barracks | 105,000 |
| Class III Storage Facilities | Hanau | 1,328,000 |
| Utilities | North Point | 40,000 |
| Water Supply Extension | Mainz | 194,000 |
| Signal Training Facilities | Pirmasens | 53,000 |
| Rehabilitation of Range Roads | Baumholder | 170,000 |
| Target Range | Hohenfels | 95,000 |
| Alteration of Ranges | Wildflecken | 11,000 |

¹⁷⁸USAREUR Engr Div, FY 55 Housing Cons Prog Repts, (Family Apts) (Sr Off Qtrs), 30 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Engr Div R&U Cons Br.

¹⁷⁹(1) USAREUR Engr Div, BOQ Cons Prog Rept, 30 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Engr Div, Ann Hist Rept, FY 57, Cons Sec, p. 11. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file above.

¹⁸⁰Cable SC-20199, USAREUR to DA for DCOFS LOG, 20 Mar 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

¹⁸¹(1) USAREUR Memo 415-5-7, 11 Dec 56, sub: FY 1957 Construction Program, Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) OCE, FY 57 Cons Dir 1, Germany, 20 Feb 57, sub: Authorization - Construction of Facilities, FY 1957 Army Program, Germany. ENGREG. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to D/USACAG, 15 Mar 57, same sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

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The delay in the transmittal of the construction directive for Germany prevented the initiation of the nine authorized projects before 30 June 1957.¹⁸²

d. FY 1958 MCA Construction Programming. The FY 1958 MCA construction program for Germany that was submitted to the Department of the Army consisted of 85 projects for \$20,026,000. After reviews by the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, and Bureau of the Budget only 5 projects amounting to \$356,000 were approved. However, severe budgetary limitations imposed by the Department of Defense caused the deferral of even these five projects in favor of higher priority items in other areas of the world. Consequently, in February 1957 USAREUR was notified that the FY 1958 new authorization program as approved by the Secretary of Defense for submission to Congress, contained no construction projects for Germany.¹⁸³

e. Welfare Fund Construction. The USAREUR Welfare Fund Construction Program had been begun in FY 1955 as a means of constructing certain recreational, morale, and welfare facilities with nonappropriated funds. Most of the desired projects had previously been eliminated from appropriated fund construction programs because they were not essential.¹⁸⁴ Shortly after the beginning of FY 1957 a FY 1956 supplemental program was approved by the Army Welfare Board, Germany-Italy-France, increasing the amount for the combined FY 1955 and 1956 programs to \$6,406,900.¹⁸⁵

(1) FY 1957 Program. The FY 1957 program was approved by the Army Welfare Board, Germany-Italy-France, in August 1956 in the amount of \$5,824,755. Two supplemental programs, which were subsequently approved, brought the total to \$7,440,155; this amount was allocated

¹⁸²USAREUR Engr Div, Ann Hist Rept, FY 57, cited above, Cons Sec, p. 12. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁸³(1) Cable DA-918174, DA from DCOFS LOG/M1 to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Feb 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1957). (2) Memo, Mr. Harrington, ODCOFS LOG Cons Div Pub Works Plans Br, 6 Mar 57, sub: FY 1958 MCA Program for Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Engr Div R&U & Cons Br.

¹⁸⁴USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 288-90. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

¹⁸⁵(1) Memo, C/USAREUR G4 Instl Br to Actg ACOFS G4, 29 Jun 56, sub: Welfare Fund Construction. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo, C/USAREUR SAD to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Jul 56, sub: Minutes of the 21 June 1956 Meeting of the Army Welfare Board, Germany-Italy-France. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 334 CWB (1956), Vol. II, Item 04 atchd.

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to the various USAREUR areas as follows:¹⁸⁶

| | |
|--------------|--------------------|
| <u>Total</u> | <u>\$7,440,155</u> |
| Bremerhaven | 10,000 |
| Berlin | 28,000 |
| HACOM | 741,375 |
| NACOM | 900,500 |
| WACOM | 1,199,750 |
| SACOM | 1,278,200 |
| USACOMZEUR | 3,282,330 |

(2) Deletion of Revenue Producing Facilities. In December 1956 the Department of the Army decided that revenue producing facilities, such as EES installations, movie theaters, and bowling alleys, could no longer be funded from the Army Welfare Fund. Such construction should be funded from the capital improvements budget of the activity concerned.¹⁸⁷ USAREUR objected that the implementation of this decision would have severe repercussions because it would seriously affect the entire morale and welfare program.¹⁸⁸ As a result, USAREUR was authorized to implement its FY's 1955, 1956, and 1957 welfare fund construction programs as planned. However, after 30 June 1957 no new nonappropriated welfare fund obligations or commitments could be made for exchange construction.¹⁸⁹

(3) Execution of Construction Programs. In August 1956 the Army Welfare Board, Germany-Italy-France, approved the proposal of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, that the USAREUR Construction Agency build certain projects in Germany. A survey of the construction program for FY 1957 indicated that 35 percent would be executed by USACAG, 60 percent by R&U agencies--including R&U contractual processes--4 percent by troops,

¹⁸⁶ (1) Memo, C/Army Welfare Bd, Ger-It-Fr, to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Aug 56, sub: Plan for FY 1957 NAF Welfare Fund Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above, Item 05 atchd. (2) USAREUR ltrs, 18 Oct 56, 1 Nov 56, 3 Jan 57, sub: FY 1957 Welfare Fund Construction Program. AEAEN-CN 600.1 AG. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁸⁷ DA-479160, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Dec 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 334 CWB (1957).

¹⁸⁸ (1) Memo, C/Army Welfare Bd, Ger-It-Fr, to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Jan 57, sub: Minutes of the 20 December Meeting of the Army Welfare Board, Germany-Italy-France. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable SC-31935, USAREUR to DA, 29 Dec 56. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file above.

¹⁸⁹ Cable DA-495374, DA from TAG to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Feb 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

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and 1 percent by engineer TOE units.¹⁹⁰

(4) Status on 30 June 1957. During FY 1957 the Army Welfare Board, Germany-Italy-France, decided to suspend approximately \$3 million of construction projects from the combined FY's 1955, 1956, and 1957 programs.¹⁹¹ Other actions taken by the board resulted in suspensions, cancellations, and adjustments that reduced the program by an additional \$500,000 so that the status of the combined programs as of 30 June 1957 was as follows:¹⁹²

| | <u>Original Program</u> | <u>Suspensions, Cancellations, & Adjustments</u> | <u>Curtailed Program</u> |
|---------------|-----------------------------|--|------------------------------|
| <u>Totals</u> | <u>\$14,838,055</u> | <u>\$3,548,175</u> | <u>\$11,289,880</u> |
| Germany | 8,330,725 | 2,889,675 | 5,441,050 |
| France | 5,851,830 | 477,400 | 5,374,430 |
| Italy | 655,500 | 181,100 | 474,400 |

At that same date, approximately 27.4 percent of the curtailed program was obligated and 15.9 percent of the construction was completed (Chart 8).

f. German Alternate Construction. The German alternate housing construction program had been initiated in May 1953. By 30 June 1957, 4,526 units had been programmed for construction, 3,242 of which were intended for Army and 1,284 for Air Force usage. USAREUR had received from the West German Government altogether 3,140 units, including 530 that had been constructed during FY 1957.¹⁹³

107. Construction in France

a. Joint Construction Agency. At the beginning of FY 1957 the Joint Construction Agency (JCA) continued to be responsible for executing

¹⁹⁰(1) Memo, C/SAD to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Aug 56, sub: Minutes of the 17 August 1956 Meeting of the Army Welfare Board, Germany-Italy-France. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to COFS, 10 Sep 56, sub: FY 1957 NAF Welfare Program. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file above, Vol. II, Item 05 atchd.

¹⁹¹(1) Ltr, Army Welfare Bd, Ger-It-Fr, to USAREUR Area Comds, COMZ and SETAF, 18 Mar 57, sub: Welfare Fund Construction Program. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Comment 2, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to USAREUR Engr Off, 9 Apr 57, sub: Welfare Fund Construction Program. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR G4 Inst Br files 600.12 WEL (1957).


¹⁹²Info from USAREUR G1 Welfare & Rec Br, 29 Oct 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁹³Info from USAREUR Engr Div RE Br, 28 Oct 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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
CHART 8

**WELFARE FUND CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM,
GERMANY, FRANCE, ITALY,
30 JUNE 1957
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)**



SOURCE: USAREUR G1 WELFARE AND REC. BR. UNCLASSIFIED.

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all construction programs in France. In December 1956, however, US EUCOM proposed to transfer the JCA functions and construction responsibilities to USAREUR.¹⁹⁴ In April 1957 the Department of the Army took up this proposal, suggesting that, with the phaseout of the JCA, USAREUR assume responsibility for all military construction in France and the Mediterranean Division, Corps of Engineers, for the same activities in the Mediterranean areas.¹⁹⁵ USAREUR planned to redesignate the former North District of the JCA as the U.S. Army Construction Agency, France (USACAF), as a counterpart of USACAG. Both agencies would be under the jurisdiction of the Engineer Division.¹⁹⁶ On 7 June 1957 the Department of the Army authorized US CINCEUR to disestablish the JCA on or about 1 July 1957. At that time responsibility for all military construction in France was assigned to CINCUSAREUR.¹⁹⁷

b. FY 1957 Reprogramming Action. Early in FY 1957 the Department of the Army decided that no additional funds for USAREUR construction in France would be requested, but that the required construction would be financed through reprogramming action of funds previously approved by Congress. The House Armed Services Committee approved the USAREUR and Department of the Army request for \$34 million, but the Senate reduced the reprogramming action to approximately \$20 million through deletion of an ordnance special weapons depot to be constructed at an indefinite location in France.¹⁹⁸ In March 1957, the Department informed USAREUR that further review action had reduced the reprogramming action to \$16,267,000.¹⁹⁹ As a result of subsequent changes, this sum was further reduced to \$10,983,000, which the Department of the Army finally

¹⁹⁴(1) Cable DA-916696, DA as Exec Agent to US CINCEUR, 23 Jan 57. SECRET. (2) Cable EC-9-534, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Jan 57. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1957).

¹⁹⁵Cable DA-920861, DA from DCOFS LOG to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Apr 57. SECRET. In file above.

¹⁹⁶Ltr, USAREUR Engr to USAREUR Stf Divs, 27 May 57, sub: Assumption of Construction Responsibility in France, w/Incl 1, Memo, USAREUR Engr to CINCUSAREUR, 21 May 57, sub: USAREUR Organization for Construction in France. AEAEN-RC 600.12 EN. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

¹⁹⁷Cable DA-536044, DA from DCOFS LOG, Agent, to US CINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, et al., 7 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁹⁸Cable DA-445938, DA from DCOFS LOG/M2 to US CINCEUR, 14 Aug 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Engr Div R&U Cons Br files.

¹⁹⁹DA Cons Dir 6, LOFC France, 22 Mar 57, sub: Authorization-Modification of Items in FY 1953 and Prior Years Construction Programs, LOFC France. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Div Instl Br files.

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approved on 6 June 1957.²⁰⁰

c. Revised Total Requirement Programming. In December 1956 USAREUR construction requirements for France were revised to conform with the ceiling of \$300 million imposed by the Department of the Army. The USAREUR construction program covering FY's 1951 through 1959 amounted to \$299,983,000, including \$272.5 million for projects in the revised FY's 1951, 1952, and 1953 programs as revised in FY 1957, \$23.4 million for FY 1958, and \$4.0 million for FY 1959. In establishing these figures, USAREUR deleted projects for approximately \$92 million in order to remain within the Department of the Army ceiling. Of the projects authorized, approximately \$228.4 million had been completed or placed under contract for construction.²⁰¹ During the second half of FY 1957 the amounts authorized for construction in France underwent several changes. (For further details, see Table 15).

d. Funding.

(1) FY 1957 Apportionment. As of 1 July 1956 the Department of the Army had apportioned approximately \$216.6 million, with \$212.5 million available for obligation in France and \$4.1 million earmarked for procurement of materials in the United States. Since the cumulative obligations for construction in France amounted to \$210.5 million, only \$2 million remained in unobligated funds. At the beginning of FY 1957 the Department of the Army and the Bureau of the Budget approved a request for an additional \$15 million apportionment. At the same time a \$22 million ceiling was imposed for the apportionment of funds during FY 1957; in June 1957, however, an additional \$1 million was authorized, bringing to \$235.5 million the total amount apportioned for obligation in France as of 30 June 1957.²⁰²

(2) Withdrawal of FY's 1951 and 1952 Funds. Public Law 161, 84th Congress, repealed all unobligated funds approved by Congress prior to 1 October 1951. Public Law 948, 84th Congress, specifically exempted

²⁰⁰(1) Ltr, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Mar 57, sub: Review of LOFC Construction Program. AGAO-CC-600.12 (21 Mar 57) DCSLOG. SECRET. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to DA for DCOFS LOG M/2, 3 Jun 57, sub: Military Construction Army Program, LOFC France. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) DA Cons Dir 7, LOFC France, 6 Jun 57, sub same as in DA Cons Dir 6, above. UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR Engr Div R&U & Cons Br files.

²⁰¹(1) Ltr, USAREUR to DA, 18 Dec 56, sub: Revised FY 1951-59 MCA Program. AEAGD-IP 600.1 GD. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Memo for rec, Maj W. E. Ross, USAREUR G4 Div Instl Br, 17 Dec 56, sub: Revised FY 1951-59 MCA Program, LOFC France. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above.

²⁰²(1) Cable DA-434523, DA from COFENGERS to JCA, 6 Jul 56. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. (2) Ltr, DA from DCOFS LOG to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Nov 56, sub: Funding for MCA Construction in France. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1956), Vol. II, Item 025-A-1 atchd.

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Table 15--Construction Authorized by the Department of the Army for
FY 1953 and Prior Year Construction Program, LOFC France

| Category Code | Directive 1 (21 Nov 55) | Directive 6 (22 Mar 57) | Directive 7 ^a (6 Jun 57) |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|--|
| <u>Totals</u> | <u>\$256,231,000</u> | <u>\$272,498,000</u> | <u>\$255,961,000</u> |
| <u>Operational and Training Facilities</u> | | | |
| 111 Runways, Landing Strips, Pads, etc. | 372,000 | 369,000 | 369,000 |
| 123 Land Vehicle Dispensing, Normal Fuel | 34,000 | 25,000 | 25,000 |
| 125 POL Pipeline (excluding Terminal & Bulk Tanks) | 28,392,000 | 28,764,000 | 28,764,000 |
| 131 Buildings for Radio, Radar, etc. (excluding naval aids) | 1,117,000 | 948,000 | 948,000 |
| 132 Other: Antenna Towers, Control Links, (excluding naval aids) | 405,000 | 553,000 | 553,000 |
| 149 Other: Tactical Structures, Protective Construction | 1,151,000 | 559,000 | 527,000 |
| 152 Wharfs | 559,000 | 579,000 | 579,000 |
| 159 Other: Waterfront Operational | - | 75,000 | 75,000 |
| 165 Dredging not related to specific construction | 639,000 | 865,000 | 865,000 |
| 179 Other: Training Courses, Ranges, etc. | 465,000 | 70,000 | 70,000 |
| <u>Maintenance and Production Facilities</u> | | | |
| 211 Aircraft | 313,000 | 372,000 | 372,000 |
| 213 Ships, Spares | 92,000 | 295,000 | 295,000 |
| 214 Tank automotive | 4,244,000 | 8,093,000 | 6,539,000 |
| 215 Weapons, Spares | 5,733,000 | 4,562,000 | 1,762,000 |
| 216 Ammunition, Explosives, Toxics | 912,000 | 953,000 | 953,000 |
| 217 Electronics and Communications Equipment | 1,215,000 | 1,139,000 | 1,139,000 |
| 218 Facilities for Miscellaneous Procured Equipment | 5,627,000 | 6,720,000 | 5,411,000 |
| 219 Installation, Repair, and Operation | 1,490,000 | 2,271,000 | 2,271,000 |

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Table 15--Construction Authorized by the Department of the Army for FY 1953
and Prior Year Construction Program, LOFC France--Continued

| Category Code | Directive 1 (21 Nov 55) | Directive 6 (22 Mar 57) | Directive 7 ^{a/} (6 Jun 57) |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|---|
| <u>Supply Facilities</u> | | | |
| 411 Bulk Depot, Terminal and Bulk-Type Storage-POL, etc. | \$31,248,000 | \$28,801,000 | \$28,139,000 |
| 421 Depot and Arsenal | 7,014,000 | 7,214,000 | 7,214,000 |
| 422 Installation and Ready Issue | 50,000 | 18,000 | 18,000 |
| 441 Depot and Arsenal | 23,975,000 | 23,035,000 | 22,197,000 |
| 442 Installation and Organizational | 3,840,000 | 5,385,000 | 4,340,000 |
| 451 Depot and In-Transit Paved and Stabilized Areas | 5,925,000 | 8,298,000 | 6,159,000 |
| 452 Installation and Organizational, Day-to-Day Storage | 1,006,000 | 473,000 | 473,000 |
| <u>Hospital and Medical Facilities</u> | | | |
| 510 Hospital Buildings | 23,317,000 | 26,887,000 | 25,337,000 |
| 520 Infirmary Buildings | 190,000 | 172,000 | 172,000 |
| 530 Laboratories and Clinics | 117,000 | 111,000 | 111,000 |
| 550 Dispensaries | 415,000 | 544,000 | 544,000 |
| <u>Administrative Facilities</u> | | | |
| 610 Administrative Buildings | 5,175,000 | 6,394,000 | 5,861,000 |
| <u>Housing and Community Facilities</u> | | | |
| 721 EM Barracks and Mess | 12,000,000 | 10,264,000 | 10,264,000 |
| 723 Detached facilities | 2,610,000 | 2,888,000 | 2,888,000 |
| 724 Bachelor Officers Quarters | 3,729,000 | 4,353,000 | 3,833,000 |
| 725 Emergency Hutmments and Tents | 2,080,000 | 1,644,000 | 1,644,000 |

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Table 15--Construction Authorized by the Department of the Army for FY 1953
and Prior Year Construction Program, LOFC France--Continued

| Category Code | Directive 1 (21 Nov 55) | Directive 6 (22 Mar 57) | Directive 7 ^a (6 Jun 57) |
|--|----------------------------|----------------------------|--|
| <u>Housing and Community Facilities</u> | | | |
| 730 Community Facilities, Personnel Support and Services | \$ 4,693,000 | \$ 5,731,000 | \$ 4,931,000 |
| 740 Community Facilities, Morale, Welfare and Recreational, Internal | 7,813,000 | 8,982,000 | 8,592,000 |
| 750 Community Facilities, Morale, Welfare and Recreational, External | 215,000 | 114,000 | 114,000 |
| <u>Utilities and Ground Improvements</u> | | | |
| 812 Distribution and Transmission Lines | 95,000 | 86,000 | 86,000 |
| 821 Steam, Source | 4,002,000 | 2,998,000 | 2,998,000 |
| 841 Supply, Treatment and Storage | 15,000 | 173,000 | 136,000 |
| 843 Fire Protection | 194,000 | 253,000 | 183,000 |
| 851 Roads, Including Incidental Parking Areas | 27,521,000 | 24,341,000 | 23,909,000 |
| 852 Sidewalks and Other Pavement | 596,000 | 1,999,000 | 1,284,000 |
| 860 Railroad Tracks | 7,681,000 | 8,027,000 | 7,690,000 |
| 872 Fencing, Gates and Guard Towers | 2,481,000 | 2,623,000 | 2,609,000 |
| 890 Miscellaneous Utilities | 24,866,000 | 32,889,000 | 32,129,000 |
| <u>Real Estate</u> | | | |
| 932 Site Improvement | 599,000 | 581,000 | 581,000 |
| 933 Demolition of Structures and Obstructions | 9,000 | 8,000 | 8,000 |

^{a/} Includes FY 57 reprogramming in the amount of \$10,983,000

Source: (1) DA Cons Dir 1, 21 Nov 55, sub: Authorization - Construction of Items in FY 53 and Prior Year Construction Programs, Location-France. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. (2) DA Cons Dirs 6,22 Mar 57; 7, 6 Jun 57, sub: Authorization - Modification of Construction of Items in FY 53 and Prior Year Construction Program, LOFC France. UNCLASSIFIED.

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FY 1953 funds from similar repeal provisions but continued the ban on FY's 1951 and 1952 funds. For this reason the Department of Defense insisted that all 1951 and 1952 projects be obligated for design by 1 July 1956 and for construction by 31 December 1956. Unobligated funds would be repealed as of 31 December 1956.²⁰³ The JCA, however, was unable to identify the scope of the FY's 1951 and 1952 construction programs by line items. To meet the Department of Defense requirement, it would first be necessary to establish a definition for a project line item in those programs.²⁰⁴ USAREUR defined a line item as identical with total scope by category code and the Department of the Army concurred in this definition. As a result, the requirement of "obligation in part" for all FY's 1951 and 1952 construction funds had been met and no projects from those programs were subject to the repeal provisions of PL 161.²⁰⁵

e. Status of Construction. During FY 1957 obligations for contracts awarded by the JCA amounted to \$31.7 million, which was only approximately one-half of the amount obligated during the previous fiscal year. Because of deobligations during the course of FY 1957, cumulative obligations actually increased by only \$17.2 million to \$227.7 million. The deobligated projects were no longer considered as essential and the funds earmarked for their execution were required for projects that had been assigned a higher priority during program reviews. Value of work in place increased by \$53.2 million during the fiscal year, \$33.3 million of which was for construction projects actually completed. These amounts were considerably more than the preceding year's value increase of \$35 million for work in place and \$21.5 million for completed construction. The trend seemed to indicate--as pointed out by the USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G4--that the construction capabilities of the French contractors increased during FY 1957. As of 30 June 1956 the cumulative value of work in place had increased to \$193.1 million, while that of completed construction had increased to \$144.1 million.²⁰⁶

²⁰³Cable DA-445939, DA from DCOFS LOG to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Aug 56. In file above.

²⁰⁴Cable (USAREUR SMC-IN 8034), JCA to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Jul 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Instl Br files (1956), PL 161 Folder.

²⁰⁵(1) Cable SC-16233, USAREUR to DA for DCOFS LOG/M2, 17 Aug 56. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable DA-448201, DA from DCOFS LOG/M2 to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Aug 56. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Cable SC-22087, CINCUSAREUR to DA for DCOFS LOG/M2, 5 Oct 56. UNCLASSIFIED. All in file above.

²⁰⁶(1) JCA Line Item Design and Cons Prog Rept, 30 Jun 55, p. VII; 30 Jun 56, p. VIII; and 30 Jun 57, p. VI. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. (2) USAREUR Qtrly Revs of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 56, p. 108; 30 Sep 56, p. 122; 31 Dec 56, p. 123; 31 Mar 57, p. 93; and 30 Jun 57, p. 95. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED). (3) Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj G. W. McCormack, USAREUR G4 Div Instl Br, 24 Oct 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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f. POL Pipeline. At the beginning of FY 1957 the completed pipelines--the 12-inch line from Donges to Chalons and the 10-inch line from Chalons to Metz--were being tested under pressure. By 30 June 1957 the 8 pumping stations were in place and the 20-inch pipeline from the dock area to the tank farm at Donges, being 99 percent complete, was already in use. The four tank farms at Melun were completed as were tank farms A and B at Chalons. Tank farms C and D at Chalons were 92 and 88 percent complete, respectively, and at Donges tank farm A was 73 percent complete while both B and C were 96 percent complete on that date. Tank farm A at Metz was 86 percent complete, while tank farm B was 93 percent complete. The French Ministry of Post, Telephone, and Telegraph reported that the pipeline telecommunications system was complete. The anchorage for the off-shore loading facility at La Croisic had not yet been installed on 30 June 1957, but the 20-mile pipeline connecting La Croisic and Donges was 92 percent complete and construction had begun on both the booster station and the booster tanks. Certain projects, however, were being held in abeyance for lack of funds. These included barracks for enlisted men at all tank farms, laboratories at all tank farms, the rehabilitation of the Fontainebleau facilities, two additional 14-inch pipelines at Donges tank farms A and B, the modification of the Donges dock and trestle, and the improvement of the ventilating system and fire hydrants at Melun tank farm A (Map 2).²⁰⁷

g. Dependent Housing.

(1) Rental Guarantee Housing. By 30 June 1957, the 1,852 units constructed under the rental guarantee construction program were completed and used by USACOMZEU personnel. These houses were situated at 14 separate locations throughout France, with the largest segment of some 600 apartments at Orleans.²⁰⁸

(2) Surplus Commodity Housing. During FY 1955 Congress had approved a program of financing construction of rent-free government quarters in various countries by the sale of surplus commodity products. In February 1957 both the appropriate Congressional committees and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget approved the surplus commodity housing program for France. The Secretary of the Army was appointed as the executive agent for the construction of not more than 2,800 family units for a maximum amount of \$50,080,000.²⁰⁹ On 29 May 1957 US CINCEUR

²⁰⁷(1) DF, USAREUR Engr to ACOFS G4, 27 Jul 57, sub: Monthly Pipeline Construction Progress Report. RCS-AEAGD-1. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Engr Div R&U & Cons Br. (2) USAREUR Qtrly Rev of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 57, pp. 8, 98. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

²⁰⁸(1) Interv, Mr. Moenk with Col H. B. Heyer, US EUCOM Housing Gp (Army Member), 7 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USACOMZEU Performance Rept, 30 Jun 57, p. 70. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

²⁰⁹Cable DA-499686, DA from DCOFS LOG/M3 sgd TAG to US CINCEUR, 19 Feb 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1957).

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signed the corresponding contracts with the Compagnie Immobiliere Marc Rainant et Cie, to construct a total of 2,700 family units for both Army and Air Force use. The Army portion of this contract was for 1,030 units at 14 separate locations as follows:

| <u>Location</u> | <u>Number of Units</u> |
|-------------------|------------------------|
| <u>Total</u> | <u>1,030</u> |
| Captieux | 24 |
| Saumur | 30 |
| Vitry le Francois | 30 |
| Paris | 40 |
| Chinon | 42 |
| Braconne | 44 |
| Fontenet | 50 |
| Bussac | 52 |
| Fontainebleau | 78 |
| Ingrandes | 88 |
| Poitiers | 90 |
| Toul | 118 |
| Verdun | 146 |
| Orleans | 198 |

The contract specified that construction would be initiated by 1 July 1957 and that total construction time would not exceed 550 days.²¹⁰

108. Real Estate in Germany

a. Utilization of Facilities.

(1) General. As of 30 June 1957 USAREUR controlled 245 facilities with a total capacity of 335,476 troops. The net usable capacity was 237,216 troop spaces, indicating the diversion of 98,260 spaces or 29.2 percent for other usages. This diversion exceeded the 25 percent allowance granted by USAREUR Circular 405-15.²¹¹ The 204,440 Army, Air Force, Navy, and Labor Service personnel billeted in the net usable space reflected a utilization rate of 86.1 percent. This was an improvement over the 76 percent utilization rate that was realized in FY 1956.²¹²

²¹⁰(1) Info from Col H. B. Heyer, US EUCOM Housing Gp (Army Member), 7 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USACOMZEUR Performance Rept, 30 Jun 57, p. 70. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

²¹¹For further details, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 296-97. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).


²¹²(1) USAREUR Compt, 4th Qtrly Program Rev and Anal Rept, 30 Jun 57, pp. 8 and 49. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED). (2) USAREUR Qtrly Rev of Log Actvs, 30 Jun 57, pp. 89-90. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

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MAP 2

PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION, FRANCE 30 JUNE 1957



SOURCE

USAREUR QTRLY REV OF
LOG ACTVS, 30 JUNE 57,
P. 9A SECRET (INFO
USED UNCLASSIFIED)

LEGEND

- COMPLETED PIPE, U.S.
- INCOMPLETED PIPE, U.S.
- COMPLETED PIPE, NATO
- COMPLETED PUMP STATION
- INCOMPLETED TANK FARM
- COMPLETED TANK FARM
- AIR FORCE BASE
- CITY

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(2) Seventh Heaven. In January 1957 the Commanding General, Seventh Army, proposed a restationing of U.S. forces to place them in a better strategic position. In general, the plan called for the removal of U.S. forces south of the Danube River and relocation to areas farther to the north. A major feature of the restationing plan was that full capacity replacement for released caserns would not be required, since the concentration of troop units would permit better use of existing U.S. facilities and the new construction would be designed for more efficient utilization. On 9 January CINCUSAREUR approved the plan in principle and ordered that it was to be implemented for planning purposes only. Discussions with the appropriate German officials were hampered by the German elections scheduled for September 1957.²¹³

b. Purchase Program, West Germany. As of 1 July 1956 the unexpended balance of funds in the USAREUR facilities purchase program was DM 12,130,211.²¹⁴ In October 1956 three commercial-type facilities included in the program were purchased for DM 355,000. The balance of funds was withdrawn by the Office of the Comptroller and applied to other USAREUR programs.²¹⁵

c. Release of Facilities. The long standing policy of releasing real estate that had become surplus to the requirements of the U.S. forces was continued. Altogether 2,296 facilities were released including 1,492 residences, 255 apartment houses, 52 hotels, 1 school, 5 restaurants, 2 theaters, 14 caserns, 14 miscellaneous military facilities, 291 parcels of open land, and 170 other types of real estate. (For cumulative USAREUR real estate releases since the inception of the program, see Table 16.)²¹⁶

d. Release of Isolated Facilities. On 22 May 1957 CINCUSAREUR initiated a special program for the release of isolated facilities wherever possible, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, was assigned responsibility for preparing an appropriate study. An isolated facility was defined as a piece of real estate geographically separated from a casern or a major military installation. Excluded were dependent housing facilities and some 75 properties under the control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2. Since isolated facilities had been an integral part of the over-all USAREUR release program, a considerable number of such properties had been released prior to 22 May 1957. Of the 444 isolated facilities

²¹³(1) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to COFS, 29 Jan 57, sub: Status Report on Mid-Range Concept. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-1151, USAREUR to SACOM, 10 Jan 57. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1957).

²¹⁴USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, pp. 298-99. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

²¹⁵Info from the USAREUR Engr Div RE Br, 28 Oct 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

²¹⁶USAREUR G4 Instl Br Mthly Repts, 25 Jul 57, sub: Release of Real Estate, 30 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Instl Br files 319.1d (1957).

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Table 16--Cumulative Totals of USAREUR Real Estate Releases, 1948-1957

| | <u>1948-55</u> | <u>30 Jun 56</u> | <u>31 Dec 56</u> | <u>30 Jun 57</u> |
|--|----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| <u>Totals</u> | <u>24,805</u> | <u>26,738</u> | <u>28,119</u> | <u>29,034</u> |
| <u>Type</u> | | | | |
| Residences | 11,295 | 12,208 | 13,192 | 13,700 |
| Apartment Houses | 2,890 | 3,400 | 3,483 | 3,655 |
| Hotels, Pensions | 446 | 470 | 503 | 522 |
| Schools | 202 | 204 | 205 | 205 |
| Restaurants | 358 | 363 | 365 | 368 |
| Theaters | 69 | 69 | 70 | 71 |
| Hospitals | 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 |
| Caserns <u>a/</u> | 79 <u>b/</u> | 95 | 96 | 109 |
| Open Land Parcels | 995 | 1,296 | 1,486 | 1,587 |
| Others <u>c/</u> | 8,403 | 8,565 | 8,651 | 8,735 |
| Other Military-Type Facilities <u>a/</u> | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 |

a/ Included in the report for the first time.b/ Fragmentary records indicate also some 571 partial releases, including single buildings.c/ Includes shops, offices, garages, warehouses, factories, and miscellaneous commercial facilities.Source: USAREUR G4 Instl Br. UNCLASSIFIED.

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USAREUR had on hand at the beginning of FY 1957, 211 were released by 30 June 1957, with 172 of the releases having occurred before the special program was initiated.²¹⁷

e. Release of Facilities to the German Armed Forces. By 1 July 1956 USAREUR had released to the West German Army 59 caserns with a troop capacity of 34,000 spaces. In October 1956 the West German Ministry of Defense requested the release of an additional 22 caserns with a troop capacity of approximately 19,000 spaces. A comprehensive study was initiated to determine how the German requirements could be met. The expected implementation of the Seventh Heaven restationing plan, however, caused the suspension of further releases until such time as the German Federal Republic either accepted or rejected the plan. During FY 1957 USAREUR turned over facilities with 8,424 troop spaces, including 7 caserns with a troop capacity of 3,000 spaces and parts of other caserns for the remaining 5,424 troop spaces.²¹⁸

Section VII: Logistical Relationships with U.S. Military and Civilian Agencies in Europe

109. Relationships with Miscellaneous Civilian Agencies

a. Logistical Support of U.S. Government Agencies. USAREUR continued to furnish certain items of logistical support to the U.S. Embassy in Bonn and the U.S. Consulates throughout West Germany as a part of a reciprocal arrangement under which military elements in the vicinity of the West German capital received support from Embassy facilities.²¹⁹ For purposes of this arrangement, all civilian agencies

²¹⁷(1) Memo for rec, Lt Col L. J. Harness, C/USAREUR G4 Instl Br, 3 Jun 57, sub: Release of Facilities. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, CINC-USAREUR to all USAREUR Area Comds, 5 Jun 57, sub: Release of Isolated Real Properties. ASAGD-I 602 GD. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR G4 Div Instl Br files 602.j (1957). (3) USAREUR Compt, 4th Qtrly Program Rev and Anal, 30 Jun 57, p. 8. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

²¹⁸(1) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 27, 13 Nov 56, p. 5. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED). (2) USAREUR G4 Div Instl Br Cap Rept, 7 Aug 57, sub: Utilization of Installations. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Instl Br files. (3) Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj F. Dunford, USAREUR G4 Instl Br, 24 Oct 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

²¹⁹USAREUR Cir 530-60, 18 Jan 57, sub: Logistical Support of Civilian Agencies of the U.S. Government in Germany. UNCLASSIFIED.

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of the U.S. Government located in West Germany were considered a part of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission to the Federal Republic of Germany and included in the term "Embassy." The arrangement, however, constituted a departure from Department of the Army policy according to which other U.S. Federal agencies would not be provided logistical support when the supplies and services in question were obtainable from local civilian sources.²²⁰

b. Logistical Support of Nongovernmental Agencies and Individuals.

(1) New Joint Army-Navy-Air Force Policy. As a result of recommendations made by CINCUSAREUR to Department of the Army, a coordinated joint service regulation was published on 17 August 1956.²²¹ The new regulation outlined the basic criteria as requisites for furnishing logistical support to nongovernmental agencies and individuals. The US EUCOM policy directive for implementing the regulation was developed by USAREUR in coordination with USAFE, NELM, and SETAF. The policy directive was submitted to US EUCOM for approval on 12 March 1957 but the staffing action at that headquarters was not completed before 30 June 1957.²²²

(2) Curtailment of Support. USAREUR implemented the new policy, by withdrawing the office space provided to 7 nongovernmental agencies in West Berlin and by asking 14 of their employees to evacuate their dependent housing units. The effective date of both withdrawal actions was 30 September 1956.²²³ In addition, commissary, post exchange, and class VI privileges were withdrawn on 30 June 1957 from about 60 employees--and their dependents--of private agencies in that city.²²⁴ The only curtailment actions in West Germany concerned withdrawal of support from the National Jewish Welfare Board at Kaiserslautern and the United Seamen's Service at Bremerhaven on 30 June 1957.²²⁵

²²⁰ SR 730-5-10, 20 Apr 49, sub: Acquisition and Transfer of Supplies and Services on a Cost Basis in Overseas Commands. UNCLASSIFIED.

²²¹ AR 700-32/OPNAVINST 4000.40/AFR 400-15, 17 Aug 56, sub: Logistical Support of U.S. Nongovernmental Nonmilitary Agencies and Individuals in Overseas Military Commands. UNCLASSIFIED.

²²² Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 12 Mar 57, sub: Logistical Support of Nongovernmental Agencies and Individuals. AEAGD-SS 400 GD. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Svcs Br files.

²²³ Cable SX-3691, USAREUR to Berlin Comd, 16 Jun 56. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

²²⁴ Ltr, USAREUR to TAG, 1 Jun 57, sub: Logistical Support Curtailment in Berlin. AEAGD-SS 400 GD. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

²²⁵ (1) Cable DA-510865, COA to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Mar 57. UNCLASSIFIED.
(2) DF, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to COFS, 19 Apr 57, sub: Logistical Support of Nongovernmental Agencies and Individuals. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 400 (1957).

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110. Support of UNEF in the Near East Crisis

The Suez Canal crisis of October 1956 led to the stationing of a United Nations police force in Egypt.²²⁶ On 13 November the Secretary of Defense informed the three services that the President had agreed to provide certain items of logistical support to the U.N. forces on a reimburseable basis. The Department of the Navy was appointed as executive agent for this project.²²⁷ USAREUR support consisted of quarter-master subsistence items, bedding, tentage, and kitchen equipment; engineer hand tools, water purification sets, and electrical generators; signal communication equipment; and ordnance small arms, trucks, and trailers. On 1 January 1957 USAREUR transferred the support responsibility to COMZ as an operational project.²²⁸ As of 30 June 1957 the requirement continued but the volume of support had diminished considerably.²²⁹

111. Participation in Operations MERCY and SAFEHAVEN

The Hungarian revolution against Communist domination and its ruthless suppression by the Soviet Union caused serious refugee problems in Austria. USAFE was assigned responsibility for two separate support actions in connection with the refugee problem: Operation MERCY, which consisted of furnishing certain support items to refugee camps within Austria, and Operation SAFEHAVEN, which was concerned with the air evacuation of selected Hungarian refugees to the United States. For Operation MERCY USAREUR furnished blankets, cots, as well as messing and kitchen equipment.²³⁰ In December 1956 US CINCEUR instructed CINC-USAREUR to prepare a staging area in Munich for airlifting some 15,000 refugees to the United States. Phase I of Operation SAFEHAVEN was inaugurated on 11 December 1956 and lasted until 4 January 1957. Phase II began on 5 January 1957 and was still in effect on 30 June 1957.²³¹

²²⁶ USAREUR Chronology Item, 15 Nov 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

²²⁷ Cable 141926Z, CNO to CINCNELM, 14 Nov 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1956).

²²⁸ USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 1, 9 Jan 57, pp. 2-3. UNCLASSIFIED.

²²⁹ Interv, Mr. Moenk with Lt Col R. M. Hermann, USAREUR G4 Sup Br, 25 Oct 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

²³⁰ USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 30, 12 Dec 56, p. 2. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

²³¹ (1) *Ibid.* (2) Ltr, SACOM to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Aug 57, sub: Report on Phase II Operation SAFEHAVEN. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G4 Svcs Br files.

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112. Support of MAAG's and Military Attaches

In December 1955 USAREUR had been made responsible for the logistical support of the various Army activities within the US EUCOM area of responsibility.²³² Although USAREUR made several requests to be relieved from this responsibility in certain specific areas,²³³ the only major change occurred on 1 September 1956, when the responsibility for logistical support of JAMMAT (Joint American Military Mission for aid to Turkey) was transferred to USAFE.²³⁴

²³² USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 301. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

²³³ (1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to DA for DCOFS LOG, 6 Nov 56, sub: Logistical Support of EUCOM Miscellaneous Activities. CONFIDENTIAL.
(2) Cable SX-2931, USAREUR to DA for DCOFS LOG, 7 Nov 56. CONFIDENTIAL.
(3) Cable EC-3-7406, US CINCEUR to DA for DCOFS LOG, 23 Nov 56. CONFIDENTIAL. All in USAREUR G4 Svcs Br files.

²³⁴ Cable EC-3-5684, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Sep 56. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

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CHAPTER 9

Military-Political Relationships and Activities

Section I: Developments in the U.S. Area of Responsibilities in Germany

113. Status of Forces Negotiations

Since October 1955 political and military representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the other Sending States with contingents of troops stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany had been engaged in negotiations concerning new arrangements to replace the Bonn Conventions. Initially the negotiations had been scheduled to last only six months, but by April 1957--when they were well into their second year with no conclusion in sight--the Germans proposed their suspension until after the elections that were to take place on 15 September 1957.¹

The American representatives were reluctant to accept the German proposal since a delay in the negotiations was generally regarded as strengthening the German position; however, the Sending States agreed to an adjournment. The conference of delegations was then replaced by a negotiating committee, consisting of the heads of the delegations. Unresolved issues were to be reported to the respective Ambassadors for decision. The governments would approve any mutual agreements but would delay signatures and public announcements until after the German elections.²

¹(1) Cable 500, AMEMB Bonn sgd Trimble to State Dept, 3 Apr 57. (2) Cable SMC-IN 6414, Secy State Dulles to AMEMB Bonn, 19 Apr 57. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1957). (3) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 8, 14 May 57. CONFIDENTIAL.

²(1) Cable SMC-IN 6414, 19 Apr 57, cited above. (2) Cable 565 AMEMB Bonn sgd Bruce to Secy State, 26 Apr 57. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1957).

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The basic difficulty in the negotiations concerned the applicability of the NATO Status of Forces (SOF) formula to the Federal Republic. The Germans, quite understandably, desired an SOF agreement similar to those previously negotiated within the NATO community. The Sending States, however, took the position that the extremely large number of foreign forces stationed in Germany and the nature of their mission created special conditions that justified significant modification of existing SOF agreements when applied to the German situation.³

Another problem was the need for close coordination of positions among the Sending States. This resulted in U.S. support of positions that were of little importance to the U.S. forces in exchange for Franco-British support of positions of vital interest to the United States. Consequently, agreement on important issues was made even more remote as the Germans found it increasingly difficult to negotiate from a position of equality vis-à-vis the three powers.⁴

The results achieved by the negotiators before adjourning in April 1957 fell into three general areas--agreements reached, subjects still under discussion on which agreement was in sight, and areas in which final agreement seemed remote.

a. Areas of Agreement. The Forces would continue to be authorized to register personal vehicles, vessels, and aircraft of their members as under Article 17 of the Forces Convention. The only change pertained to the assumption of third party liability; to cover that risk for vehicles operating on German territory insurance companies or their agents would have to be authorized by the Federal Republic. Drivers' licenses would still be issued by the Forces but they would be withdrawn upon request of German authorities when a person disqualified himself from operating a vehicle. U.S. military police patrols would continue to operate in close liaison with German police authorities. Under the Forces Convention customs control of goods sent to, or by, members of the Forces through the postal or freight service of a Force was exercised by the Forces. Under the new agreements control would be exercised by the German authorities at mutually agreed-upon places in the presence of Forces representatives.⁵

A change would also be made in the payments required of Forces personnel applying for marriage licenses in Germany. Under the existing arrangements every alien desiring to marry had to submit a certificate issued by his home town indicating that there was no legal impediment to the marriage. Members of the Forces were able to obtain a waiver of this

³Cable SMC-IN 6414, 19 Apr 57, cited above.

⁴Cable 555, AMEMB Bonn sgd Bruce to State Dept, 24 Apr 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

⁵Annex A, Current Status of Negotiations under NATO SOF Agreement, to USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 8, 14 May 57, cited above. CONFIDENTIAL.

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requirement upon payment of a fee of from DM 10 to 500, based upon income. Under the new arrangements, the fee--not to exceed DM 50--would be based upon the administrative work involved in processing the application rather than upon the income of the applicant.

No changes would be made in the arrangements under which the Chase-Manhattan Bank and the American Express Company operated, provided they served only the U.S. forces and its members. The American Red Cross and the University of Maryland would also continue to receive the exemptions accorded the Forces to the extent necessary to fulfill their mission.

b. Areas of Disagreement. The question of criminal jurisdiction was the most significant of the subjects on which final agreement had not yet been reached. Under the existing arrangements the Forces exercised exclusive jurisdiction over their members, whereas if Article VII of the NATO SOF agreement became effective in Germany, the Federal Republic would exercise concurrent jurisdiction in certain offenses. While USAREUR desired to retain exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses, the Germans wanted the right to "recapture" jurisdiction in those cases where "major considerations of German administration of justice" made such action imperative to them. Although there were indications that this right would be applied only in cases involving death, robbery, or rape, the American negotiators were unable to obtain a clear interpretation of this phrase from the Germans.

Also, there were two areas of disagreement concerning the liability of members of the Forces to German taxation. The first involved tax payments for privately owned vehicles, which, depending upon weight and horsepower, could amount to as much as \$200. The second concerned the sale of tax-free gasoline to members of the Forces. Since members of the Forces paid vehicle and/or gasoline taxes in Great Britain and France, the Germans insisted upon similar rights.

Other areas of disagreement existed in the fields of continued financial support, free facilities and services, damage claims, and maneuver rights. The latter problem was complicated by recent German legislation restricting Bundeswehr maneuver rights that, according to the Germans, would also apply to the Forces. The Sending States held that any curtailment of their freedom to maneuver and conduct training exercises would seriously hamper the mission of the Forces. Moreover, the Forces requested the free use of private land for maneuvers and exercises, a right that they did not enjoy under the Bonn Conventions. The German representatives simply ignored this request. As to the free facilities and services, German legislation concerning the requisitioning of private property placed time limits on the Forces' right to occupy property. While the Forces were to relinquish such properties when suitable substitutes were found, agreement in certain instances proved extremely difficult. To find a practical solution, the Federal Republic would have had to change existing national laws by international agreements,

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a problem that has aroused considerable attention in the United States.⁶

c. Status of U.S. Forces in the Saar. When the Saar was incorporated into the Federal Republic early in 1957, the status of the U.S. forces in that area had to be clarified. Both the U.S. Embassy in Bonn and the State Department in Washington concurred in USAREUR's position that the status of U.S. forces in the Saar should be governed to the extent applicable by the Forces and Finance Conventions, rather than by the Franco-German Saar Agreement. The State Department directed the settlement on an ad hoc basis of any practical problem arising during the transitional period. Until the conclusion of a Status of Forces agreement with the Federal Republic the U.S. forces would therefore maintain exclusive jurisdiction over their personnel stationed in the Saar.⁷

114. German Civil Jurisdiction

Pending the successful completion of the Status of Forces negotiations, relations between the Forces and the Federal Republic were governed by the Bonn Conventions. Under the terms of Article 2 of the Forces Convention, members of the U.S. forces stationed in Germany were required to observe the provisions of German law. Although not subject to the jurisdiction of German criminal courts, members of the Forces and their dependents could be sued in German civil courts in paternity cases, for automobile accidents, and for breach of contract. In late 1956 the Department of the Army published AR 608-99 providing specifically for cooperation with local foreign authorities by effecting services of process in paternity cases, as a purely ministerial act only.

This directive furnished U.S. authorities with specific guidance in the light of provisions of Article 10 of the Forces Convention. It provided an opportunity for Forces personnel to deny or admit paternity. U.S. authorities were still precluded from enforcing paternity decrees of foreign courts, despite the obligation to perform the ministerial acts of service indicated above. During the month of January 1957, for example, the Judge Advocate Division handled 714 processes from German courts to be served on members of the Forces.⁸

Under Article 2 members of the Forces employing domestics were also liable to pay and withhold the income tax of such employees; this provision

⁶(1) Cable 555, 24 Apr 57, cited above. (2) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 8, 14 May 57, cited above. Both CONFIDENTIAL.

⁷USAREUR JA Div Jnl, Jun 57. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁸(1) DF, USAREUR JA Div to USAREUR Stf Divs, 21 Dec 56, sub: German Civil Jurisdiction, w/Incl, Discussion of German Civil Jurisdiction. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (2) USAREUR JA Div Jnl, 31 Jan 57, p. 2. UNCLASSIFIED.

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was enforced in early 1957.⁹

115. Liability for Bremerhaven Port Properties Rentals

Since a negotiated settlement of the longstanding dispute concerning USAREUR's liability to pay rentals to the city of Bremen for requisitioned port properties¹⁰ was considered in the best interests of the United States, CINCUSAREUR agreed to resolve the case. On 19 July 1956 the city of Bremen was paid DM 1,450,000 in settlement of rental claims for the period 1 October 1952 to 5 May 1955. No payments were made for the subsequent period, but some rental arrangement would eventually have to be made between USAREUR and the representatives of Bremen.¹¹

116. Retention and Release of Requisitioned Facilities

a. Interpretation of Article 48. Despite the derequisitioning of the vast majority of the properties formerly held by the U.S. forces, considerable real estate was retained, either by lease or by requisition. Moreover, new requirements impelled the U.S. forces to acquire additional land to accomplish their mission.

In the fall of 1956, for instance, when representatives of USAREUR and the Baden-Wuerttemberg Ministry of Finance discussed the acquisition of a training area, the Germans contended that Article 48 of the Forces Convention did not apply to requisitioning of real properties after 5 May 1955. USAREUR protested against this narrow interpretation, insisting that the article also applied to real property acquired or required after the end of the occupation.¹² However, these disputes became largely academic with the application of the new German requisitioning law.

b. New Legislation Pertaining to Requisitioning. From 5 May 1955 until 31 December 1956 the Forces had retained their requisitioned properties under German legislation that extended the status quo. On 1 January 1957 the Federal Requisition Law (Bundesleistungsgesetz) became

⁹(1) USAREUR JA Div Jnl, 12 Sep 56, Mil Aff Item 7. UNCLASSIFIED.
(2) Cable SC-10557, USAREUR to area comds, et al., 5 Jan 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

¹⁰For details, see USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 56, p. 317. SECRET (info used UNCLASSIFIED).

¹¹(1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG BPE, 9 Jul 56, sub: Compensation for Use of Properties in Bremerhaven Area. (2) DF, USAREUR Engr Div to JA Div, 12 Aug 57, sub: Compensation for Use of Properties in Bremerhaven Dock Area. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR Engr Div Real Estate Br files.

¹²Sum Sheet, USAREUR CAD to DCOFS, 25 Oct 56, sub: CAD Activities Report. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 SD (1956), Actvs Repts, Item 03.

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effective, assuring the U.S. forces of continued use of needed real estate through lease, purchase, alternate construction, or, as a last resort, forcible requisition. Requisitioned housing could not be held beyond 30 September 1957; other properties could be requisitioned for periods up to two years. The process of requisitioning, however, was to be accomplished by the Federal Government and not by the Forces.¹³

The immediate problem posed by this legislation was that the Forces could be required to vacate private dwellings by 30 September 1957 and commercial and industrial type facilities after 31 December 1958, even though replacement properties might not be available. The alternate construction program that was to provide substitute facilities could not meet these deadlines. USAREUR insisted that the provision was contrary to the Federal Republic's obligations under the Forces Convention, which, as an international treaty, overrode any contrary provisions of German law. The U.S. forces therefore adopted the position that the Federal Republic would have to take legislative action to extend these deadlines.¹⁴ There was little likelihood of German action on this controversial matter until after the September elections.

117. Transfer of Facilities to the Federal Republic of Germany

a. Initial Transfer Program. As the Bundeswehr increased in size its space requirements grew larger. Since the U.S. forces occupied more casernes than the other NATO forces stationed in Germany, the Bundeswehr relied considerably upon USAREUR assistance for meeting its troop housing requirements. In May 1956 all interested commands were ordered to report excess spaces and accommodations and to prepare plans for the consolidation of troop facilities. To this end Seventh Army formed a facilities planning board to draw up consolidation plans in cooperation with the area commands.¹⁵ Maintenance of unit integrity was a primary consideration in the consolidation of facilities whenever a caserne was to be occupied jointly with a German unit.¹⁶

The principle applied in the facilities transfer program was that the Germans would be given all possible assistance in meeting their space requirements short of jeopardizing the U.S. forces' training and combat

¹³ USAREUR ACOFS G4 Logistics Comments, 13 Dec 56, for CINCUSAREUR's Bimthly Amb-Comdr's Conf on 17 Dec 56. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED). In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1956), B/P, No. 6.

¹⁴ (1) Memo for rec, 19 Jan 57, sub: 9th Meeting of Rep of CINC-USAREUR and CINCUSAFE. (2) Min, 10th Mtg of Reps of CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE, 8 May 57. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 337 (1957).

¹⁵ DF, USAREUR G4 to COFS, 11 Sep 56, sub: Progress on Items of Interest to CINC, w/Incl, Release of Facilities to the Federal Republic of Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600 Ger (1956).

¹⁶ USAREUR Memo 1-20-9, 24 Jul 56, sub: Bimonthly Ambassador-Commander's Conference. UNCLASSIFIED.

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effectiveness. By November 1956 a total of 59 casernes with an estimated capacity of 34,000 troops had already been released to the Federal Government. USAREUR still retained, as of that date, approximately 246 caserne with a capacity of 344,000 troops. Providing the Germans performed the necessary construction and renovation projects, USAREUR planned to release additional facilities to house about 14,000 troops.¹⁷

b. Reaction to Mid-Range Concept. With the development of the so-called Mid-Range Concept--or Seventh Heaven, as it was generally known among staff officers--USAREUR's facilities transfer program came to a halt in January 1957. No further releases, except those concerned with replacing the French II Corps units, would be initiated. All future moves of units or facilities were to be governed by the goals of the Mid-Range Concept.¹⁸

118. War Criminals

At the beginning of FY 1957 26 war criminals were still confined at Landsberg; by 30 June 1957 this total had dropped to 12. The total of 269 war criminals of all categories over whom CINCUSAREUR exercised jurisdiction in July 1956 was progressively reduced through expiration of sentences to 157 as of 30 June 1957. In addition to the 12 remaining in confinement, 141 were on parole, 1 on medical parole, and 3 on good conduct release.¹⁹

As the prisoner strength diminished, the personnel at the prison facility were correspondingly reduced. While in January 1957 101 persons were still employed at Landsberg²⁰ that number dropped to 40--including 2 U.S. Army officers, 8 enlisted men, 1 Polish officer, 17 Polish security guards, 4 Polish mess personnel, and 8 German LWR employees--by 30 June 1957.²¹

In November 1956 negotiations resumed for the transfer of responsibility for the war criminal prison to the Federal Republic.²² Previous

¹⁷ USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 27, 13 Nov 56. SECRET.

¹⁸ Memo, Maj Gen A. T. McNamara, USAREUR ACOFS G4, to COFS, 29 Jan 57, sub: Status Report on Mid-Range Concept. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1957), B/P, 7th Heaven.

¹⁹ USAREUR JA Div Jnls, Jan thru Jun 1957. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁰ DF, USAREUR PM Div to DCOFS, 7 Feb 57, sub: Analysis of American Strength at U.S. Army War Criminal Prison, Landsberg. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 000.5 (1957).

²¹ Min, Mtg of War Crim Pris Bd, 25 Jun 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

²² DF, USAREUR PM Div to CINCUSAREUR, 31 Jan 57, sub: Proposed Transfer of Responsibility of U.S. Army War Criminal Prison, Landsberg. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

efforts had been unsuccessful because the Federal Republic refused to accept custody on the grounds that no constitutional authority existed for such action and refused to create such authority through a constitutional amendment. No change was expected until after the September elections, and no further negotiations for the transfer were initiated during the last months of FY 1957.²³

119. Community Relations

In late 1956 the Defense Department took a more active part in the over-all direction of the Armed Forces community relations program. At each command level a staff officer--military or civilian--was made responsible for the program. Interservice community relations councils were established at all major command levels where more than one service was represented. Each service was to budget for community relations, and overseas commanders were urged to conduct vigorous and constructive programs in close cooperation with other governmental agencies.²⁴

a. Measures to Improve German-American Relations. During the spring and early summer of 1956 the incident rate had risen in Germany. At USAREUR direction, during August 1956 commanders gave to all personnel a general orientation on the importance of good community relations, which was to be repeated periodically.²⁵

In an additional effort to improve community relations, Seventh Army received \$3,000 for use in establishing and maintaining friendly relations with German governmental officials, including members of the Community Advisory Councils with whom the military were in contact. Another entertainment fund of \$2,000 was divided among the area commands to enable commanders to reciprocate courtesies extended to them by local officials.²⁶

At the suggestion of the U.S. Embassy CINCUSAREUR designated Major General G. E. Martin, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, as his personal representative to the German-American Troop-Community Relations Working Group meetings in Bonn. The working group handled community relations at the governmental level and was supplemented by 3 Land (State)

²³(1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 15 Feb 57, sub: Transfer of War Criminal Prisoners to German Custody. (2) DF, USAREUR PM Div to DCOFS, 12 Mar 57, sub: Transfer of War Criminal Prisoners to German Custody. (3) Min, Mtg of War Crim Pris Bd, 25 Jun 57. Both UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file above.

²⁴CINCUSAREUR's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 28, 21 Nov 56. CONFIDENTIAL.

²⁵USAREUR Memo 632-5-3, 1 Aug 56, sub: Standards of Conduct, Orientation of Community Relations. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁶Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 25 Sep 56, sub: Improvement of German-American Relations. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1956).

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councils--composed of Land government representatives and high ranking Army officers--and 52 community advisory councils composed of township officials and military installation commanders.²⁷

The Germans, too, made many efforts to improve troop-community relations, including a project to invite U.S. military personnel into German homes. This project received support from Chancellor Dr. Konrad Adenauer who, in a radio address, called attention to the many manifestations of generosity by U.S. servicemen in past years and suggested that the Germans do something to express their gratitude. On two occasions the North German radio network sponsored visits of U.S. servicemen to homes in Hamburg, whose citizens were among the most active supporters of this program. The Troop-Community Relations Working Group also requested the Staedtische Tag (Council of Mayors) to support the West German cities' hospitality program.²⁸

b. The Incidents Problem. While newspaper publicity concerning incidents between U.S. personnel and German nationals had declined significantly, in May 1957 there were indications of another press buildup similar to that of the spring and summer of 1956. In reality there was no significant rise in the incident rate; the press simply focused its attention on incidents. To combat this tendency local newspaper editors were asked to withhold rumors and to determine carefully whether American military personnel were actually involved.²⁹

Efforts to reduce the number of offenses against Germans in the areas occupied by Seventh Army units, where most of the U.S. personnel in West Germany were concentrated, brought the rate per thousand from a high of 1.29 in December 1955 to .80 in September 1956. In November 1956, however, the incident rate rose again to 1.6; dropping to 1.2 in March and finally to .92 in June 1957.³⁰

In October 1956 American and Bavarian officials joined forces to clarify the incident picture. A joint advisory committee composed of Bavarian and U.S. officials was organized for the purpose of investigating U.S. troop offenses against German citizens reported through local police channels. The committee met frequently with representatives of German

²⁷(1) Memo, USAREUR Info Div to COFS, 17 Dec 56, sub: German-American Troop Community Relations Working Group. (2) Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to Hon W. C. Trimble, U.S. Emb, Bonn, 18 Oct 56. Both FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Both in file above.

²⁸DF, USAREUR Info Div to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Jan 57, sub: Therese Bonney, w/atcd Summary of USAREUR Community Relations Program. CONFIDENTIAL (info used UNCLASSIFIED). In file above.

²⁹Annex A, to CINCUSAREUR's Bimthly Amb-Comdr's Conf, 18 Jun 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

³⁰USAREUR PM Div Shuttle Charts, 1955-57. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G1 Pers Svcs Br.

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civic, press, radio, and television organizations in order to follow up alleged incidents of major importance. In that manner rumors were exposed and incidents were accurately described.³¹

Both German and American law enforcement agencies maintained statistical records of incidents involving German and U.S. personnel. The responsible officials reached differing conclusions, however, perhaps because of differences either in interpreting or in recording incidents. German officials stated that criminality had not diminished, while at the same time USAREUR representatives considered the incidents problem to be under control.

The rise in the number of incidents toward the end of 1956 was discussed by the German-American Troop-Community Relations Working Group in December 1956. At that time the Federal Minister of Interior stated that Bavaria had the highest incident rate, with the Rhine Palatinate and Baden-Wuerttemberg following closely.³²

Section II: Developments in the U.S. Area of Responsibility in France

120. Status of Forces Agreement in Operation

a. Judicial Problems. Various aspects of the Status of Forces Agreement that was in effect in France preoccupied U.S. authorities and news media in the United States and overseas. Of particular concern was the question of whether the trials of U.S. personnel by French courts were essentially fair and in accordance with the accused person's U.S. constitutional rights. It was generally agreed that most trials were fair, with denial of rights occurring in relatively few cases.³³

In November 1956 USAREUR issued a letter which implemented a Department of the Army letter of 10 April 1956 and US EUCOM Directive 30-1 relative to safeguarding the interests of U.S. personnel confined in foreign prisons. Subordinate commanders were directed to ascertain

³¹ USAREUR CAD Jnl, Sep-Oct 56. CONFIDENTIAL.

³² Memo, USAREUR Info Div to COFS, 17 Dec 56, cited above. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

³³ (1) Ltr, Gen H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen G. H. Decker, Dep CINCEUR, 6 Aug 56. (2) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Maj Gen R. W. Colglazier, CG COMZ, 16 Aug 56. Both FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Both in USAREUR SGS 250.4 (1956), Item 9.

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that such personnel were accorded treatment equal to that which they would be entitled to in U.S. military confinement.³⁴

The French Ministry of Justice agreed that the U.S. Army should retain jurisdiction when U.S. personnel had committed serious crimes against French nationals unless there was considerable public interest or political importance attached to the case. A possible obstacle to this procedure was that neither the U.S. military nor the French authorities could summon French witnesses to testify before a U.S. military court martial.³⁵

b. Customs Inspections. The Status of Forces Agreement with France did not provide for tax-free importation of packages through the mails or of Post Exchange, commissary, class VI, and POL supplies. Instead, customs exemptions on these items were based upon verbal agreements with the French, who heretofore had not insisted on applying the customs inspection provisions of the SOF Agreement. However, concern about the possible resale of imported merchandise had apparently changed their attitude. The action they wanted to take was essentially a spot check to determine whether individuals were not importing merchandise excess to their needs.³⁶

In January 1957 French customs officials advised U.S. military authorities that, in accordance with the SOF Agreement, they intended to apply customs regulations on parcel post packages imported into France by U.S. military personnel. All parcels containing goods that would normally be taxed 500 francs (about \$1.40) or more if sold on the domestic market would be assessed customs duties. This would not, however, apply to initial shipments of personal effects, household goods, and private automobiles. After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain negotiating instructions from the Defense Department, US EUCOM sought diplomatic assistance to persuade the French authorities to reconsider their decision.³⁷

The trend toward further limiting the extra-territorial privileges enjoyed by the Forces might spread to other European countries. To forestall the French action, it was decided to attempt to reduce the amount of tax-free merchandise imported through Army postal channels by prohibiting commercial representatives from soliciting on U.S. Army

³⁴ TAB A, to Comment 2, USAREUR JA Div to Hist Div, 23 Oct 57, to DF, Hist Div to JA Div, 3 Oct 57, sub: Review of Draft Chapter of USAREUR Annual Historical Report (U). SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

³⁵ Cable AEZJA-C-5358, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Apr 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 092 France (1957).

³⁶ Ltr, Gen Decker to Gen Hodes, 11 Mar 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

³⁷ Cable EC-9-436, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jan 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

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installations unless licensed by appropriate French agencies.³⁸

While recognizing that the customs provisions of the existing agreement did not give the U.S. military a strong bargaining position, USAREUR insisted that parcels from the United States that passed through Army postal channels would have to be allowed tax-free entry into American military installations in France. Otherwise one of the privileges normally associated with the military service might be lost.³⁹

In March 1957 reports indicated that the French customs authorities were no longer inspecting and taxing parcel post packages as extensively as in January and February. With the customs officials gradually returning to their former liberal interpretation of the tax agreements, USAREUR decided not to press the issue since further discussions in the existing political climate might lead to the imposition of even greater restrictions on the Forces stationed in France.⁴⁰

c. EES Annual Report. Because of steadily increasing pressure from European, and particularly French, business circles to curtail the Forces' customs exemptions, USAREUR limited the distribution of the 1956 annual report of the European Exchange System (EES). This formerly widely circulated brochure detailed the extensive commercial activities of the EES. Since widespread publicity would inevitably lead to further restrictions in France and would hamper status of forces negotiations with the Germans, the report, although already published, was withdrawn from circulation in Europe.⁴¹

d. Access Roads. Negotiations regarding responsibility for the improvement and maintenance of access roads to U.S. military installations in France were conducted through diplomatic channels. USAREUR insisted that the host country had a definite obligation to share costs since the U.S. forces were often not the sole users of access roads. During the negotiations the United States acknowledged the difficulties that small communities might experience in bearing the full burden of such improvements but maintained that the French national budget could supplement

³⁸(1) Cable SX-1467, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 28 Jan 57. CONFIDENTIAL.
(2) Cable SC-14975, USAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 9 Feb 57. UNCLASSIFIED.
Both in file above.

³⁹Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Decker, 20 Feb 57. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

⁴⁰DF, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 15 Mar 57, sub: French Postal Customs on APO Parcels. UNCLASSIFIED. In file above.

⁴¹(1) Ltr, Gen Decker to Gen Hodes, 26 Jan 57. (2) Ltr, Gen Hodes to Gen Decker, 1 Feb 57. (3) DF, USAREUR G1 to COFS, 30 Jan 57, sub: EES Annual Report. All UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR SGS 334 EES (1957).

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local road maintenance funds.⁴²

The French view was that since access road improvements were necessary only because of U.S. military requirements, the National Assembly would never appropriate funds for this purpose. In view of the continued resentment that the long unsettled status of this problem created in the local communities and the manifest failure of French local or national agencies to contribute their share of the maintenance costs, the United States Embassy in Paris considered it in the best interests of the United States to provide the funds.⁴³

Until the end of the fiscal year there were no further developments. The access roads were maintained as in previous years; the French furnished some of the repair materials, such as crushed stone, and the U.S. forces provided the labor and equipment.⁴⁴

121. Negotiations for Rail Spur Agreement

Since 1952 an increasing number of rail spurs to various installations had been used without a formal agreement with the French railroad administration. After four years of negotiations between the French Central Military Liaison Mission and the French National Railways (SNCF) a general agreement was virtually reached. The responsibility for obtaining an agreement between the two French agencies lay with USACOMZEUR, which was to submit the draft to USAREUR for concurrence. The final exchange of signatures was expected for the fall of 1957.⁴⁵

122. Negotiations for Armed Forces Network Facilities

Negotiations between U.S. diplomatic and French governmental representatives concerning the establishment of an Armed Forces radio network in France were successfully concluded in May 1957 after three and a half years of effort. The last obstacle to be surmounted was the negotiation of an agreement with the French Society of Authors, Composers, and Musicians (SACEM) for the right to play music under its copyright control. After the agreement was reached a meeting was planned for July 1957 to settle the technical aspects of establishing broadcasting facilities. The plans called for low power transmission facilities,

⁴² Cable SMC-IN 5478, Secy State Dulles to Paris pass US CINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jan 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 092 France (1957).

⁴³ Cable SMC-IN 7339, AMEMB Paris sgd Yost to Secy State, 19 Mar 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

⁴⁴ Interv, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col E. P. Streck, Engr Div, 10 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴⁵ (1) Sum Sheet, USAREUR G4 to COFS, 8 Aug 56, sub: Rail Spur Agreement for France. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 617 (1956), Item 08A. (2) Interv, Dr. Fisher with Lt Col M. J. Peters, USAREUR G4 Svcs Br, 10 Sep 57. UNCLASSIFIED.

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utilizing U.S. Army-purchased equipment, to be installed in existing buildings. Land communications lines would carry the signals from one transmitter to another, in contrast with the high power transmitters used by the Armed Forces Network in the Federal Republic of Germany.⁴⁶

Section III: Contacts with Soviet Armed Forces

123. Top Level Contacts

a. Soviet Observer Exchange Proposal. During the course of CINC-USAREUR's courtesy call on his Russian counterpart at Wuensdorf headquarters on 28 June 1956, Colonel General Koshuvoi--believed to be first deputy to Marshal V. I. Grechko--had proposed to the Chief of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission that mission personnel exchange visits to military exercises. If USAREUR allowed Soviet mission personnel to observe U.S. Army training exercises and maneuvers, the Russians would be prepared to grant similar privileges. The Soviet general declared that an army could not be studied seriously from behind bushes, and since the Soviet Armed Forces were practicing to fight those of the United States it would be interesting for USAREUR's representatives to observe Soviet training. No change was desired in the Huebner-Malinin Agreement; instead, the Russian general was willing to accept a verbal agreement on the military mission level. This seemed a serious proposal, and the British were at that time studying a similar suggestion made to them.⁴⁷

From the military point of view USAREUR regarded the proposal as advantageous to the United States, and recommended that observers from among accredited members of the respective liaison missions be exchanged on a trial basis, subject to certain conditions. When expedient to the interests of the United States, USAREUR would notify the Soviet military mission of the time and place of the exercise and, upon request of the mission, Soviet observers would be permitted to attend the exercise or maneuver. No classified material would be shown to the Soviet observers, nor would they be permitted to attend NATO exercises. Concurrence of all participating services would be required before Soviet observers would be

⁴⁶(1) DF, C/USAREUR Info Div to COFS, 21 Nov 56, sub: Proposed Letter Relative to AFN in France. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 000.7 (1956). (2) Interv, Dr. Fisher with Mr. M. J. Puretz, USAREUR Info Div, 10 Sep 57. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁴⁷(1) Cable SMC-IN 258, USMLM Potsdam to CINCUSAREUR for CAD, 2 Jul 56. (2) Cable SX-1048, USAREUR to CINCUSAFE, COMNAVGER, 3 Jul 56. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1956).

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permitted to attend joint exercises. To insure reciprocal treatment Air Force and Navy members of the U.S. mission would not attend Soviet exercises without prior USAFE or USNAVGER concurrence. No formal written or verbal agreement was to be made with the Soviet military, so that the exchange could be terminated at any time it no longer appeared to be of advantage to the United States.⁴⁸ Since many political problems were involved in the Soviet proposal, the matter was referred to the joint Chiefs of Staff. No further action was taken during FY 1957.⁴⁹

b. Official Visits. Despite differences in U.S. and Soviet national objectives and the consequent difficulty in finding a common meeting ground, a generally friendly atmosphere prevailed during liaison meetings. After the Hungarian uprising, however, contacts diminished noticeably. The October Revolution Anniversary Reception given by the Soviet Liaison Mission in Frankfurt was not attended by U.S. personnel because of the Russian armed intervention in Hungary. This action was taken in conformity with U.S. policy to boycott Soviet social events at that time.⁵⁰ This was a change in policy since one general officer from Headquarters, USAREUR, had attended previous anniversary celebrations as CINCUSAREUR's representative. Officers below general rank were allowed to accept or decline at their pleasure.

On two occasions CINCUSAREUR declined Marshal Grechko's invitations to visit his headquarters at Schoenefeld Airfield, East Berlin. While a meeting between the two commanders in chief at some U.S.-sponsored function was considered desirable, the type of "family get-together" suggested by the Soviet commander was not favored under the circumstances. In any event no such meeting took place during the year.⁵¹

124. The U.S. Military Liaison Mission

Beginning in April 1957 U.S. Military Liaison Mission vehicles were tailed constantly by East German security agents in cars equipped with two-way radios, presumably to monitor the mission's car radio communications. Frequently two or three vehicles were used to insure that the

⁴⁸ Cable SX-1215, USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 14 Jul 56. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

⁴⁹(1) Cable SMC-IN 925, Secy State sgd Hoover to AMEMB Bonn, 7 Jul 56. (2) Cable DA-906687, DA from ACSI to US CINCEUR for J2, 17 Jul 56. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above. (3) Interv, Dr. Fisher with Lt Col S. H. Barrow, USAREUR CAD, 10 Sep 57. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁵⁰ Comment 2, USAREUR CAD to Hist Div, n.d., to DF, Hist Div to CAD, 3 Oct 57, sub: Review of Draft Chapter of USAREUR Annual Historical Report (U). CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

⁵¹(1) Cable 161630Z, USMLM Potsdam sgd Bellonby to CINCUSAREUR for C/CAD, 16 Apr 57. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-2909, USAREUR to USMLM Potsdam, 20 Apr 57. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1957).

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mission vehicle remained under constant surveillance. On several occasions personnel were threatened or attacked by agents who also damaged mission equipment. USAREUR protested to the Soviet External Relations Branch in East Berlin, pointing out that Soviet Military Liaison Mission personnel at Frankfurt were not subjected to this kind of treatment by West German security agencies.⁵²

In April 1957 USAREUR reminded the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt that only members of the mission and their dependents would be permitted to ride in mission vehicles. This restriction had actually been in effect since the establishment of the missions and was reiterated as a basis for positive action should violators be apprehended.⁵³

The Russians continued their practice of barring U.S. mission personnel by placing signs along main public roads at considerable distance from military installations, and large areas were declared out-of-bounds for specific periods during maneuvers. In addition, mission personnel had no access to the permanently restricted areas and the areas actually occupied by troop units and military installations. The U.S. mission complained frequently about tailings and detentions based on alleged violations of restrictions.⁵⁴

On 12 April 1957 the Soviets informed the U.S. mission at Potsdam that the German Democratic Republic would assume control over U.S. graves registration activities in East Germany; applications to continue this work would have to be made to East German officials. USAREUR rejected this new diversionary attempt; the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany was still considered the responsible authority within the Soviet zone of occupation.⁵⁵

125. Access to Berlin

a. Russian Restrictions. Soviet attempts to restrict free access to Berlin both by military train and by motor vehicle caused constant friction. On 16 November 1956 the Soviet detachment commander at the Helmstedt border crossing point advised the British train commander that,

⁵²Cable 051400Z, USMLM Potsdam to CINCUSAREUR for CAD, 5 Jun 57. SECRET. In file above.

⁵³(1) USAREUR CAD Jnl, Apr 57. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable SX-3853, USAREUR to AMEMB Bonn, 8 Jun 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1957).

⁵⁴Incl 1, n.d., sub: Unit History, to ltr, U.S. Army Elm, USMLM (Potsdam), to USAREUR Hist Div, 16 Apr 57, sub: Transmittal of Unit History. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

⁵⁵(1) Cable 121530Z, USMLM Potsdam to CINCUSAREUR for CAD, 12 Apr 57. (2) Cable SX-2839, USAREUR to USMLM Potsdam, 17 Apr 57. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 250.2 (1957). (3) USAREUR CAD Jnl, Apr 57. CONFIDENTIAL.

since unauthorized personnel were traveling on military trains, in the future individual travel orders and identity cards would be required in addition to two lists indicating the name and category of each passenger. Russian officers would also enter Allied trains at Marienborn to check the passengers against the lists submitted. When Allied representatives in Berlin sought to clarify the situation, they were informed that these measures would be enforced without amendment and that the restrictions would also apply to Autobahn travel. The three Allied Ambassadors thereupon decided that train commanders would not discuss the category of personnel entitled to ride on the trains with Russian officers. Rather than permit the Russians to enter the trains or remove passengers, the commanders would return the trains to their points of departure. On 23 November the British commander at Helmstedt was informed that the change in procedures would be effective the night of 26 November.⁵⁶

Anticipating the Russian restrictions, USAREUR limited military train travel to members of the Forces and their dependents for the following two weeks. On 24 November, at Russian insistence, the U.S. train commander paraded all passengers past a door of the train to facilitate a check of the passengers and their travel documents. The Russians confiscated the temporary AGO card of a school teacher on the ground that it was not a valid document. On 25 November two officers from USAREUR headquarters flew to Berlin to represent CINCUSAREUR on the westbound train on the night of 25-26 November; their train arrived at its destination without incident.⁵⁷

On 26 November CINCUSAREUR sent a letter to Marshal V. I. Grechko protesting the Soviet travel restrictions. Colonel N. Kotsiuba, Deputy Commandant of the Soviet Sector of Berlin, replied that control over military traffic between the Federal Republic and West Berlin was exclusively within the competence of Russian authorities. On 28 November the three Allied missions in Berlin delivered simultaneous notes to Colonel Kotsiuba rejecting the Soviet position. The following day USAREUR's weekly Berlin Command motor convoy was delayed 1 hour and 26 minutes at the Russian checkpoint outside Berlin. The Russian officer stated that he had instructions to inspect all vehicles for additional personnel. When the convoy commander refused to permit this inspection the convoy was cleared with the warning that in the future such inspections would have to be made. On 30 November USAREUR protested against this delay of the motor convoy. On the same day Marshal Grechko's reply to CINCUSAREUR's protest concerning the harassment of military trains was received; it asserted that Soviet officials were not imposing restrictive measures but merely exercising their rights derived from the Four Power Agreement of 10 September 1945.⁵⁸ The Russians meanwhile continued their practice of checking U.S. military passenger trains. On 4 December U.S., French, and

⁵⁶USAREUR CAD Jnl, Nov 56. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid.

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British representatives discussed Marshal Grechko's reply of 30 November and agreed to take no further action but to await developments.⁵⁹

On the night of 8-9 December the Russians delayed the U.S. Ambassador's special diesel train at the checkpoint and demanded to see the travel documents of all passengers. Russian translations of the travel orders of four passengers, including the Ambassador, were retained because their passports lacked the Certificate of Status Stamp. This discourteous delay of the Ambassador was protested in writing by the U.S. Liaison and Protocol officer to his Russian counterpart. On 13 December the acting chief of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission was summoned to Heidelberg. In blunt language General Hodes informed the Soviet representative that he strongly objected to interference with military trains and convoys into and out of Berlin, and that the determination of who among U.S. military personnel should have access to Berlin was the concern of CINCUSAREUR and no one else. The Soviet representative was to convey this information to Marshal Grechko and to inform him that during his visit to Berlin on 18-19 December General Hodes would be willing to discuss this problem with the Soviet Marshal if he desired.

Following this meeting there was a temporary cessation of harassment on the part of the Russians.⁶⁰

b. USAREUR's Proposal. Since the cumulative Soviet restrictions were a threat to the free access to Berlin, positive steps to secure the removal of the restrictions or to determine the true Soviet intentions seemed indicated. In an effort to force the Russians' hand, CINCUSAREUR proposed to send a convoy to the Berlin checkpoint after notifying the Russian authorities that the military convoy would be commanded by an officer who would identify himself and certify that the convoy was an official one but refuse to show the identification cards of the enlisted men. If the Russians refused to clear the convoy without inspecting the cards, the convoy would return to Berlin where a factual press release would be made. This procedure would be repeated daily until the Russians finally cleared the convoy.⁶¹

The French and British refused to accept this proposal, fearing that such action would only provoke the Russians into a more profound review of the access issue, which could lead to further difficulties. The U.S. Ambassador therefore suggested that the implementation of

⁵⁹USAREUR CAD Jnl, Dec 56. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹(1) Cable SX-1189, USAREUR to USCOB, 12 Jan 57. (2) Cable SX-1375, CINCUSAREUR sgd Hodes to AMEMB personal for Conant, 23 Jan 57. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1957). (3) USAREUR CAD Jnl, Jan 57. CONFIDENTIAL.

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CINCUSAREUR's proposal be deferred.⁶² The State Department intimated that any U.S. action resulting in a partial self-imposed blockade should be reserved for cases involving more significant threats to the free access.⁶³

While this principle seemed sound, acquiescence in a series of Soviet-imposed restrictions might eventually result in significantly limiting Allied access to Berlin. Past experience had demonstrated that the Soviets withdrew in the face of determined opposition but exploited every opportunity where opposition was light.⁶⁴

c. Tripartite Travel Documentation. A factor further complicating the problem was the lack of uniformity in travel documentation. The French utilized a uniform travel order signed by the French commandant in Berlin regardless of the issuing headquarters, while the British employed a status stamp signed by the United Kingdom High Commissioner and linking the bearer to the occupation of Berlin. The United States, on the other hand, employed two types of travel orders issued over the Ambassador's signature in Bonn or over CINCUSAREUR's signature in Heidelberg, Bremerhaven, and Berlin. Also, the Allies had different documentation procedures for road movements, with the French and British never refusing to show Soviet control personnel the identity cards of all travelers. Moreover, the British rarely transported personnel by truck, and the French never sent convoys to Berlin.⁶⁵

USAREUR procedures on issuance of Berlin travel clearance were tightened up as of 1 April 1957; after that date travel from locations other than Bremerhaven or Berlin was to be cleared by the Adjutant General Division. Russian translations of travel authorizations would be issued at Bremerhaven, Frankfurt, Helmstedt, or Berlin for personnel stationed outside West Germany.⁶⁶ Also, travel originating at Bremerhaven or Berlin would be cleared by the Berlin headquarters, so that no telephonic communications between Berlin and West Germany concerning the credentials and status of individuals applying for travel to Berlin would be needed. In this manner the basic U.S. policy on clearance of travelers to Berlin

⁶² Cable 288, AMEMB Bonn sgd Conant to State Dept, 19 Jan 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

⁶³ Cable SMC-IN 8393, Secy State Dulles to AMEMB Bonn, 30 Jan 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

⁶⁴ Cable SX-1591, CINCUSAREUR sgd Hodes to AMEMB Bonn, 4 Feb 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

⁶⁵(1) Cable 86, Berlin sgd Gufler to AMEMB Bonn, 16 Jan 57. (2) Cable 93, Berlin sgd Gufler to AMEMB Bonn, 1 Feb 57. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above.

⁶⁶ USAREUR CAD Jnl, Mar 57. CONFIDENTIAL.

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would not be disclosed to the Russians.⁶⁷

After several conferences between Allied and Soviet representatives in Berlin it became evident that the Russian objective was not merely to standardize travel documentation, but rather to restrict Berlin travel to bona fide duty personnel. The Russians insisted that, in addition to travel orders, personnel should carry documents indicating that they were going to Berlin either on permanent change of station or on temporary duty.⁶⁸ This meant that all other surface travel by Allied personnel could be accomplished only on East German documentation. Soviet insistence on the right to determine what type of personnel could travel to Berlin was regarded as a serious threat to the fundamental right of access to Berlin.⁶⁹

d. Temporary Restrictions on Autobahn Travel. Following a conference with U.S. Embassy representatives that took place at Bonn on 1 April 1957, dependent personnel who were not U.S., British, or French nationals were again issued U.S. military travel orders to drive to and from Berlin via the Autobahn. It was USAREUR's understanding that the lifting of the previously imposed restrictions had Embassy approval, but when it was determined that this was not the case, the restrictions were reimposed on 9 May 1957. During the following days it became evident that the refusal to issue travel documentation to German dependents of U.S. personnel stationed in Berlin could not possibly be withheld from the press. By 25 May the restrictions were finally removed; all authorized dependents of U.S. personnel stationed in Berlin, regardless of nationality, were thus permitted to travel via the Autobahn on U.S. travel documentation provided they had either AGO cards or a valid passport with the U.S. Berlin Commandant's stamp.⁷⁰

e. Leave Travel. While USAREUR continued to maintain that any concession on the right of access to Berlin would lead to further restrictions, the American Embassy in Bonn pointed to the weakness of the U.S. position in contending that the Ambassador and military commanders were competent to determine that large numbers of personnel on leave should travel to Berlin or that such travel was essential to the occupation of Berlin. The Soviet harassment of the past seven months had been

⁶⁷ Memo, USAREUR CAD to COFS, 21 May 57, sub: Clearance for Berlin Travel. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

⁶⁸ (1) Cable 144, Berlin sgd Hillenbrand to AMEMB Bonn, 20 Apr 57. (2) Cable 151, Berlin sgd Gufler to AMEMB Bonn, 29 Apr 57. Both CONFIDENTIAL. Both in file above.

⁶⁹ Cable SX-2936, USAREUR to AMEMB Bonn, 23 Apr 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

⁷⁰ (1) Cable SX-2821, USAREUR to USCOB, 16 Apr 57. (2) Cable SX-2889, USAREUR to AMEMB Bonn, 19 Apr 57. (3) Cable SX-3267, USAREUR to USCOB, 9 May 57. (4) Cable SX-3588, USAREUR to USCOB, 25 May 57. All CONFIDENTIAL. All in file above.

increasingly focused upon the failure of current documentation to establish that the travel to Berlin was for official business only.⁷¹ USAREUR took a strong stand against this, pointing out that commanders down to regimental and separate battalion level had been authorized to issue leave orders for travel to Berlin since 1947. The only documentation required at that time was a letter of authority for the visit and a Russian translation.⁷² Any attempt to disguise leave travel with a general phrase "in connection with the occupation of Berlin" was rejected as a subterfuge that the Russians would eventually detect. At the same time, USAREUR stopped the advertising of package tours to Berlin via military duty trains.⁷³

f. Summary. Existing quadripartite agreements gave the Allied Powers an unassailable basis for insisting upon the right of travel to and from Berlin for personnel stationed there. As to personnel stationed elsewhere, their right to travel freely to and from Berlin in the performance of their official duties was equally incontestable. According to the American Embassy in Bonn, however, leave travel rested upon the sanction of practice rather than formal agreement with the Russians. If continuation of leave travel on the present scale eventually jeopardized the more essential duty and leave travel of the Berlin occupation forces themselves, as well as the duty travel from West Germany to Berlin, the Embassy would be prepared to consider curtailing leave travel to Berlin. USAREUR, on the other hand, maintained throughout the reporting period that every Soviet effort to restrict leave travel should be firmly opposed. The appropriate Allied authorities (i.e., the American Ambassador to Germany and CINCUSAREUR in the U.S. case) had the right to determine who and what was necessary for the occupation and government of the Western Sectors of Berlin. The unrestricted continuation of leave travel to Berlin was implicit in this right and any restriction upon leave travel was an infringement upon the right of free access to Berlin.⁷⁴

⁷¹(1) Cable 666, AMEMB Bonn sgd Trimble to State Dept, 4 Jun 57.
 (2) Cable SMC-IN 2486, Secy State sgd Dulles to AMEMB Bonn, 8 Jun 57.
 (3) Cable SX-3927, USAREUR to AMEMB Bonn, 12 Jun 57. All CONFIDENTIAL. All in file above.

⁷²Cable SX-4018, USAREUR to AMEMB Bonn, 15 Jun 57. CONFIDENTIAL. In file above.

⁷³USAREUR CAD Jnl, Jun 57, pp. 4-7. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁷⁴(1) Cable SX-1261, CINCUSAREUR from Hodes to AMEMB personal for Conant, 17 Jan 57. (2) Cable 709, AMEMB sgd Bruce to Dept [of State], 15 Jun 57. (3) Cable SX-4048, USAREUR to AMEMB Bonn, 17 Jun 57. (4) Cable SMC-IN 6280, State Dept, Secy State Dulles, to AMEMB Bonn, 19 Jul 57. All CONFIDENTIAL. All in USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1957). (5) USAREUR CAD Jnl, 30 Jun 57. CONFIDENTIAL.

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Glossary

This glossary contains all abbreviations used in this volume, except those listed in AR 320-50, 7 May 1957.

| <u>Term</u> | <u>Definition</u> |
|-------------|--|
| AAGT | Aptitude Area General Technical (test) |
| ACMS | Army Command Management System |
| ADCC | Air Defense Coordinating Center |
| ADD | Air Defense Division |
| ADPS | automatic data processing system(s) |
| ADSEC | Advance Section |
| AEP | Alien Enlistment Program |
| AER | Army Emergency Relief |
| AFCE | See AFCENT |
| AFCENT | Allied Forces Central Europe |
| AFEX | Air Force Exchange |
| AFMPS | Air Force Motion Picture Service |
| AFN | Armed Forces Network |
| AIRCENT | Allied Air Forces Central Europe |
| AMA | Army Military Attache |
| Amb | ambassador |
| AMEMB | American Embassy |
| AMEXCO | American Express Company |
| Anal | analysis |
| Apt | apartment |
| Ann | annual |
| ARC | American Red Cross |
| ARS | Army Relief Society |
| ASAE | Army Security Agency in Europe |
| AYA | American Youth Activities |
| BAFSV | British Armed Forces Special Vouchers (scrip) |
| BAOR | British Army of the Rhine |
| BEP | budget execution plan |
| Bldg | building |
| BND | <u>Bundesnachrichtendienst</u> (West German intelligence agency) |
| B/P | bulky package |
| BPOE | Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation (later USAPEB) |
| BRDA | Board of Requisition Demand Appeals |
| CAD | Civil Affairs Division |
| CAG | See CENTAG |
| C&C | consumables and construction |
| CCFFA | <u>Commandant en Chef, Forces Francaises en Allemagne</u> (Commander in Chief, French Forces in Germany) |

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| <u>Term</u> | <u>Definition</u> |
|-------------|---|
| CENTAG | Central Army Group |
| CG | commanding general |
| Ch | chaplain |
| Chm | chairman |
| CINCENT | Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe |
| CINCNELM | Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean |
| CINCSOUTH | Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe |
| CISM | <u>Conseil International du Sport Militaire</u> (International Council of Military Sport) |
| CMIA | command management inventory accounting |
| COMCENTAG | Commander, Central Army Group |
| COMLANDCENT | Commander, Allied Land Forces Central Europe |
| COMUSRHIN | Commander, U.S. Rhine River Naval Group |
| CONARC | Continental Army Command |
| Cons | construction |
| CORRPAT | Commander, Rhine River Patrol |
| CP | command post; capabilities plan |
| Ctl | control |
| CWS | continental wage scale |
| Cy | copy |
| CZ JEDP | Central Zone Joint Emergency Defense Plan |
| | |
| DAC | Department of the Army civilian |
| DAD | Department of the Army Detachment |
| DBBV | <u>Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung</u> (German Federal Construction Agency) |
| DCMS | Depot Command Management System |
| DEG | Dependents Education Group |
| Dep | deputy |
| Dept | department |
| DFS | direct forces support |
| DM | <u>Deutsche Mark</u> |
| Doc | document |
| DRC | Defector Reception Center |
| DSD | Dependent School Detachment |
| Dtd | dated |
| DUKW | amphibious truck, 2½ ton, cargo |
| | |
| EAM | electric accounting machine(s) |
| ECP | European Command property (account) |
| Ed | edit(ion) |
| EEO | emergency evacuation order |

| <u>Term</u> | <u>Definition</u> |
|---------------|---|
| EES | European Exchange System |
| EMPS | European Motion Picture Service |
| Ent | entertainment |
| EP | emergency alert plan |
| <u>et al.</u> | <u>et alii</u> (and others) |
| ETSSE | evacuation of technical services supplies and equipment |
| Eur | Europe(an) |
| Exec | executive |
| Expend | expenditure |
| FAPC | Frankfurt Air Passenger Center |
| FED-REP-GER | Department of the Army project for the storage of materiel destined for the Federal Republic of Germany |
| FMFAP | Foreign Military Facilities Assistance Program |
| FOURATAF | Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force |
| Fr | from |
| FRG | Federal Republic of Germany |
| FTX | field training exercise |
| GAO | general alert order |
| GED | general education development |
| GFR | See FRG |
| GFY | German fiscal year |
| GOA | general operating agency |
| Govt | government |
| GTAG | German Training Assistance Group |
| GTAV | general transport administrative vehicle |
| HACOM | Headquarters Area Command |
| <u>Ibid.</u> | <u>Ibidem</u> (in the same place) |
| ICA | International Cooperation Administration |
| ICCG | Intelligence Coordinating Committee, Germany |
| Interv | interview |
| INTEX | Intelligence Extract |
| IRP | Investigations, Relief Program |
| ISA | International Security Affairs |
| JCA | Joint Construction Agency |
| JCP | joint capabilities plan |
| JCOC | joint command and operations center |

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| <u>Term</u> | <u>Definition</u> |
|---------------|--|
| JEAP | joint emergency alert plan |
| Jnl | journal |
| JPAW | joint atomic fire plan |
| Jt | joint |
| Jus | justice |
| LANDCENT | Allied Land Forces Central Europe |
| LANDSOUTHEAST | Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe |
| LCM | landing craft, medium |
| LCU | landing craft, utility |
| LOFC | line of communication |
| LRO | <u>Land</u> (State) Relations Office(r) |
| LSD | Labor Service Division |
| LWR | local wage rate |
| MAD | Military Assistance Division |
| Man | manual |
| MAP | Mutual (or Military) Assistance Program |
| MASS | Modern Army Supply System |
| M&O | maintenance and operations |
| MCA | Military Construction, Army |
| MDAP | Mutual Defense Assistance Pact |
| Memo | memorandum |
| MEPS | Military Express and Passenger Service |
| Min | minute(s), minister |
| Misc | miscellaneous |
| Misev | military service unit |
| MOD | Ministry of Defense (German) |
| MSA | Mutual Security Act |
| MS(s) | manuscript(s) |
| Mtg | meeting |
| Mthly | monthly |
| NACOM | Northern Area Command |
| NAF | nonappropriated fund |
| NAVCAG | Naval Forces Central Army Group |
| NAVCENT | Naval Forces Central Europe |
| n.d. | no date |
| NELM | Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean |
| NEO | noncombatant evacuation order |
| NODEX | new offshore discharge exercise |
| NORTHAG | Northern Army Group |

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
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C. OTHER AGENCIES

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| 1 | USA Construction Agency, Germany | 75 |
| 1 | U.S. Air Forces in Europe | 76 |
| 1 | U.S. Embassy, Bonn | 77 |
| 1 | U.S. European Command | 78 |
| 1 | U.S. General Accounting Office, European Branch | 79 |
| 1 | U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations | 80 |



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| <u>Term</u> | <u>Definition</u> |
|-------------|---|
| O&M | operations and maintenance |
| OCA | Office of the Coordinator and Special Adviser, Bavaria |
| OCB | Operations Coordinating Board |
| OCE | Office of the Chief Engineer |
| OED | ordnance explosive disposal |
| ORA | order for reinforced alert |
| ORIN | Orleans Installation |
| ORO | Operations Research Office |
| OSP | offshore procurement |
| OSWS | ordnance special weapons support |
| | |
| p.(pp.) | page(s) |
| P&C | purchasing and contracting |
| PLG | Paris Liaison Group |
| Prev | prevent(ive) |
| Pres | president |
| PRIBAG | priority baggage |
| | |
| QRLA | Quarterly Review of Logistical Activities |
| Qtr | quarter |
| | |
| RAPOD | Rapid Phase-Out of Dependents and Certain Other Personnel |
| R&U | repair and utilities |
| REA | Railway Express Agency |
| REG | Returnee Exploitation Group |
| RGH | rental guarantee housing |
| RORO | roll-on, roll-off |
| Rqmts | requirements |
| | |
| SACOM | Southern Area Command |
| SAD | Special Activities Division |
| SBLO | Senior British Liaison Officer |
| SD | Secretary of Defense |
| Secy | Secretary |
| SETAF | Southern European Task Force |
| Sgd | signed |
| SID | Strategic Intelligence Detachment |
| SMC | Staff Message Center |
| SN | Secretary of the Navy |
| SNCF | <u>Societe National de Chemins de Fer</u> (French National Railways) |
| SOA | special operating agency |

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| <u>Term</u> | <u>Definition</u> |
|-------------|--|
| SOF | Status of Forces |
| SOTFE | Support Operations Task Force, Europe |
| Sub | subject |
| Sum | summary |
| SUSLO | Senior U.S. Liaison Officer |
| | |
| Tech | technical |
| Term | terminal |
| Thru | through |
| TWOATAF | Second Allied Tactical Air Force |
| | |
| UFAT | USAREUR Field Assistance Team |
| ULE | USAREUR Logistical Estimate |
| UNEF | United Nations Emergency Force |
| USACAF | U.S. Army Construction Agency, France |
| USACAG | U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany |
| USACOMZEUR | U.S. Army Communications Zone, Europe (after 1 Jan 58) |
| USAFE | U.S. Air Forces in Europe |
| USAPEB | U.S. Army Port of Embarkation, Bremerhaven |
| USCOB | U.S. Commander, Berlin |
| USEP | United States Escapee Program |
| US EUCOM | U.S. European Command |
| USGAO | U.S. General Accounting Office |
| USMLM | U.S. Military Liaison Mission to Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany |
| US NAVGER | U.S. Naval Forces, Germany |
| USRO | U.S. Regional Organization |
| | |
| Vol. | volume |
| vs. | versus |
| | |
| WACOM | Western Area Command |
| Wkly | weekly |

Chronology

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Paragraph Reference</u> |
|-----------------|---|----------------------------|
| <u>1956</u> | | |
| <u>Jul</u> 1 | U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany, is established. | 106a |
| | USAREUR adopts interim operations and maintenance budget program structure. | 8c |
| | USAREUR is established as a special operating agency with two subsidiary general operating agencies, Headquarters, USAREUR, and Headquarters, USAREUR COMZ. | 9a |
| | USAREUR adopts Consumer Credit System. | 10b |
| | Revised welfare fund distribution procedures are adopted Army-wide. | 15a |
| | General Transport Administrative Vehicle program is implemented in USAREUR. | 105c |
| 6 | US CINCEUR assigns CINCUSAREUR responsibility for controlling all surface movement in Central Europe in an emergency. | 57b(1) |
| 7-14 | Seventh Army CPX SUMMER STOCK is held. | 82a |
| 15 | USAREUR reaches agreement with the German Ministry of Finance for the settlement of contract claims appeals by the German Government. | 90b |
| 16 | CINCUSAREUR approves the USAREUR Capabilities Plan 1-56 (Basic). | 57a |
| 19 | USAREUR Staff Memorandum 10-100-1 is published to clarify staff responsibilities for atomic planning | 60a |
| | UFAT is directed to determine the applicability of the Class I Command Management System to area commands. | 8d |
| | Maj. Gen. A. T. McNamara replaces Col. J. H. Heil, Jr., as Assistant Chief of Staff, G4. | |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Paragraph Reference</u> |
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| 20 | New program of officer integration into the Regular Army begins. | 22a |
| 23 | USAREUR Air Defense Coordination Center is established. | 3c |
| 25 | CINCUSAREUR approves the tripartite Berlin air evacuation plan, TRIPLE PLAY. | 59a |
| <u>Aug</u> | | |
| 1 | Railway passenger rates are increased in Italy. | 104a(4) |
| 2 | Maj. Gen. H. G. Maddox replaces Lt. Gen. J. F. Uncles as Chief of Staff. | |
| 4 | Maj. Gen. J. M. Willems replaces Maj. Gen. J. H. Phillips as Assistant Chief of Staff, G2. | |
| 6 | Maj. Gen. H. Hewett is appointed Air Defense Coordinator. | |
| | SACEUR directs the establishment of joint command and operations centers at all joint levels of command. | 60c(2) |
| 13-16 | CENTAG and Seventh Army conduct CPX CLEAN SWEEP. | 82b |
| 27 | Maj. Gen. E. D. Post replaces Maj. Gen. O. P. Newman as Deputy Chief of Staff. | |
| <u>Sep</u> | | |
| 1 | The common tripartite wartime mission of defending Berlin is published. | 59b(1) |
| 14 | Lt. Col. K. E. Lay replaces Col. R. B. Shinn as Chief, Public Information Division. | |
| 15 | German price control auditing service is extended to fixed price dollar contracts. | 16b |
| 17 | Operations Instruction 6, the tripartite defense directive for Berlin, is published. | 59b(2) |
| 26 | USAREUR Plan for Rapid Phase-Out of Dependents and Certain Other Personnel (RAPOD 1-56) is distributed. | 57d |
| 26-29 | CPX WHIP SAW is conducted. | 82c |

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Paragraph Reference</u> |
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| <u>Oct</u> | | |
| 1 | Maj. Gen. R. C. Cooper replaces Maj. Gen. J. C. Oakes as Assistant Chief of Staff, G3. | |
| | USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, assumes responsibility for the entire surplus property disposal program in Europe. | 98a |
| | Conversion of overseas DA civilian employees to competitive Civil Service status is completed. | 26a(1) |
| | Forms control responsibility is transferred from the Adjutant General Division to the Office of the Comptroller. | 18 |
| 2-19 | NODEX 11 is conducted at St. Jean de Luz, France. | 102b(1) |
| 3 | LANDCENT authorizes CENTAG to negotiate directly with the German Federal Republic on matters of mutual interest pertaining to civil defense planning. | 61a |
| 10 | Exercise BLITZ is conducted to test movement control. | 57b(3) |
| 21 | Tariff agreement with Swiss Railways is established. | 104a(6) |
| <u>Nov</u> | | |
| 1 | Col. E. R. Ott is appointed Chief, Information Division. | |
| | Armed Forces Information and Education Division is abolished. | 3a |
| | Public Information Division is redesignated as Information Division. | 3a |
| 1-10 | FTX SABRE KNOT is conducted. | 82e |
| 13 | DD orders USAREUR to provide logistical support for UNEF as requested by the Navy. | 110 |
| 16 | Soviet military authorities initiate harassment of Allied military travel to Berlin. | 125a |
| 24 | USACOMZEUR Outline Plan for Major Installations and their Missions is published. | 86a |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Paragraph Reference</u> |
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| 26 | CINCUSAREUR sends letter to Marshal V. I. Gretchko protesting Soviet travel restrictions. | 125a |
| 29 | Relief of French Task Force Boston by West German units is completed. | 56d(1) |
| <u>Dec</u> | | |
| 1 | U.S. Army Reserve School System is established in Europe. | 79d |
| 1-18 | NODEX 12 is conducted at Le Verdon, France. | 102b(2) |
| 4 | USAREUR publishes first training document (Cir 350-59) to define objectives of atomic warfare training. | 79a |
| 4-11 | FTX WAR HAWK is conducted. | 82e |
| 6 | DA orders deletion of revenue-producing facilities from the USAREUR welfare construction program. | 106e(2) |
| 7 | Dependents' Medical Care Act of 1956 becomes effective. | 33e |
| 8 | Col. C. H. Miles, Jr., replaces Col. M. B. Hale as Finance and Accounting Officer. | |
| 10 | Commanders of CENTAG and FOURATAF meet to resolve the problem of control of atomic weapons expenditure. | 60c(1) |
| | USAREUR area commanders are made responsible for issuing noncombatant control cards and identification tags. | 57c(2) |
| 11 | U.S. Military Liaison Mission to Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, is redesignated as U.S. Army Element, U.S. Military Liaison Mission to Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany. | 41a(5) |
| | Service Detachment (7746) is redesignated as U.S. Army Operations and Research Detachment. | 41a(6) |
| 21 | DA authorizes recruitment of Hungarian refugees into Labor Service units. | 29c |

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Paragraph Reference</u> |
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| 26 | US EUCOM approves the USAREUR Capabilities Plan 1-56 (Alternate). | 57a |
| 27 | Lt. Col. W. F. Ashenfelder is appointed Acting Finance and Accounting Officer vice Col. C. H. Miles, Jr. | |
| 28 | Central Zone Joint Atomic Fire Plan (JPAW) 1-57 is published. | 56a |
| 31 | DA policy of compulsory retirement of 30-year enlisted men becomes effective. | 22b |

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| 1 | Finance and Accounting Division is abolished. The Office of the Finance and Accounting Officer is established and placed in the Office of the Comptroller. | 3b |
| | U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany, assumes responsibility for welfare construction in Germany. | 15b |
| | German Requisition Law (<u>Bundesleistungsgesetz</u>) becomes effective. | 116b |
| | CINCUSAREUR reduces strength of Headquarters, USAREUR. | 19b |
| | Charges for certain commercial banking services to individuals are increased. | 30b(3) |
| | Supplementary contributions by command to retirement pay for French LWR cadre workers begin. | 26c(2) |
| 7 | Lt. Col. B. L. Anderson replaces Col. W. L. Schreiber as Headquarters Commandant. | |
| 21 | Col. E. F. Penaat replaces Brig. Gen. H. M. Hobson as Provost Marshal. | |
| | Col. M. P. Brooks replaces Col. E. R. Ott as Chief, Information Division | |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Paragraph Reference</u> |
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| | CINCUSAREUR directs the formation of the First Provisional Artillery Task Force to provide atomic support to NORTHAG. | 60e(1) |
| <u>Feb</u> | | |
| 1 | USAREUR Chemical Command is discontinued. | 87a |
| | USAREUR Intelligence Center is redesignated as USAREUR Interrogation Center. | 41a(2) |
| 1-20 | NODEX 13 is conducted at Le Verdon and Pauillac, France. | 102b(3) |
| 2 | First Roll-on, Roll-off vessel arrives in Europe. | 102a(6) |
| 6 | Federal Republic of Germany agrees to continuation of German Labor Service after 5 May 1957. | 29a |
| 7 | Board of Seventh Army general officers is appointed to survey the functioning of Project MASS in Seventh Army. | 94e(1) |
| 13 | Special USAREUR enlistment/reenlistment program begins. | 21a |
| 15 | MAAG, Germany, assumes operational control of 15 GTAG teams. | 83a |
| | USAREUR receives draft air defense directive from US EUCOM. | 66 |
| 28 | USAREUR introduces a new system of numbering plans. | 55b |
| <u>Mar</u> | | |
| 5 | US CINCEUR directs CINCUSAREUR, in coordination with CINCUSAFE and other appropriate U.S. commanders, to develop a recommended U.S. military position on CINCENT's Military Vigilance and Counter-Surprise Military Alert systems. | 57b(7) |

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Paragraph Reference</u> |
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| 6 | US EUCOM assigns CINCUSAREUR primary responsibility for over-all coordination, assistance, and consultative service in introducing NIKE equipment to NATO forces. | 76,83c |
| | U.S. Army Port and Inland Transportation Office is established at Rotterdam. | 102a(3) |
| 11 | Col. D. D. Bode replaces Col. R. B. Strader as Chemical Officer. | |
| 13 | Dollar reimbursement for PCS travel by privately owned vehicle is authorized. | 30a(3) |
| 15 | Second phase of French II Corps regroupment is completed. | 56d(2) |
| 18 | New noncombatant evacuation order (NEO) concept is proposed. | 57c(4) |
| 20 | Col. C. H. Miles, Jr., replaces Lt. Col. W. F. Ashenfelder as Finance and Accounting Officer. | |
| 21 | Mr. J. T. Sinclair assumes duties of Acting POLAD, replacing Mr. A. B. Moreland. | |
| 21-27 | CPX LION NOIR is held. | 82d |
| 23 | German military regions are authorized to contact appropriate NATO headquarters to discuss operational plans. | 56e |
| | Maj. Gen. H. Ker replaces Brig. Gen. C. H. McNutt as the USAREUR Engineer. | |
| | 11th Airborne Division is reorganized along Pentomic lines. | 4 |
| 27 | Performance allowance system for German LWR manual workers is adopted. | 26b(3) |
| 31 | Investigative phase of Refugee Relief Program in Germany ends. | 52e |
| | DD reduces USAREUR headquarters strength. | 19b |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Paragraph Reference</u> |
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| <u>Apr</u> 1 | Project MASS is textended to USACOMZEUR, area commands, Berlin, and Bremerhaven. | 94f(2) |
| | Flat rate tariff system is established for French railways. | 104a(5) |
| | USAREUR Berlin travel clearance procedures are revised. | 125c |
| 1-16 | NODEX 14 is conducted at Suscino and La Turballe, France. | 102b(4) |
| 4 | Col. C. E. Reitzel, Jr., is announded as Acting Judge Advocate, vice Col. A. N. Hickey. | |
| 6 | US CINCEUR dispatches report on guided missile range requirements to DA. | 81d |
| 11 | CENTAG and its subordinate headquarters are authorized to participate actively in alert planning with German forces assigned or to be made available to the Central Zone. | 57b(6) |
| 12 | East German Government assumes control over U.S. graves registration activities in Russian Zone. | 124 |
| 15 | Brig. Gen. N. B. Rieger replaces Col. C. E. Reitzel, Jr., as Judge Advocate. | |
| 18 | Contract is awarded for construction of the first NIKE site in the Rhine-Palatinate. | 73d(2) |
| 19 | New G2 publication called USAREUR Weekly Sitrep is first issued. | 45 |
| 20 | Air Defense Division is established. | 3c |
| 23 | Commander, Rhine River Patrol (CORRPAT) and the Commander, Rhine River Naval Group, U.S. V and VII Corps sectors (COMUSRHIN), are directed to report to Seventh Army for operational control for U.S. peacetime planning and training exercises, in addition to their wartime tasks. | 57g(2) |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Paragraph Reference</u> |
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| 30 | Reorganization of the 11th Airborne Division is completed. | 58a |
| <u>May</u> | | |
| 1 | Test of Class I Command Management System is begun in HACOM. | 8d(3) |
| | Col. H. V. Mitchell replaces Brig. Gen. B. Easley as Adjutant General. | |
| 13 | CINCENT approves activation of German III Corps. | 56d(3) |
| 15 | EUCOM directs integration of Army and Air Force Motion Picture Services in Europe by 1 October 1957. | 36b(note) |
| 16 | Col. W. F. Powers replaces Maj. Gen. A. T. McNamara as Assistant Chief of Staff, G4. | |
| 21 | Hesse state government agrees to permit the 3d Armored Division to use the Friedberg training area. | 81a |
| 22 | The United States and Spain conclude an agreement on production of maps for emergency use. | 46 |
| 23 | CINCUSAREUR limits strength of Theater Army headquarters to a nucleus of 100 officers and 150 enlisted men. | 57f |
| 24 | CENTAG authorizes subordinate commands to make direct contact with German military region headquarters. | 56e |
| 25 | Restrictions on Berlin <u>Autobahn</u> travel of non-Allied dependents of U.S. personnel are removed. | 125d |
| 29 | US EUCOM signs contract for construction of 1,030 dependent housing units as part of the Surplus Commodity Housing Program. | 107g(2) |
| 31 | NODEX 15 is begun at St. Gilles Croix de Vie, France. | 102b(5) |

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| <u>Jun</u> | | |
| 1 | Commander, Naval Forces in Germany/Naval Forces, Central Army Group (COMNAVGER/COMNAVCAAG) is disestablished, and direct command of U.S. Naval Forces in Germany is assumed by CINCNELM. | 57g(2) |
| 3 | Col. C. O. Conner is appointed Acting Inspector General vice Brig. Gen. L. A. Hammock. | |
| 4 | Col. F. D. Atkinson replaces Col. M. E. Townes as Transportation Officer. | |
| 6 | PX and commissary privileges are withdrawn from dependents coming overseas without military authorization. | 23c |
| 8 | Maj. Gen. H. R. Westphalinger replaces Col. W. F. Powers as Assistant Chief of Staff, G4. | |
| | NODEX 15 is concluded. | 102b(5) |
| 12 | Combined USAREUR/CENTAG Emergency Alert Plan (USAREUR/CENTAG EP 321) is submitted for lateral and ambassadorial coordination. | 57b(2) |
| 15 | Army and Air Force exchange systems in Europe adopt memorandum of understanding for experimental cooperation during FY 1958. | 36c |
| 17 | Col. W. J. Wuest replaces Col. C. O. Connor as Inspector General. | |
| | Col. A. J. Maroun replaces Brig. Gen. R. Hackett as Comptroller. | |
| | Agreement is reached with Swiss Government for transit rights through that country for specified items of military equipment. | 104b |
| 18 | USAREUR implements plan to use troop education facilities to train personnel needed in critical MOS categories. | 84b |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Paragraph Reference</u> |
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| 19 | CINCUSAREUR delegates responsibility for conduct of annual command inspection to immediate subordinate commanders. | 78 |
| 20 | Agreement is reached on 45-hour workweek for majority of German LWR employees, effective 1 August 1957. | 26b(1) |
| | US CINCEUR approves modified USAREUR NEO concept for planning purposes. | 57c(4) |
| 25 | USAREUR establishes policy for testing operational readiness of command. | 57b(4) |
| | DA approves USAREUR's request to activate a fourth Honest John battalion during FY 1958 from equipment and personnel on hand. | 60b |
| 28 | DA approves establishment of German NIKE liaison groups at Fort Bliss and the Redstone Arsenal. | 83c |
| 30 | USAREUR terminates certain support responsibilities for GTAG teams. | 83a |

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